

# The Future of Aid INGOs in 2030

Image by Sergey Neamoscou, featuring Ami Touré, Community Leader, Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire.

“This report has developed a compelling analytic framework for humanitarian organizations to use in their strategic planning for the years ahead.”

Vincenzo Bollettino  
Director  
Resilient Communities Program  
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative

“Today’s world is plagued by long and complex conflicts, widespread involuntary migration, violent natural disasters, and rising inequality. The next 15 years will likely see humanitarian needs grow further and INGOs and other aid actors will play a vital role in alleviating human suffering, promoting peace and development, and driving human progress globally. This report warns of what is to come, whilst providing practical solutions to those organisations that are ready to rise to the challenge.”

Mike Penrose  
UNICEF UK  
Executive Director



*futuribles*  
L'anticipation au service de l'action



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## Preface

At the end of the 19th century, Otto von Bismarck observed: “International relations are simple. In a system of five, three must be against two.” There were, as he saw it, only five great powers in the world: the Russian Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the German Empire, France and the British Empire. Today’s international relations cannot be described in such simplistic terms. Relations between states are at best complex, at times totally unintelligible and more than often unpredictable. The world stage has become a lot more crowded since then with the proliferation of international actors, ranging from states – nearly 200 today compared to a meagre 50 when the UN was founded – to a plethora of non-governmental actors as diverse as multinationals, mafias and... non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Due to these myriad potential influences, international decision-making has taken an increasingly complex turn with countless elements needing to be factored in. Strategic anticipation and reflection are vital to counter the short-termism fostered by our fast-moving pace of life, knee-jerk media reactions and the social networks.

In the past thirty years, NGOs have risen to prominence on the international stage against the backdrop of globalization. International relations moved into the media spotlight, public

opinion increasingly swayed domestic and foreign policy-making, borders opened up and a new-found awareness of moral issues surfaced – creating fertile ground for the emergence of NGOs. Their growing influence is admittedly quite a game-changer. However, a more fundamental trend has emerged, directly impacting their actions. In our turbulent Post-Cold War era, the goalposts are shifting all the time, but we are talking about a period only spanning four decades. Another momentous strategic turnaround has closed a chapter of history opened as long as five centuries ago – the global domination of the West. This dominance has changed the face of international relations, concurrently shaping the development of INGOs (international non-governmental organizations) whose roots primarily lie in the West.

In the face of such rapid and far-reaching changes, the need for a global vision and a long-term approach has never been more evident. The following report produced by the IARAN provides valuable input to help address this essential challenge.

By Pascal Boniface, Director of IRIS, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques

Image by Andrew Gook





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Image by Aman Shrivastava





## Definition of Actors

Image by Brigitte Grignet



There are many terms used to reference the different groups of actors who undertake humanitarian work. There is little continuity between who is considered to be in the humanitarian sector and who is on its periphery, who are “traditional” actors and who qualifies as a “new” actor. As a result, this study has constructed a lexicon that explains what is meant by the various terms used.

Though it is not often recognized, there is and has long been a diverse group of actors who have played a role in providing humanitarian relief and assistance locally, nationally, and transnationally. This study uses the term **humanitarian ecosystem** to include all actors who participate in and contribute to humanitarian action. This is a broad categorization that encompasses competing power structures and actors with diverse roles and understandings of what it is to be a humanitarian. Though broad and complex, we believe this definition of the humanitarian ecosystem reflects the realities of humanitarian action, and as such it is the basis of this study.<sup>1</sup>

The humanitarian ecosystem is composed of two categories of actors: the formal humanitarian sector and non-formal actors.

Actors included in the **formal humanitarian sector**<sup>2</sup> are those for whom humanitarian work is their primary purpose, those that have had a role in shaping the institutions that govern and structure international humanitarian action, and finally, those that subscribe to traditional humanitarian principles. These actors include the United Nations (UN), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, and traditional donor governments such as those in the OECD-Development Assistance Committee. Each of these actors plays a significant role in influencing financing for the sector and shaping the humanitarian narrative on the world stage, underpinning its Western-centric bias.

Conversely, **non-formal actors** are defined as those who have been operating on the periphery of the formal humanitarian sector but are gaining in influence and importance, including national governments in areas of humanitarian operations, military actors, private sector actors, affected communities, local NGOs, and new donors. These actors are not new to the humanitarian ecosystem, but the shifting power dynamics are making them increasingly relevant, challenging the dominance of the formal humanitarian sector.



# Introduction

Humanitarian action has consistently evolved, transforming what is entailed in humanitarian action and who humanitarian actors are. The legitimacy and efficacy of what we consider the formal humanitarian sector is eroding. In the past, when the formal humanitarian sector has been in crisis, unable to adequately respond to needs – in the aftermath of both World Wars, for instance, and, more recently, in the Biafra War and following the Rwandan genocide<sup>3</sup> – new humanitarian actors have appeared or programmatic approaches have evolved. As is evidenced by the Syria crisis, the formal humanitarian sector is once again in such a period of crisis. Humanitarian needs have escalated, the number of displaced people worldwide is higher than ever before, the effects of climate change are increasingly being felt, and conflict is endemic in some parts of the world. It is both a challenge and an opportunity for humanitarian leaders to create a more inclusive and efficient humanitarian ecosystem that better reflects those within it and those it serves.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provide a long-term framework of 17 objectives “to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity.”<sup>4</sup> The SDGs are a call to action to which the humanitarian ecosystem can contribute; however, to do so effectively requires a change in the way the humanitarian ecosystem works. Crucially, it requires moving beyond the humanitarian-development divide, which creates a superficial segregation of work and approaches that undermines the capacity of the humanitarian ecosystem to systematically address vulnerabilities, manage risks, and build resilience. The question of how to be more effective and impactful over the long term must be considered by all actors in the humanitarian ecosystem if they are to leverage their resources and expertise to help achieve the vision of the SDGs.

Leading actors in the formal humanitarian sector have made commitments to change the way they work, many of which are encompassed in the Grand Bargain: Agenda for Humanity signed at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016<sup>5</sup> and the New Ways of Working Initiative.<sup>6</sup> However, fundamental, not incremental, change is required if a shift in power is to be realized, collaboration is to become the norm, and the success of a humanitarian actor’s mission is to be disassociated from their institutional growth. Many of the trends explored in this study reflect the emerging discourse on the future of the humanitarian ecosystem, but we endeavor to present an analysis that explores how these dynamics will evolve and the impact they will have, as well as how INGOs can become gamechangers, amplifying the impact of formal and non-formal actors in a more open and inclusive humanitarian ecosystem.

## Scope of the project.

This report seeks to explore the drivers of change in the global environment in which the humanitarian ecosystem works, the causes of humanitarian need, and the potential evolution of the dynamics of the humanitarian ecosystem to 2030. The length of the outlook has been set to match the timeline for the delivery of the SDGs, to highlight the humanitarian ecosystem’s important role in contributing to the 17 agreed objectives.

## General objectives:

- This report endeavors to provide a comprehensive and rigorous analysis of the potential evolutions of the humanitarian ecosystem and the global environment in which it operates by 2030
- This report has been commissioned as a thought piece to provoke discussion about the role of INGOs in a more inclusive humanitarian ecosystem
- This report was commissioned to support INGOs in designing a resource strategy that would be fit for purpose in the long-term



## Summary of the report

The first section provides an overview of the methodology applied in the creation of this report. The foresight analysis, where we analyze the drivers of change, was split into three distinct sections: global changes, types of humanitarian need and crises, and the humanitarian ecosystem. Twenty-three key topics were identified across the three subsections of analysis, each of which was individually explored in a dedicated insight file (see Annex 2) and subsequently summarized to define the foresight base for the study at the outset of the report. The foresight analysis examines the main trends and uncertainties of each topic. These help to develop an understanding of the forces that can shape the future.

The global scenarios are the basis of the projected environment in which the humanitarian ecosystem could operate in 2030. These are constructed by analyzing the interactions of the uncertainties and main trends explored in the foresight base. Four global scenarios are explored in detail to define the environment in which the role of the humanitarian ecosystem will be grounded. Scenarios are a vehicle to frame the trends and uncertainties that can shape the future and present different sets of global dynamics for which actors in the humanitarian ecosystem can prepare to manage.

Subsequently, we propose a typology of humanitarian crises. These constructed groupings are intended to be not an exhaustive list but a representation of the types of humanitarian need to which humanitarian actors will engage over the course of the outlook. This typology, built from the foresight base, illustrates the different types of crises and explores the implications of each given a particular scenario.

Finally, we have explored several differing organizational profiles for INGOs. These present five distinct potential structures for INGOs, each with differing strengths and weakness and each with contrasting roles in the humanitarian ecosystem. The organizational profiles of INGOs provide a lens through which INGOs can consider what will make an effective structure; what resources, capacities, and relationships would be required; and how the different profiles would be better or less suited depending on the scenarios and types of crises to which they might need to respond.


These three component parts, the global scenarios, the typology of crises, and the organizational profiles for INGOs are layered to build a comprehensive outlook.

Image by Sergey Neamoscou





# Project Overview





## Summary of Insight Files

Over the course of the structural analysis, 23 key issues were identified as determinant. These were subdivided into three sections: global changes, humanitarian needs and crises, and the humanitarian ecosystem. These sections are explored in a summary below, but the full body of research is available in Annex 2: Insight Files, where the key uncertainties and main trends of each topic are developed in more detail.

The global changes group of insight files explores how shifts in the socio-political, environmental, and economic dynamics over the course of the outlook would impact the humanitarian ecosystem. We have summarized these in several themes.

**People and governance:** Population growth, fastest in Sub-Saharan Africa, will result in a steady increase in the number of people worldwide over the course of the outlook.<sup>7</sup> Increasing longevity in middle- and high-income countries and persistently high rates of fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa will exacerbate existing weaknesses in their demographic makeup, aging populations becoming older<sup>8</sup> and youthful countries having a continued high proportion of children. Though there are debates on the level of progress in projected poverty reduction, depending on the definition of poverty that is applied, there is an overall trend toward fewer people living below the poverty line worldwide, with the world's poor concentrated in fragile states and Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>9</sup> The global population is increasingly urban and increasingly wealthy (though the fragility of the new middle classes is a significant uncertainty<sup>10</sup>), which will expand access to technology that develops at an accelerated pace.

The intersection of these trends over the course of the outlook may result in significant changes; demographic shifts underpinned by the spread of technology could lay the foundations for new forms of governance – for example, those led by transnational networks of megacities that have more in common with each other than their rural compatriots or groups of mobilized citizenry that can exploit technological advancements to leverage a virtual platform for change. Though the potential of new governance structures is uncertain, there is a complementary trend of an increase in non-state actors as rule-makers. While sovereign states have become more divergent in their application of international law, there is a growing trend for new players, such as private companies, to increase their role in transnational rule-making, setting standards for their sectors<sup>11</sup> and potentially supporting a trend toward alternative forms of governance.

**Effects of climate change:** The growth in population and increases in consumption and wealth will place a significant strain on global resources, especially the demand for food.<sup>12</sup> As poverty reduction and urbanization change the socio-economic status of millions of people, diets are likely to change.<sup>13</sup> The increased demand for food will be exacerbated by the effects of climate change, which are accelerating. Water scarcity<sup>14</sup> and reduced crop yields<sup>15</sup> are critical concerns and will be concentrated in Africa and

Asia due to the disparity in how arable land is affected globally, while some areas at high latitude will increase production. The concentration of vulnerability in low- and middle-income countries is likely to cause mass migration. The consequences of rising sea levels in conjunction with increased urbanization create particular concern for coastal areas (especially cities), where population growth is highest.<sup>16</sup>

**Multiple dimensions of inequality,** including in income, economic opportunities, and access to basic services, are a significant theme in the trends explored. Beyond the unequal ramifications of climate change internationally, inequality is intensifying at national and subnational levels. An expression of inequality is the distinction between rich and poor within urban centers and between urban and rural areas. Urban centers are hubs of wealth and economic activity; they account for just 6% of the global population but more than 40% of the world's wealth,<sup>17</sup> a phenomenon that is likely to intensify with unequal access to technology between urban and rural areas. Though urban centers have highly concentrated wealth, there will be a growth in the urban poor, living in slums, as the urban population rapidly grows and wealth is poorly redistributed.

**Protracted fragility:** The most significant extremes of global inequality will be represented by stalled or stunted development in fragile states. States that are considered fragile in 2017 will continue to have political instability compounded by population growth, chronic poverty, protracted conflict, terrorism, and the effects of climate change. Though insecurity will spread in the form of terrorism to middle and high-income countries and the risks of inter-state war are a significant uncertainty over the course of the outlook,<sup>18</sup> protracted conflict will be concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Fragile states are likely to be the areas where least progress is made in reducing poverty, infant mortality, and hunger. They will continue to be the major source of migrants fleeing persecution, conflict, and poverty, underpinning the growth in the population of people on the move.

The files examining the dynamics of humanitarian needs and crises highlighted three key themes: the escalation of human needs, the growing structural vulnerability of many communities, and the ongoing challenge to the humanitarian space.

**Growing structural vulnerability:** Analysis of the insights developed to explore humanitarian needs highlights where the trends in global dynamics could create new areas of vulnerability or exacerbate existing structural weakness. Most evident are the effects that climate change will have on the frequency and intensity of natural disasters, increasing the brittleness of the humanitarian ecosystem, escalating conflicts over resources, and potentially changing the dynamics of infectious diseases.<sup>19</sup> The impact of climate change on humanitarian needs and crises is significant, though some of the ways in which its effects could be felt are also highly uncertain. In addition to climate change, social and political instability, underpinned by socio-economic trends, including a growing youth population, frustration with democratic deficits, and insufficient economic opportunity, will increase human vulnerability in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa,<sup>20</sup> and Sub-Saharan Africa. As with the global dynamics, there will be uneven escalation of human distress and vulnerability, concentrated increasingly in poor and fragile countries. The socio-economic dynamics that can promulgate political instability can also contribute to the spread of a more exclusive model of nationalism from right-wing populist movements,<sup>21</sup> as seen in some electoral results worldwide. Whether the spike in nationalism will become an established trend and how this could affect the humanitarian ecosystem (particularly in funding) is uncertain.

**Escalation of humanitarian needs:** There will be an escalation in humanitarian needs over the course of the outlook as a result of chronic state fragility (explored above), the regionalization of political instability and conflict (including in high-income countries), perpetuated intolerance, more frequent natural disasters,<sup>22</sup> and the emergence of new diseases and the spread of existing ones.<sup>23</sup> Each of these crises will contribute to the increase in large-scale forced displacement, which will be protracted in nature and will reinforce the trend of urbanization as low government capacity or community preference means that displaced communities eschew encampment where possible. Growing role of states: The politicization of humanitarian crises and humanitarian interventions will make it increasingly difficult for NGOs to operate independently. The rebuffing of foreign support<sup>24</sup> by states eager to limit external interference, and concerned about the Western-centric nature of aid and its effectiveness,<sup>25</sup> increasingly restricts INGO operations. National and regional capacity will grow, particularly in middle-income countries. However, in some countries the politicization of aid, which restricts the influx of international support and limits the space for national actors, could lead to significant gaps in services, increasing humanitarian need.

The insight files that explore the humanitarian ecosystem highlight trends and changes that are likely to shape its evolution in the years to come. These trends have been grouped into the following key themes:

**A shift toward the Global South:** The slow shift in power from the Global North (or the West) to the South is evident among some actors in the humanitarian ecosystem. This trend is likely to continue over the course of the outlook as INGOs could move

their hubs closer to crises,<sup>26</sup> hire fewer expatriate staff, partner with more local organizations, including private companies, and localize decisionmaking. This is likely to be accompanied by increasing challenges to Dunantist humanitarian principles<sup>27</sup> and a growing preference for localized aid – ranging from human resources to logistics provision. In this context, local NGOs will play a significant role, drawing on contextual and cultural proximity and, in the case of faith-based NGOs, religious affinity to affected populations. Similarly, at the international level, alliances and partnerships between organizations will form along cultural fault lines. There is a lack of certainty on how long it will take for the shift of resources from the North to South to translate into an actual shift in power, or whether, as is the case currently, the commitments to “localization” are token efforts on the part of large INGOs.<sup>28</sup>

**New actors:** An increasing number of actors are getting involved in humanitarian aid – at all levels, and from all sectors. Though many are not in fact new to humanitarian action,<sup>29</sup> their recognition in the humanitarian ecosystem is increasing. The growing role of new donors, private companies, the increasingly strong faith-based NGOs, and the use of the military<sup>30</sup> (particularly in natural disaster responses<sup>31</sup>) may be normalized in the humanitarian ecosystem. The arrival of new actors on the scene has blurred the definition of who is considered part of the humanitarian ecosystem and has shrunk the space between states and non-state actors, for-profit and non-profit organizations. Arguably, this has eroded the perceived neutrality of humanitarian actors and has in turn led to the violent targeting of humanitarian workers worldwide.<sup>32</sup> The insecurity of NGO staff will remain an issue, and ensuring their safety could come at the expense of access to vulnerable populations,<sup>33</sup> though the increased use of technology and innovative approaches may mitigate the problem. Humanitarian principles, particularly the Western idea of neutrality, are likely to be applied increasingly flexibly and infrequently. Uncertainties remain regarding the effect that increased violence in the name of religion will have on the influence of faith-based NGOs.<sup>34</sup>

**New ways of working:** Along with the changes that are noted above, the delivery of aid, the structure of NGOs, and the essence of partnerships in the humanitarian ecosystem will change. The New Way of Working initiative, which focuses on reducing the humanitarian-development divide between international organizations (UN, World Bank, IOM) and in the broader humanitarian ecosystem, highlights the shift toward “collective outcomes” and greater systematic thinking.<sup>35</sup> Large blocks of like-minded organizations<sup>36</sup> are likely to form alliances to ensure survival, both in terms of finance and relevance. Advocacy and technical support such as analysis and fundraising will increasingly be directed from the North,<sup>37</sup> while program implementation will be led largely in the South. The decline in funding from traditional donors and the increased number and diversity of actors involved in aid will drive competition for resources and access, necessitating the use of more creative and innovative funding mechanisms, such as crowdfunding.<sup>38</sup> These forms of funding will rival traditional donor structures. The growing influence of private actors, who typically focus on activities with high returns on investments, and the push for value for money from donors will continue to pressure



INGOs to operate more like profit-driven businesses – prioritizing efficiency, targets, effectiveness, and results.<sup>39</sup>

There is uncertainty about how well the humanitarian ecosystem and the private sector will be able to meet and share divergent practices, such as around transparency and accountability. Aid will continue to be used as a tool to advance non-humanitarian goals<sup>40</sup> (e.g. political buy-in, market exposure, religious conversion).

Many of the changes described above will require actors in the humanitarian ecosystem, particularly those in the formal humanitarian sector, to change their operating model to adapt to a changing environment. This transformation will, in large part, rely

on shifting power to the South and genuinely empowering regions affected by disasters to respond to and rebuild sustainably after crises. However, there are many uncertainties about how some of the most influential actors who can drive change will evolve. These uncertainties must be framed to enable humanitarian actors to develop robust and long-term strategies. Strategic foresight is critical to planning collectively and effectively. To be capable of shaping the future in which they exist, humanitarian actors must develop a shared understanding of the main trends and uncertainties affecting their environment. These are best encapsulated in scenarios.

# Scenarios

A critical component of this analysis is the construction of a set of global scenarios that represent four distinct possible futures in which humanitarian interventions may take place in 2030. These are designed to explore the way in which political, economic, social, technological, legal, and environmental trends and uncertainties will affect how and where humanitarian actors operate, and who those actors will be.

The scenarios have been constructed by identifying the key uncertainties that could be critical to shaping the future of humanitarian action and using them to frame the possible futures outlined below. These uncertainties include:

- What impact will the rise of nationalism and erosion of traditional global governance have on the humanitarian ecosystem?
- How will the role of networks, companies, megacities, and citizens in governance structures evolve?
- How will humanitarian principles shift in their interpretation and application as they are challenged by non-Dunantist<sup>41</sup> approaches and new actors?
- What will shape the prominence of faith-based NGOs at the national and international level, or not?
- How will nation states and regional organizations manage large-scale forced migration?
- What will be the impacts of ecosystemic crises<sup>42</sup> exacerbated by climate change and demographic pressures?

These uncertainties were gathered into two groupings, one focused on global governance and a second on the main types of crises likely to involve humanitarian actors.

The grouping that encompasses dynamics of global governance in the humanitarian ecosystem focuses on who the main players will be – states, citizen movements, companies, and alliances of NGOs are among those explored, as well as how such diverse actors will structure their interactions.

Whether the formal institutions that have dominated discussions on issues such as climate change, poverty, and urbanization to date will continue to be relevant or be challenged by new actors, networks, and decision-making structures is a central question in these scenarios, represented by the extremes of the vertical axis.

The uncertainties around the scope and scale of humanitarian need are framed to examine the potential shift in the dynamics of crises and human vulnerability. These are represented on the horizontal axis. Though the extremes of the axis represent the dominance of a particular type of crises – namely localized or ecosystemic – the nuance of the scale is represented in the scenarios, where it is not one or the other but rather how a shift in the lens through which crises are viewed and responded to could change depending on the way human distress is conceptualized and what is considered more frequent and important.

The juxtaposition of two groupings of uncertainties and the interaction between them laid the foundation for the matrixed scenarios that were developed.



# Assumptions

Several assumptions have been made to focus this study on the uncertainties that could cause a change in the structure of the humanitarian ecosystem or the environment in which it exists. By integrating these assumptions, phenomena that are not likely to manifest before 2030, are not likely to fundamentally alter the structure of the humanitarian ecosystem, or are highly unlikely to occur can be controlled for.

1. The following changes are likely to take place too slowly to be relevant before 2030:
  - A reform of global governance structures, which would enable global governance institutions to significantly expand their role vis-à-vis other actors
  - Stabilization of chronically fragile countries (Yemen, Syria, South Sudan, etc.)
2. The following changes are unlikely to fundamentally alter the way in which the humanitarian ecosystem operates in the long-term
  - Crises induced by sudden-onset natural hazards (such as earthquakes or tsunamis)

3. The following changes could have major consequences but are unlikely to take place:


- The occurrence of a cataclysm such as a deadly pandemic or a major asteroid impact
- A new world war

Each of the components outlined above is assumed to either not happen or not be significant over the course of the outlook for the purposes of the following scenarios.

Image by Sergey Neamoscou



# Global Scenario Matrix



These scenarios outline four possible futures that represent different ways in which the system of global governance and the type of humanitarian crises could evolve. They are not intended to be definitive, but they are designed to represent a spectrum of possible futures in 2030. These scenarios provide visions of what future humanitarian action could look like and what dynamics, challenges, and opportunities actors in the humanitarian ecosystem will need to prepare for and adapt to.



**Global trends and the slow pace of change within the humanitarian ecosystem makes this the most likely scenario before 2020.**

**This scenario is characterized by the rise of nationalism leading to a decline in the relevance of global governance institutions where the humanitarian ecosystem is challenged by the politicization of crises, particularly those in areas of chronic fragility.**

In 2030, protracted crises, localized to fragile states and their border areas, remain the major source of humanitarian concern. Crises resulting from political instability are concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East (Chad, Mali, DR Congo, Eritrea, South Sudan, Somalia, Syria). There has been limited resolution to situations of chronic fragility.

Crises are becoming more politicized, and humanitarian interventions are the purview of national governments and, increasingly, delegated to national militaries (particularly for natural disasters). Local governments are eager to show their populations and the international community that they can manage situations of humanitarian need on their own, shunning foreign intervention to increase their independence and legitimacy.

The role of global institutions (such as the United Nations) is shrinking, destabilized by the increased prominence of nationalism, particularly from great powers such as China, Russia, or the United States, which reaffirms the preeminence of national sovereignty.

The rise in nationalism and increasing political tensions puts more pressure on minorities and targeted groups. There is little respite from persecution for targeted communities. For those populations, the situation is worrisome, often leading to mass displacement. Populations in refugee camps are growing, and the situation is becoming extremely difficult to contain, increasing the density of global migration flows.

Humanitarian interventions in areas of conflict are highly contentious, and actors are frequently accused of taking sides in conflicts, which limits their ability to access vulnerable communities.

## Implications for INGOs

Control over and restrictions on INGOs' humanitarian interventions increases. Mistrust of INGOs is growing as they are regarded as Western-centric and their effectiveness is questioned; national governments perceive them as interlopers. National governments favor, or tolerate, interventions from national, local, and faith-based NGOs under their own coordination.

Dunantist principles are applied and discussed only in conflict settings, and more space is accorded to different cultural and more pragmatic approaches. INGOs continue to struggle to find a compromise between their vision and values and the necessity of accessing populations in need. To have access to vulnerable populations, INGOs must form partnerships and alliances with national governments, local NGOs, and faith-based NGOs. Direct access to vulnerable communities for INGOs is limited. Local NGOs gain importance, playing a significantly greater role in the humanitarian ecosystem and attracting higher levels of direct funding, which changes the dynamics of the international humanitarian narrative.

Consequently, the dominance of INGOs is reduced as they compete for funds and access with the main humanitarian assistance providers (governments, local and faith-based NGOs).

Nevertheless, INGOs are still able to exploit their experience with interventions and technical expertise. INGOs intervene mainly in crises requiring specific and high levels of technical knowledge.

**In this scenario, the humanitarian ecosystem exists in a future characterized by the withdrawal of global governance and a resurgence in the preeminence of sovereignty where humanitarian actors face a dramatic escalation in humanitarian need as a result of the intensifying ecosystemic crises.**

By 2030, protracted localized crises continue to be a source of major concern; however, compounding crises of state fragility, ecosystemic crises are worsening and dramatically increasing humanitarian needs on a larger, regional scale. Community vulnerability, a result of the intersection between political, ecological, agricultural, urban, and economic destabilization, is exacerbated by the effects of climate change and demographic growth, resulting in a steady intensification of humanitarian needs. Human ecosystems are becoming more brittle; areas of ecosystemic crisis are not defined by national boundaries, necessitating long-term, transnational solutions. With limited global governance, coordination on global challenges is poor, adding to the complexity of finding solutions. Regions with well-established institutions provide for a for discussion but frequently lack the influence to drive forward solutions. Regional ecosystemic crises worsen existing state fragility, creating a vicious cycle of escalating need and declining resilience throughout the affected areas. Complex crises are deepening and are becoming more difficult for humanitarian actors to engage with strategically.

Due to the inability of many less economically developed states to meet the challenge of mounting needs and an inadequate level of international humanitarian aid, migration increases significantly. Forced displacement is concentrated in areas with an intersection of state fragility, conflict, and ecosystemic crises, which overwhelms the capacity of governments and humanitarian actors. The long-term consequences of ecosystemic crises fundamentally alter the environmental and economic context of affected areas.

At the global level, tensions are growing between UN Security Council states such as China, Russia, and the United States, weakening the international system. The weight of the nation state in the international decision-making system is reinforced, sidelining other emerging governing paradigms while underpinning the preeminence of sovereignty.

In Western countries, the continued arrival of migrants leads to the rise of radicalism and extremism in politics. Western countries face political destabilization and growing uncertainty when faced with their inability to adequately integrate existing migrant communities and to forestall the arrival of more.

## Implications for INGOs

INGOs have increasing difficulty accessing vulnerable communities as the humanitarian space is under significant restrictions from national authorities.

While INGOs possess the capacity and expertise to engage in localized crises, limited experience in managing regional responses effectively reduces their relevance when faced with deepening ecosystemic crises, which require anticipatory measures and longer-term strategies. Even where INGOs have the knowledge and expertise, they are overwhelmed by the scale of need as funding for humanitarian action does not keep pace, leading to situations of high and prolonged distress.

INGOs are struggling to maintain their relevance while the international system is in decline, being superseded by national and regional capacities.

INGOs struggle to raise funds as institutional donors are increasingly giving money to local and/or faith-based NGOs or even to military humanitarian responses. Global development assistance is not seen as a priority by many states, and an increasing number of private donors are focusing on domestic issues.



**This scenario is characterized by a series of protracted, localized crises and a dramatic growth in largescale involuntary migration. In this future, actors coalesce into networks, forming new institutions organized around specific thematics or geographic areas of interest, creating a more fractured humanitarian system.**

Non-formal humanitarian actors are gaining importance in the humanitarian ecosystem, particularly at the global level, where companies and foundations increasingly dominate decision-making, setting priorities and dictating the way in which humanitarian aid is implemented. These non-traditional actors organize themselves by creating new networks composed of four types of actors: companies and their stakeholders, foundations (e.g. Bill & Melinda Gates), megacities (e.g. the C40 initiative), and citizens' movements. This was illustrated during the 2015 COP21 initiative, where diverse actors collaborated to create partnerships on specific subjects such as urban management, water, and sanitation.

New networks are structured around specific causes or subjects of interest, for example health, water, energy, or human mobility. The motivation of actors within each network varies from a high level of self-interest (for example the ability to enter new markets, promote their own relevance and legitimacy, or gain greater influence) to purely humanitarian concerns. Networks focus on interventions that are related to their strategic interests, either directly or indirectly. Diverse networks of actors are able to intervene in political, economic, social, environmental, and legal for a, with the most adapted partners taking the lead wherever appropriate. New actors bring new vision to what is considered humanitarian assistance and the most effective way to implement it strategically.

Major emerging urban centers are areas of particular interest, as they are hubs of economic development and becoming politically powerful, such as Lagos, Nairobi, Kuala Lumpur, Mumbai, Jakarta, and Kinshasa. In general, new networks are focused on emerging countries and their neighbors, which are regarded as areas of strategic importance, such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Kenya, and Egypt.

Due to the diverse motivations of actors within the networks (not purely humanitarian), these networks can neglect some humanitarian crises, as they focus their energy where humanitarian needs and strategic interests coincide. The fractured international system means that many situations of humanitarian need (particularly in areas of state fragility and chronic conflict) are not adequately addressed by the new dominant networks in the humanitarian ecosystem and there is limited funding outside of these new networks. Some areas of limited interest for new actors that receive insufficient attention include the Central African Republic and Eritrea; these areas are left in protracted crises. A two-tier humanitarian assistance paradigm is developing. Areas or

situations in need of humanitarian assistance that are economically, politically, or strategically interesting are supported by these new networks, while others are ignored.

### Implications for INGOs

In this scenario, INGOs represent the best channel for attracting global support for neglected areas and vulnerable communities in situations of chronic crisis. Together with local and increasingly faith based NGOs, the formal humanitarian sector retains preeminence in this domain. Even though INGOs benefit from their field knowledge and experience in intervening in these areas, they lack effectiveness to improve structural vulnerabilities, force political solutions, and implement anticipatory measures to contain the exacerbation of these crises.

In the areas outside such forgotten crises, INGOs will face growing competition from non-traditional actors' networks, which have a new way of addressing humanitarian need. This competition will challenge INGOs' management and processes, as they seek to adapt to fit into such new structures or become sidelined.

As the funding for humanitarian action is becoming more fragmented, competition significantly increases. Non-traditional donors dedicate funds systematically to targeted issues and areas that accord to their interests, diminishing the funds available for forgotten crises.

INGOs have difficulty raising funds outside of a network for thematic projects such as food security and education. Donors demand ever-greater accountability for money spent and raise the bar for the expected impact.

Through the construction of new networks, humanitarian assistance is considered more as a service where new actors compete to increase their efficacy and reach through service provision, balancing the diverse objectives of networks and communities.

**Given the degree of change required from the types of organizations working in the humanitarian space and the structure of their interactions, this scenario and its potential paths is unlikely before 2025.**

**The (R)evolutions scenario is defined by the establishment of a new and more diverse system of international governance, driven by self-regulation and built organically through the institutionalization of formal interactions between rising actors and networks, which supersede traditional global governance structures to form a new paradigm. The humanitarian ecosystem plays a central role in 22 innovating and regulating humanitarian assistance. Inclusivity supports the adoption of a more systematic approach to the increasing ecosystemic crises and escalating humanitarian needs.**

By 2030, localized crises remain concentrated areas of humanitarian need, but new areas of concern emerge on a larger, regional scale, driven by the intensification of ecosystemic crises. The combination of economic, demographic, political, and environmental destabilization disrupts sub-regional areas, especially those adjacent to or including fragile states. Human ecosystems become ever more brittle, leading to prolonged situations of high distress and increasing need.

Non-formal humanitarian actors are gaining in importance. These actors intervene in anticipation of crises, forming a response that integrates many actors in the affected area, driven by vulnerable communities and responding to the dynamics of the local economy. Their intervention is driven by self-interest (similar to the To Each Their Playing Field scenario) and is more strategic and long-lasting, as the funding, design, and delivery of humanitarian aid are embedded with key local stakeholders who are directly affected by its success or failure and quicker to adapt and create systematic approaches.

The growing role of non-formal actors leads to the emergence of new regulations and approaches to managing crises and humanitarian need, which can vary by region and are adapted to the context. This forms the basis of a new structure of global governance. However, these changes are slow to be formalized, and in the interim the humanitarian ecosystem is unable to meet the escalated needs caused by the intensification of crises and vulnerabilities in critical areas.

**This new community-driven regulation can be created by different actors, oriented around their interests:**

1. Creation of new regulations under networks of big private companies, foundations, or megacities. New rules and standards are built according to the vision and economic and political interests of the network. Regulations are developed as required opposed to through a formal structure.

2. New regulation is driven by the mobilization of citizens exerting greater influence on key stakeholders at the local and regional level, but which can also be coordinated to drive global agendas on common objectives. Regulations are focused on topics such as women rights, migration, and the protection of minorities and targeted groups.
3. New regulation is driven by non-profit organizations in the humanitarian ecosystem, which operates through alliances of INGOs, national and local NGOs, and faith-based NGOs. These alliances have a more global approach with a focus on thematic areas such as hunger, poverty, and human rights.
4. New regulation is driven by alliances and partnerships with a broad range of actors acting on common thematic areas such as the COP21 initiative.

## Implications for INGOs

For INGOs the (R)evolutions scenario represents an opportunity in which they can use their influence and expertise to shape a new form of humanitarianism. As INGOs are one of many players in this future, they will need to be more adaptable and think more strategically to seize the opportunity to become game changers. However, they must also be willing to forgo the dominance they (and other actors in the formal humanitarian system) have enjoyed in the space.

The role of INGOs will be dependent on their ability to ensure that they remain valuable in the humanitarian ecosystem. INGOs will have a key role in reinforcing the capacities of other actors, such as private sector actors, military actors, and local NGOs, who take time to build their capacity in transnational humanitarian programming and advocacy.

In addition to the global context in which humanitarian action takes place, the types of crises to which the humanitarian ecosystem must respond will also evolve over the course of the outlook. Actors in the humanitarian system must consider not only how the global environment will change, but how those shifting uncertainties will affect human vulnerability. New types of crises could emerge, such as those caused by a protracted denial-of-service attack. Existing crises will intensify, for example ecosystemic crises, which are exacerbated by climate change. Finally, protracted crises will continue to create significant humanitarian needs such as chronic state fragility. The dynamics of each type of crisis are specific, and the way in which they will evolve is critical to understanding how the humanitarian ecosystem can adapt to ensure it is delivering an inclusive and effective response.

# Crises situations for the humanitarian ecosystem by 2030

Building on the global scenarios, we have created a descriptive typology<sup>43</sup> of humanitarian crises that seeks to illustrate a representative breakdown of the types of crises or humanitarian need with which the humanitarian ecosystem might engage over the course of the outlook. We have identified nine types of crises, which are overlaid with a categorization of protracted crises, recurrent crises, and emerging crises. (Each type of crisis is explored further in Annex 1.) Multiple types of crisis could occur concurrently in any given context as many of the causes are interlinked.

**Protracted crises** are defined as situations where “a significant proportion of the population is vulnerable to death, disease or disruption of their livelihoods over a long period of time.”<sup>44</sup> Such crises create the dynamic of an “everyday emergency,”<sup>45</sup> where elevated humanitarian needs are normalized by the lengthy duration of crises. Protracted crises are worsened by the diminishing capacity of people to withstand future shocks or further deteriorations of the crises in which they live. Over time the resilience of communities is eroded, and the long-term consequences of a lack of protection, education, and nutrition intensify.<sup>46</sup> The high level of vulnerability endured by people living in protracted crises makes these communities some of the most at-risk worldwide.

**Recurrent crises** are those that regularly re-appear, with similar dynamics, though the scale and intensity can vary, such as sudden-

onset disasters caused by natural hazards or epidemics. Though the effects of recurrent crises can be long-lasting and recurrent crises can erode community resilience, recurrent crises create a short period of acute need. The immediate loss of life and livelihoods in large-scale recurrent crises can create significant need very quickly.<sup>47</sup>

**Emerging crises** are those that are becoming increasingly relevant or those that have the potential to have a larger impact over the course of the outlook due to changing dynamics of global risk. Shifts in population dynamics, the effects of climate change, and the risks associated with the integration of regional and global economies that are ever more dependent on technology can intensify existing vulnerabilities and lay the foundations for new ones. The interaction of multiple kinds of risk can create a vicious cycle of deteriorating vulnerability. The dynamics of emerging crises are highly variable, but a consistent feature is that each can lead to a regional, national, or localized system failure.





These categories and crises are not intended to be an exhaustive list of humanitarian crises but are an attempt to represent the critical dynamics of the main types.

Image by Clinton Naik










## Summary Table of Crises

Type of Crisis	Title	Logic	Description	Trend
Protracted Crisis	Large-scale involuntary migrations	Though often considered a symptom or a cause of each of the crises in this typology, the growing population of migrants over the course of the outlook (including those forcibly displaced) creates a distinct crisis in and of itself.	Encompasses urgent and long-term needs for newly displaced and protracted caseloads. Communities are at risk of protection violations, limited basic service provision, and exploitation (in urban areas) and do not have adequate access to durable solutions.	
Protracted Crisis	State fragility: system failure	There is a spectrum of state fragility, from resilience to system failure. Though some states will shift toward one extreme or the other, chronic instability will not be quickly resolved, and as a result state fragility will be a continued form of crisis in 2030.	Chronic instability/conflict and the inability of governments to fulfill their core functions, resulting in protection violations, physical and psychological trauma, a lack of access to basic services, and large-scale forced displacement.	
Protracted Crisis	Persecution of minorities and targeted groups	Not often reflected as a humanitarian emergency, the persecution of minorities and targeted groups creates significant humanitarian need and reinforces the vulnerability of marginalized groups. This persecution is a discrete type of crisis to which the humanitarian ecosystem can respond.	The discrimination and persecution of segments of society institutionalized through culture or law. Targeted communities have little to no protection under the law and face exploitation, displacement, intimidation, arbitrary arrest, and torture.	
Recurrent Crisis	Sudden onset disasters induced by natural hazards	Sudden onset disasters induced by natural hazards will become more frequent and will recurrently create significant surges and longterm increases in humanitarian need.	Sudden onset disasters induced by natural hazards that result in loss of life, devastation to the natural and built environments, large-scale displacement, and disruption of basic service provision.	

## Summary Table of Crises

Type of Crisis	Title	Logic	Description	Trend
Recurrent Crisis	Epidemics	The potential for the spread of new or existing plant, animal, and human diseases regionally and globally distinguishes epidemics from other kinds of sudden onset disasters. As such, epidemics are treated as a different type of crisis.	A health-related event or transboundary animal or plant disease in excess of a normal caseload. A high percentage of the population is affected, resulting in significant illness or death, which can overwhelm health systems and cause loss of crops and pastures and high levels of death and disease in animals. Deviation of local resources to containment.	
Recurrent Crisis	Man-made destructive events	Man-made destructive events have particular social, legal, and political dimensions. They are infrequent, but the particularity of these crises necessitates a discrete category.	Man-made destructive event, which could lead to localized system collapse. Could result in a high immediate death toll and long-term health complications, large-scale displacement, and physical and psychological trauma.	
Emerging Crisis	Ecosystemic crises	Ecosystemic crises resulting from the intersection of environmental, political, and economic instability create long-term and worsening vulnerability for affected populations, which can result in system collapse. Exacerbated by population growth and climate change, ecosystemic crises are likely to become increasingly prevalent.	Environmental, political, and economic instability resulting in highly vulnerable communities characterized by endemic poverty, under or unemployment, limited investments in infrastructure and service provision, poor health outcomes, and food insecurity	

## Summary Table of Crises

Type of Crisis	Title	Logic	Description	Trend
Emerging Crisis	Protracted denial-of-service crises	Though a protracted denial-of-service attack has yet to result in large-scale humanitarian need, as basic service provision (e.g. healthcare) and many sectors of the economy become increasingly reliant on technology it could become a significant driver of humanitarian need, creating a new kind of crisis.	Prolonged infrastructural disruption affecting finance, industry, and most basic services. Immobile groups (young children, the elderly, disabled) are most vulnerable. Effects could be long-lasting.	
Emerging Crisis	Economic crises in middle- and high-income countries	Global or regional financial shocks, economic stagnation, and rising inequality can create protracted humanitarian crises as development stagnates or reverses for a significant proportion of the population. The consequences of economic crises in middle- and high income countries are frequently overlooked, but they are necessary to consider.	Shock from national, regional, or global economic crises, rising unemployment rates, inflation, and poverty. Escalated rates of asset loss, reversing development gains, and growing inequality.	

Each of these types of crisis creates different vulnerabilities for the affected populations and distinct challenges for the humanitarian ecosystem.

Image by Sergey Neamoscou





# Typology of crises and the intersection with global scenarios

The construction of a typology of crises when matched with the global scenarios indicates how the impact of different crises could be more or less severe depending on the global scenarios in which they occur. The intersection between these two components looks at whether there is a higher degree of human vulnerability

created, either through an increase in likelihood of a crisis or the capacity or willingness of the global humanitarian ecosystem to address it, in any given scenario. The chart below endeavors to summarize this intersection with a sliding scale.



Types of crises \ Scenarios	The Narrow Gate	Overflow	To Each Their Playing Field	(R)evolutions
Large-scale involuntary migrations	Dark Blue	Dark Blue	Light Blue	Light Blue
State fragility	Dark Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue
Persecution of minorities and targeted groups	Dark Blue	Light Blue	Light Blue	Light Blue
Sudden-onset emergencies	Dark Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Grey	Dark Grey
Epidemics	Light Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue	Light Blue
Large-scale man-made destructive events	Dark Grey	Dark Grey	Dark Grey	Dark Grey
Ecosystemic crises	N/A	Dark Blue	N/A	Light Blue
Protracted denial of service	Light Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Grey
Economic crises in middle-income and developed countries	Light Blue	Light Blue	Light Blue	Light Blue

Elevated levels of state control in The Narrow Gate scenario highlight the capacity of the humanitarian ecosystem to respond to crises that can be efficiently led by government or military entities, notably in crises driven by a protracted denial of service, epidemics, and economic crises in middle- and high income countries. However, for crises where a coordinated international response beyond the capacity of a national government is required, the withdrawal of global governance and the rise of nationalism could exacerbate humanitarian need. The obstacles to running an effective transnational response or operating in areas with low government capacity, as is the case for large-scale involuntary migration, state fragility, and sudden-onset disasters (limited access if the crisis exceeds national capacity), elevates the vulnerability of the affected population. The most extreme consequence to the increased politicization of crises in this scenario is an unwillingness to respond to the persecution of minority or targeted groups who would be significantly worse off.

The scenario where the humanitarian ecosystem has the least capacity to respond to humanitarian need resulting from the different types of crises is Overflow. The inability of the humanitarian ecosystem to make measurable progress in reducing human vulnerability, due to a retraction in global governance and limited leadership, is compounded by the escalating level of need in the Overflow scenario. In the face of increasingly likely crises with transnational consequences (ecosystemic crises coupled with state fragility, epidemics, and large-scale migration) there would be a dramatic escalation in unmet needs. The significant difference between the capacity of the humanitarian ecosystem and the level of need in the Overflow scenario means that there are no crises in which the humanitarian ecosystem can respond well. Due to a lack of space and funding to intervene strategically or challenge structural inequalities, the ability of the humanitarian ecosystem to effectively respond to crises in middle- and high-income countries or to champion the cause of minority and targeted groups is limited.

The humanitarian ecosystem represented in To Each Their Playing Field is best adapted to respond to single-issue crises where networks of interested parties can establish systematic interventions exploiting the expertise of a network of actors, such as for large-scale involuntary migrations or where there is a high level of strategic interest (e.g. crises in middle-income or developed countries). Crises in areas of state fragility are neglected, worsening the situation for vulnerable populations. In crises caused by a denial of service, networked structures are unlikely to be well adapted to respond, given the dispersed nature of their resources (human and other) and likely dependence on technology in their modalities of response. In To Each Their Playing Field, the ability of the humanitarian ecosystem to mount responses that require surge capacity outside areas of long-term strategic programming, such as to a sudden-onset emergency or a man-made destructive event, is highly uncertain.

Given the potential spectrum of change the humanitarian ecosystem in (R)evolutions undergoes in the long term, this scenario presents the greatest level of uncertainty in how

adaptable the humanitarian ecosystem would be to different types of crises. (R)evolutions offers the greatest opportunity for the humanitarian ecosystem to structure itself to best respond to a range of crises through creation of a new system of global governance. The integration of networked citizens (responding to the needs of persecuted minorities and targeted groups) and the creation of new rule systems, led not by states but by businesses, cities, and communities, provides the opportunity to create an integrated and systematic approach to managing ecosystemic crises, crises in middle-income and developed countries, and transnational crises such as large-scale involuntary migration. The capacity of the humanitarian ecosystem would be weakest where national capacity is low, namely in crises resulting from state fragility.

Large-scale man-made destructive events are sufficiently rare and the potential consequences so extreme that it is unlikely that any humanitarian ecosystem would be able to respond strategically. As a result, it is framed as an uncertainty.

The intersection of crises and scenarios demonstrates the considerable impact that the uncertainties explored in the scenarios could have in shaping how able the humanitarian ecosystem is to address humanitarian need over the course of the outlook. The matching of these crises to the projected scenarios is intended to demonstrate the way in which the global environment affects not only the types of crises and forms of humanitarian need that could happen, but also the dynamic of the response. The entry of new actors and the potential withdrawal or restructuring of global governance determine how the humanitarian ecosystem as a whole works to achieve its mission.

The dynamics of the humanitarian ecosystem could shift considerably over the course of the outlook. The erosion of the legitimacy of formal humanitarian-sector actors, the rise of non-formal actors, and the creation of new networks will have a significant impact on the way in which the humanitarian ecosystem operates. The role of INGOs could change significantly.

# Role of INGOs

There have been waves of expansion in the number and scope of INGOs since the earliest were established, but since the end of the Second World War, growth has been more sustained. Large INGOs have seen continued increases in their budgets and staff, consolidating their position as some of the most influential actors in the ecosystem.<sup>48</sup> The majority of funding in the humanitarian ecosystem comes through UN agencies or large INGOs,<sup>49</sup> in particular the big five: Save the Children, the International Rescue Committee, Médecins sans Frontières, Oxfam, and World Vision. INGOs are not monolithic in their mandates, approaches, or structures, but in their spheres of influence (including human rights, humanitarian response, and development) they frequently dominate the narrative of the humanitarian ecosystem. While INGOs have been embedded within the ecosystem since the beginning of the last century and have a vested interest in maintaining their position, they can also be agents of change. INGOs have a history

of challenging the status quo; they have already proven to be a driving force in shaping how the humanitarian ecosystem evolves, promoting innovative approaches.

However, INGOs must not take their place in the humanitarian ecosystem as given. They will be constantly challenged by the entry of new actors and shifting dynamics of power and influence. The perpetuation of the INGO model can be justified only for as long as they add value to the humanitarian ecosystem. This will be continually evaluated as the humanitarian ecosystem evolves, and INGOs should prepare themselves to embrace the changes that they can make to increase the overall efficiency of the humanitarian ecosystem moving forward.

## Summary of scenarios

The Narrow Gate	Overflow	To Each Their Playing Field	(R)evolutions
<p>Rise of nationalism leading to a decline in the relevance of global governance institutions, politicization of crises, particularly those in areas of chronic fragility</p>	<p>Withdrawal of global governance, resurgence in the preeminence of sovereignty, dramatic escalation in humanitarian need, intensifying ecosystemic crises</p>	<p>Series of protracted, localized crises, dramatic growth in large-scale involuntary migration, actors coalesce into networks, forming new institutions organized around specific thematic or geographic areas of interest</p>	<p>Establishment of a new and more diverse system of international governance, driven by self-regulation, inclusivity supports the adoption of a more systematic approach to the increasingly ecosystemic crises and escalating levels of humanitarian need</p>



In the **The Narrow Gate scenario** INGOS need to:

- Manage worsening access to vulnerable populations (except in the case of transnational migrations)
- Create real and equitable partnerships between international, local, and faith-based NGOs and integrate them meaningfully in consortia
- Manage increased interactions with military actors in the humanitarian ecosystem
- Struggle to maintain a neutral way of working in the face of increased politicization of aid and crises and a push for a more pragmatic rather than principled approach in many contexts
- Develop new fundraising opportunities, e.g., crowd sourcing for direct operations

In the **Overflow scenario** INGOS need to:

- Meet unprecedented levels of assistance needs
- Manage needs caused by increased migration
- Create regional programming and develop capacity for anticipation to effectively manage increasingly regionalized crisis dynamics
- Operate with resources that are incommensurate with the needs they are trying to respond to

In the **To Each Their Playing Field scenario** INGOS need to:

- Manage competition with other humanitarian actors, particularly for funds, in a more fragmented humanitarian ecosystem
- Find new ways to cooperate with diverse humanitarian actors in a strategic way
- Push to reshape global humanitarian governance structures in an inclusive way
- Meet increased efficiency requirements
- Focus on forgotten crises

In the **(R)evolutions scenario** INGOS need to:

- Take part in the construction of a new humanitarian global governance system
- Share the value chain with new humanitarian actors through a genuine transfer of power
- Develop competencies and knowledge to manage intensifying/emerging crises
- Manage their legitimacy and authority (brand) while empowering other humanitarian stakeholders

Each scenario raises different challenges and opportunities for INGOS. How INGOs will continue to leverage their experience and scale to alleviate human suffering in different crises depends on how they adapt to the changing context in which they operate and how they distinguish themselves from other, new humanitarian actors.

Image by Peter Hershey



# Organizational profiles for INGOs

Building from the analysis of the changing dynamics in the humanitarian ecosystem and the context in which it will operate, a series of organizational profiles that present five different approaches to the structure, mandate, competencies, and business models of future INGOs are explored below. There will not be a one-size-fits-all model that is most appropriate or effective but rather many potential structures, creating a diverse spectrum of INGOs with different rationales for their place in the evolving system. Which organizational profile is best suited for the future of any INGO depends on their culture, mandate, and ambition.


We have adapted the notion of a value chain to the humanitarian ecosystem to structure each profile, considered the degree of centralization or subsidiarity in each model, and assessed the degree of focus or breadth in the mission of an INGO (e.g. focused on a thematic or type of crisis, or capable of responding to many situations). A value chain is defined as “the full range of activities ... businesses go through to bring a product or service from conception to delivery.”<sup>50</sup> Value-chain analysis is used in the private sector to identify areas of comparative advantage, reduce inefficiencies, maximize opportunities, and strategize.<sup>51</sup> As the goals of the humanitarian ecosystem differ from those in the private sector – the end goal is not the growth of the organization but rather the improved delivery of services to vulnerable communities – we will not frame our analysis by

how INGOs can create a comparative advantage over other humanitarian actors but rather use the value-chain analysis to examine how INGOs can best structure themselves to complement other actors in the humanitarian ecosystem, striving to ensure the best possible delivery of services for communities through a collaborative, not competitive, approach. For the humanitarian ecosystem, we have identified seven primary activities for the delivery of humanitarian interventions.

Image by Neil Cooper



## Humanitarian value chain



The organizational profiles presented explore how INGOs could give different weight to each activity on the value chain, depending on how they see their role in the humanitarian ecosystem. By thinking strategically about their place in the humanitarian ecosystem compared to other actors, INGOs can identify where their value-added is in an ecosystem with a growing number of actors, which will enable them to concentrate their resources strategically where they can deliver humanitarian aid most efficiently. We do not explore a profile where an INGO approaches all the activities on the value chain with equal importance. Rather, organizational profiles are structured to explore how INGOs can complement other actors in the humanitarian space, maintaining their relevance but adapting to the new realities in which they find themselves to more effectively achieve their mission. Organizational profiles are designed to highlight how INGOs can amplify their impact

through excellence and adaptability and leverage their requisite skills and resources to catalyze humanitarian action.

INGOs have the capacity to shape the humanitarian ecosystem, but to do so requires a willingness to forgo dominance across the full value chain, to support other actors to take over on some primary activities, and to focus on the areas where their skills and experience can have the most influence. It necessitates that INGOs challenge the competitive incentive structure in which they operate to build a more collaborative response. A change in organizational profile would result in a complete change in structure, as each requires markedly different resources and expertise to be effective. Below are five proposed organizational structures for INGOs.



# Organizational profile 1: INGO© – franchised partners, linked through global brand

## Focus on the value chain



The INGO structure is built on franchised national NGOs and private partners, coordinated by regional management. The franchised national NGOs will be accountable for consortia building and operations, supported by stakeholder empowerment (included in terms of emergency-response capacity) by regional INGO management. INGO programming is underpinned by pre-emptive strategies built up with collaborative and participative foresight techniques, driven from field level. These pre-emptive strategies are regularly updated according to regional monitoring systems that look for changes in transnational determinants.

### Level of strategic alignment

The principle of subsidiarity is key in this organizational profile. National and local NGOs and private partners are franchised into an INGO structure but retain significant degree of power, driven through a bottom-up approach to strategy and policy setting. Franchised members sit on the board of the INGO and are the main powerbrokers in its governance. This structure is highly pragmatic, allowing the maximum variation to enable a broad approach that can position the organization on many different types of crises and thematics.

### Business model

This organizational profile is based on an assumption that institutional donors continue to be the primary source of income for INGOs. To complement these funds, INGOs can engage in revenue generating activities (through their private partner franchises) and seek private donations at the global level and through local and national NGO partners.

### Key competencies required in the INGO

- Knowledge management
- Analysis, foresight based strategy and forecast based action
- Systems thinking
- Technical expertise on key sectors of implementation
- Architect/lead contractor ability
- Regional and local network design and management
- Capacity building and empowerment, including humanitarian leadership and governments
- Advocacy and policy
- Monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning


### Limitations

1. INGOs significantly downsize their operations capacity
2. INGOs play a lesser role in leading in humanitarian responses
3. More variation in the standards of quality that are applied to programming
4. There is a reliance on institutional donors

# Organizational profile 2: INGO

## Global Fund – gathering funds for a cause

### Focus on the value chain



The INGO structure is a conduit for gathering and managing public and private funds and revenues. Local and regional NGOs and private companies apply for funding structured around a regularly updated strategy. The strategy is informed by big-data intelligence and analysis according to the vision. Granted national, regional NGOs, and private companies will be accountable for the programming design and operations.

### Level of strategic alignment

There is strong alignment on the brand, values, and vision of the organization. The INGO structure is highly centralized, and all activities are focused on a narrow transnational issue such as infectious diseases, hunger, or LGBTI rights. All programs and partners receiving funds through the organization must demonstrate how they fit into the strategy and contribute toward the stated objectives of the INGO.

### Business model

The business model of this profile brings together three different funding strands. First, partnership with large multinational corporations and financial institutions will be a key source of funding. INGOs will need to position themselves as the holders of expertise that can facilitate the most effective distribution of funds to achieve strategic objectives. Second, INGOs will work to source funds from private donations. The third funding stream for INGOs of this profile is revenue that comes from marketable innovations developed by specialized research teams and tested through programs.

### Limitations

1. Limited contact with vulnerable populations
2. Competition with extant foundations with independent funding sources
3. Increased emphasis on compliance

### Key competencies required in the INGO

- Fundraising from private donors (including relationship building and maintenance)
- Contract and fund management with institutional donors (funds of tens of millions of USD)
- Big-data intelligence
- Specialized research teams on topics of focus (evolve with funding landscape, in line with vision)
- Legal, auditing, and financial expertise in headquarters
- Monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning
- Advocacy, lobbying, and policy

# Organizational profile 3: Fire-Fighting INGO – direct implementer, specialized emergency responder

## Focus on the value chain



INGO programming is largely reactive in responding to major emergencies. Disaster-preparedness programming is informed by a risks-and-hazard unit. The INGO structures are built on four levels of network complexity (local, national, regional, and global), which can be modulated in terms of where resources flow according to the georisk and hazard mapping. To respond to highly impactful hazards, an emergency surge unit is set up at the global level, with regional bases and frontline stocks pre-identified according to the geo-risk mapping.

### Level of strategic alignment

There is alignment in the structure of the INGO to optimize the efficiency of processes – emergency capacity hosted at global level, decentralized programming to regional level, and operations run locally. INGOs have a niche focus on specific thematic of intervention (e.g. water supply or food security). The reactive nature of responses requires a highly adaptable structure capable of surging to respond to large-scale emergencies.

### Business model

This organizational profile is focused on a traditional business model for INGOs, funds from institutional donors and private donations.

### Limitations

1. Siloed approach to humanitarian crises, lack of investment in resilience
2. Limited transformational capacity, inability to become game changer in the system
3. Trapped in perpetual response
4. Reliance on institutional donors


### Key competencies required in the INGO

- Logistics
- Niche focus (thematically) with a high degree of expertise in program implementation
- Emergency-response capacity (surge)
- Local capacity (including through partners maintained in areas with high levels of consistent fragility)
- Risk management (including analytics)
- development



# Organizational profile 4: INGO & Co – communalization of resources in a network

## Focus on the value chain



The efficiencies of scale make it difficult for INGOs to operate as independent entities; alliances of INGOs becomes the norm, consolidating expertise. INGO support services (human resources, logistics, financial management, etc.) are privatized. Policy, lobbying, advocacy, and stakeholder empowerment are managed in consortia and informed by a network of analysts and technical staff building an evidence base. Programming and operations (emergencies) are managed by local partners locally with the support of the INGO consortia.

### Level of strategic alignment

This organizational profile is founded on the communalization of resources. This necessitates a high degree of alignment on the thematic of intervention and geographical reach of the organization. The principle of subsidiarity is strongly applied. INGOs work as independent agencies only at the top of the value chain, where they leverage their brand recognition, communications skills, and fundraising experience to contribute to a large network.

### Business model

Due to the communalization of activities in the middle of the value chain, there is a significant margin for cost savings for INGOs. The resources required for fundraising (the only element singularly managed by an INGO) stems mostly from individual giving, foundations, and sponsorship. Network activities are funded by institutional donors and private corporations, which give both financial support and in-kind donations supporting activities (e.g. in anticipation).

### Limitations

1. Political compromises on identity of INGOs
2. Reduced competitive advantage
3. Limited implication on the value chain

### Key competencies required in the INGO

- Brand management and communications
- Fundraising
- In global consortia, between agencies sharing the same values and vision: strategy, advocacy policy development, research, program management, MEAL

# Organizational profile 5: INGO At Your Service – service provider for local and regional humanitarian actors

## Focus on the value chain



INGOs no longer engage in operations. They are a resource for local and regional NGOs to whom funding flows directly from institutional and private donors. INGOs provide a valuable source of expertise on a demand-driven basis to advise on program design, support advocacy, and empower new humanitarian actors. INGOs are a space for research and development, which they use to inform their work and supplement their revenue stream. The structure is highly centralized in major cities worldwide.

### Level of strategic alignment

This is a highly centralized model where the full capacity of the INGO is concentrated in programming activities – the design of humanitarian interventions. INGOs maintain the technical expertise and host the evidence base from which they support implementers in designing humanitarian interventions using consistent methodologies, tools, and approaches to provide a guarantee of quality. To remain competitive, INGOs will need to maintain their capacity for consultation and research on a broad spectrum of thematic and operational modalities, engaging with the private sector and academic institutions.

### Business model

This organizational profile is predicated on the assumption that local and national NGOs and private sector actors would, for a time, seek support from INGOs who retain a significant amount of technical expertise on a consultancy basis. As such, the primary funding stream would be through contracts to deliver services to other humanitarian actors. This is based on a reversal of the current funding stream, where national and local NGOs receive the majority of humanitarian funding directly and subsequently employ support where required. To complement this, INGOs would also leverage their technical expertise by exploiting patents and licencing for innovations and develop close partnerships with multinational consulting firms.

### Key competencies required in the INGO

- Technical expertise (sectoral, project-cycle management, MEAL, advocacy, risk management, etc.)
- Knowledge management
- Research and development
- Mentoring, coaching, and training
- Marketing and business development

### Limitations

1. No decision-making capacity in the humanitarian space
2. No operational capacity
3. The sustainability of the model as other actors become increasingly experienced and carry greater weight within the international humanitarian ecosystem

These organizational profiles have been designed to provoke thought about what the role of INGOs could look like in 2030. The relevance of each approach will be heavily influenced by how the environment that humanitarian actors operate in evolves and the objectives of each INGO.

# Fit for the future: relevance of organizational profiles in 2030

There are pros and cons to each organizational profile; however, to fully evaluate how relevant each profile would be in 2030, they must be put into the context of the global scenarios, which define the potential environment in which they will operate.

## **INGO© – franchised partners, linked through global brand: fit for the future?**

The INGO© profile is fairly well adapted to the four global scenarios due to its elastic and inclusive structure, which can integrate both non-profit and for-profit actors. Only in the Narrow Gate scenario does this profile have poor relevance as a result of the increased nationalization of aid and withdrawal of legitimacy and influence of global initiatives. In The Narrow Gate there is little space for the growth of large transnational structures that INGO© would create. While INGO© has an added value in the management of ecosystemic crises, as its federated structure is designed to work transnationally and is managed regionally, it has the greatest value in scenarios with new forms of governance. The inverted power structure of INGO© enables it to not only maintain its relevance but to use its elasticity to adapt to a more competitive space, as in the case of To Each Their Playing Field.

## **INGO Global Fund – gathering funds for a cause: fit for the future?**

The high level of specialization of the INGO Global Fund could allow it to play a limited but essential role in multiple scenarios. The INGO Global Fund has the highest added value in the To Each Their Playing Field context, where it can leverage its specific focus (either on a specific thematic or crisis) to mobilize funds for a diverse network of humanitarian actors in a competitive space. The INGO Global Fund can contribute to specific, strategic initiatives where relevant but is particularly impactful in supporting humanitarian actors directly implementing programming in forgotten crises. INGO Global Fund can have an added value in focusing its efforts on providing an alternative form of funds for humanitarian actors in an increasingly competitive and nationalistic environment, as in The Narrow Gate, though its relevance in this scenario could be time limited. The specialization of the INGO Global Fund profile becomes an asset in the (R)evolutions scenario as the organization has transferred many of the activities on the value chain to other humanitarian actors and can leverage its experience to set new rules and standards for the international humanitarian ecosystem. However, while the narrow focus of the INGO Global Fund could allow it to carve out a space in the other scenarios, it has less relevance in responding to the needs of ecosystemic crises where there is limited global governance to drive the integration of their efforts with complementary partners, demonstrated in the Overflow scenario.

## **Fire-Fighting INGO – direct implementer, specialized emergency responder: fit for the future?**

The Fire-Fighting INGO is not as flexible an organizational profile. That it does not transfer power and adapt to new forms of governance in its structure and approach limits the capacity of Fire-Fighting INGO to be as effective a game-changer in the long run, which means that for both To Each Their Playing Field and (R)evolutions the role of this organizational profile is more limited. Nevertheless, Fire-Fighting INGOs could still have a critically important role in the delivery of short-term, emergency responses in which they are specialized. This is especially evident in a context categorized by a withdrawal of global governance. In this context, the independence of the model means that it maintains its added value in providing support where it can deliver small but effective responses (namely in fragile contexts) and support national capacity where it is unable to meet the needs as in the Overflow scenario (especially for programming on transnational migration).

## **INGO & Co – communalization of resources in a network: fit for the future?**

INGO & Co is the most adaptable organizational profile. Its high level of cost efficiency and focusing of its resources on the activities in the humanitarian value chain where it can complement other actors ensures its continued relevance. The networked way of working, which amplifies other humanitarian actors' impacts, best suits it to respond to ecosystemic crises where new partners can be easily included to ensure a systematic response at a regional level, as evidenced in the Overflow and (R)evolutions scenarios. The integrated but streamlined network is a high value in the (R)evolutions scenario as it is able to leverage shared capacity to shape the creation of new standards and rules, helping to define the evolution of the humanitarian ecosystem. INGO & Co has an added value in scenarios where localized crises are the norm, but the full potential of the model is not realized, as the networked structure would have limited relevance transnationally.

## **INGO At Your Service – service provider for local and regional humanitarian actors: fit for the future?**

INGO At Your Service is one of the least adapted profiles, not because of its potential effectiveness but rather how long the model will remain relevant. INGO At Your Service has the poorest relevance in the Narrow Gate scenario as the resurgence in sovereignty and nationalism combined with increased privatization and militarization of the humanitarian ecosystem reduces the demand for INGO expertise. In the Narrow Gate scenario, humanitarian action is both implemented and supported by national actors. While similar dynamics in global governance exist in the Overflow scenario, the scale of the needs to which humanitarian actors must respond creates a market for INGOs to



support national and regional capacities, underpinning the move to address transnational ecosystemic crises more effectively. In To Each Their Playing Field, the INGO At Your Service profile has added value but only in the short to medium term. As INGO At Your Service supports new actors entering the humanitarian ecosystem (both public and private) and builds the capacity of existing humanitarian actors at the local level, it transmits its skills and experience, empowering new actors and making itself redundant. As a result, the INGO At Your Service model will have limited relevance in 2030. Though the same process is consistent for the (R)evolutions scenario as the power structures within the humanitarian ecosystem change, a recomposed humanitarian ecosystem that can set rules and standards for itself could have more space for INGO At Your Service, working for and across new structures. Hence, there could still be value in this model in

the (R)evolutions scenario even as the capacity of other actors in the ecosystem grows.

Each profile has been evaluated for its relevance to each scenario on a scale of high added value to poor relevance. This scale measures the ability of an INGO in the profile expressed to contribute effectively to humanitarian responses and reduce vulnerability.

Scenarios	The Narrow Gate	Overflow	To Each Their Playing Field	(R)evolutions
Organizational profiles				
Organizational profile 1: INGO©	<p><b>Poor relevance</b></p> <p>Risk of progressive loss of legitimacy for INGOs due to increased nationalization of humanitarian aid</p>	<p><b>Added value</b></p> <p>Well adapted for some crises (largescale involuntary migration, ecosystemic crisis, etc.) Responses are transnational, defined by the crises, not national borders</p>	<p><b>High value</b></p> <p>High elasticity of the INGOs due to the bottom-up power structure make them more adaptive and relevant in a competitive space</p>	<p><b>Added value</b></p> <p>Inverted power structure increases legitimacy of the INGO in the creation of a new and more equitable humanitarian architecture</p>
Organizational profile 2: INGO Global Fund	<p><b>Added value</b></p> <p>Relevant at middle term for INGOs as their legitimacy as implementers and funding sources is challenged. Long term there is a risk of nondifferentiation with other foundations</p>	<p><b>Limited relevance</b></p> <p>Maladapted to systematically engage with multiple and complex crisis situations</p>	<p><b>High value</b></p> <p>Relevant on specific programmatic thematic or crises, added value in forgotten crises</p>	<p><b>Added value</b></p> <p>Full transfer of some activities on the humanitarian value chain and a specialized focus, bringing expertise to the creation of a new humanitarian ecosystem</p>

Scenarios	The Narrow Gate	Overflow	To Each Their Playing Field	(R)evolutions
Organizational profiles				
Organizational profile 3: Fire-Fighting INGO	<p>Added value</p> <p>Well adapted for direct implementation of small but effective short-term responses</p>	<p>Added value</p> <p>Emergency responses can be delivered at scale to meet escalating levels of needs, unable to address root causes of vulnerability in complex crises</p>	<p>Limited relevance</p> <p>INGOs specialized in emergency response have limited transformational capacity in a game of complex cooperation</p>	<p>Poor relevance</p> <p>INGOs have limited value when limited to direct interventions in a world where the humanitarian ecosystem is highly recomposed</p>
Organizational profile 4: INGO & Co	<p>Added value</p> <p>Founded on network with national, local, and faith-based NGOs secures access, cost efficient</p>	<p>High value</p> <p>Cost effective, impact of national, local, and faithbased NGOs amplified by transnational approach in response to ecosystemic crises</p>	<p>Added value</p> <p>Non-competitive model of coworking is well adapted to an open-network ecosystem</p>	<p>High value</p> <p>Network increases integration of new actors in the ecosystem and the legitimacy of INGOs in becoming rule makers shaping the evolution of the humanitarian architecture</p>
Organizational profile 5: INGO At Your Service	<p>Poor relevance</p> <p>Limited international funds are directed to national organizations, specific demand for services is covered by traditional business actors in a competitive, national market</p>	<p>Added value</p> <p>INGO services are sought to reinforce national aid actors to meet overwhelming needs</p>	<p>Limited relevance</p> <p>Medium-term added value as national and local actors are empowered to lead locally integrated responses, longterm irrelevance as added value decreases due to rising capacity of other actors in the ecosystem</p>	<p>Added value</p> <p>Leverage expertise to support new and evolving actors to lead in the creation of a new humanitarian ecosystem, evolving role in a recomposed ecosystem</p>

# Conclusion

The evolving global context in which the humanitarian ecosystem will exist, as is expressed in the global scenarios, will define how humanitarian actors must adapt to be successful. Though there are uncertainties as to how this environment will evolve and the way in which humanitarian needs and crises will change, there are some adaptations actors in the humanitarian ecosystem can make to best prepare. The humanitarian ecosystem is changing, and new actors will increase in their prominence and power. If formal humanitarian-sector actors do not change their modalities of interaction with non-formal actors and support a genuine power shift, they could find themselves side lined as “parallel systems”<sup>52</sup> are created. The humanitarian ecosystem must explore new ways of working together (including with actors that have hitherto been kept at arm’s length, such as the private sector and military actors) and embrace new approaches to humanitarianism, accepting a broader understanding of what principled humanitarian action can look like.

The ongoing initiatives to bridge the divide between humanitarian and development work are critical for the humanitarian ecosystem to make the shift to systematically engaging with the vulnerabilities they tackle and the crises they respond to, which is fundamental to increasing their effectiveness in the long term. In order to design and implement systematic interventions, which is the only way to make measurable progress toward the SDGs, actors in the humanitarian ecosystem must work more collaboratively and draw on the expertise of all the actors included under that umbrella. All actors in the humanitarian ecosystem must learn to act pre-emptively if they are to become game-changers and effect long-term change for the communities they serve. The ability to plan strategically for a collaborative response that most efficiently uses the resources of the diverse actors in the humanitarian ecosystem is an essential capacity that must be developed.

## Challenges for INGOs

INGOs will need to work against the current incentive structure to shape their new role in the evolving system. This will require a double focus, to continue to deliver much-needed humanitarian aid in the near-term while concurrently challenging themselves to make the investments necessary for a successful strategic shift toward 2030.

INGOs will need to be proactive in pursuing their own structural change to be in a position to exert leadership and explore new ways of working with different humanitarian actors. If INGOs wait for the incentive structure to change or postpone making the requisite changes to their approaches, they will be left behind.

INGOs will need to give more support to the inversion of the power structure in the humanitarian ecosystem, going beyond capacity building to the full transfer of activities of the value chain, even though this will reduce their own comparative advantage. INGOs can be instrumental in pushing the humanitarian ecosystem to abide by the commitments of localization, cash programming, and networked ways of working that came from the World Humanitarian Summit.

## Recommendations

1. INGOs need to think strategically about what their value added is and how they will be situated in the humanitarian ecosystem vis-à-vis other actors to ensure that they continue to contribute as effectively as possible to the alleviation of human suffering and the building of community resilience
2. INGOs need to analyze where they can optimize their activities through restructuring, refocusing, or partnerships to increase their impact
3. INGOs must be prepared to challenge the vested interests in the humanitarian ecosystem and critically assess who can deliver the best services moving forward (organizationally and individually)

Image by Sergey Neamoscou





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# Annex 1: Types of Humanitarian Crises by 2030

Protracted crisis

## Large-scale involuntary migrations

### Nature of crisis and origin

The causes of large-scale involuntary migration vary depending on the context, but multiple factors, including persecution, insecurity, conflict, natural disasters, environmental degradation, endemic poverty, and a lack of opportunities, often contribute. Migrant source countries must concurrently manage the ramifications of the crises that caused displacement and caseloads of internally displaced people. 86% of refugees are in the Global South<sup>56</sup>; countries that host large displaced populations struggle to find the resources and political will for the management and absorption of refugees. The average length of displacement has reached 26 years,<sup>57</sup> exemplifying the fact that crises involving largescale involuntary migration encompass both urgent needs created through new waves of displacement and long-term care made necessary by protracted situations.

### Vulnerabilities

The global forcibly displaced population comprises people in differing situations of displacement: those internally displaced, refugees displaced across an international border, and asylum seekers. Displaced populations are highly vulnerable as they have limited forms of protection and are often forced into highly insecure environments. Approximately 50% of refugees are women and girls<sup>58</sup> who are at particular risk of gender-based violence. Along transit routes and in hosting areas, displaced people lack access to basic services, including healthcare, education, and sanitation, and have limited access to water and food. Displaced populations are increasingly urban: over 60% of refugees and 80% of IDPs live in urban centers.<sup>59</sup> Though displaced people living in cities might have greater freedom than those who are encamped, as well as the ability to earn an income and to informally integrate, there are significant risks, including exploitation and detention. A lack of durable solutions,<sup>60</sup> discrimination, and derogation of rights create an intolerable situation for many forcibly displaced people. Smuggling by organized criminal groups is also a significant risk as displaced communities seek greater safety.

### Predictability and frequency

- Patterns of displacement in conflicts and crises caused by slow-onset natural hazards can be relatively predictable, while displacement from events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are highly unpredictable
- The intensity of the crises are highly variable

### Case study: Somalia

Severe drought and decades of endemic conflict in Somalia have forced millions of people to flee their homes. The first of the displaced communities who fled their homes in the 1990s have since been compounded by multiple waves of refugees and IDPs.<sup>53</sup> Though there have been some returns in periods of relative calm, these have not been significant enough to dramatically reduce the size of the displaced population. Since 2011-2012 the situation has dramatically worsened due to an intensive drought and the deterioration of the conflict. In 2016, 883,000 Somali refugees lived in neighboring countries, including Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Yemen.<sup>54</sup> Displaced communities are subjected to protection violations and food insecurity and often receive services that are below minimum humanitarian standards as a result of continued funding shortfalls.<sup>55</sup> There is little prospect of a significant proportion of displaced Somali communities having access to durable solutions in the foreseeable future, making them reliant on humanitarian aid and the Somali diaspora, which provides a huge inflow of support.

### Other similar cases/examples

- Horn of Africa displacement crisis<sup>61</sup>
- Bay of Bengal displacement crisis<sup>62</sup>
- Central America displacement crisis<sup>63</sup>
- Syrian displacement crisis<sup>64</sup>

### Challenges (obstacles, difficulties, and leverage)

Durable solutions to displacement require significant funding and political will. The lack of progress in finding sustainable solutions creates protracted caseloads, which are compounded by new waves of displacement that increase the overall burden. Humanitarian actors face donor fatigue and a severe lack of funding to respond to displacement crises; in 2015, UNHCR anticipated that it received only 47% of its comprehensive budget,<sup>65</sup> leaving a significant gap and dramatically increasing the vulnerability of displaced communities who rely on international support.

## State fragility: system failure

### Nature of crisis and origin

State fragility represents a continuum toward system failure. The root causes of crises as a result of state fragility are multidimensional and vary depending on the context, but their origins lie in endemic poverty, economic stagnation or decline, demographic pressure, ethnic fractionalization, a lack of institutional sustainability, corruption, social and political exclusion, cycles of insecurity and violence, and regional conflict dynamics. State fragility results in chronic instability and the inability of governments to fulfill their core functions due to an absence of capacity, authority, or legitimacy.<sup>66</sup> States that are fragile often experience inter- or intra-state conflicts such as civil war or ethnic and resource conflicts. Even where conflict is absent the inability of a government to exert full control over its territory can create an enabling environment for the proliferation of crime and community tensions. State fragility is often worsened by natural hazards.

### Vulnerabilities

Crises caused by state fragility often result in large-scale forced displacement. Displaced populations and those who remain in their homes can suffer from a lack of access to basic services, including healthcare, sanitation, education, and food. Fragile states often lack large-scale and functioning infrastructure as a result of a lack of investment in state institutions or from ongoing damage during conflict. The consequences of protracted state fragility on the development of the country and its population are often intergenerational.<sup>70</sup>

### Predictability and frequency

- Crises from state fragility are protracted

### Examples

- Central African Republic, South Sudan, Somalia
- Afghanistan
- Yemen, Iraq<sup>71</sup>

Image by Florian Serieux



### Case study: South Sudan

The crisis in South Sudan is an archetypal example of state fragility resulting in system failure. The situation in South Sudan compounds a long history of multilevel violence with socio-economic dynamics, including clan conflict, endemic poverty, high levels of population growth, and a lack of infrastructure that creates an environment of perpetual fragility. Since the outbreak of the civil conflict in 2013, sparked by a political struggle between differing factions in the government, 1.3 million people have sought refuge in neighboring countries and 1.9 million people are internally displaced.<sup>67</sup> In April 2017, 7.5 million people were in need of assistance out of a population of approximately 12 million.<sup>68</sup> Famine was declared by United Nations officials in Unity State, impacting more than 100,000 people,<sup>69</sup> and food insecurity across the country is widespread. South Sudan is projected to remain a highly fragile context for the foreseeable future.

### Challenges in response (obstacles, difficulties, and leverage)

Humanitarian actors face many challenges when responding to crises in fragile contexts, including consistently high levels of insecurity and, in some areas, lack of access to vulnerable communities.<sup>72</sup> Limited state capacity and the emergence of concurrent crises compound the needs of the population in ever more complex situations. Though fragile contexts receive the majority of funds dedicated to humanitarian responses, funding is variable, is often insufficient to meet needs,<sup>73</sup> and remains highly reactive, with limited funds available for building resilience or addressing the structural causes of vulnerability. Additionally, while many crises in these areas are protracted, multi-year funding to address structural drivers of fragility is rare.



## Persecution of minorities / targeted groups

### Nature of crisis and origin

A multitude of people and groups face discrimination, exclusion, and the threat of physical violence due to their ethnicity, religious belief, skin color, gender, or sexual orientation. Victims of modern slavery<sup>76</sup> are also highly vulnerable. Discrimination can be institutionalized through culture and by law through national or local authorities.

### Vulnerabilities

The affected minorities and targeted groups have limited or no protection under the law, particularly when discrimination is formalized through the state or local authorities. As a result of their persecution, targeted groups can be denied their fundamental rights and access to basic services, including healthcare and education. In the most severe cases, targeted populations face displacement, intimidation, arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture. Discrimination is likely to have life-long and even inter-generational ramifications.

### Predictability and frequency

- These crises are protracted, with discrimination escalating or waning unpredictably over long periods of time and changes in political leaders and social and cultural mores. Targets are variable.
- The frequency and intensity of persecution vary according to the political, economic, and social climate

### Other similar cases/examples

- LGBT communities (e.g. Chechnya,<sup>77</sup> Saudi Arabia<sup>78</sup>)
- Ethnic minority groups (e.g. Rohingya in Myanmar<sup>79</sup>)
- Religious communities (e.g. Baha'is in Iran, Evangelical Christians in Eritrea<sup>80</sup>)
- Political opposition (e.g. Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo<sup>81</sup>)
- Migrant workers (e.g. domestic workers in Oman<sup>82</sup>)

### Challenges (obstacles, difficulties, and leverage)

Humanitarian actors face many obstacles in an evolving and often-repressive political or cultural environment with extreme sensitivities to external intervention. They often lack access to vulnerable groups, particularly when the discrimination comes from local authorities and is institutionalized in law. Activists are often subject to threats of retribution, undermining their capacity.

### Case study: Persecution of gay men in Chechnya

In 2017, persecution of the LGBT community in Chechnya intensified, resulting in a campaign targeting gay men in the region who have been detained, tortured, or forcibly disappeared.<sup>74</sup> Hostility toward the LGBT community is widespread in Russia, and the escalation has worsened the treatment of LGBT communities, underpinning the “pervasive tone of homophobia.”<sup>75</sup> Given the level of institutionalization of persecution of the LGBT community it is unlikely to dissipate in the foreseeable future, leaving a significant number of gay men highly vulnerable.

## Sudden-onset disasters caused by natural hazards

### Nature of crisis and origin

Natural hazards are extreme geophysical, hydrological, or weather-related events such as earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, floods, or storms. When such an event overwhelms the capacity of those affected to deal with it, it can become a disaster. The impact of the crisis can be highly localized or global depending on the scale of the event and level of preparedness and resilience of affected communities.

### Vulnerabilities

Disasters induced by natural hazards can lead to critically high death tolls. Even where there is extensive preparedness, the scale of some events can overwhelm government capacity to respond effectively. Affected populations can be displaced and are often unable to access basic services. There is reduced or little access to essential provisions, including food and water. In addition to damage to the built environment, heavily polluted air and water can compound environmental fragility resulting from the event. Over the long term, impacted areas face severe and long-lasting economic costs and disruptions, particularly in areas with recurrent disasters. Where disasters caused by natural hazards occur in already vulnerable or fragile countries, the damage can be significantly greater and the long-term impacts more severe.

### Predictability and frequency

- Weather-related crises are mainly predictable; however, geophysical disasters are highly unpredictable
- These crises are frequent though highly variable in intensity (there are few events with affected populations over 2 million people)<sup>86</sup>

### Case study: Indian Ocean tsunami

The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami killed more than 228,000 people.<sup>83</sup> It was one of the deadliest disasters ever reported. Hundreds of thousands more people were injured and up to 5 million people across 14 countries were affected.<sup>84</sup> The social and economic life in the region was significantly disrupted, and the local ecosystem and environment were impacted over the long term, for example by the damage done to the coral reefs and through salt intrusion.<sup>85</sup>

### Other similar cases/examples

- Earthquake in Haiti in 2010
- Tsunami on the northeast coast of Japan in 2011
- Earthquake in Van, Turkey, in 2011
- Earthquake in Nepal in 2015<sup>87</sup>
- Flooding in India in 2016<sup>88</sup>

### Challenges (obstacles, difficulties, and leverage)

The destruction of critical infrastructure makes access to affected areas more difficult. The scale of disasters caused by natural hazards can overwhelm the humanitarian ecosystem as affected populations reach into the millions. Over the long term, affected areas have to try to build resilience while attempting to manage the disruption to local socio-economic life and the natural environment on which many livelihoods depend.



## Epidemics

### Nature of crisis and origin

An epidemic is the “occurrence in a community or region of cases of an illness, specific health-related behavior, or other health-related events clearly in excess of normal expectancy.”<sup>91</sup> A disease outbreak beyond a normal caseload in countries with weak or unprepared health systems can have regional or even global consequences. The re-emergence of near extinct infectious diseases, such as polio, poses significant concern in areas with limited immunity where the diseases could quickly spread.<sup>92</sup> New infectious diseases are even more challenging as the time required to adapt current medication to stem the spread of infection and develop a new vaccine is unpredictable. In addition to human vulnerability to epidemics, animal and plant diseases are also of significant concern. Transboundary plant and animal diseases can spread rapidly, devastating crops and pasture and resulting in high levels of animal death and disease.<sup>93</sup> Two global megatrends underpin the dramatic escalation in the spread of animal and plant diseases: globalization and climate change.<sup>94</sup> Where resources are inadequate to meet and contain the outbreak, the scale of the emergency and loss of human and animal life can rapidly escalate, depending on the characteristics of the disease.

### Characteristics of involved population

In the case of an epidemic (even more so in a pandemic) a large proportion of the population (human, animal, and plant) is affected, which can overwhelm the capacity of local systems and even an international response.

Epidemics can result in significant death and disease among affected populations. Communities in affected areas can have difficulty in accessing basic services and essential goods (including food) as resources are directed to the emergency response and movement across zones of infection are limited. The focus on epidemic response can result in a reduction of services and attention to other healthcare priorities, such as nutrition. There can be long-term health and socio-economic ramifications of an epidemic for affected communities.<sup>95</sup>

Outbreaks of plant and animal diseases can result in huge losses of livestock, crops, and pasture, significantly increasing the risk of food insecurity and devastating livelihoods in affected areas.<sup>96</sup> The socio-economic impact of animal and plant epidemics can be long-lasting.

### Case study: 2014 Ebola outbreak

In March 2014, Guinea experienced an outbreak of the Ebola virus.<sup>89</sup> The outbreak subsequently spread but was concentrated in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. More than 28,000 people were infected and 11,323 killed.<sup>90</sup> The Ebola outbreak was declared over in 2016, but it has significantly undermined the economic and social life of affected countries.

### Predictability and frequency

- Epidemics are infrequent and sporadic with variable intensity
- Epidemic crises are predictable with alert/outbreak thresholds monitored by states and, on the global level, by the WHO<sup>97</sup>

### Other similar cases/examples

- HIV<sup>98</sup>
- Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)<sup>99</sup>
- Ebola<sup>100</sup>
- Foot-and-mouth disease<sup>101</sup>
- Wheat rust diseases<sup>102</sup>

### Challenges (obstacles, difficulties, and leverage)

Limited health systems in resource-restricted countries and competing health priorities make the management of epidemics difficult. Local authorities can find it challenging to recruit sufficiently qualified personnel, adequately resource health centers, and provide assistance to affected populations. Humanitarian actors, governments, and international organizations may be unable to contain the spread of the epidemic if funding is not provided at the level required and the time requested. With increased human mobility, containing the spread of epidemics is increasingly challenging.

## Man-made destructive events

### Nature of crisis and origin

A man-made destructive event such as a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack or technological accident could lead to a localized system collapse. The potential consequences of such an event are likely to surpass the capacity of local authorities and may result in large-scale destruction of infrastructure and create unprecedented needs among affected communities. International efforts could be hampered by the difficulty of accessing the disaster areas.

### Characteristics of involved population

The population in affected areas faces a significant immediate death toll and protracted health complications, particularly for nuclear, chemical, or biological attacks or accidents. Depending on the scale and nature of the event, those affected might not be able to access basic services and essential provisions, and there would likely be large-scale displacement. Elderly and disabled people are some of the most vulnerable as they can be highly immobile and unable to easily leave affected areas. Over the long term, the affected population likely suffers physical and psychological trauma. The environmental and economic effects of such an event may be long-lasting and potentially irreversible, dramatically altering the socio-economic and political dynamics of the region.

### Predictability and frequency

- Such crises have a low probability of occurring
- The risks are predictable, with the possibility to put in place emergency and anticipatory measures at the local, national, or even regional level. However, the event itself and the targets are hard to predict.

### Other similar cases/examples

- Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks in 1945<sup>104</sup>
- Use of chemical weapons by Iraq in 1980s<sup>105</sup>
- Use of chemical weapons in Aleppo<sup>106</sup>
- Chernobyl accident<sup>107</sup>

### Case study: Chernobyl

On April 26, 1986, an explosion occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine, releasing dangerous radioactive material. Nearly 8,400,000 people were exposed to radiation and 404,000 people were resettled.<sup>103</sup> The health consequences for those affected have lasted for decades. The environment and local ecosystem were devastated for decades, with significant portions of the surrounding areas contaminated, necessitating an exclusion zone. This is an extreme example of the consequences of a large-scale manmade disaster.

### Challenges (obstacles, difficulties, and leverage)

The legal and political consequences of a deliberate attack, violating international law, could complicate access to affected areas and any response. The local system is unlikely to be able to function and could collapse. The safety of the affected area, the establishment of networks through which goods and services could flow, and the distribution of staple goods could be extremely challenging for humanitarian responders given the scale of the population in need. Impacted and neighboring areas face long-term destabilization, while at the global level such events could undermine international stability and diplomatic relations. The risk of retaliation is high, particularly if responsibility for the event is rightly or wrongly attributed to a state or a recognized organization.





## Ecosystemic crisis: Ecosystem, regional destabilization, environmental, climactic, agricultural

### Nature of crisis and origin

Ecosystemic crises are caused by a combination of factors – including environmental, political, and economic instability – that, through their intersection over time, compound human vulnerability. Demographic pressure and natural-resource mismanagement reinforce endemic poverty and the environmental fragility of the concerned areas, which are often politically marginalized. The transboundary nature of these crises can result in global or regional destabilization.

### Vulnerabilities

Ecosystemic crises are protracted, and the results can be intergenerational. Affected populations suffer from chronic poverty, a loss of livelihoods, marginalization, displacement, poor health outcomes, and reduced food supply, including in major urban centers. Damage caused by ecosystemic crises can be irreversible, permanently changing the environment and economy of affected areas.

### Predictability and frequency

- Ecosystemic crises are protracted
- The situations develop over long periods of time and will worsen without strategic interventions

### Other similar cases/examples

- Crisis in the Lake Chad Basin<sup>113</sup>
- Crisis in the Ganges Delta<sup>114</sup>
- Crisis in the Gonakier forests of the Senegal River floodplain<sup>115</sup>
- Aral Sea, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan<sup>116</sup>

### Challenges (obstacles, difficulties, and leverage)

The main challenge in responding to this type of crisis is the interrelation of drivers, which considerably diversifies and increases the needs. Ecosystemic crises are defined by the ecological boundaries of an area, as opposed to international borders of states, which then requires a degree of regional cooperation to manage the response. Political engagement in affected areas is highly variable, but marginalization can significantly reduce the resources that are made available for crisis management at a national or regional level. The dynamics of multi-year crises are further complicated by the lack of multi-year funding.

### Case study: Lake Chad

There is an ecosystemic crisis in the region surrounding Lake Chad where environmental and economic stress intersect with the Boko Haram conflict, compounding the vulnerability of affected populations. Since the 1970s Lake Chad has shrunk by 90%.<sup>663</sup> The effects of climate change, population growth and the unsustainable exploitation of water for irrigation have all contributed to the worsening fragility of the Lake Chad basin.<sup>664</sup> This has had serious consequences for the population depending on the Lake and its resources, increasing unemployment and poverty, limiting economic opportunities and, growing resentment among communities. Approximately 50 million people rely on the Lake and its resources for their livelihood, a population likely to double by 2030 adding ever greater stress to the area.<sup>665</sup> While a commission to manage the resources of Lake Chad was established in the 1960s, there has been little measurable progress in stemming the worsening “ecological catastrophe”.<sup>666</sup> Adding to the decades long environmental, economic and social challenges of the crisis, the region has been significantly affected by the on-going conflict with Boko Haram. The conflict has spread across national borders, displaced over 2.5 million people and contributed to 7.1 million people being food insecure across the Lake Chad Basin in 2017.<sup>667</sup> The compounding vulnerabilities in this region will likely continue to erode community resilience and sustain a high-level of humanitarian need.

## Protracted denial of service

### Nature of crisis and origin

A protracted denial-of-service<sup>118</sup> crisis could be the result of a cyber or technological attack resulting in a full and prolonged infrastructural disruption. With the growth of the internet and the proliferation of systems that depend on it, in the worst cases these crises can cause a system collapse.

### Vulnerabilities

Global societies are increasingly dependent on technology and the internet for delivering basic services, particularly in emerging and developed countries. Though increasing security measures are being put in place to protect against denial-of-service attacks, many countries and their populations lack readily available resources to manage a large-scale breakdown. As a result, a prolonged crisis would quickly cause significant disruption to basic services and create instability. Elderly and disabled people are the most vulnerable populations in such crises.

### Predictability and frequency

- The occurrence and scale of crises are highly unpredictable
- Protracted denial-of-service crises are very infrequent

### Other similar cases/examples

- Hackers repeatedly targeting Ukraine's power grid<sup>119</sup>
- Cyber-attacks on US banks<sup>120</sup>
- Cyber-attack on the National Health Service in the UK<sup>121</sup>

### Challenges (obstacles, difficulties, and leverage)

Denial-of-service attacks could affect the internet, the provision of power, and transportation systems, among others, which would complicate coordination efforts in any response and make accessing vulnerable populations challenging. A lack of electrical power would be the greatest challenge for humanitarian actors as innumerable services depend on it, especially as it relates to healthcare. Increasing difficulties in accessing basic services creates social, economic, and political instability. If poorly managed, these crises can lead to civil unrest.

### Case study: Cyber-attack on UK National Health Service

A ransomware attack in 2017, which infected computers in over 150 countries, affected more than 16 organizations in the British National Health Service, causing major disruption and resulting in operations being postponed and ambulances being diverted.<sup>117</sup> The disruptions and delays to service lasted several days. Though the NHS was able to continue to deliver urgent care, diverting some patients to unaffected hospitals, the attack highlighted the potential damage that a more debilitating event could cause.

## Economic crises in middle- and high-income countries

### Nature of crisis and origin

National or global economic crises or stagnation could cause a wider systemic collapse. Local economies, unable to absorb the shock, would see increasing unemployment, inflation, and poverty. Communities would be directly impacted by the rising cost of living. Local and national governments could be undermined by increasing debt and become unable or unwilling to meet the basic needs of their population. A system collapse could lead to the outbreak of insecurity.

### Characteristics of involved population

The percentage of the population living on the brink of the poverty line in middle- and high-income countries is large<sup>125</sup> and growing. Subject to high levels of unemployment or underemployment, reduced access to basic services, and high vulnerability to asset loss, affected communities can see progress in their quality of life and development erode and ultimately reverse. Inequality can be reinforced by economic crises.<sup>126</sup> Populations seek other ways to access essential goods, reinforcing a growing black/parallel market and causing migration.

### Predictability and frequency

- These crises are predictable, with most manifesting over time. Many indicators allow for the evaluation of the economic situation and predict coming crises, such as the unemployment rate, inflation rate, consumer price indices, GDP, etc.
- These crises are protracted and can be monitored.

### Other similar cases/examples

- Decline in Russian economic prospects<sup>127</sup>
- Greek government debt crisis<sup>128</sup>
- Recession in Brazil<sup>129</sup>

### Challenges (obstacles, difficulties, and leverage)

The politicization of these crises complicates responses. States may be unwilling to accept external assistance in their territory or even to recognize the severity of the crisis. The affected population can be dispersed throughout the country, making reaching the most vulnerable more difficult. The structural nature of economic fragility and its effect on communities at or near the poverty line necessitates strategic interventions at the state level and investments over the long term.

### Case study: Venezuela

Since 2013, Venezuela has been suffering from a worsening economic crisis linked to the “tumbling oil price” and the depletion of foreign cash reserves.<sup>122</sup> Poverty has expanded considerably, and food and other staple shortages (including medicine) are becoming frequent, tripling the number of Venezuelans eating two or fewer meals per day from the rate in 2015.<sup>123</sup> While growing numbers of people are fleeing to neighboring countries to access basic services, social unrest is increasing, with the emergence of unprecedented protests.<sup>124</sup> In this context, the country’s future political and societal stability is greatly uncertain.

Image by Pawel Janiak



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# Annex 2: Insight Files

## Global Changes



Demography



Urbanization and its Stakes



Poverty Around the World



Climate Change



Food and Agriculture



Violent Conflict



Terrorism



International Legal Framework



Technology

## Humanitarian Distress & Crises



Political Instability



New Waves of Nationalism



The Resurgence Of Sovereignty And Political Centrality Of Humanitarian Crisis



Disasters incurred by Natural Hazards



Epidemics



Large-scale Forced Migration and the Intensification of and Increased Scale of Humanitarian Crises

## Humanitarian Ecosystem



Acceleration of Alliances : A Networked Way of Working



Decentralisation of INGOs: Toward Federation



The Rise of Faith-based and Local NGOs



Humanitarian Workers of Tomorrow



The Role of Private Companies and Foundations



The Militarization of Aid



Donors of Tomorrow



Principled Humanitarian Action and Advocacy

Photo: Brigitte Grignet, ECHO

# Global Changes

Demography

Urbanization and its Stakes

Poverty Around the World

Climate Change

Food and Agriculture

Violent Conflict

Terrorism


International Legal Framework

Technology



# Demography

7.3 billion Global population in 2015  
 8.5 billion Projected global population in 2030



“ Globally, life expectancy is projected to rise from 70 years to 77 years in 2050. Africans are projected to live 19 years longer in 2100. ”

## Key insights



Least developed countries will continue to experience rapid population growth, which will exacerbate humanitarian situations

## Main trends



Global population will continue to grow though the rate of growth will begin to decline.



The 65+ age group will be the fastest growing demography in all major regions of the world. By 2050 in all regions except Africa, 1 out of 4 people will be aged 60 or over



Developing countries particularly in the Sub-Saharan region, will drive population growth.

## Uncertainties



Projections of increasing life expectancies have been criticized for being based on a Western development model that might not take into account the development challenges faced in other parts of the world.




Regional disparities in fertility rates will remain until 2100, and the high rates in sub-Saharan Africa will drive global population growth for the coming century.

Sources: UN, Parant.



# DEMOGRAPHY

Population of the World: Estimates, 1950–2015, medium variant projection and 80 and 95 confidence intervals 2015–2100



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015), World Population Prospects: the 2015 Revision. New York: United Nations.

## Definition

The world's population has almost tripled from 2.5 billion people in 1950 to 7.3 billion in 2016.<sup>130</sup> This growth is taking place unevenly across the globe. While the population of African countries is steadily increasing, many industrialized countries are seeing a decline as they fail to reach replacement rates.

## Key insight

**Least developed countries will continue to experience rapid population growth, which will exacerbate humanitarian situations.**

Population growth, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, will lead to an increase in the number of people living in political, economic, or environmental fragility.

## Changes by 2030

- Steady global population growth, led by developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa

Global population will continue to rise at a steady pace, reaching **approximately 8.5 billion people by 2030 – an increase of 1 billion people within the next 15 years.**<sup>131</sup>

The exponential growth seen over the course of the 20th century is expected to stabilize by the beginning of the 22nd century.<sup>132</sup> Predictions for stabilization were for the year 2050, but these estimates have been revised since fertility rates in Sub-Saharan Africa did not decline as quickly as expected or as historical evidence from Asia and Latin America would have predicted.<sup>133</sup>

Global population is expected to increase by 38% between 2010 and 2050.<sup>134</sup> Europe's population is expected to decline by 4%,<sup>135</sup> whereas Africa's population is expected to more than double, increasing by 132%.<sup>136</sup> By 2050, half the world's population growth is expected to be concentrated in nine countries: India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Tanzania, the United States, Indonesia, and Uganda.<sup>137</sup> This concentration of population growth in fragile countries will make preserving any gains in development and further advancing toward development goals significantly more challenging. A "tremendous economic effort" will be required just to maintain per-capita levels of food consumption in Sub-Saharan Africa – especially East Africa – and an even higher level of economic growth is necessary if countries expect to make measurable progress in reducing poverty and undernutrition.<sup>138</sup>

The population of the least-developing countries, 954 million people in 2015, is projected to increase by 39% by 2030 and to double by 2050, reaching 1.9 billion.<sup>139</sup> Africa has 34 of the 54 least developed countries, and this continent's population is projected to grow from 1.1 billion to 2.4 billion by 2050, accounting for half the global population growth.<sup>140</sup> Twenty-eight African countries are projected to see their population more than double by 2050.<sup>141</sup> In 2050 the population of Nigeria will surpass that of the United States, and Nigeria will be the world's third most populous country after India and China.<sup>142</sup> Post-2050, Africa is expected to be the only region experiencing substantial population growth.<sup>143</sup> Population pressure is likely to be a significant driver of sociopolitical disturbances in already fragile areas.<sup>144</sup>

### Demographic dividend

The demographic dividend refers to the economic growth experienced by a country as the population evolves, when fertility rates fall and there are fewer dependent people compared to the number of people active in the workforce.<sup>145</sup> The simultaneous occurrence of favorable demographic shifts and targeted interventions – including the reduction of fertility and mortality rates, the implementation of favorable economic policies, investments in children's health and education, and women's empowerment – can create a favorable climate for fast economic growth.<sup>146</sup>


Although a large labor pool often presents an economic opportunity in terms of demographic dividend, an inability to manage demographic changes can be a significant liability for countries unable to exploit those changes. Countries with limited ability to integrate entrants into the labor force can be left with a significant, idle youth population, which can increase the risk of social or political disruption.<sup>147</sup> Whether states in transition to a demographic dividend will be able to leverage their burgeoning workforces or whether large youthful populations will become a vulnerability in 2030 will be determined by the investments made in infrastructure and basic services in the preceding decade.

### A global aging population

**In all major regions of the world, the older cohort of the population is growing faster than other age ranges,** and as a result, the median age is on the rise.<sup>148</sup>

**By 2050 in all regions except Africa, a quarter of the population will be aged 60 or older.**<sup>149</sup> This will be the fastest-growing age range worldwide. By 2050, the proportion of people aged 60 or over will reach 34% in Europe and 25% in Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America. The median age is projected to increase from 28 to 37 between 2010 and 2050.<sup>150</sup> In the least developed countries, the older cohort will grow despite sustained high fertility rates, putting additional pressure on the working-age population.

### Estimated Change in Population by region, 2010 to 2050 (%)



Source: Pew Research Center, Attitudes About Aging: A Global Perspective, chapter 3, "Aging in Major Regions of the World, 2010 to 2050," January 30, 2014


### Globally, life expectancy at birth is projected to rise from 70 years in the 2010–2015 periods to 77 years in 2045–2050.<sup>151</sup>

Africa will experience the strongest gain, with approximately 19 years more by 2100<sup>152</sup> against an average of 10 to 14 years for other areas.<sup>153</sup> Differences between male and female life expectancies are expected to remain consistent.<sup>154</sup> Aging populations could require developing countries to reorient their health systems toward an increased burden of non-communicable diseases (such as cancer and heart disease) and long-term healthcare<sup>155</sup> while concurrently managing high rates of fertility and population growth. Significant investments in healthcare structures will be needed to manage this higher burden at both ends of the age scale.

Image by Sergey Neamoscou



## Controversies and debates



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2013). World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, Highlights and Advance Tables, working paper No ESA/P/WP.228

### Longevity estimates

While an aging population can be seen to create benefits such as “silver economies,” there are major uncertainties regarding the investments needed for a top-heavy demography to succeed economically. Indeed, this is being questioned already in aging societies, where the labor force cannot offset the number of people in retirement.<sup>156</sup>

Investments made in healthcare and education in developed nations will not necessarily be replicated in developing countries. This lack of investment may slow the rate of increase in life expectancy.<sup>157</sup> In addition, pandemics such as HIV/AIDS may affect the prolongation of life, reducing certainty in life-expectancy projections.<sup>158</sup>

### Strong variations of fertility decrease between regions

Global fertility rates have significantly decreased since the 1950s from 3.8 to 2.5 children per woman.<sup>159</sup> Nine percent of the world's population lives in high-fertility countries (more than 5 children per woman), mostly in Africa, while the rest of the global population is divided almost equally between low-fertility countries (less than 2.1 children per woman) and intermediate-fertility countries (2.1 to 5 children per woman).<sup>160</sup>

Globally, **total fertility is expected to fall from 2.5 children per woman in 2010–2015 to 2.25 in 2045–2050.**<sup>161</sup> However, there will be great geographic disparities. In Europe and North America, the fertility rate is projected to increase to 1.8 to 1.9 children per

woman by 2045–2050, while in Africa and Asia it is expected to fall. Thus, no worldwide convergence of fertility rate is likely before 2100.<sup>162</sup>

This projection is debated by experts who highlight the importance of governmental and international actors in family planning and women's empowerment.<sup>163</sup> Low levels of education for women, especially in Africa, make changes in fertility rates difficult to predict.<sup>164</sup>

Image by Florian Serieux



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


# Urbanization and its Stakes

In 2014, there were 488 cities with more than 1 million inhabitants and 28 megacities with more than 10 million inhabitants.

In 2030, there will be 600 cities with more than 1 million inhabitants and 40 megacities with more than 10 million inhabitants.

Proportion of populations living in cities:



## Key insights

1

Some megacities in proximity to protracted crises will become critical regional hubs -- economically, politically, and logistically-- for humanitarian actors.

2

The proliferation of shanty towns will become a major concern for humanitarian stakeholders.

## Key trends



The world is becoming more urban. Rural populations totals will remain relatively consistent, but urban populations will grow dramatically, particularly in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.



Rapid urbanization will lead to a rise in slums. By 2025, 1.8 billion individuals should live in shanty towns accounting for approximately one in five people globally and one in three city dwellers.



The largest cities will be the most economically active and technologically developed.



Some cities will experience a decline in population especially in Asia and Europe.



Coastal populations grow faster than inland areas. Coastal cities are extremely sensitive to economic, demographic, and climate changes. Hundreds of millions of people will be affected by coastal issues, especially in Asia.


## Uncertainties



The degree to which megacities take on state-like qualities is uncertain. If given autonomy megacities could lead the way in developing sustainable governance for cities worldwide.

Sources: UN, Julin Damon, James Mani, UNEP.

# Urbanization and its Stakes



Source: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospect: The 2014 Revision

## Definition

As of 2017, 54.9% of the world's population lives in urban areas.<sup>165</sup> Urbanization is the “process by which a large number of people becomes permanently concentrated in relatively small areas, forming cities.”<sup>166</sup>

## Key insights

**Some megacities in proximity to protracted crises will become critical economic, political, transport/logistics, and regional hubs.**

There are several countries at the epicenter of protracted crises, affecting both the countries in question and the regions in which they sit. Proximity to these protracted crises and the ability of cities to act as logistics hubs for disaster response (both chronic and sudden onset) is essential for every INGO. Large regional centers will continue to be loci of power, with secretariats and headquarters of regional or international organizations (both economic and political), and as such are key places for NGOs. These institutions vary in their influence and importance but regularly, and with increasing efficacy, play a central role in driving economic and social policies, disaster response and preparedness, and mediating national and regional conflicts. The headquarters of these institutions are likely to remain in their current locations at least in some form and can therefore be included in a 10-year outlook. Suggested key cities of focus are Dakar, Abidjan, Lagos, Accra, and Kinshasa in West and Central Africa; Nairobi, Djibouti, Addis Ababa, and Kampala in East Africa; Johannesburg and

Lusaka in Southern Africa; Cairo, Ankara-Istanbul, Amman, and Riyadh in the Middle East; Delhi, Dhaka, and Almaty in South and Central Asia; and Beijing, Jakarta, Manila, and Bangkok in East and South Asia.

**“Slummification” and proliferation of shantytowns will become a major concern for humanitarian stakeholders.**

The development of shantytowns in emerging countries, in particular in Asia and in Africa where population growth is particularly dynamic, increases economic, social, and environmental risks: pollution, availability of arable land, water supply, food, and electricity, for instance. Such risks could slow the development of megacities.


Image by Abbie Bernet





## Changes by 2030

### Urban Population and Megacities by 2030



Source: Urban Geographies: Cities/Places/Regions, World Urbanization 1970-2030

### An urbanized world

According to the United Nations World Population Prospects,<sup>167</sup> by 2050 the urban population will be 6.3 billion and is projected to represent 66% of the world's total population. North America, Europe, and Latin America are the most urbanized regions, with the urbanization rate exceeding 70%. While in Asia, almost half the population lives in urban areas (48%), Africa remains predominantly rural (60% of its population lives in rural areas).<sup>168</sup> Sixteen countries<sup>169</sup> have below 20% levels of urbanization, most of them in Africa (Burundi, Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger, South Sudan, and Uganda) and Asia (Nepal and Sri Lanka). According to UN projections,<sup>170</sup> these states will see their urban-population proportion more than double by 2050. Nearly 90% of the global increase of urban population will come from Asia and Africa.

High rates of urbanization will result in significant challenges that will have to be addressed, especially in the lower middle-income countries, which will experience the most significant increases. Urban management is critical for countries that seek to provide their city dwellers with adequate utilities, healthcare, education, employment, and transportation. Decentralization policies, which shift power from central governments to lower-level governments, are an important factor in encouraging local authorities to focus on urban planning and prosperity.<sup>171</sup>

### An increase in megacities

In 2014, there were 488 cities with more than one million inhabitants,<sup>172</sup> three times more than in the 1970s.

The world will have more than 600 cities of more than **1 million inhabitants by 2030, including 40 megacities with 10 million inhabitants or more, representing 9% of world population and 730 million people.**<sup>173</sup> By 2030, Dhaka, Karachi, and Lagos will

replace Sao Paulo, Osaka, and New York as some of the most populated cities in the world. Such rapidly expanding centers will likely increase water, air, noise, light, and land pollution.

### Concentration of activities and wealth

Urbanization leads to a concentration of activities and wealth in places that become the heart of human activities. Megacities are hubs of economic functions, including education, research, industry, and finance. The 10 most urbanized areas, which account for 6% of the world's population, produce more than 40% of world GDP and 70–80% of technologies.<sup>174</sup> Countries with an existing concentration of universities, think tanks, and civil-society partners have strong advantages. These countries will be key players in the 15-year outlook. Nevertheless, this concentration encourages segregation by concentrating knowledge and talent in megacities, embedding nation-wide inequality.

## Global Slum Population, 2025



Source: James, M., Frost & Sullivan, Spot the Business Trends and Opportunities in Africa from the World Design Capital for 2014

### Slummification

Urbanization can bring benefits such as economic development, access to education and healthcare, and social mobility.<sup>175</sup> However, when uncontrolled, rapid urbanization has in many cases led to the creation of new slums and the expansion of existing ones. In 2013, more than 860 million people were living in shantytowns.<sup>176</sup> By 2025, 1.8 billion people will live in shantytowns, accounting for approximately one in five people globally and one in three city dwellers.<sup>177</sup> This will be mainly due to rapid urbanization, population growth, and insufficient employment opportunities.<sup>178</sup> Slummification will put social, economic, and ecological pressure on already fragile cities and might cause political unrest and displacement.

### Declining population in some cities

According to the United Nations,<sup>179</sup> some cities have experienced population decline in recent years. Most of these cities are located in the low-fertility countries of Asia and Europe where the overall population is stagnant or declining. Economic contraction and natural disasters have contributed to population losses in some cities as well.<sup>180</sup> Those cities are likely to suffer from competition from megacities and could continue to decline.

### Coastal urbanization

Populations and activities are concentrated near or on the coastal areas. Half the world population now lives within 60 km of the sea.<sup>181</sup> In many countries, capital cities are located near a coastline (Bangkok, Mumbai, Dakar, Jakarta, Lagos). Coastal populations grow faster than inland areas and are extremely sensitive to economic, demographic, and climate changes, especially the rise

in sea levels and increasing salinization.<sup>182</sup> Hundreds of millions of people could be displaced, especially in East, South, South-East Asia.

### Uncertainties

#### Global governance: the rise of megacities

Over the past few decades, megacities have gained influence in global economic and governance spheres. Seen as being politically legitimate actors representing local needs and growing global economic powers, megacities and networks of cities are using their own leverage to shape national and global governance. According to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs,<sup>183</sup> “42 of the largest 100 economic entities in the world are cities.” This global economic power is enhanced by city networks such as C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group or United Cities and Local Governments. Megacities and city networks may represent an answer to some national governments’ bureaucratic paralysis and political gridlock. At the same time, cities face particular challenges, such as urban planning and the impact of climate change in very dense areas, that are not necessarily addressed by national or international entities. As a result, cities use their experience to share best practices in networks and to challenge national governments and international institutions to adopt more efficient policies at the local level. Megacities and city networks have pushed for greater involvement in sustainable development, refugee management, multicultural and religious issues, to name but a few. Megacities could become the driving force behind a new order of global governance.



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# Poverty Around the World

Global poverty fell for the first time in history from 902 million in 2012 to 702 million in 2015 (10% decrease)

95% of the world's extreme poor live in 3 regions: South-Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, and Sub-Saharan Africa

8–9% of the developing world's population will still be poor in 2030. In Sub-Saharan Africa this rate will be 14.4%



Sustainable Development Goal #1 : to 'end extreme poverty in all its forms everywhere by 2030' is unlikely to be achieved unless economic growth rates increase dramatically, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.



## Key insights



By 2030, poverty will remain mainly concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia

## Main trends



Global poverty will continue to decline, however even with solid economic growth, about 5.4% of the global population will remain poor.



Poverty will be concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Stable countries will see their poverty rates fall rapidly.



Fragile states, particularly in Africa, will have the highest concentration of poverty.



A rise in inequality and poverty in developed nations is expected. In the EU an additional 15-25 million people could be living in poverty by 2025.

## Uncertainties



The utility of a universal poverty line has been widely debated. The variety of tools, data, currencies, and models used inject a degree of uncertainty into projections.




The lack of a definition of the 'middle class' makes it hard to predict how this group is likely to evolve in the decades to come. Projections for the size of the middle class in 2030 range from 1.15 billion to 4.9 billion people.

Sources: Bluhm, World Bank, Oxfam, OECD, Brookings.



# Poverty Around the World



Source: The Brookings Institution (2013), *The Final Countdown: Prospects for Ending Extreme Poverty by 2030*, print.

## Definition

A household is considered poor when its total income is inadequate to acquire the resources necessary to meet locally established standards. The international poverty line was originally set at people making less \$1 a day in 1990; to account for changes in purchasing power parity this figure was adjusted to \$.25 a day in 2005 and to \$1.90 a day as of October 2015. It is estimated that in 2015 there were 702 million people living in extreme poverty.<sup>184</sup> Though extreme poverty is declining, primarily thanks to economic growth in China and India, it remains an important challenge, particularly in fragile countries of the Sub-Saharan region. In line with current trends, the target of the first Sustainable Development Goal, to “end extreme poverty in all its forms everywhere by 2030,” will be difficult to achieve.

## Key insight

**By 2030, poverty will remain mainly concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia**

For the past several decades, three regions – East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa – have accounted for some 95% of global poverty.<sup>185</sup> Yet the composition of poverty across these three regions has shifted dramatically. In 1990, East Asia accounted for half the global poor, whereas only 15% lived in Sub-Saharan Africa. By 2015 these statistics have reversed: Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for half the global poor, and approximately 12% live in EastAsia.<sup>186</sup>


While some African countries have seen significant successes in reducing poverty, the region as a whole lags behind the rest of the world. Poverty reduction has been slowest in fragile countries, and rural areas remain much poorer, although the urban-rural gap has narrowed.

To end extreme poverty by 2030, higher economic growth than in the past and concentrated development efforts will be needed in Sub-Saharan Africa. Maintaining the current pace of poverty reduction requires faster and sustained growth to allow countries to withstand future crises. Optimistic estimates suggest that 8–9% of the developing world’s population will still be in poverty in 2030.<sup>187</sup>

Image by Hans Eiskonen



## Changes by 2030



Source: The World Bank (2015) Ending Extreme Poverty and Sharing Prosperity: Progress and Policies

### A global decline in poverty

Despite an increasing world population, poverty has declined globally since the 1950s. As a result the overall proportion of poor people has diminished significantly from 36% to 17.7% since 1990.<sup>188</sup>

**Global poverty rates are projected to fall to 9.9%<sup>189</sup> by 2020 and to 5.4% by 2030.<sup>190</sup> By 2030, 386 million people will still be living in poverty.<sup>191</sup>** There is uncertainty in the estimated poverty projections as global progress is not symmetric. Slowing consumption and growing inequality indicate that there is a risk that poverty reduction and income distribution will stall.

### Concentration of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia


Three regions – South-Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, and Sub-Saharan Africa – contain 95% of the world's extremely poor.<sup>192</sup> In 2015, five countries accounted for almost half the world's population: India and China (40%), and the United States, Brazil, and Indonesia (10%).<sup>193</sup> Poverty reduction varies between regions, but rates on the African continent are of most serious concern. In 2010, the population living under the poverty line in Sub-Saharan Africa still represented 47.9% of the region's total population. In 2030, it is estimated that 14.4% of Sub-Saharan Africa's population will still be in poverty.<sup>194</sup>

Source: Our world data, world population living in extreme poverty, 1820-2015; Web; accessed may, 2016

By 2030, fragile and low-income countries, particularly in Africa, will be home to nearly two-thirds of the world's poor.<sup>195</sup> Among these countries the situation differs greatly. Of the 27 nations with more than 40% of their population in extreme poverty, 25 are in Africa. These include states with large populations such as Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo.<sup>196</sup> In many less populous states, such as Liberia, Burundi, and Madagascar, more than two-thirds of the population is considered extremely poor. Consequently, in spite of the global decline in the absolute number of people in poverty, poverty will still be a critical issue in some African states. Endemic violence in some African states<sup>197</sup> reinforces chronic poverty in conflict-affected areas. This leads to a "vicious spiral" of insecurity: long-term poverty increases violent predatory behavior, offering a means of livelihood for people with limited legal economic opportunities; violence deters sustainable investments and growth, making a conflict economy the only way to make a living. Uneven development nationally, promoting only specific people or territories, can also cause disruption and fragility.



## Poverty Rate 2013



Source: OECD data

### Rising inequality in middle-income and developed countries

In 2015, a fifth of the EU population was at risk of poverty and social exclusion.<sup>198</sup> In five countries – Bulgaria, Romania, Spain, Greece, and Lithuania – one fourth or more of the population was in poverty. Women are at greater risk of being poor; the number of children living in poverty within the EU grew by 1 million between 2008 and 2013, and it is predicted that in 2025, 15 to 25 million more EU residents could be living in poverty.<sup>199</sup> Emerging crisis drivers, including refugee crises, will blur the socio-economic demarcations of vulnerability. Among these drivers, the rise of inequality is already impacting middle-income and developed countries. In 2013, poverty was higher in the US than in Turkey, Chile, Estonia, and Greece.<sup>200</sup>

## Uncertainties

### A disputed definition of poverty

The indicator used as a threshold of extreme poverty in poorer and middle-income countries has been the \$1.25-a-day line since 2005 (increased to \$1.90 in October 2015<sup>201</sup>). Poverty indicators are often criticized for not being representative of reality due to limited data and the models used to produce them. Even projections using the same base data differ in their conclusions and lead to different regional and geographic conclusions.<sup>202</sup> Some experts predict that by 2025, poverty will be concentrated in fragile African states, while others focus on populous, middle-income countries such as India and Nigeria. Conclusions depend on the criteria chosen for analysis (e.g. economic growth or maternal mortality).

Complicating projections further are varying currency exchange rates, the different ways in which countries survey their citizens, and methods of data collection (criteria and system).<sup>203</sup> The difficulties of making projections are illustrated in the following chart, which uses a \$2 poverty line<sup>204</sup>:

Estimate of the Global Distribution of \$2 Poor People in 2020 and 2030 by Various Growth Scenarios (Numbers are percentage of global \$2 poverty total)

Scenario	2020			2030		
	Pessimistic	Moderate	Optimistic	Pessimistic	Moderate	Optimistic
World	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
East Asia and Pacific	12.6	7.9	7.0	7.5	4.0	2.8
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.1
Latin America and the Caribbean	4.0	5.3	5.6	4.6	6.3	6.6
Middle- East and North Africa	2.6	2.9	2.6	3.4	4.0	3.5
South Asia	41.2	31.9	27.9	30.8	16.5	11.5
Sub-Saharan Africa	39.1	51.6	56.5	53.4	68.9	75.5
Current LICs	31.6	39.7	42.5	40.4	46.5	48.6
Current LMICs	60.0	54.6	51.9	54.9	47.5	45.9
Current UMICs	8.3	6.7	5.7	4.7	6.0	5.6
Remaining LICs in 2020/2030	32.7	33.8	32.5	36.8	35.7	33.0

Source: Sumner, A. and Edward, P. (2015) New Estimates of Global Poverty and Inequality: How Much Difference Do Price Data Really Make?

### Who is the middle class?

Evaluating the level of poverty in middle-income and developed countries is difficult mainly because of the lack of a universal definition of the middle class. Some studies define the middle class as those living on \$2 to \$10 a day,<sup>205</sup> while others use a \$10-a-day threshold. The OECD<sup>206</sup> argues that “poverty is rapidly becoming a matter of within-country inequality” and that a poverty line is insufficient in capturing inequality in developed countries.

Still others make a distinction between the “new” middle classes of emerging countries (between \$2 and \$20 per day) and what they called “established” or “secure” middle classes predominantly in developed countries. The rate of growth in the middle class depends on its definition, but it is universally acknowledged that there will be a significant growth of the global middle classes. Using the definition of those living between \$2 and \$20 per day, the projected increase is from 1.8 billion people in 2009 to 4.9 billion in 2030.<sup>207</sup> The variability in these figures illustrates the fragility of a new middle class that depends on stable geopolitics, protectionist policies, climate, and economies. Just 6% of Africans qualify as middle class, and this number barely changed in the decade before 2011.<sup>208</sup> It is posited that the reason Africa’s middle class is still a small percentage of the population after a decade

of 5% economic growth is that wealth is shared very unequally. Poverty in Africa is so entrenched that even as incomes increase, people graduate from “extremely poor” to “merely poor.”<sup>209</sup>

Image by Alexander Trukhin



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- 202 Three thresholds are often used : The common extreme poverty line of \$1.25 (newly \$1.90 line) which is highly criticized, the \$2 poverty line considered as more reasonable (close to the median poverty line of all developing countries (Chen and Ravallion, 2010; 2012) while \$10 line is sometimes evokes (Pritchett) as the security from poverty line.
- 203 The distinction between low-income countries and middle-income countries is often vague. Some low-income countries can be re-categorized as middle-income countries, resulting in less attention, while their headcounts of poor population is still unchanged.
- 204 Sumner, A. and Edward, P. (2015) [New Estimates of Global Poverty and Inequality: How Much Difference Do Price Data Really Make?](#) International Development Institute Working Paper, King's College London and the Center for Global Development
- 205 Drabble, S., Ratzmann, N., Hoorens, S., Khodyakov, D., and Yaqub, O. (2015) [The Rise of a Global Middle Class: Global Societal Trends to 2030: Thematic Report 6](#), RAND Europe
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# Climate Change



2016 was the hottest year on record and a new high for the third year in a row. 16 of the 17 hottest years on record have been this century.



**0.2°C** Global surface temperatures are expected to keep rising at 0.2°C per decade.

By 2100, global temperatures are expected to increase by 0.3-4.8°C.

**1 in 3** people lives in a water stressed country. By 2025, this figure will have risen from 1.8 billion to 5 billion.

**50+** countries are acutely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change today.

Areas that are colder today will be more favourably affected than will warmer climates. In warmer areas there may be shortages of food and water, higher mortality rates, a greater susceptibility to natural disasters, and a higher likelihood for conflicts over resources to erupt.

Development will need to be climate-smart and sustainable to mitigate the effects of global warming.

## Key insights



Climate change will become a new issue for human rights and justice.



Climate change will prevent people from escaping poverty and will push more than 100 million people into extreme poverty.

## Main trends



By 2030, climate change will increase the occurrence of droughts and floods (resulting in reduced yields), destabilise ecosystems, accelerate species extinction and exacerbate water access tensions.



By 2030, the number of lives threatened by desertification will double to reach 10 million. 40% of the world could face a water deficit in 2030.



Low-lying coastal areas will be particularly vulnerable, especially in Asia.



Environmental migration is expected to rise. South to South migrations are likely to stay stable, whereas South to North migrations are likely to continue increasing.

## Uncertainties



Though its occurrence is still relatively hard to predict, the effects of El Niño are well known, and they seem to be getting more extreme.

Sources: Damian Carrington for the Guardian, BBC News, WHO, IPCC, NOAA, UNEP., Oliver Milman for the Guardian, Per Krusell, DARA, IOM, UN.



# Climate Change

## Definition

Global surface temperatures rose 0.74°C between 1906 and 2005,<sup>210</sup> and 2016 was the warmest year on record.<sup>211</sup> Climate change has already begun affecting ecosystems, human populations, and historical weather patterns and is likely to continue to do so in years to come. The effects of climate change are likely to continue to exacerbate humanitarian needs worldwide.

## Key insights


**Climate change will prevent people from escaping poverty and will push more than 100 million people into extreme poverty.**

Climate change is a “threat multiplier” that intensifies natural resource stresses and increases the likelihood of livelihood devastation, state fragility, human displacement, and mass death. These dynamics do not always result in conflict, but they certainly represent a threat to human, national, regional, and international security. The effects of climate change will prevent people from accumulating wealth, and without rapid, inclusive, and climate smart development, combined with emission-reduction efforts that protect the poor, there could be more than 100 million additional people in poverty by 2030.<sup>212</sup>

**Climate change will become a new issue for human rights and justice**


Climate change is a transnational issue that sits at the intersection between human and environmental evolution. As temperatures rise, the poorest people and those living in developing countries<sup>213</sup> with no safety net will be most severely affected by extreme weather incidents, flooding, drought, and changes in seasonal patterns. Such shocks could wipe out hard-won gains, leading to irreversible losses and driving people back into poverty, particularly in Africa and South Asia.

**Rapid, Climate-Informed Development Needed to Keep Climate Change from Pushing More Than 100 Million People into Poverty by 2030**




Source: The World Bank, (November 8, 2015); Web; Accessed October 17, 2016

**Contributions to greenhouse gases, versus impacts of greenhouse gases worldwide.**




Source: Cook, J., Those Who Contribute the Least Greenhouse Gases Will Be Most Impacted by Climate Change, 16 March 2011; Web; accessed 17 October 2016

## Changes by 2030: main trends



### Global Vulnerability to Climate Change



## Acceleration of climate change

By 2100, global temperatures are expected to increase by 3.7 to 4.8°C above the average compared to 1850–1900.<sup>214</sup> It is very unlikely that the international objective to cap rises at 2°C will be met. A reduction of 40% to 70%<sup>215</sup> in emissions (compared to the 2010 rate) would be necessary to minimize global warming. Rising temperatures will cause droughts, floods, ecosystem destabilization, species extinction, and water scarcity.

## Increasing vulnerabilities in low - and medium income countries

Northern regions are less vulnerable to the effects of climate change,<sup>216</sup> as they benefit from anticipation and management capacities, which helps to limit the death toll, and are able to invest in more resilient infrastructure and systems. However, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Central America exhibit critical and escalating vulnerabilities. These regions often suffer from poor environmental management and lack the resources and policies to face climate-change challenges. When considering fatalities and potential financial damages, the Indian sub-continent, Central America, and the Asia-Pacific region exhibit high levels of climate risk.<sup>217</sup> Densely populated countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Vietnam are particularly vulnerable.

The impact of natural disasters depends heavily on the characteristics of the territory, its infrastructure, the population density, and authorities' anticipation and adaptability capacities. Vulnerability indices point to the decreasing resilience of fragile countries with weak governance, a lack of anticipation and adaptation plans, and rapid, uncontrolled urbanization.<sup>218</sup> Sub-Saharan Africa will be even more fragile in the future due to continued high levels of population growth, adding demographic pressure, and endemic poverty in some of the most environmentally fragile countries. The concentration of these threats in the poorest

countries makes problems related to inequality, hunger, education, and healthcare more difficult to resolve.


## Increasing water scarcity

Significant improvements have been made in providing access to drinking water; in 2015, 91% of the world's population had access compared to 76% in 1990.<sup>219</sup> Nevertheless, this issue remains a great challenge for many countries, especially in Asia and Africa.

**Already, some 1.8 billion people<sup>220</sup> – a third of the world's population – live in water-stressed countries, a figure expected to rise to 5 billion by 2025. By 2030 half the global population will live in areas affected by water stress.<sup>221</sup>**


Climate change combined with population growth and urbanization has resulted in worrisome levels of water scarcity in some parts of the world. Warmer temperatures increase evaporation and create more intense but less frequent precipitation, which undermines general water security. The situation in regions facing the most severe water scarcity will worsen, particularly Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Average river run-off and water availability is projected to decrease by 10% to 30%<sup>222</sup> in dry regions, and this situation is projected to worsen due to irrigation, which accounts for 69% to 90% of global water usage. Water resources will decline in areas with lessened rainfall such as Southern and Western Africa, while demand will increase due to changes in consumption and behavior.

## Physical and Economic Water Scarcity in the World



Source: Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture (2007) Water for Food, Water for Life: A Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture (London: Earthscan, and Colombo: International Water Management Institute 2007); print

## Projected Impact of Climate Change on Agricultural Yields



Source: European Environment Agency, Projected Impact of Climate Change on Agricultural Yields, 29 November 201

### Reduced crop yields

As a result of the changing climate, the degradation of water sources, plant epidemics, and severe weather events, climate change has already affected the agricultural sector. Crop yields are already decreasing globally. Maize production has decreased by 4% since 1980 and wheat by 5%.<sup>223</sup> **Without any adaptation measures, by 2030 worldwide crop yields will decrease an average of 2% per decade.**<sup>224</sup> Wheat yields could decrease by 6% with every additional degree increase in temperature.<sup>225</sup> This loss will be unevenly distributed geographically. **High latitude regions will see increased agricultural production due to an increase in the number of warm days per year, while areas that are already food insecure in Asia and Africa<sup>226</sup> will see drastic reductions in crop yields.**<sup>227</sup>

Sub-Saharan Africa will be particularly affected by desertification. Two billion people in the world currently depend on dry-land ecosystems: 90% of them live in developing countries. Twelve million hectares of land become unproductive every year because of desertification and drought.<sup>228</sup> In the Sub-Saharan African context of poor governance, rapid population growth, poorly functioning market systems, and insufficient food reserves, an increase in the rate of desertification and a generalized reduction in crop yields could lead to severe regional food insecurity and famine.


### Rising sea level affecting more people

Currently the sea level rises an average of 3 millimeters per year.<sup>229</sup> Based on an increase of 0.3°C to 4.8°C, sea levels are projected to rise 260–980mm by 2100.<sup>230</sup> By 2030, sea levels are expected to rise by 50–80mm per year, which will affect coastlines, deltas, and low-lying islands. More than 1 million people could be displaced in the Nile, Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Mekong deltas alone. Small island states of the Pacific and Indian Oceans (Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tonga) are most prone to cyclones and could disappear entirely. 60% of the world's 39 megacities with populations over 5 million are located within 100 km of coasts.<sup>231</sup> The coastal areas, already extremely sensitive due to human development and urban sprawl, are strongly affected by

climate change.<sup>232</sup> This is particularly true in Asia, already the most populous continent, with the fastest rates of urbanization. Coastal vulnerability could be a significant driver of mass migrations.

Additionally, as sea levels rise salt water penetrates into fresh groundwater, making it unsafe to drink. This is projected to happen in Bangladesh, where coastal water salinity is projected to increase by 26% by 2050.<sup>233</sup> In situations where ground water is being used faster than it can be replenished, the water table drops and is replenished with salt water. As a result, freshwater will be less available for irrigation and human consumption, resulting in lower yields and heightened pressure on existing food stocks.

Image by Nasa






## Relative vulnerability of Coastal Areas



Source: Nicholls et al. (2007). Coastal systems and low-lying areas. Climate change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom.

## Environmental Displacement Risk 2010



Source: Observatoire des enjeux géopolitiques de la démographie, Impacts du changement climatique sur les flux migratoires à l'horizon 2030

## Rise of environmental migrations

Migration has increased in recent decades. Among these populations on the move are a growing number of environmental migrants leaving areas affected by climate change.<sup>234</sup> Rural parts of developing countries are seeing the highest rates of emigration due to scarce or unproductive land, land degradation, and the economic pull toward cities.

Migration is a necessary safety valve in those countries facing high rates of population growth and poor governance and land-management practices. **It is estimated that in 2030, 100 million people will be on the move, and in 2050, that figure will have doubled.**<sup>235</sup> **South-to-south migrations are likely to remain stable, whereas south-to-north migrations are likely to increase.** Migratory movements are likely to continue to originate in the regions most affected by climate change: Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Central America.<sup>236</sup> However, whether destination countries will remain the same through to 2030 remains to be seen as the wealth of migrants, the journeys they make, and the policies of host countries change.


## Uncertainties:

### Impacts of El Niño/La Niña

The El Niño–Southern Oscillation is “a periodic fluctuation in sea surface temperature and the air pressure of the overlying atmosphere across the equatorial Pacific Ocean.”<sup>237</sup> El Niño is known to be a cyclical phenomenon, appearing every two to seven years and lasting approximately 12 months. Though its occurrence is still relatively hard to predict,<sup>238</sup> the effects of El Niño are well known, and they seem to be getting more extreme. Some scientists hypothesize that climate change may be causing these “super El Niños,” but there is no general consensus in the scientific community.<sup>239</sup>

Still, changes in weather patterns are being seen globally. Wind patterns are changing; wet regions of Western South America, the Pacific Ocean, and Central Asia are becoming even wetter, and dry regions are becoming dangerously drier in northern South America, the Indian subcontinent, and Sub-Saharan and Southern Africa, increasing the occurrence and severity<sup>240</sup> of natural disasters such as floods, storms, or drought and depleting fish stocks and crop yields. La Niña<sup>241</sup> events may also be increasing in frequency, though this is yet to be proven conclusively.<sup>242</sup>

### El Nino and Rainfall



Source: International Research Institute for Climate and Society.


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# Food and Agriculture

By 2030, global food demand is expected to rise by 35%.



International assistance will be needed to deal with food and crop shortages in fragile countries

Global food demand should grow at a rate of 1.1% per year between 2006 and 2050.  
 The average per person consumption of animal products is expected to grow by 44% by 2030.  
 The total number of hungry people will decline from 687 million in 2015 to 543 million in 2030.

## Key insights



There will be growth in global food production levels, but this will not necessarily translate to greater access to food.

## Main trends



Increases in global food production will mostly come from closing the yield gap in underperforming regions such as sub-Saharan Africa.



Agricultural commodity price shocks will lead to instances of hunger and social unrest.



The global dietary convergence will continue and the world's population will consume less cereals and more meat, dairy, and sugar.



Hunger will decrease globally but Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia will face the highest levels of undernourishment.

## Uncertainties




There is some debate about the reliability of yield growth projections.

Sources: FAO, UNSDA, Celine Laisney, IPCC, Anna Ratcliffe, Farming First.



# Food and Agriculture

## Net Food Imports in Domestic Food Supply in Total Calories (%)



Source: FAO (2017). The Future of Food and Agriculture – Trends and Challenges

### Definition

Economic progress, notably in the emerging economies, and demographic rise will lead to increasing demand for food. At present, 795 million people suffer from undernourishment,<sup>243</sup> particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.<sup>244</sup> Future agricultural production will need to be greater and more sustainable to meet the needs of those suffering from hunger and the future increase in demand.

### Key insight

**There will be growth in global production levels, but this will not necessarily translate to greater access to food.**

While a continued increase in agricultural productivity is expected to fulfill the growing food demand, it will require sustained investments. There is also a growing imbalance between production areas (e.g. the Americas, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia) and areas of demand (e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South and East Asia).<sup>245</sup> International assistance will be needed to address potential shortages that can strongly affect more fragile countries, particularly those that are highly dependent on foreign supplies and their populations.

### Changes by 2030

#### A strong global growth for food demand

Since 2000, global average food demand per person has increased due to demographic growth and improvements in standards of living. It is projected that this growth will continue at a rate of 1.1% per annum between 2006 and 2050.<sup>246</sup> By 2050, this would represent an increase of 60% of the global demand compared to

2005–2007.<sup>247</sup> Even more than demographic growth, the pace of economic development and diet change in emerging countries will be crucial in determining the evolution of global food demand.

Unequal geographic repartition of arable lands, yield variability, and food demand will result in major production deficits in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. North America, Europe, and Latin America will likely continue to be major exporters. These dynamics will be reinforced by the effects of climate change.

#### A constant but insufficient decrease in hunger, particularly in least developed countries

The number of undernourished<sup>248</sup> people is projected to decline from 795 million in 2016 to 653 million in 2030 under a business-as-usual scenario, leading the FAO to call for more sustained pro-poor development.<sup>249</sup> In 2030, undernourished people will represent 7.9% of developing countries' populations, down from 19.7% in 1990–1992.<sup>250</sup> Despite this forecasted reduction, many challenges will remain. The 1996 World Food Summit target to reduce the number of hungry people by half from its 1990–1992 level (815 million) by 2015 will not be met, even by 2030. Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are areas of particular concern, with the highest concentration of undernourished people, who will still represent 14.5% and 10.5% respectively of their total populations. By 2030, these areas will likely experience only a small reduction in the number of chronically undernourished people, with 15 million fewer undernourished people in Sub-Saharan Africa and 5 million fewer undernourished people in South Asia compared to current levels.<sup>251</sup>

## Global Meat Demand Growth Estimates(2010-2030)



Source: The Australian chicken meat industry: An industry in profile, global context, Meat Forms an Important Part of the Diet for Most People Around the World (Rabobank 2011); web; 17 October 2016

### Global nutrition shifts toward “Western diet”

A shift of global consumption toward a “Western diet” with more meat and dairy products has been observed over the past few decades.<sup>252</sup> Rising standards of living and urbanization have drastically changed eating behaviors, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The “nutrition transition”<sup>253</sup> that took centuries in developed countries is happening rapidly in developing countries, particularly in urban centers. This nutrition transition is characterized by a decrease in the consumption of cereals and an increase in the consumption of animal-based products such as meat, eggs, and dairy. Meat consumption is projected to rise from 39kg per person per year in the 2005–2007 period to 45kg per person per year by 2030. In 2030, cereals will still represent almost half of total calorie intake (47%), particularly in developing countries; its proportion in the diet, compared to animal based products, will decline. This new diet is also much richer in sugars and is already affecting health outcomes in countries all over the world.

### Regional and national resistance: maintaining cultural and traditional diets

There is a “wide diversity among countries as regards both the levels of consumption achieved as well as the speed with which the [nutrition] transformation has been taking place.”<sup>254</sup> China’s meat consumption has skyrocketed over the last decade. The pace at which this has happened is unlikely to be repeated elsewhere before 2030. In contrast, some developing countries, such as India, still have very low levels of meat consumption due to religious restrictions (e.g. cattle and pork) and the cost of meat. Globally, the demand for poultry as a share of global


meat consumption could rise sharply in the coming decade as it is a cheaper form of meat and not subject to religious restrictions.<sup>255</sup>

### Regional disparities of arable land

Agricultural production has more than tripled since the 1960s and is still increasing. This growth is not so much a result of the expansion of lands under cultivation (only 13% between 1961 and 2007<sup>256</sup>) as of yield improvements, such as those that were brought about through the Green Revolution. Future production growth could be more difficult than in the past as the constraints are likely to be greater, including scarcity of land and water resources, soil degradation and salinization, use competition from nonfood agricultural products like biofuel, and the impact of climate change.

As of 2005, there were “7.2 billion hectares of land with rain-fed production potential”<sup>257</sup>; however, only 1.4 billion hectares of this arable land is prime land suitable for cultivation. The remaining 5.8 billion hectares constitute forests, protected areas, built areas, and less suitable arable land, and as a result are excluded. Though there is surplus land that could be cultivated, it is projected that only an addition 70 million hectares will be employed in agricultural production by 2050.<sup>258</sup> This is mainly due to the difference in land-production potential and expansion growth between regions. Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and developed countries have by far the highest land-production potential, with 451 million, 363 million, and 447 million hectares respectively.<sup>259</sup> North Africa, South Asia, and Central America, on the other hand, have limited potential for land-production expansion. Among those regions, the quality and quantity of available arable land differs greatly, with often highly localized dynamics.

## Crop Yield Growth



For some regions, the projected expansion of land production differs from the potentiality. Arable land production is expected to increase by 110 million hectares by 2050 for developing countries, particularly for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, while developed countries might experience a decrease of nearly 40 million hectares in the same period.<sup>260</sup>

An increase in arable land does not necessarily result in increased yields, as the quality of land must be taken into consideration.<sup>261</sup> Countries such as Nigeria, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Sierra Leone are already experiencing yield decreases. Newly cultivated areas will require significant investments to improve yields, and this may be difficult for most fragile countries.

### Likely increase in food prices in the long run and risk of shortages

Between 2010 and 2030, the price of basic commodities could more than double, with half this projected increase attributable to climate change and more frequent natural hazards.<sup>262</sup> Changes in climate and precipitation patterns could be responsible for an increase of between 3% and 84% in food prices by 2050.<sup>263</sup> Prices of some crops, such as cacao and tea, are likely to be at the higher end of price increases.

The limited number of exporters for most commodities gives a comparative advantage to traditional exporters from North America, the European Union, Australia, and some developing countries.<sup>264</sup> The dependency on a few countries for the provision of basic commodities increases the risk of shortages for many others. If supply from one country is disrupted by natural disaster or disruptions in the commodities market, there could be major repercussions on the economic and political situations of the most dependent countries. This disadvantaging situation is significant for countries highly dependent on foreign supplies, as illustrated by the 2011 “food riots” across North Africa and the Middle East.<sup>265</sup>

## Uncertainties

### Toward a slowdown in yield growth?

There is uncertainty in the validity of crop-yield projections, as the historical trends that are the foundation of these estimates are the result of likely “one-time innovations” rapidly adopted as part of the Green Revolution.<sup>266</sup> Many agricultural systems in more developed countries have increased yields for half a century and are now reaching yield plateaus set by the upper biophysical limit of the crops. As such, projections that ignore these constraints are likely to vastly overestimate global food production in the future. Limited yield growth in staple crops would increase the risks of food insecurity (and societal disruption) for many less economically developed and fragile countries across the globe.

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# Violent Conflict

There was a 20% decrease in interstate and societal violence between 2014 and 1991. Conflicts fell from 50 in 1991 to 40 in 2014.

Out of 53 conflicts in 1991, 48 were civil wars, whereas civil wars represented only 50% of the 20 ongoing wars in 1949. This is mostly due to the promotion of multilateral peace negotiations and the promotion of regional economic and industrial cooperation.



Interstate and societal violence have significantly decreased during 1990s and early 2000s. Protracted conflict in fragile states increased and intrastate conflicts between gov and non state actors



## Key insights

1

The entrenched nature of conflict means humanitarian responses will need to be strategic in the long-term to reduce community vulnerability. Protracted conflict will need longer-term solutions.

## Main trends



Though not at the 1990s peak, the number of civil wars is increasing. After a precipitous decline in the 1990s, there has been an inconsistent increase in the number of civil wars. There are currently six ongoing civil wars, in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Sudan. Civil wars are likely to remain the main type of conflict.



Conflicts are mostly protracted crises – have the possibility of permanently damaging country's infrastructure.



Conflicts are increasingly concentrated in the world's poorest regions.



Interstate conflicts, though rare, are still deemed likely and impactful.

## Uncertainties




The risk of rising interstate tensions around issues such as the South China Sea could hold the potential for interstate conflict.

Sources: Centre for Systemic Peace, PRIO, Council on Foreign Relations, Coburn, Walter.

# Violent Conflict

Global Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2015



Source: Center for Systemic Peace, Conflict Trends, retrieved on 2 March 2017

## Definition

Conflict can be broadly defined as “any situation in which parties perceive they have incompatible goals.”<sup>267</sup> However, violent conflict here will be narrowly defined as a form of conflict where parties engage in physical force, resulting in a loss of life, to advance their objectives. Conflicts can be intrastate, interstate, or multi-state.<sup>268</sup>

## Key insight

**The entrenched nature of conflict means humanitarian responses will need to be strategic in the long-term to reduce community vulnerability**

Violent conflicts, particularly protracted conflicts, represent great challenges for humanitarian actors. Conflicts result in urgent humanitarian needs among displaced and local populations for protection, food, water, education, healthcare, and basic services. However, as well as providing immediate life-saving interventions, humanitarian actors will need to move beyond palliative care and address long-term critical vulnerabilities that contribute to, cause, and are caused by prolonged conflict. They must be adaptable and intervene in post-conflict situations to provide a continuum of support.

## Changes by 2030


### A global decline of conflicts

Since the 1990s, a global decline in the number of conflicts has been observed. Interstate and societal violence have significantly decreased during the 1990s and early 2000s. In 1991, there were more than 50 conflicts ongoing. This figure dropped to fewer than 30 in 2003 before climbing to 40 in 2014. Overall,

this represents a 20% decrease in less than 30 years. This trend was particularly marked for armed conflicts and high-intensity conflicts. Interstate conflicts have almost disappeared, with less interstate war, genocide, and terrorism throughout the period. Some long-standing conflicts, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, persist. However, violent conflict has become concentrated in protracted conflicts in fragile states. Conflicts that have the potential to become violent will persist particularly in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Eastern Europe. Those driven predominantly by intra-state conflicts between governments and non-state armed actors (including political opposition groups) such as in Syria or in Ukraine will continue. The drug trade in Central America demonstrates another facet of violent conflict oriented around interpersonal violence and opposition between criminal enterprises and the rule of law.<sup>269</sup>

Though the overall rate of global warfare has declined, violent conflict will continue to be a recourse for opposing parties, particularly in states with recent histories of violence that lack the process and cultural imperative to manage conflict peaceably.

## Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946–2014



Source: PRIO, Trends in Armed Conflicts 1946–2014.

### Though not at the 1990s peak, the number of civil wars is increasing

After a precipitous decline in the 1990s, there has been an inconsistent increase in the number of civil wars. There are currently six ongoing civil wars,<sup>270</sup> in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Sudan, fueled by various factors, including ethnic violence, religious rivalries, political turmoil, and economic instability.

Although they are often not as deadly as interstate wars, civil wars have severe consequences for populations, increasing migration and damaging entire socio-economic systems, from which it is challenging to recover. The civil war in South Sudan has already caused the deaths of 10,000 people,<sup>271</sup> whereas the death toll in the Syrian conflict has reached 400,000.<sup>272</sup>

Civil wars are likely to remain the predominant type of conflict over the course of the outlook as ongoing protracted civil conflicts are compounded by the emergence of new ones.

### Interstate conflicts, though rare, are still deemed likely and impactful

Since the 1980s, there has been a significant and continued decline in interstate conflicts.<sup>273</sup> Out of 53 conflicts in 1991, 48 were civil wars, whereas civil wars represented only 50% of the 20 ongoing wars in 1949. This is mostly due to the promotion of multilateral peace negotiations and the promotion of regional economic and industrial cooperation. Though direct interstate conflict was reduced, wars between great powers continued in the form of

proxy wars throughout the Cold War and to the present day, as seen in the war in Syria.<sup>274</sup>

In spite of this trend, there is concern that there could be a resurgence in direct interstate conflict.<sup>275</sup> Interstate conflict in Asia and Eastern Europe is increasingly likely and would be highly impactful. In the South and East China Seas, for instance, conflict could be another step in a progression from low-level incident to full-scale war. Even though few powers have an interest in waging interstate war, such an event could result from escalation following an accident, misunderstanding, or low-level attack.

### Conflicts are increasingly concentrated in the world's poorest regions

Since the end of the Cold War, conflicts have been increasingly concentrated in a few regions of the world. Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for only 13% of all countries experiencing renewed civil war in the 1960s. This figure has increased to 35% at the beginning of the 21st century.<sup>276</sup> This can be explained by the fact that less economically developed countries are more fragile and therefore present socioeconomic and political conditions that make violence a more prominent form of conflict, particularly in Sudan, Mali, and Central African Republic. Ethnic, religious, and economic rivalries between communities are also sources of tension in these countries. Tackling the issues that can lead to civil wars and other conflicts in the world's poorest regions will require significant long-term investments in basic services, including education, infrastructure, and environmental protection.



Civil War Onset by Decade <sup>278</sup>		
Decade	Onset in a country with no previous conflict	Onset in a country with previous conflict
1960s	57%	43%
1970s	43%	57%
1980s	38%	62%
1990s	33%	67%
2000s	10%	90%

The concentration of conflicts in the world's poorest areas is likely to continue, as the circumstances of fragility that increase the risk of conflict are often self-perpetuating, engendering a vicious circle.

### Conflicts are mostly protracted crises

90% of civil wars happen in countries with conflictive pasts. Civil wars, which have become the dominant form of armed conflict in the world today, have a high recidivism rate. Of the 103 countries that experienced some form of civil war between 1945 and 2009, only 44 avoided a subsequent return to civil war.<sup>277</sup> The chart below suggests that most conflicts categorized as new civil wars are in fact continuations of previous conflicts.

Such protracted conflicts tend to have significant socio-economic and political impacts and can permanently damage a country's infrastructure. This creates an environment where cyclical violence can flourish, each violent action reinforcing the dynamics that lead to further violent conflict. Protracted conflicts often result in forced, protracted displacement, which poses the risk that crises will become regionalized. More than half (53%) of the global displaced

population comes from three countries: Somalia, Afghanistan, and Syria, two of which have been unstable for decades.<sup>279</sup>

### Uncertainties

#### A risk of rising interstate tensions

Increasing geopolitical instability and rising diplomatic tensions between great powers are putting more pressure on already fragile areas. For instance, the situation in the South China Sea, where China opposes neighboring countries' territorial claims over local islands, has deteriorated. Similarly, the rise of separatist movements in eastern Ukraine sustained by Russia is pitting Russia against the government of Ukraine and its allies. These conflicts are unlikely to turn into open interstate wars, but conflicts with the potential for violence are increasing in frequency.<sup>280</sup>

Image by Annie Sprat






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# Terrorism



Since 2008, terror-related deaths increased by 286%

From 2000 to 2015, 40% of all terror attacks occurred in Iraq, Nigeria and Afghanistan

## Key insights



Terror attacks will mainly affect the most fragile areas, deepening or prolonging insecurity.



The proliferation of counter-terror measures will have a significant impact on humanitarian actors- often risking non-compliance or loss of access.

## Main trends



There has been a dramatic increase in the number and fatality of terror attacks in recent years. This rise is projected to continue.

The complex web of anti-terror laws will continue to impact the humanitarian sector



Most of the attacks between 1975 and 2015 happened in three areas: Asia, the Middle East, and the African Lake Chad region. This concentration is likely to be sustained.

## Uncertainties



Attacks on aid workers are forcing NGOs to change their operating modalities




Terror attacks in industrialised countries have an impact on foreign policy and international aid - some countries have decided to increase their contributions abroad while other have decided to reduce theirs.

Sources: Wagner, Institute for Economics and Peace, IRIS, WEF, UNOCHA, NRC, The Aid Workers Security Database

# Terrorism

Number of deaths from terrorism since 2011



Source: Global Terrorism Database

## Definition

There are more than 100 legal definitions of terrorism<sup>281</sup> and little international agreement on how to interpret the term. To be comprehensive: terrorism is “the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims.”<sup>282</sup>

“Groups that are designated as terrorist organizations by states and international organizations are not monolithic. They are not shaped by the tactics that they employ but by their objectives, culture, operating environment and ideology.”<sup>283</sup>

## Key insights

### Terror attacks will mainly affect the most fragile areas, deepening or prolonging insecurity

Terrorist activity will continue to be concentrated in already fragile areas, while attacks will be predominantly low-tech, designed to create maximum damage at minimum cost.

### The proliferation of counter-terror measures will have a significant impact on humanitarian actors

Limited transparency and continuous iterative changes to the web of international, regional, and local legislation pertaining to terrorism will be a significant challenge for humanitarian organizations operating in areas with active terror groups. The risks of non-compliance and the potential cost to principled humanitarian action will intensify.

## Changes by 2030

### Increase in terror attacks and level of fatality


The death toll from terrorism has significantly increased from 5,000 victims in 2005 to 32,000 victims in 2014. There has been an ever-greater acceleration since 2008, as terrorism-related deaths have increased by 286%.<sup>284</sup> The year 2014 was the most violent, both worldwide and in countries experiencing protracted conflicts such as Iraq (9,929), Afghanistan and Pakistan (6200), Syria (1698), and Nigeria (7512).<sup>285</sup> This is mostly due to the rise of new forms of terrorism, relying on new non-state actors such as ISIS, mostly operating in the Middle East, in Syria and Iraq, or Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region. The use of terror tactics to advance political or religious agendas is likely to continue to be a modality of conflict over the period of the outlook, with a concentration of attacks in fragile areas of the Middle East and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and more events in industrialized countries.<sup>286</sup>

### Concentration of the attacks

### Most of the attacks between 1975 and 2015 happened in three areas: Asia, the Middle East, and the African Lake Chad region.

From 2000 to 2015, 40% of all terror attacks worldwide occurred in Iraq, Nigeria, and Afghanistan.<sup>287</sup> The Middle East is the most impacted area, with 1,490 attacks taking 20,193 lives, while the death toll in Africa reached 3,445 in 187 attacks.<sup>288</sup> Terrorist tactics are increasingly part of conflict, and terrorism’s role is growing in zones of fragility. Civilians are the most impacted by terrorist attacks, both directly (as victims) and indirectly (through the socio-economic ramifications of prolonged insecurity). Terrorism has significant impacts on local economic and political stability. Attacks deter foreign investors from being actively involved a

## Victims of Terrorist Attacks beyond Western Europe




Source: Global Terrorism Database

country and reduce the state's ability to perform its core functions, thus damaging governments' legitimacy and stability. Terrorism has been one of the primary causes of decreased tourism in Tunisia, Turkey, and even Europe,<sup>289</sup> which has long-term consequences for the economies that rely on those industries. The resolution of conflicts seems harder to achieve in countries impacted by recurrent terrorism attacks, as non-state actors' degree of dispersion, influence on internal politics, and ability to disrupt formal processes and the local economy make the negotiation processes more complex.<sup>290</sup> Terrorist attacks will continue to drive instability, with the potential to prolong already protracted conflicts throughout the course of the outlook.

### The rise in anti-terror laws will impact the humanitarian sector

The amount of legislation related to terrorist activities dramatically increased after the September 11th attacks in 2001. This increase had significant consequences, including the creation of an expanding web of conventions, laws, and institutions. Though not directly targeted by the majority of counterterrorism legislation, the counterterrorism architecture has had a significant impact on the ability of humanitarian organizations to deliver principled humanitarian aid.<sup>291</sup>


## Trends in Terrorism Legislation



Source: Pokalova, E. (2015) Legislative Responses to Terrorism: What Drives States to Adopt New Counterterrorism Legislation? Terrorism and Political Violence, 27(3), 474-496, pg 477



## Total Incidents (1997-2015)



Data verified up to 31 December 2015  
Source: The Aid Worker Security Database

Legislation has made it harder to raise money to finance humanitarian actions, especially for Islamic NGOs and those unable to assure compliance.<sup>292</sup>

Counter terrorism legislation could also make it harder to access populations in need. Some states could be tempted to use anti-terror laws for political gain to target opposition groups, expel aid workers, or restrict where or how humanitarian organizations can program.

## Uncertainties

### Attacks on aid workers are forcing a change in operating modalities

In 1997, 39 aid workers were killed, 28 kidnapped, and 6 wounded, figures that rose to 109, 68, and 110 respectively in 2015.<sup>293</sup>

In response to this increasingly perilous context, many humanitarian organizations have been forced to change their modus operandi: “The 2013 spike in casualties and subsequent decline have related causes. Escalating conflicts in South Sudan and Syria, as well as ongoing violence in Afghanistan, drove the surge. In all these contexts, attacks declined by over a third in 2014. This was due mainly to reduced or reconfigured operational presence in these countries, with fewer aid workers deployed to field locations deemed insecure.”<sup>294</sup> Continued terrorist activities in areas with high levels of humanitarian need could force further reductions in access or a change in the types of interventions explored.

### Impact of terror attacks in industrialized countries on foreign policy and international aid

The rise of terrorism in developed countries could affect the provision of official development assistance and public philanthropy. Developed countries are major donors, and as a result, fluctuations in the level of aid provided could be significant. However, experts disagree what impact terrorism will have on development assistance, as it relies on many other factors, such as “economic and political risk” and historical relations between donor and recipient countries.<sup>295</sup> Contrary trends can be observed, with some individuals or organizations reducing charitable activities, while others have increased their participation due to “charity and empathy with the victims.”<sup>296</sup> Terrorism and the fear it induces can escalate sentiments of “nationalism and patriotism”<sup>297</sup> and could result in donors giving aid to a limited group of NGOs. This results in a highly uncertain environment for both foreign direct investment and individual giving.

Image by Sergey Neamoscou



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# International legal framework



Recent evolutions in the international legal frame are making the operating environment increasingly challenging for the humanitarian sector.



## Key insights



Increasing divergence in the behavior of states will undermine the customary nature of many international norms.



Private and informal international actors will develop new forms of rule making

## Main trends



International Humanitarian law is and continue to be increasingly violated.



International legal structures (laws of war, protection of civilians, rights of displaced communities) will struggle to evolve quickly enough to have continued relevance and applicability.



Global standards and guidelines issued from private networks and non-state actors is increasing while the development of public international law is stagnating.



States behavior regarding international norms is becoming more divergent. This is particularly marked in the dispute management system and in relations with International justice.

## Controversies



While the number of people at risk of displacement is increasing, there are many people in involuntary large-scale migrations who are not offered protection under the existing international legal frame (including climate refugees) - their status will be a potential area of evolution in international law.

Sources: HiiL, Morgan Kelley, Ivan Nechepurenko & Nick Cumming-Bruce for the New York Times, Arend & Beck.

# International Legal Framework

## Definition

The international legal framework sets a number of rules globally regarded as binding the relations between states. In the humanitarian context, it sets the rules of humanitarian intervention and protection of populations in an armed conflict situation. Recent evolutions in the international legal framework are making the operating environment increasingly challenging for the humanitarian sector. This situation is reinforced by the divergent behavior of states where international norms are concerned.

## Key insights

### Increasing divergence in the behavior of states will undermine the customary nature of many international norms

Disrespect for the Geneva Conventions by states and non-state actors, which erodes the protection offered to civilians and protected groups in conflict, is increasing. Though the Conventions are still maintained as an ideal within the international legal system, actors will continue to challenge or disregard them.

Existing international legal structures that pertain to humanitarian vulnerabilities (the laws of war, the protection of civilians, the rights of displaced communities) will not evolve quickly enough to have continued relevance and applicability.

### Private and informal international actors will develop new forms of rule making

States no longer monopolize the creation of rules and regulations. The increase of transnational governance will generate networks that make rules and standards for their sectors, transforming their status to rule makers.

## Changes by 2030

### Growing involvement of non-state actors in law- and rule-making process

Since the beginning of the 21st century, rule making by private networks has been increasing,<sup>298</sup> while the development of public international law is stagnating.<sup>299</sup> “International governance often resides in private networks<sup>300</sup>” composed of corporations, NGOs, and institutions. The Forest Stewardship Council, an organization that sets standards to promote better forest management, is an example of a private network creating and enforcing a norm to “promote environmentally sound, socially beneficial and economically prosperous management of the world’s forests.”<sup>301</sup> In parallel, this increasing private governance and regulation is becoming more transnational due to the globalization of needs.

Diverse rules, standards, and guidelines have emerged as the practices vary significantly by industrial sector, topic, state, and region. The increased cooperation between some rule makers without the requirement of universal adherence has resulted in competition between rules and standards which are developed at different levels. The diversification of actors who engage in rules- and standards-making is a trend that is likely to continue.


As rule making by private networks has proliferated, public international law with the ambition of universal agreement and ratification has been neglected in favor of more informal international lawmaking. Law-making between states is less prolific at traditional for a such as the UN but continues to occur at regional levels or within groups such as the G-20.<sup>302</sup> For instance, non-binding guiding principles for global investment were decided at the G20 Summit in July 2016, in Shanghai, to promote coherence in investment as well as inclusive economic growth.<sup>303</sup> The de-internationalization of rule making is likely to continue as the world becomes increasingly multipolar and regionalization increases the importance of supra-national bodies outside the UN structure.

### State behavior regarding international norms is becoming more divergent

Currently, international law enforcement has many limits, as the main body for enforcement is the UN Security Council and its resources are limited to contributions by member states. States with veto power such as the United States, China, and Russia can choose to comply with international law according to their national interest, creating a double standard and a politicization of transgressions. As a result, even if many tenets of international law are widely followed, in absence of a higher global authority, each state remains the ultimate decisionmaker of whether or not to abide by international law in their own territory. This situation is particularly evident in relation to the dispute-management system and states’ relationship with the International Court of Justice. The recent case (2013–2016) of the Philippines versus China, or the South China Sea Arbitration,<sup>304</sup> illustrates the non-compliance of great powers with decisions deemed to encroach on their national interests. The United States’ war on terror and the Russian annexation of Crimea (2014) can also be seen as examples of non-compliance with international law. These states particularly emphasize the importance of state sovereignty and the non-intervention principle as surpassing other principles and laws.<sup>305</sup>



## Status of Ratification by Each State of 18 International Human Rights Treaties



More recently, Russia's withdrawal from the International Court of Justice (2016), preceded by other states,<sup>306</sup> illustrates the rising prominence of national interest as the primary lens through which states view international regulation.<sup>307</sup> "Some African countries have been especially critical of the ICC for pursuing heads of state. Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir has been wanted by the court since 2009 for allegedly orchestrating atrocities in Darfur. The ICC also caused an uproar among some African nations by indicting Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta on charges of crimes against humanity for post election violence in 2007 in which more than 1,000 died."<sup>308</sup>

### Increasing violation of international humanitarian law

International humanitarian law and particularly the Geneva Conventions have been challenged by contemporary modern warfare.<sup>309</sup> The Geneva Conventions, originally adapted to international conflicts, increasingly lack relevance in the face of modern intra-state warfare. Civilians are more often held hostage by warring parties, while an increased number of state and non-state actors are unwilling to act in accordance with the Conventions.<sup>310</sup> As illustrated by the Syrian conflict, the blurring of civilians and combatants and the involvement of non-state actors who disregard international law in conflicts raise existential questions on the effectiveness of international humanitarian law.<sup>311</sup>

One example of the challenge to the effectiveness of humanitarian law is the increase in risks to humanitarian actors over the last decade. This trend suggests that humanitarian workers are increasingly viewed as targets in spite of their protection in international treaties. The recent decrease in number of attacks (2014 and 2015) is attributed to the "growing no-go areas limiting humanitarian aid delivery"<sup>312</sup> rather than greater adherence to laws protecting civilians and non-combatants.


Unwillingness in the international community to review international humanitarian law and human rights treaties makes it difficult to adapt them to this new context, casting in doubt their continued relevance.

## Uncertainties

### The status of refugees

The populations displaced by the effects of climate change who are not protected by international treaties are an increasing concern.<sup>313</sup> The reasons for displacement place differing legal obligations on states to protect affected populations. Climate refugees are the most at risk as they are not recognized by all countries, and the way in which to manage the impending surge of climate refugees is a topic of debate. "The problems with the term 'climate refugee,' [...] have thus been at the heart of an international legal debate consisting of two main sides. While some advocate either amending the 1951 Refugee Convention or creating a new convention for this 'new' category of migrants, others recommend aggregating existing legal mechanisms and producing something similar to the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, but for environmental migrants."<sup>314</sup> Refugees are protected by the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 protocol, but these conventions have not been ratified by all states<sup>315</sup> and do not cover all large-scale involuntary migrations. How the international legal frame adapts new dynamics of migration is a critical uncertainty as the displaced population is likely to grow.

### Total number of attacks per year 2004-2014



Source: European Commission, International Humanitarian Law, Humanitarian aid and civil protection ECHO Factsheet 2015

Image by Unsplash



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# Technology

By 2020 57% of world population is expected to be equipped with mobile broadband.

81% of developed countries and 15% of less developed countries have access to the internet. 75% of Africa's population is still offline.

2.9 m patent applications in 2015. Year on year these increase by 5-9%

Globalisation and the growth of young populations in developing and middle income countries have contributed to the current technology boom.



For humanitarian NGOs, the interaction between an ever-increasing range of technologies and natural hazards will pose ever more challenging strategic and operational issues.



## Key insights



The use of new technologies and their increasing availability will have major “transformative consequences” for the humanitarian sector – telemedicine, impact of social networking

## Main trends



Acceleration of technological change



Inequalities in access to technology persist.



There is a high global acceptance of new technologies. Mass adoption has been on the rise since the 1990s.

## Uncertainties



Nanotechnologies are expected to impact numerous sectors, including drug delivery, agriculture (through nanoseeds, for instance), energy, and even textiles, thus changing the way humanitarian assistance is provided and the way humanitarian actors interact with populations in need.



Technology may facilitate citizen-driven humanitarian responses but the longevity and sustainability of these movements still needs to be assessed.



Technology is increasingly being used in disasters to locate affected populations. Humanitarians may successfully use these tools to ameliorate responses.

Sources: International Telecommunication Union, World Intellectual Property Organization, European Environment Agency, OECD, Kent et al, Philipps.



# Technology

## Definition

The reach of technology has expanded considerably since the beginning of the 20th century and particularly since the 1990s. The use of technology is ever-growing and in industrialized countries permeates almost every sector of peoples' lives. Currently, basic technologies are accessible to the majority of the world's population. Technologies can include basic and everyday objects such as cars, coffee machines, or credit cards, while new technologies range from nanotechnology, smartphones, drones, and 3D printers to artificial intelligence. Developments in information and communication technology are particularly far-reaching. In 2016, information and communications technology (ICT) services are becoming increasingly affordable and covering ever-larger areas, available to two-thirds of the world's population.<sup>316</sup> This development is advancing progress toward Goal 9 of the Sustainable Development Goals, which seeks to "build resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialization and foster innovation."<sup>317</sup>

## Key insight

**The use of new technologies and their increasing availability will have major "transformative consequences"<sup>318</sup> for the humanitarian sector**

Technology allows access to remote areas and communities. For example, "related technologies, including telemedicine, open the way for the provision of care at a level normally not considered possible in poor or inaccessible communities."<sup>319</sup> It induces changes in all socio-economic aspects of peoples' lives with often-positive impacts on education and social connections between individuals. However, it also provides risks, as social networking can be a relay of "misleading information,"<sup>320</sup> sometimes leading to confusion between "different calls for assistance."<sup>321</sup> Technology is challenging

for aid organizations in terms of public perception and media coverage. "The widespread availability of social networking and mobile capability shapes the local and global public arenas in which NGOs must negotiate their credibility and legitimacy."<sup>322</sup> Technology can also be a vector of crises as it can be used for nefarious purposes, such as in cyber-attacks. Moreover, the emergence of "social networking presents a vision of possibilities that are profoundly transformative, and yet their social, socio-economic and political consequences are filled with uncertainty."<sup>323</sup>


Humanitarian providers must adapt to this new context and its stakes. "For humanitarian NGOs, the interaction between an ever-increasing range of technologies and natural hazards will pose ever more challenging strategic and operational issues."<sup>324</sup>

## Changes by 2030

### Acceleration of technological change


The acceleration of technological developments is a major and continuing trend of the 20th and 21st centuries.<sup>325</sup> This trend has been particularly marked since the beginning of the 2000s and the unprecedented development of information and communication technologies. Ever-growing technologies intersect with an increasing number of objects in various domains, as is illustrated by the increase in patent applications. In 2015, no fewer than 2.9 million patent applications were submitted. This trend looks likely to continue, with consistent increases of between 5% and 9% each year, building from the brief decline in 2009/2010 after the economic crisis.<sup>326</sup> The acceleration of technological change is underpinned by other major trends, such as a growing population of youth in developing and middle-income countries who are more inclined to integrate technology into their work and personal lives, as well as continued economic globalization, which ensures growing demand.

Trend in patent applications for the top five offices



Source: WIPO

## Shortening the time lapse before mass adoption of new technologies



European Environment Agency (2016)  
Safeguarding People from Environmental Risks to Health

### High global acceptance for new technologies

This acceleration trend is sustained by high global acceptance of technologies by civil societies. Mass adoption of new technologies is quickening since the 1990s: it took 7 years and 13 years, respectively, for the internet (World Wide Web) and mobile phones to be adopted and used by a quarter of the United States' population, whereas it took 35 years for the telephone and 46 years for electricity.<sup>327</sup>

Technologies such as mobile phones and the internet have a higher penetration rate than any other technology. Between 2000 and 2015, global internet penetration grew seven-fold from 6.5% to 43%<sup>328</sup> of the world population. Mobile phone penetration grew 97% from 738 million units to 7 billion units during the 2000–2015 period.<sup>329</sup> In 2016, 52.3% of global households had internet access,<sup>330</sup> up from 46%<sup>331</sup> in 2015 and 44%<sup>332</sup> in 2014.

This increase in the use of ICT is almost certain to continue to grow. By 2020, 57% of the world population is expected to be equipped with mobile broadband connections, compared to 24% in 2015,<sup>333</sup> and 54% of the world population is projected to be online by 2020.<sup>334</sup>

Concurrently, other technologies such as robotics or “internet of things” items have begun to gain momentum. Currently, 1.8 million robots are active, 80% of which are used in industry. Between 2008 and 2017, the sale of robots increased by 500% and is continuing, sustained largely by Asian demand. The number of internet-capable objects is expected to jump to 18 to 50 billion by 2020, compared to 6 to 14 billion in 2014.<sup>335</sup>


### Remaining significant inequalities for technology access

Despite the accelerating development of technology, significant global disparities in access and adoption remain. This inequality of access and use of technologies is known as the “digital divide.”<sup>336</sup> The global digital divide highlights unequal access to new technologies, as lack of access to the internet and mobile technologies can be an inhibitor to exploiting other technological advancements and basic goods and services.

The divide in access is particularly marked between developed, emerging, and the least developed countries. The majority of those who do not use the internet live in Africa and Asia. On average, 81% of the population of developed countries is using the internet, compared to 15.2% for the least developed countries.<sup>337</sup> Connectivity is a particular challenge in Africa, where the offline population is 75% of the total.<sup>338</sup>

Unequal access is not restricted to ICT technologies, as these overlap with more diverse and advanced technologies. Robotics constitutes one example, with 70% of robots, particularly those used in industry, being bought by just five countries: China, Japan, Korea, the United States, and Germany. 3D-printing technologies are similarly concentrated, with nearly 40% of the products currently located in the United States. Japan, Germany, China, the United Kingdom, Italy, and France have 39% of the world's 3D printers, while the rest of the world shares the remaining 21%.<sup>339</sup>

### Proportion of Regional Population Using the Internet



Source: ITU

In addition, there is a geographical and gender divide in technology penetration rates at the national level. Despite investments in extending technologies to remote areas, access and quality disparities between urban and rural areas are persistent, with 60% of the unconnected population living in rural areas.<sup>340</sup> There is also a gender divide, with women representing 58% of unconnected people worldwide.<sup>341</sup> This gender gap is most pronounced in the least developed countries, with the largest gap in African countries and the smallest in the Americas.<sup>342</sup>


These inequalities are mainly due to the lack of locally adapted infrastructures and longer delays in getting the latest technologies. When the technology is available, including in urban areas, it

can be unaffordable or inaccessible given the level of skills<sup>343</sup> or language<sup>344</sup> needed to use it effectively. Consequently, “the offline population is disproportionately female, rural, poor, illiterate and elderly.”<sup>345</sup>

Inequalities are likely to remain an ongoing challenge. Projections show that by 2020, the percentage of the population that is online in the least developed and developing countries will represent only 17% and 46% respectively.<sup>346</sup>

Nevertheless, lack of access to the most recent technologies can be bypassed by other means. The least connected populations often use adaptative mechanisms to meet these inequalities by

### Individuals using the internet (%)



Source: ITU

relying on more broadly available technologies – for example, mobile phones: in 2016, “seven billion people (95% of the global population) live in an area covered by a mobile-cellular network,”<sup>347</sup> which has allowed the unexpected expansion of mobile money transfer networks such as M-Pesa in Kenya.

## Uncertainties

### Use of nanotechnology

Nanotechnologies are often spoken of as revolutionary tools that could eventually transform many socio-economic dynamics. “Nanoscale materials have been used for decades in applications ranging from window glass and sunglasses to car bumpers and paints. Currently, the convergence of scientific disciplines (chemistry, biology, electronics, physics, engineering, etc.) is leading to a multiplication of applications in many domains such as industry, health care, energy, biotechnology, space exploration and security. Nanotechnology is expected to have a significant impact on our economy and society.”<sup>348</sup> Nanotechnologies are expected to impact numerous sectors, including drug delivery, agriculture (through nano-seeds, for instance), energy, and even textiles, thus changing the way humanitarian assistance is provided and the way humanitarian actors interact with populations in need.

### Citizen-driven humanitarian response facilitated by technologies

The emergence and global spread of technologies, particularly digital technologies, allows for greater involvement of citizens in humanitarian responses. Using emerging technologies (e.g. platforms, social networks, mobile technology), citizens can gather,

mostly virtually, to respond to humanitarian demand directly in anticipatory, emergency, and even post-crisis support. A citizen-driven humanitarian response was evident after the 2010 Haiti earthquake, by way of tremendous financial support via donations and technical support with the online-crowdsourcing platform Ushahidi.<sup>349</sup> The emerging trend of citizen-driven response via digital technologies is often referred to as digital humanitarianism, describing “the people who participate or volunteer to deploy technology for the humanitarian aid.”<sup>350</sup> Despite its potential advantages, the impact of this new form of humanitarian assistance remains unclear due to lack of cooperation between actors and uncoordinated individual initiatives.<sup>351</sup> Concurrently, the sustainability of such movements is uncertain, with the risk of support being concentrated on crises that attract media and public attention while others are neglected.

### Populations increasingly using technologies to face humanitarian distress situation

Broader usage of social networks and the greater availability of mobile technology is “increasing information supply and demand”<sup>352</sup> in situations of humanitarian distress. As illustrated in several recent crises, mostly the result of natural hazards, affected populations are increasingly using digital technologies to respond more rapidly to emergencies. During the Japanese tsunami in 2011 and Hurricane Sandy in 2012, the Twitter social network was used extensively to ask for help and propose assistance.<sup>353</sup> Even if the positive impacts and contributions of these systems are well recognized, the long-term consequences remain highly uncertain.<sup>354</sup> How the humanitarian community will meet the challenge of a “new set of expectations from affected communities for the provision of response”<sup>355</sup> is unclear.

Image by Sergey Neamoscou





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# Humanitarian Distress and Crises

Political Instability

New Waves of Nationalism

The Resurgence of Sovereignty and Political Centrality of Humanitarian Crises

Disasters Incurred by Natural Hazards

Epidemics

Large-Scale Forced Migration and the Intensification and Increased Scale of Humanitarian Crises

# Political Instability

**2 billion** people live in countries affected by fragility, conflict, or violence.

By 2030, this figure will rise to 46% of all people.

A per capita purchasing power of \$15,000 is considered a threshold for democratisation.



By 2030 global demand for food, water and energy will be up 30%, 40% and 50% respectively.

Water is likely to be a source of tension and active conflict in the next 15 years.



## Key insights



Political instability will be endemic in chronically fragile states.



The impact of demographic growth and climate change will compound political tensions resulting in a concentration in areas where multiple vulnerabilities intersect.



High-income countries could experience strong political tensions leading to humanitarian issues

Conflict, terrorism and regime instability will continue to destabilise the Middle East. East Africa will be faced with political violence and resource nationalism. Both of these regions will increase political risk globally.



## Key trends



Political instability will result from social and demographic changes such as:

- Growing youth populations
- Political transitions following the death of a long standing authoritarian leader
- Over-reliance on the energy sector
- Growing middle classes demanding democratic transformation.



Crises will become increasing regional or global in scope. Simultaneously supra-national structures will weaken as countries become increasingly protectionist.



Natural resource conflicts will increase and intensify due to climate change.



The West will face threats from the terrorism, ethno-nationalism, and Russian intervention.

Sources: World Bank, UNHCR, World Economic Forum, National Intelligence Council.



# Political Instability

## Definition

Political instability will be defined in broad terms, encompassing the likelihood of sustained civil disobedience or protests resulting in a weakening of a government's legitimacy, the potential loss of trust in governance structures or processes, and the propensity for irregular regime change (e.g. assassinations or coups).

## Key insights

### Political instability will be endemic in chronically fragile states

A significant increase in conflict, terrorism, and regime instability in the Middle East and North Africa, along with intensifying political violence and resource nationalism<sup>356</sup> in East Africa, are among the key factors driving a global rise in political risks. A "vicious circle" reflects the self-reinforcing impact of poor governance, conflict, high levels of corruption, persistent regime instability, and societal dissent and protests. Currently seven of the worst countries for political risk are Somalia, Afghanistan, Sudan, DR Congo, Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Iraq.<sup>357</sup> Countries that are likely to remain unstable in 2030 include Chad, Niger, Mali, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Burundi, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen.

### The impact of demographic growth and climate change will compound political instability, resulting in a concentration of fragility in areas where multiple vulnerabilities intersect

The rate of population growth, over and above the pace of developmental progress, will impinge on the ability of states to make the investments necessary to take advantage of their demographic dividends and manage the impact of climate change and the corresponding environmental degradation and reduction in available natural resources.

### High-income countries could face significant political tensions, resulting in humanitarian crises

The humanitarian sector should anticipate the possibility of an emergency in the EU following an internal crisis in a member state or the collapse of the EU.

## Changes by 2030: Main trends


### Social and demographic patterns will lead to political instability

Social instability is one of the most prominent concerns in the next decade for Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and North Africa,<sup>358</sup> fueled by growing frustration with the political system and the economic situation. Corruption and bad governance will be increasingly contested as citizens are better informed and interconnected through new technologies.

Challenges to the dominant political system will be most likely in countries where the median age is still under or around 25 and the middle class is increasing. Popular protests or even larger phenomena like the Arab Spring will likely occur over the course of the outlook, particularly in the more youthful countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (Chad, Uganda, Nigeria) and South-East Asia (Laos, Cambodia). The number of young people is set to explode in developing countries, and this cohort will require ever-increasing access to livelihood and economic opportunities in order for countries to benefit from their demographic dividend. This group is likely to demand better public services and increased political participation as well as much greater government accountability. Failing to meet these expectations could lead to a large, idle, disillusioned youth population, increasing the risk of social unrest, which could in turn result in greater, sustained political instability.

The ability of authoritarian regimes to reform or at least manage the emergence of a civil society will be challenged. Resistance to change will weaken the state and reduce its capacity to sustain itself in the face of growing instability. The legitimacy of long-lived

### The Median Age of Country-Level Populations 2010–2030



Source: National Intelligence Council, 2012, Global Trends 2030, Alternative World

leaders (**Belarus, Tajikistan, Cameroon, Congo**) or emergent political elites will be increasingly questioned, if they do not represent rapidly changing societies. Trust in global institutions, business, government, media and NGOs is declining.<sup>359</sup> Inequalities and political representation will continue to be at the center of citizens' action, as globalization is challenged.

For several countries (**Algeria, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan**), succession issues following the death or departure of leaders will lead to a critical transition phase, offering an opportunity for authoritarian regimes to peacefully adapt their governance to reduce social frustration and avoid popular unrest. These power vacuums can also lead to social instability, fights among political-economical elites, a weakening of state legitimacy, and the polarization of society.

### Economic growth leads to new expectations on the political field

Due to structural economic problems, such as low diversification, limited redistribution of energy incomes, and lack of public investment in infrastructure, major energy producers, such as **Russia, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria** are likely to experience serious political instability. The tacit social contract between the regimes and their population (restriction of political freedom for relative prosperity and stability) will become more fragile.

A political crisis in China before 2030 is also a possibility. China's rapid growth has allowed millions of people to escape the most extreme forms of poverty, but the balance between preserving the desired level of state control while instituting much-needed economic and political reforms is increasingly difficult.<sup>360</sup> Despite a slowdown in the GDP growth rate, GDP per capita in China is forecasted to continue to grow and projected to exceed \$15,000/year Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) by 2018.<sup>361</sup> A per capita purchasing power of \$15,000 is considered a threshold for democratization,<sup>362</sup> and the loyalty of China's middle class to the one-party system could be severely challenged by the lack of representation in the face of potentially painful economic reforms. Such a crisis in China could have deep regional and global implications.

### Growing complexity and regionalization of crises in a multipolar world

Most of the current crises in North Africa and the Middle East will have consequences lasting the duration of the outlook. Syria will likely be the focal point of crises in the Middle East, with the potential spillover effect causing political instability in neighboring countries such as **Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey**. A destabilization of Turkey would have a significant impact not only on the whole region, but also on the Balkans and Europe.

The trend of the international system being divided regionally, organized around predominant powers (China, Russia, the US), will likely weaken the legitimacy and influence of international institutions such as the United Nations. New forms of diplomacy will

arise, and the effectiveness and existence of security frameworks such as NATO will be questioned.

### Conflicts over natural resources, intensified by climate change

The rise of the middle class, urbanization, and industrialization will accentuate competition over resources and heighten the risk of political instability and intrastate and interstate conflicts.

As the competition for resources increases as a result of demographic pressure and economic growth, climate change will severely impact water supply and crop yields, intensifying existing weather patterns, as dry areas will be dryer and wet areas will be wetter.<sup>363</sup> In the case of a 1.5°C temperature increase by 2030, 40% of maize cropping would be lost in Sub-Saharan Africa without adaptation measures. Though some areas will benefit from climate change through an extension of arable lands,<sup>364</sup> the negative effects will impact the poorest countries, which already face food scarcity (**West and North Africa, Central Asia**). The challenge of climate change and the ability of states to adapt to it will be a further driver of political instability in already vulnerable countries.

Water access may become a significant source of conflict in the next 15 years.<sup>365</sup> Existing ethnic or confessional divisions over water basins could fuel political tensions, as in the **Nile Basin, Israel/Palestine, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Central Asia**. In 2017, water management is already a source of tension between downstream Uzbekistan and upstream Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Conflicts have been mostly avoided so far through negotiations and agreements, but growing water scarcity in some regions could stifle any chance of compromise.

### The Western world as an area of crisis

The Ukrainian crisis and the European migrant crisis have shown that the West is not unaffected by humanitarian crises. The migrant crisis is already triggering protests, increasing political tensions, a rise of the political right, xenophobia, and a general polarization of society in EU member states (as well as in European neighbors). Enduring economic stagnation and increasing mistrust of politics is fueling populism, nationalism, and cultural and religious clashes. In that context, it cannot be ruled out that in 2030, one of the European countries (**France, Hungary, Western Balkans**) will have experienced massive riots, violence against minorities, or even internal conflict.

Another major crisis could be triggered by the failure to overcome divisions between member states, leading to a collapse of the EU. Such an event would cause serious disruption at the political, economic, and social level.

Finally, a major terrorist attack targeting energy or food- or water-supply infrastructures in a Western country (**France, UK, Germany**) could lead to a significant humanitarian crisis.

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
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# New Waves of Nationalism

“ Global economic weakness, migration and a rise in inequality appear to be causing a disturbing growth in ethnic nationalism. ”

2016 election results in Europe point to a rise in support for nationalist parties:



In ethnic nationalism, group membership is limited only to individuals who share the same ethnic, religious, linguistic, or similar cultural category.

## Key insights



Nationalist parties and policies will be part of mainstream politics.



Nationalism will challenge the international order.

## Main trends



Nationalism will gain in strength, fueled by economic stagnation, inequality, and demographic diversification.



Nations will seek to reassert their sovereignty by withdrawing from international organizations and treaties.



Nations will become more restrictive about international aid within their borders.



The growth of nationalism will spur separatist movements and ethnic conflict in developing as well as developed nations.



In the West a culture of intolerance will grow and could lead to ethnic cleansing, which in turn could pressure minorities to seek refuge abroad.

## Uncertainties



Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an ongoing debate about whether the world was moving towards greater globalism or factionalism. While the globalist view was dominant for the past three decades, many now question if the world is moving in the other direction. Is this growth in nationalism a temporary reaction to these crises or part of a longer trend?

Sources: Robert Shiller for the New York Times, BBC, The Economist, The Telegraph, Shannon Tieze.



# New Waves of Nationalism

## Definition

Nationalism is a shared sense of group identity and desire for political self-determination. It is generally described as having two forms: civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. In the former, group membership is open to individuals who share in the principles and values of the nation. In ethnic nationalism, group membership is limited to individuals who share the same ethnic, religious, linguistic, or similar cultural category. The following report focuses on group nationalism as it has become more prevalent in the 21st century and its exclusionary politics can result in humanitarian crises.

## Key insights

### Nationalist parties and policies will be part of mainstream politics

Though not always able to win elections (either legislative or executive) outright, nationalist parties will become more mainstream. Wielding greater influence over the tone of political discourse, nationalist parties will be able to mobilize their populist support and apply pressure on governments to accommodate their priorities.

### Nationalism will challenge the international order

The rise of nationalistic parties early in the outlook will advance protectionism, undermining initiatives to build greater economic and political integration. With major world powers focusing attention and resources domestically, support to supra-national institutions will be reduced.

## Changes by 2030

### Spread of nationalism

Nationalism will continue to gain strength, as it has done since the beginning of the 21st century. Economic conditions will be a significant driver of this trend. The slowdown in the global economy will contribute to austerity and protectionist policies at the national level and create hardships for the middle and lower classes at the household level. Persistent or worsening inequality levels will also contribute to feelings of resentment among the populace, which can be exploited by the populist political narratives employed by nationalist parties.<sup>366</sup>

The surge in nationalism will also be the result of demographic diversification. Past decades saw unprecedented human migrations, from refugees, economic migrants, and the establishment of border-free travel zones such as the Schengen. Some members of ethnically homogenous communities have reacted to what they perceive to be a loss of their cultural identity in the face of

changing demographic landscapes. Far-right nationalist parties will foster these feelings of fear and resentment of immigrants to bolster their base. Areas that have recently seen large influxes of immigrants will likely be hotbeds of nationalist support.<sup>367</sup>

### Resurgence of sovereignty

Nations will seek to reassert their sovereignty by withdrawing from international treaties and intergovernmental organizations. This will not mean the complete undoing of globalization, but its expansion may stall and in some instances retract. The European migrant crisis has fueled Euroskepticism over EU-mandated refugee quotas.<sup>368</sup> The Brexit campaign was also launched on the platform of reclaiming British sovereignty from the EU.<sup>369</sup> In the US, economic populism from the left and right in the lead-up to the 2016 elections undermined President Obama's push to pass the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).<sup>370</sup> Such growing distrust of international trade deals has also led some to call for the US to withdraw from NAFTA and the WTO.<sup>371</sup> The trend is not limited to Western countries, with increases in nationalistic discourse gaining power in Turkey, India, and the Philippines among others.<sup>372</sup> This trend toward states reclaiming aspects of their sovereignty from international treaties will continue in the coming decades and will reshape the international system.

### Impediment to humanitarian action

As a consequence of the resurgence of state sovereignty, humanitarian interventions will become more difficult. Governments will become more reluctant to allow international organizations, even humanitarian ones, to intercede in crises within their borders. There will also be a push for national NGOs to replace the work done by international NGOs based in foreign countries. Humanitarian crises will become more politicized, making their resolution more complex and potentially leading to organizations compromising principles of neutrality to secure access.

Donor governments in countries with growing nationalist discourses could be inclined to reduce their foreign aid budgets – reallocating the money to domestic programs. Though the funds allocated to overseas development aid are less than 1% of gross national income in the majority of countries (Sweden, the UAE, Norway, and Luxembourg were exceptions in 2015),<sup>373</sup> reducing the foreign aid budget is politically popular. As nationalist parties and policies gain influence there could be a reduction in foreign aid from traditional institutional donors.

## Growth of separatist movements

The growth of nationalism will spur separatist movements and ethnic conflict. Identification with the unifying principles of liberal democracy will weaken as individuals place greater emphasis on ethnic affiliation. This will continue in less developed countries that are recovering from colonial legacies and arbitrarily drawn borders. Additionally, the West will see a rise in independence movements, such as has been the case with the Catalans, Basques, Flemish, Scots, and Québécois.<sup>374</sup> There will also be a rise in political, and sometimes violent, clashes as these groups seek to affirm their political aspirations at the expense of the existing state. Demonstrations and isolated incidents of domestic terrorism will become more commonplace.

## Ethnic cleansing through the expulsion of minority groups

The West is likely to see more instances of ethnic cleansing. As nationalist parties come to power, they will “build real and imaginary walls to protect national cultural identities and economic interests from the perceived threats of Mexican, Arab or African immigrants pounding on their doors.”<sup>375</sup> The extension of this political discourse is the idea that the only way to protect the nation from within these walls is through the expulsion of immigrants.<sup>376</sup> In such instances, a culture of intolerance will grow where lawful citizens of minority groups will experience intimidation and hostilities that could pressure them to seek refuge abroad.<sup>377</sup>

## Controversy and debates

There is an ongoing debate about which direction the world is moving, toward globalism or factionalism.<sup>378</sup> Many saw the end of the Cold War as ushering in a new age of international cooperation and prosperity, and the 1990s did witness unsurpassed levels of globalization. Others, however, warned that the world would return to sectarian conflicts, as people prioritized identity politics over neo-liberal economic gains, citing the First Gulf War and the breakup of Yugoslavia. The globalists seemed to be winning the argument for the past three decades; however, the recent surge in nationalism after the financial crisis, conflicts in Iraq and Syria, and the resulting European migrant crisis have rekindled the debate. Is this growth in nationalism a temporary reaction to these crises or part of a longer trend?

## Tomorrow is already here

Europe has seen a sharp rise in support for nationalism following the financial and migrant crises. Jean-Marie Le Pen is often considered one of the founders of modern far-right nationalism in Europe, but in 2011, his daughter Marine Le Pen assumed leadership of his party, the National Front, and brought it into the mainstream.<sup>379</sup> In the 2017 election, the Front National made it to the second round of the presidential election, and though they lost by a wide margin, their proportion of votes has continued to increase.<sup>380</sup> Nationalism is pervasive across Europe today, with far-right parties gaining increasing support in recent elections. Though none yet have a majority government, their appeal has

been dragging conservative parties further to the right as they now face competition on both sides of the political spectrum. While the UK Independence Party holds limited seats, it was instrumental in promoting the Euroskeptical Brexit vote.

The election of Donald Trump marks the growth in nationalist sentiments in the US. Much like in Europe, there is growing resentment among white, working-class voters who feel that they have not benefited from globalization and that their traditional culture is under threat from a changing demographic landscape. Trump capitalized on these sentiments by promising to bring back manufacturing jobs and deport undocumented workers. This nationalist message has upset the platform of the conservative movement in the country, which has favored neo-liberal policies.

Asia has also seen a rise in nationalism, such as in the recent elections of Shinzo Abe (Japan), Park Geunhye (South Korea), and Narendra Modi (India). The trend is broadly attributed to an economic reaction against the history of colonialism.<sup>381</sup> The region has been largely free of major international conflicts since 1979, though three potential areas of conflict remain: Kashmir, the Korean Peninsula, and the East and South China Sea.<sup>382</sup> The rising threat of an emergent China is the most dynamic of these and has spurred nationalist sentiments in neighboring countries, including Japan. Japan is now even considering rewriting its pacifist constitution put in place in the wake of WWII.<sup>383</sup>

In Asia's less developed countries, a surge in nationalism could affect the implementation of humanitarian programs. Distrust and condemnation of foreign intervention are typical under such conditions. For instance, when criticized for his hardline policies on drugs, President Duterte of the Philippines responded, “If you think it is high time for you guys to withdraw your assistance, go ahead, we will not beg for it.”<sup>384</sup> The possibility of a head of state rejecting all or most foreign aid for being criticized is a great concern when many people in the country are still dependent on external assistance.

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# The Resurgence of Sovereignty and the Political Centrality of Crises

Among the 38 most environmentally vulnerable countries in 2015, 18 have a national disaster-management authority, including India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.



"While some crises attract considerable attention and thereafter large amounts of international humanitarian assistance, others remain persistently underfunded and 'forgotten.' Despite the level of vulnerability and humanitarian need, these crises are routinely missing from international media headlines and repeatedly absent from the list of countries receiving the most humanitarian assistance."



## Key insights



Governments of humanitarian-crisis-affected states will be more inclined to resist external intervention and will prefer more localized approaches. A reluctance will manifest to allow INGOs to operate independently in country, strengthening national NGOs.



Humanitarian crises will become increasingly political-impact of interconnectedness, media attention, government pressures

## Main trends



The national capacity for and willingness of developing countries to respond to humanitarian crises, is increasing.



Humanitarian assistance is going to continue being used as a geopolitical instrument



Complex emergencies and humanitarian crises are gaining political centrality.



Rising impediments against NGO and particularly INGO interventions is being witnessed, and a resurgence of state sovereignty is making NGO interventions more difficult.

## Uncertainties



There are deepening disparities between countries' points of view on humanitarian assistance in international institutions



How important is the safe and unhindered access of humanitarian aid to governments?

Sources: Development Initiatives, INFORM, Dany Harvey.



# The Resurgence of Sovereignty and Political Centrality of Humanitarian Crises

## Definition

Resurgence of sovereignty in countries affected by humanitarian crises leads to increasing control over humanitarian assistance activities. Implementation of restriction measures and even denial of access for NGOs, particularly INGOs, become more frequent. Consequently, there are increasing obstacles against the participation of NGOs, which could be to the detriment of affected populations if adequate support is not provided by the government or private sector.

## Key insights

**Governments of humanitarian-crisis-affected states will be more inclined to resist external intervention and will prefer more localized approaches**

Crisis-affected states will be more reluctant to allow international organizations to operate independently within their borders. There will be pressure on national NGOs to increase capacity. Where international NGOs are allowed to operate, there will be more preconditions placed on their programming, such as hiring local staff whenever possible.<sup>385</sup> In some instances, crises may be exacerbated by a refusal to allow access to qualified response organizations; in others, national response capacities will be strengthened to mount a localized response.

**Humanitarian crises will become increasingly political**

In an increasingly interconnected world, crises can have severe and widespread implications. With increased media attention, humanitarian issues are taken much more seriously today than in decades past, and governments are under greater pressure to address them. Mishandling humanitarian crises, or even the perception of mishandling,<sup>386</sup> can result in administrations losing power. Where aid comes from, and to whom it goes, are increasingly political issues. Donor and recipient nations are also held accountable by their constituents for their perceived complicity in dealing with unpopular states.<sup>387</sup>

## Changes by 2030

**National capacity of developing countries to respond to humanitarian crises increases**

Many developing countries have seen their capacities and willingness to respond to humanitarian emergencies increase significantly; for example, a growing number of countries have created national disaster-management authorities. Among

the 38 most environmentally vulnerable countries<sup>388</sup> in 2015, 18 have a national disaster-management authority, including India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.<sup>389</sup> Given this increased capacity, these countries tend to favor their own emergency response over external intervention from international organizations. An increasing number of countries, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region,<sup>390</sup> possess substantial resources to respond to disasters unilaterally.

This trend also reflects a greater demand to preserve the ability of national governments to act in times of crises, concurrently demonstrating their leadership, their capacity to be the primary service provider, and their ability to respond to the political challenges that disasters can bring. The trend of nationalizing humanitarian responses also supports the regionalization of response, where regional bodies are similarly building capacity. Regional entities, which are predicated on the support of national governments and are less inclined to challenge government policies or approaches, are more likely than INGOs to be called on where surge capacity is required. For example, ASEAN<sup>391</sup> provided key assistance to Myanmar in 2008 following Cyclone Nargis, while the governing regime rejected any other external assistance.<sup>392</sup> The role of international actors has been challenged for numerous reasons, but often cited is the resentment that results from a lack of communication between INGOs and national authorities. These situations sometimes lead to the creation of “a public discourse of hostility and distrust of humanitarian organizations”<sup>393</sup> seen as intrusive and as “less effective than national actors.”<sup>394</sup>

Governments' capacity to respond to disasters still differs greatly between countries and regions. Even in developed countries, government responses can be insufficient to meet the needs of populations in emergencies (e.g. the Fukushima response), necessitating international assistance. This is even more pronounced in less economically developed countries, and as a result international aid structures will likely continue to be relevant, though the dynamics of implementing programming will shift as national capacities grow.

**Greater political centrality of humanitarian crisis**

The increasing awareness that many humanitarian crises are complex emergencies with political, social, and economic dynamics is a recognition of the multi-causal nature of human vulnerability and the range of potential hazards.<sup>395</sup> This framing of humanitarian crises has raised the political stakes for the actors who are involved (or not) in the response, most notably for national governments who want to be seen as capable of leading even in times of crisis. The instrumentalization of humanitarian aid, where the needs

## Cases of rejected humanitarian aid offers, 1999-2012

No	Year	State	Disaster	Actor	Type of Rejection
1	2012	Iran	Earthquake	Iranian Red Crescent, Government	Rejection of international aid workers and supplies
2	2012	USA	Storm	Government	Rejection of aid offer from the Iranian Red Crescent
3	2011	Japan	Tsunami/Nuclear Disaster	Government	Rejection of international aid workers, USA expert team
4	2011	Turkey	Earthquake	Government	Rejection and extradition of international aid workers and supplies
5	2010	Russia	Forest Fire	Government	Rejection of international aid workers and supplies
6	2009	Philippines	Storms	Government	Rejection of aid for the region of Mindanao
7	2009	Indonesia	Earthquake	Government	Rejection of aid for the region of West Java
8	2008	Myanmar	Cyclone	Government	Rejection of international aid workers and supplies
9	2005	USA	Hurricane	Government, National Agency (FEMA)	Rejection of International aid, aid by ICRC, offers from Cuba and Venezuela
10	2005	India	Tsunami	Government, Military	Rejection of aid for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands
11	2005	Pakistan	Earthquake	Government	Rejection of aid from India
12	1999	Venezuela	Flood	Government	Rejection and extradition of U.S troops

Source: Danny Charlotte, Why is humanitarian aid rejected? Comparing the motives of autocratic and democratic states.

of crises-affected populations are subordinated to advance a broader political agenda by key stakeholders (predominantly governments or non-state actors), can create barriers to effective humanitarian action.

Affected states have to give their consent to international aid. Total and partial rejections of humanitarian aid are more frequent particularly after natural disasters. Sixteen cases where international humanitarian aid was rejected after severe natural disasters have been identified between 1984 and 2012, with a significant increase since 2005.<sup>396</sup> Rejection of aid can be directed toward all humanitarian aid offers, including those from states, UN organizations, NGOs or Red Crescent. The government of Myanmar's rejection of international aid after Cyclone Nargis in 2008, because of "fears of foreign intervention aiming at regime

change,"<sup>397</sup> remains the most significant case. Since then, there have been other high-profile cases of aid rejection, not limited to natural disasters, including Venezuela's rejection of international assistance despite its ongoing humanitarian crisis due to severe shortages of food and medicine.<sup>398</sup>

Aid rejection often stems from a plurality of factors. For example, the state is wary of the political agenda of the international community, the state does not wish to permit foreign aid workers to assess the situation, or the state believes that it can adequately respond alone. In 2010, the Chilean government attempted to manage the response to the earthquake without external assistance before accepting international aid, given the magnitude of the disaster.<sup>399</sup> The fears of foreign influence for societal and political change, mistrust and hostility toward aid workers, the perception that

INGOs are Western and politicized, and the supremacy of the sovereignty principle are cited to explain total or partial rejection of international assistance.<sup>400</sup>

Politicization of humanitarian crises makes their resolution more complex and can force humanitarian organizations to compromise their principle of neutrality in favor of access to populations in need.

### Humanitarian assistance as a geopolitical instrument

The acceptance or rejection of aid is not the only aspect of humanitarian assistance that is politicized.<sup>401</sup> Where aid is channeled by donors is seen as a highly political matter. “While some crises attract considerable attention and thereafter large amounts of international humanitarian assistance, others remain persistently underfunded and ‘forgotten.’ Despite the level of vulnerability and humanitarian need, these crises are routinely missing from international media headlines and repeatedly absent from the list of countries receiving the most humanitarian assistance.”<sup>402</sup> It is clear, given the uneven allocation of financing to crises, which does not necessarily reflect the level of need, that donors integrate their own objectives into funding decisions, including historical or diplomatic ties, their geostrategic perspective, and domestic political priorities.<sup>403</sup>


In addition to aligning humanitarian assistance to domestic priorities, donor governments can be more direct in using aid as a geopolitical instrument. Bilateral humanitarian aid (government to government) can be seen as a tool of diplomacy by many developing countries and can be used as a form of soft power. Important new institutional donors, such as China, Saudi Arabia,

and the United Arab Emirates, greatly favor direct bilateral support to affected governments. During the 2010–2014 period, non-OECD DAC countries provided 6.5% of the total reported humanitarian assistance, but they provided 50% of all direct funding to affected governments over the same period<sup>404</sup> and increased it to 70% in 2015.<sup>405</sup> The emphasis of new donors on bilateral aid reinforces the trend of states leading responses within their borders and gives them the opportunity to rebuff aid that could be viewed as biased or conditional on governmental changes.

### Rising impediments against NGO and particularly INGO interventions

As a consequence of the resurgence of state sovereignty, humanitarian interventions have become more difficult. Governments in affected states have become more reluctant to allow international organizations to intercede in crises within their borders. Some states are limiting the space for NGO operations: “since 2012, more than 60 countries have passed or drafted laws that curtail the activity of non-governmental and civil-society organizations ... [while] ninety-six countries have taken steps to inhibit NGOs from operating at full capacity.”<sup>406</sup> Countries such as Israel, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Cambodia, Venezuela, Russia, India, and China, among others, have recently passed more restrictive laws. This wave of restrictions, particularly from developing countries, specifically targets human-rights NGOs and NGOs considered to be under Western influence. Increasingly frequently, NGOs are obliged to register with and precisely report their activities to the local authorities. At the same time, practical constraints such as unusual delays to obtain visas, more restrictive tax regimes, extradition of foreign workers, financial

Funding by donor region to the 10 recipients of the most international humanitarian assistance, 2015



penalties, and even staff imprisonment have been on the rise.<sup>407</sup> In addition, counterterrorism activities such as measures to curb terrorist organizations, principally issued from Western countries, have had negative impacts on NGOs' activities. This trend is seen as likely to continue; it represents a real challenge for humanitarian NGOs' activities and undermines their independence.

**Weak signal: Deepening disparities between countries' points of view on humanitarian assistance in international institutions**

Increasing disparities in views are highlighted in the UN's Economic and Social Council, "the only official forum for donor and disaster-affected states to discuss humanitarian issues" in the United Nations.<sup>408</sup> On one side, Western donor governments promote "the need to respect the humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence and to ensure 'safe and

unhindered access.'" On the other hand, governments of the G77, representing 134 developing countries, stress "the primary role of the affected state in the 'initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory.'"<sup>409</sup> This growing division could put even more pressure on the current humanitarian system, which is highly dependent on international organizations and traditionally supports a more Western view.

Image by Avel Chuklanov





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# Disasters Incurred by Natural Hazards

Since 2005, an average of 335 disasters have been reported each year. This is an increase of 14% over the 1995-2004 period and a doubling of the 1980-1989 statistics.

Low income countries are the most economically impacted with an average loss of 5% GDP per year.



The likelihood of being displaced by a natural disaster today is 60% higher than it was four decades ago



Between 1994 and 2013, natural disasters claimed an average of 30,000 lives per year.

95% of all people displaced due to natural disasters live in developing countries.

## Key insights



There will be a consistent increase in the impact of natural disasters and an exacerbation of the humanitarian consequences.

## Main trends



Increasing occurrence of natural disasters, particularly floods, storms, and drought.



Inequalities are growing between countries facing natural disasters, especially floods and storms.



Increase of the brittleness (less resilience, less variety) of human ecosystems, which increases the impact of natural disasters.



Anticipatory planning and adaptive measures will continue to reduce the human impact of these disasters.




Natural disasters will displace millions of people, particularly from storms and flooding in Asia. The number of people likely to be displaced could reach 22 million in China and 7 million per year in India.

Sources: CRED, IMDC

# Disasters Incurred by Natural Hazards

Number of Climate-related Disasters 1980-2011



Source: United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Disaster Statistics: Counting the Costs and Impacts

## Definition

The impact of disasters incurred by natural hazards on ecosystems has grown (number of people involved, global cost, etc.) due to a combination of population growth, settlement patterns, and the increasing frequency of events (floods, storms, heat waves, etc.). Between 1994 and 2013, natural disasters have claimed 606,000 lives, representing an average of 30,000 lives every year<sup>40</sup> and impacting billions more. Disasters incurred by natural hazards cause displacement, exacerbate health and economic vulnerabilities, and disrupt ecosystems. Natural disasters often worsen the situation of already fragile populations.

## Key insight

**There will be a consistent increase in the impact of natural disasters and an exacerbation of the humanitarian consequences**


Climate change is increasing the frequency of climatological (droughts, wildfires), meteorological (storms, heatwaves), hydrological (floods, landslides), and biological (human and agricultural epidemics) disasters. Continued environmental degradation reduces resilience to these shocks. With increased urbanization, particularly in coastal zones, natural disasters will be increasingly devastating. While the frequency and impact of natural disasters has been increasing, long-term planning by policy makers could help to mitigate the worst impacts of these events.

## Main trends

### Increasing occurrence of natural disasters, particularly floods and storms

Disasters incurred by natural hazards have become more frequent particularly due to the increase of weather-related disasters like floods and storms. An average of 335 disasters have been reported each year since 2005, representing an increase of 14% compared to the 1995–2004 decade and more than double the number of disasters recorded in the 1980–1989 period.<sup>41</sup> Floods and storms represent the most dramatic increase, while the number of geophysical events remained quite stable, suggesting that this increase is due to climate change rather than improvements in reporting.

### Weather related deaths per income group, 1995-2015



Source: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) (2015), The Human Cost of Weather-Related

## A slight decline in number of affected people

Despite the increasing number of natural disasters, the number of people affected by a hazardous event (including climate related events and others) has slightly declined during the last decade. The number of affected people<sup>412</sup> reached a peak in 2002 and then slightly declined to an average of 165 million people affected each year during the 2005–2015 period against 245 million in the 1995–2004 period.<sup>413</sup> Deaths caused by natural disasters have increased to reach an average of 34,000 in the last decade compared to 26,000 during the 1995–2004 period. However, Cyclone Nargis, which claimed the lives of 138,000 people, has distorted the average; with that event removed, the death toll follows the same pattern of decline as the number of affected people, with an average of 20,000 deaths each year from 2005 to 2015. This downward trend is also illustrated over the longer term. The deadliest natural disasters since the beginning of the 20th century mostly occurred before the 1990s. Concurrently, since 1900 the population has grown fivefold.

This decline is mainly explained by measures taken by policy makers (national, international, NGOs) to anticipate, adapt to, and reduce the risk of natural disasters and the vulnerability of at-risk populations.


## Growing inequalities between countries facing natural disasters

Asia and North America – more precisely the United States, India, and China – are most frequently subject to natural disasters. There is significant inequality in the impact of events between affected states. Among the 2.3 billion people affected by flooding during the 1995–2004 period, 95% lived in Asia.<sup>414</sup> Of the top 15 countries with greatest population exposed to river flood risk, 10 are in Asia.<sup>415</sup> However, when looking at the ratio of natural disasters to total population by country, African countries are the most affected.

South and Southeast Asia are particularly affected by storms: the region registered just 21% of the world's storms but 80% of global deaths caused by storms. Africa is particularly impacted by drought, with 136 events accounting for 41% of the global total in the 1995–2015 period. Moreover, the very low number of deaths registered as drought related (4% of total deaths) is misleading as the figure excludes indirect deaths (malnutrition, disease, etc.) and reflects countries' under-reporting.

Though disasters in developed countries have a much higher absolute cost (such as Hurricane Katrina) they do not account for a large percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Looking at lost percentage of GDP, low-income countries are clearly the most impacted, with an average of 5% GDP loss against an average of 0.2% for high-income countries.<sup>416</sup> In absolute terms


Annual Global Death Rate (per 100,000) from Natural Catastrophes, 1900–2013, per decade



Source: Max Roser, Annual global death rate (per 100,000) per decade from natural catastrophes, 1900–2013, Our World in Data



### Economic losses as a percentage of GDP from weather-related disasters, 1995-2015



Source: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) (2015), *The Human Cost of Weather-Related Disasters 1995–2015*

the Americas and Asia account for respectively 46% and 37% of recorded economic losses. This estimate is seen as low due to under-reporting of losses worldwide.

#### Increase of the brittleness (less resilience, less variety) of human ecosystems

Increasing the resilience of communities is essential to reducing the impact of natural disasters. A lack of assistance in the immediate aftermath of an event, and limited continued funding for long-term recovery, compounds vulnerabilities and reduces community resilience. Natural disasters damage countries' basic infrastructure, such as drinking-water systems, homes, clinics, hospitals, and schools. Though the damage from disasters induced by natural hazards is ubiquitous, less developed countries have fewer resources to rebuild and repair critical infrastructure and are less able to adapt infrastructure to be disaster resilient.

The more the GDP and the labor force of a country depend on the agricultural sector, the higher the risk of ecosystemic destabilization.<sup>417</sup>

#### Rise of population displacement associated with natural hazards

Each year an average of 2.3 million<sup>418</sup> people are displaced by natural hazards, particularly by floods and storms. "The likelihood of being displaced by a disaster today is 60% higher than it was four decades ago."<sup>419</sup> Low- and middle-income countries account for the vast majority of displacement related to natural disasters, 90% of the global total of people displaced in 2016.<sup>420</sup> Asia is the most affected area, with large and recurrent population displacement; 11 of the 20 countries most affected by displacement are in Asia.

Asia will continue to be the most impacted area, with a higher risk of displacement and a greater number of people affected during the 2015–2025 period, particularly in China, India, and the Philippines (see map below). More than 10% of the population of countries such as the Philippines and Afghanistan are likely to be displaced because of weather-related disasters over the next 10 years.<sup>421</sup> In China and India, 22 million and 7 million people respectively may be displaced each year.<sup>422</sup>

While most displacements caused by natural disasters are internal, disasters can also induce people to cross borders. None of the existing international and regional refugee-law instruments specifically address the plight of such people. Displacement caused by the slow-onset effects of climate change is largely internal as well. However, the intensification of climate-change impacts might contribute to increased international migrations.<sup>423</sup>

## Disaster displacement risk in four regions

IDMC has tested its Disaster Displacement Risk Index in 50 countries in four focus regions : South Asia, South-East Asia, South Pacific and Latin America and Caribbean.




Image by Yosh Ginsu



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# Epidemics


Epidemics since 1974



Epidemics are rapid increases in the incidence of disease.



Infectious diseases are responsible for 14 million deaths each year around the world. 90% of these deaths occur in less developed countries.



■ 0-6  
■ 7-21  
■ 22-55

## Key insights



Existant diseases will be compounded by new infections and diseases.

## Main trends



The likelihood of zoonotic diseases will increase in the next 15 to 30 years to come.



By 2050, antimicrobial resistance will be the first cause of death responsible for 10 million deaths each year against 700,000 currently.



Developing countries in the tropics will continue to be the most impacted by infectious diseases.



Crops and livestock also face the threat of pandemics. The lack of biodiversity in production increases the risk of disease to the global food supply.

## Uncertainties



Climate change will disrupt ecosystems, the distribution of species and their interactions and so will facilitate the emergence and spread of infectious diseases




Antimicrobial research and development is underfunded, and a severe outbreak has the potential to set health systems back to the pre-antibiotic era.

Sources: WHO, ECDC, CDC.



# Epidemics

Newly Recognized Emerging Human pathogens since 1980



Source: United Kingdom Office of Science and Innovation, Infectious Diseases: Preparing for the Future. Future Threats

## Definition

Epidemics are rapid increases in the incidence of disease. When an epidemic affects a large number of people across multiple countries or continents, it is then known as a pandemic.<sup>424</sup> In the 19th and early 20th centuries, there was great progress in the fight against infectious diseases. However, since the second half of the 20th century new infectious diseases have emerged, such as HIV/AIDS, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), H1N1 influenza, Ebola, and Zika. In 2012, infectious diseases still accounted for almost one-third of global deaths (32%).<sup>425</sup> Every year, more than 14 million people die because of infectious diseases, disrupting the economic, political, and social environment in areas affected.

## Key insight

### Extant diseases will be compounded by new infections and diseases

Humans, animals, and plants will continue to suffer from extant diseases<sup>426</sup> while at the same time being threatened by new infections. This is a significant threat as new infectious diseases could be difficult to diagnose and treat and could be highly virulent and highly transmissible.

## Changes by 2030

### Re-appearance and emergence of new diseases


Since the 1960s, a significant decrease of mortality for infectious diseases (e.g. polio, tetanus, measles, diphtheria) has been achieved. Though there has been a decrease in global mortality due to infectious diseases, the perpetuation of diseases such as polio, particularly in developing countries, continues to be a

priority. Funding the fight against extant diseases (e.g. tuberculosis, malaria) while preparing for the outbreak of new ones is a critical challenge. The latter is certain to occur given the characteristics of infectious diseases: the evolution of microbes' capacities, the potential for greater geographic spread, and the weakening of health systems in fragile countries. In addition, environmental, technological, and demographic changes such as population growth, agricultural practices (deforestation, intensive livestock farming, etc.), globalization, and intensification of trade and transport, human migrations, climate change and the spread of vectors, and urbanization may all exacerbate the emergence of new infectious diseases.<sup>427</sup> In 2016, more than half the world's population lived in urban areas.<sup>428</sup> Cities often grow faster than infrastructure is developed, resulting in a dearth of critical services such as running water<sup>429</sup> or a functional waste-management system. In addition, elevated levels of air pollution, poor housing, and high population density create an environment that is conducive to the spread of infectious disease and to the increase of diarrheal disease and pneumonia.<sup>430</sup> The number and diversity of outbreaks increased notably over the previous decades: 330 new or re-appearing infectious diseases were identified over the last 60 years, with the most intense acceleration since 1980.<sup>431</sup> This proliferation can also be explained by the use of new tools and the discovery of new organisms.<sup>432</sup>

### Animal and plant disease outbreaks

Trends in human and animal health are of increasing concern.<sup>433</sup> Outbreaks in plants, in particular, underline capacities for "rapid evolution through the hybridization and mixing of genes conferring pathogenicity."<sup>434</sup> Some diseases can be directly transmitted to humans, such as through respiratory transmission of influenza, from pigs to people, or by eating beef infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), also known as mad cow disease.

## Global examples of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases



Red represents newly emerging diseases; blue, re-emerging/resurging diseases; black, a 'deliberately emerging' disease. Adapted, with permission, from ref. 23.

Source: Morens, D. M., Folkers, G. K. & Fauci, A. S. (2004) The Challenge of Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases, Nature


Epidemics and pandemics have the potential to greatly impact crops and livestock. Half the world's food supply is based on four staple crops: rice, maize, potatoes, and wheat.<sup>435</sup> An epidemic in one of these crops would represent a significant global threat for food security. In the 1950s, *Fusarium oxysporum* f. sp. *cubense*, better known as Panama disease, destroyed nearly all the world's commercial banana crop. As nearly all banana plantings are genetically identical clones of a cultivar called Gros Michel, they lack the genetic diversity to resist sudden pandemics.<sup>436</sup> Other crops face similar circumstances. The latest development of a virulent fungus observed in Uganda in 1999 threatens 90% of all African wheat varieties.<sup>437</sup> The FAO estimates that there are roughly a quarter-million plant varieties available for agriculture, but less than 3% of these are in use today.<sup>438</sup> This lack of diversity

increases the risk of disease to the global food supply.

### Discrepancies in the impact of infectious diseases


Infectious diseases are responsible for 14 million deaths globally each year,<sup>439</sup> though there is great disparity in the impact. More than 90% of the total deaths linked to infectious diseases happen in less developed countries.<sup>440</sup> Infectious diseases represent 43% of overall mortality in these areas compared to only 1% in developed countries.<sup>441</sup> Less economically developed and fragile states struggle with poor access to healthcare, low quality of service delivery, low levels of vaccination, poor access to clean water and improved sanitation, and a lack of surveillance systems and response capabilities. Several diseases, such as plague, that

### Worldwide epidemics 1974-2003



Source: EM-DAT, CRED International disaster database

## Deaths attributed to antimicrobial resistance every year by 2050



Source: Review on Antimicrobial Resistance 2014

are rare in developed countries are still endemic in many others (Asia, Africa, particularly Madagascar).

Moreover, Africa has the largest proportion of immunosuppressed individuals with AIDS who are more vulnerable to other infectious diseases. Many less developed countries (particularly those in the tropics) are located in areas with the largest reservoirs of disease organisms.<sup>442</sup> **Among the 335 new infectious diseases discovered between 1940 and 2004, 60% are zoonoses, infectious diseases that can be transmitted from animals to humans.**<sup>443</sup>

Developing countries are also impacted by diseases affecting livestock and crops that severely damage their economies. Africa is particularly vulnerable, with an increase in consumption of bush meat, backyard rearing, and marketing of livestock. At the same time, veterinary infrastructure and services are in decline, restricting further early-detection capacities.

Consequently, **the likelihood of zoonotic disease will increase in the next 15 to 30 years, while HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria will remain critical challenges, particularly for Africa.** Developed countries will have less mortality but rising social costs and an increasing incidence of emerging infectious diseases.

### Development of antimicrobial resistance

Antimicrobial resistance is a growing threat to human security.

Concurrently, resistance against herbicides and insecticides is also increasing. This resistance is partly due to the misuse or overuse of antibiotics (in part a result of a lack of information, qualified staff, and the false belief that antibiotics are a better treatment than other alternatives) in both livestock and humans. Compounding this issue, **no new class of antibiotics has been discovered since the 1980s.**<sup>444</sup> This situation forces the re-use

of medicines once avoided because of their strong side effects.<sup>445</sup>

Moreover, lack of knowledge about the reservoirs of resistance present in humans, animals, and plants and the increasing market of adulterated or fake medicines, particularly in developing countries,<sup>446</sup> is a serious concern. Drug-resistant infections are already responsible for 700,000 deaths each year. **This could rise to 10 million deaths annually by 2050, making such infections the primary cause of death globally.**<sup>447</sup> "Even diseases that are currently under control could become untreatable and could reemerge, posing a serious public health threat."<sup>448</sup> Antimicrobial resistance poses the greatest threat in areas that suffer from a lack of well-trained medical staff, inferior diagnostic capacity, poorly regulated drugs, and strong black markets of sub-standard medicines. As a result, though antimicrobial resistance is an issue of global concern, the death toll linked to antimicrobial resistance is expected to be concentrated in those areas.

### Breaks: Climate change's role in epidemic extension

Climate change brings temperature variability, disturbs rainfall patterns, and disrupts ecosystems, the distribution of species, and their interactions. Consequently, the link between climate change and the geographic and temporal distribution of infectious diseases, in particular cholera, malaria, and dengue,<sup>449</sup> is of significant concern. Climate change favors the migration of insect vectors to new geographical regions. This trend is reinforcing the increasing transborder movements of peoples and trade.<sup>450</sup> Climate change can also facilitate the development of plant diseases, threatening the economic and food security of some areas. In addition, an increasing number of people will be forced to flee extreme weather conditions, potentially causing a concentration of vulnerable populations and very poor sanitary conditions, thereby encouraging the emergence and spread of some infectious diseases.

Given the trajectory of climate change, it is likely that in the next 10 to 25 years, new infectious diseases will emerge, while others will be reinforced.

#### **Weak signals: fewer resources for antibiotic treatment and research**

Antimicrobial resistance and re-emerging diseases highlight the vulnerabilities of the global healthcare system, even in developed countries. The health crises of SARS, avian influenza, and more recently Ebola highlight the pressing need for a greater allocation of resources to identify and respond to the threat of these emerging diseases.<sup>451</sup> There is a lack of scientific research in the antimicrobial domain as it is poorly incentivized. Between 2003 and 2013, less than 5% of venture capital in pharmaceutical research and development was dedicated to antibiotics and antimicrobial resistance.<sup>452</sup> Moreover, doctors working in infectious diseases earn less than their colleagues working in other specialties.<sup>453</sup> Consequently, healthcare systems could be ill prepared to face outbreaks of re-emerging or new diseases, potentially resulting in a situation comparable to the pre-antibiotics period.



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# Large-Scale Forced Migration and the Intensification and Increased Scale of Humanitarian Crises

21.3 m have fled their countries, making them refugees.

3.2 m are asylum-seekers

40.8 m people remain internally displaced

6.7 m refugees were in a protracted situation in 2015.

## Key insights

1

By 2030, displaced people will become the fastest growing group with the most acute humanitarian needs

3

Humanitarian stakeholders will focus more on strengthening the resilience of host communities.

2

The migration agenda will be increasingly securitized

4

The legal framework for the protection of displaced communities will be outdated and unable to address the vulnerability of particular categories of people on the move

## Main trends



Longer wars and lasting violence are causing increased refugee flows.



Refugees are the targets of a complex global economy of people traffickers and smugglers.



The politicisation of refugee issues is likely to increase the duration of their exiles.



Displaced populations are becoming increasingly urban. This trend is likely to continue and accelerate as conditions in camps fail to improve.



By 2030, the protracted nature of conflict and the increasingly severe consequences of climate change will drive flows of refugees to neighboring countries, likely concentrating needs in the countries surrounding conflicted and fragile states and in turn increasing instability in hosting countries.

Refugees living in cities

60%

IDPs living in cities

80%

## Uncertainties




Whether the legal structure created after the Second World War is still relevant with the modern dynamics of displacement will be clear by 2030.

Sources: UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF, UK Aid.



# Large-Scale Forced Migration and the Intensification and Increased Scale of Humanitarian Crises

Population Trend Chart



UNHCR 2016

## Definition

Persecution, conflict, insecurity, and climate change have forced people to flee their homes in record numbers. For decades, the multiplication of crises and the increasingly protracted nature of displacement have led to a growing number of refugees worldwide. In 2016, there were approximately 21.3 million refugees who had fled their country of origin and 40.8 million internally displaced people; 3.2 million are asylum seekers.<sup>454</sup>

People displaced across international borders are generally referred to as refugees. The rights and the obligations of governments are defined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Article 1 of the Convention defines a refugee as any person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”<sup>455</sup>

The Convention requires refugees to demonstrate personal persecution (on the grounds enumerated in the definition); it does not extend protection to people fleeing generalized violence, conflict, endemic poverty, or the effects of climate change or disasters induced by natural hazards. People displaced by causes not included in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees are entitled to limited international protection.

## Key insights

### Displaced people will become the fastest-growing subgroup in humanitarian need

The humanitarian sector will be faced with a growing number of people in need. Due to enduring flows of migration and displacement (particularly that caused by climate change), displaced people will become the fastest-growing subgroup in humanitarian need. The protracted nature of displacement and lack of durable solutions will necessitate long-term strategic planning, increased reliance on local NGOs, and more partnerships with the private sector, such as utilities companies, to respond to refugees’ needs and find solutions for them.<sup>456</sup>

### Humanitarian stakeholders will focus more on strengthening the resilience of host communities

To mitigate the risk of tensions between refugees and host communities, humanitarian stakeholders will need to develop a more comprehensive approach to address host communities’ needs and resilience. Addressing conditions of displacement is a critical area where actors could work to bridge the emergency/development divide, especially where displaced populations are hosted in high-density or environmentally fragile areas.

### The migration agenda will be increasingly securitized

There will be a growing tendency to mix military and humanitarian intervention as the migration agenda is further securitized. The migration narrative will be focused on the security risk that large-scale forced migration poses to countries of transit or destination, resulting in an escalation of detention and confinement and

further pressure to stem the flow of migrants regardless of the humanitarian cost.

**The legal framework for the protection of displaced communities will be outdated and unable to address the vulnerability of particular categories of people on the move**

The legal framework defining the criteria for who is eligible for protection may not reflect the realities of the communities made vulnerable through displacement. Those fleeing conflict, endemic poverty, and natural shocks will have limited if any rights under international law, and the rights of those who do qualify as refugees will rarely be met.

**Changes by 2030: main trends and breaks, weak signals**

**Protracted nature of crises and violence**

Armed conflicts involve an increasingly wide range of actors and transnational criminal and terrorist networks. Reaching a political settlement has become more complicated, and conflict is becoming increasingly entrenched. Civilians have been targeted by armed groups or are caught between different warring parties. Lasting violence that targets civilians is pushing more and more people to flee and creating substantial refugee flows. Insecurity and conflicts in fragile states such as Syria, Yemen, South Sudan, Burundi, and the Central African Republic are likely to persist and continue to feed a steady flow of refugees.

Organized crime and gang-related violence resulting from decades of conflicts and instability are also driving displacement. In Central America’s Northern Triangle (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras), the consequences of the 1980s civil wars (violence, fragile institutions, lack of opportunities) and some of the highest rates of violent crime in the world are creating flows of migrants.<sup>457</sup> This trend is likely to continue.

**Climate change uncertainties**

Climate change is increasing the number and severity of natural disasters (floods, earthquakes, etc.) and the pressure on already scarce resources (water, livestock, crops, etc.). As a result, people are forced to move as their areas of origin become uninhabitable. This in turn fosters resentment, where environmental refugees and host communities are competing for scarce resources, creating tensions and depleting resources, making areas of refuge more environmentally vulnerable. For example, in the Lake Chad basin, the receding of water has led to conflict and displacement, threatening peace and security in the region.


**Increasing duration of exile**

UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as “one in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five or more years in a given asylum country.”<sup>458</sup> In 2015, it was estimated that 6.7 million refugees were in a protracted situation.

The durable solutions available to refugees in a protracted situation are limited: return to their country of origin, integrate into the local population where they have sought refuge, or resettle to a third country. Without peace and security, refugee repatriation becomes almost impossible. Even after a peace agreement, lack of access to social services (healthcare, education, psycho-social support) and difficulties in reclaiming land and property discourage refugees from returning to their homes.


Large-scale protracted displacement leads to the politicization of the refugee problem in host countries, as local integration, the second durable solution, is highly unpopular. The intense media coverage of the crisis in Europe (for a relatively small number of migrants) has shown how refugees have been caught up in

**Resettlement of Refugees 1993–2015**



UNHCR 2016, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015, Resettlement of Refugees 1993–2015 (end-year), retrieved 27 October 2016





UNHCR 2016, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015, Major Refugee-Hosting Countries 2014-2015 (end-year), retrieved 27 October 2016

domestic politics and security concerns. This trend is expected to continue or even grow due to the massive presence of refugees in volatile and developing regions.

Rates of resettlement to a third country are marginal compared to the overall population of concern for UNHCR – less than 1% of all refugees were resettled in 2015.<sup>459</sup> Though many countries have increased the quota of refugees that they will resettle, this increase has not kept pace with the rising number of applications.<sup>460</sup>

Given the difficulties in resolving conflicts, mitigating the consequences of climate change, and finding durable solutions for refugees, protracted displacement is likely to continue.

### Intensification, increased scale and regionalization of needs

In December 2015 the number of refugees, IDPs, and asylum seekers worldwide surpassed 60 million people for the first time.<sup>461</sup> With limited access to durable solutions and a perpetuation of the circumstances that forced people to flee their homes, this population likely will grow. Displaced populations can be some of the most vulnerable groups; more than half the world's refugees are children.<sup>462</sup>

Currently, the majority of displaced people are hosted in developing countries. In 2015, 86% of the refugees under UNHCR's mandate were in low and middle-income countries.<sup>463</sup> Hosting countries are predominantly neighbors of the states of conflict. The added burden of hosting significant displaced populations can create tensions and conflict with host communities over resources, deteriorating already fragile and volatile environments, making it a highly political issue. The concentration of displaced populations in the regions surrounding highly fragile states and those at the forefront of climatic shocks regionalizes crises.

By 2030, the protracted nature of conflict and the increasingly severe consequences of climate change will drive flows of refugees to neighboring countries, likely concentrating needs in the countries surrounding conflicted and fragile states and in turn increasing instability in hosting countries.

### Continuing urbanization of refugees

Displaced populations are becoming increasingly urban. At the end of 2015, approximately 60% of the world's refugees and 80% of IDPs lived in urban environments.<sup>464</sup> This trend is likely to continue and accelerate as conditions in camps fail to improve and displaced populations rebel against "warehousing,"<sup>465</sup> seeking opportunities for gainful employment in urban centers. However, urban displaced populations are highly vulnerable as they have limited access to legal employment or basic services.

Urban displaced populations create more challenging environments for humanitarian actors to provide assistance. The continuing urbanization of the refugee crisis will challenge the traditional humanitarian response.

### The economics of large-scale forced displacement

The political controversy around state responses to large-scale forced migrations is likely to continue to emphasize the short-term costs of integrating migrant communities rather than the longer-term economic benefits. Integrated migrant populations rarely result in a reduction in GDP for hosting countries and can often boost the economy.<sup>466</sup>

The migrant crisis is a lucrative business for criminal organizations. Migrants are exploited by smugglers and other unscrupulous employers who use them as illegal workers on migration paths or in hosting countries. They are also often taken advantage of

because of their irregular status, especially in housing,<sup>467</sup> increasing their vulnerability.

## Uncertainties

### Whether the legal structure created after the Second World War is incompatible with the modern dynamics of displacement

The legal structure that outlines the rights of displaced people and the obligation of states hosting them is failing to adequately protect forcibly displaced people: it is not being used as a “living document”<sup>468</sup> and as such may not sufficiently evolve to reflect the changing dynamics of displacement. The Refugee Convention was not intended to respond to mass migration, and the limited interpretation of who constitutes a refugee – those fleeing persecution, not generalized conflict or climactic shocks – covers a very limited number of the 65.3 million persons of concern to UNHCR.<sup>469</sup> Though supplementary regional legal frameworks (such as those in the African Union and the European Union) have expanded the definition of refugee, granting protection to a majority of those fleeing conflict, there are still large discrepancies in the level of protection accorded to different classes of migrants globally. As the dynamics of displacement continue to evolve (increasing number of climate migrants, extension of protracted situations), the legal-protection framework, if left unaltered, will

look increasingly anachronistic. Given the dominant reactionary attitude to responding to mass migration, there could be significant resistance to expanding the rights accorded to displaced people over the course of the outlook. This will leave tens of millions of displaced people with limited recourse to solve their displacement and will be a significant source of humanitarian need.

Image by Annakate Auten



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# Humanitarian Ecosystem

Acceleration of Alliances: A Networked Way of Working

Decentralization of INGOs: Toward Federation

The Rise of Faith-Based NGOs and Local NGOs

Humanitarian Workers of Tomorrow

The Role of Private Companies & Foundations

The Militarization of Aid

Donors of Tomorrow

Principled Humanitarian Action and Advocacy



# Acceleration Of Alliances: A Networked Way Of Working



By 2030, stakeholders in the aid sector will increasingly create alliances, integrating their structures for mutual benefit, building on shared interests and objectives.



## Key insights

1

NGOs will have to be part of more diverse alliances to continue to be relevant and access resources

2

Alliances will be between organizations with similar objectives though they are still likely to face the challenge of cultural tensions

3

The types of partnerships and alliances will diversify: the importance of hybrid profit/non-profit systems will grow.

## Main trends



The influence of non-Western organizations and donors will grow leading to more Western/non-Western alliances.



Partnerships between local NGOs and INGOs will go from transactional relationships to alliances.



Public/private partnerships will become increasingly strategic and innovative, but will increase competition.

## Uncertainties



There is potential for cultural and normative clashes between Western and non-Western NGOs.



Alliances have thus far replicated existing power structures. Whether power could be more equally distributed between Northern and Southern NGOs by 2030 remains to be seen.

Sources: ODI, GHA 2016, HPN, ALNAP.

# Acceleration of Alliances: A Networked Way of Working

## Definition

By 2030, stakeholders will increasingly create alliances, integrating their structures for mutual benefit, building on shared interests and objectives.<sup>470</sup> An acceleration of alliances between NGOs and new actors will create a networked<sup>471</sup> way of working in the humanitarian system, creating interdependence and strengthening connections between actors.

## Key insights

### NGOs will have to be part of more diverse alliances to continue to be relevant and access resources

Funding from the international community and private companies will be increasingly directed toward alliances and networks that can provide a systematic and transnational response, not singular actors.<sup>472</sup>

### Alliances will be between organizations with similar objectives though they are still likely to face the challenge of cultural tensions

NGO alliances will more likely be between organizations with similar objectives. However, organizational cultural clashes will continue to slow progress toward a fully networked response.<sup>473</sup>

## Hybrid system

The types of partnerships and alliances will diversify. New models of networking will rise that use for-profit enterprises to invest in their programming, creating an alternate model of funding, to reach beneficiaries and to survive as bigger networks.<sup>474</sup> Thus, the profit/non-profit hybrid system's importance will grow.

## Changes by 2030

### From Western to multipolar world: multipolar alliances

For decades, Western norms and principles have heavily influenced the biggest international donors and humanitarian organizations. However, new actors that have begun investing in the sector are growing in importance, and others are only just beginning to be recognized. Middle Eastern donors and the BRICS countries are only two of the most important blocs.<sup>475</sup>

As the world grows increasingly multipolar, non-Western countries and national/local organizations are looking to create their own space, expanding the diversity of partnerships and donors in the humanitarian system. INGOs of Western origin are also looking for alliances and partnerships with donors and organizations from the

Global South. For example, Action by Churches Together (ACT Alliance) is a coalition working on development, humanitarian issues, and advocacy, linking 144 churches and faith-based organizations in over 100 countries.<sup>476</sup> Such engagements are likely to continue to grow.

### Beyond transactional partnership to an alliance

Local implementing partners and advocacy organizations are being increasingly recognized as humanitarian actors in their own right. Creating alliances between local NGOs and INGOs has the potential to enable each group to benefit from the other's experience and to improve the quality of care for vulnerable communities. However, to achieve the full potential of a networked approach, alliances and partnerships would need to move beyond the transactional interaction, as is often the case.<sup>477</sup>

Many partnerships between INGOs and local NGOs have been structured around the funding or capacity building of local partners. These partnerships have been criticized for their top-down approach based on a unidirectional transfer of skills, in which INGOs make limited efforts to change their own structure or ways of working to make partnerships more equitable.<sup>478</sup> However, the growing recognition of the role of local NGOs in the sector could challenge this distortion, and the move to fund local NGOs more directly, as has been called for by some groups,<sup>479</sup> could begin to invert the power structures that have previously characterized many alliances and partnerships.

Supporting this trend further, INGOs such as Care and Oxfam have already signed the Charter for Change, an initiative launched in 2015 by 50 Southern-based NGOs to localize humanitarian aid, urging international organizations to change the way they work.<sup>480</sup>

### A cross-sectoral system: Toward bigger networks (but with limits)

The increased competition between humanitarian actors and the trend toward alliances pushes NGOs to look to diversify traditional modalities of operations, advocacy, and fundraising. A standard model of coordination, mostly between INGOs and international organizations, has limitations. The emergence and empowerment of new humanitarian actors such as private companies and local NGOs means that alliances will need to become more inclusive as traditional and new humanitarian actors find ways to work together.<sup>481</sup>

There are different depths of partnerships, ranging from coordination of efforts, to collaboration in designing joint positioning or programming, to a more formal alliance that could provide a platform to institutionalize interactions, creating a

shared obligation. The latter formulation requires a much greater investment of resources and as a result is likely to be formed by organizations with similar mandates and goals.

The functionality of all types of partnerships, particularly for alliances, depends on the institutional culture and practices of each organization. Though the selection of partners is likely founded on the commonality of goals across the alliance, the ethos of each agency is similarly important. For example, organizations that are more inclined to speak publicly on issues or rights violations could jeopardize the operational presence of other partners who rely on the acceptance of governments or parties to a conflict for access.

The ability to progress with a networked way of working relies on community building, which underpins the values and standards of work for the alliance.<sup>482</sup> Every network and alliance needs to have a common framework, policy, and goals to be efficient: these conditions might be easier to establish with a likeminded organization but more difficult to build, representing the gauntlet of actors involved in the humanitarian space. As a result, the more diverse formulation of alliances will likely be slower to evolve as trust is built.

The Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN Network)<sup>483</sup> of the UN, which brings together all United Nations agencies working in nutrition to break the cycle of malnutrition across generations, is an example of a crosssectoral and inter-actor network. The SUN Network was founded in response to a “fragmented and dysfunctional” international architecture.<sup>484</sup> It makes civil society, donors, UN agencies, and the private sector collaborate to support country-led, multi-sectoral strategies to combat undernutrition. Bond is another kind of network, which engages significantly in advocacy, speaking with one voice. Furthermore, the Bond network generates money through member subscriptions and paid-for service. Bond also receives grants, including strategic funding from the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.<sup>485</sup>

## Uncertainties

### Open versus closed systems

Will there be a cultural and normative clash between traditional versus non-traditional humanitarian actors or will they find common ground to work together? How will professionals from differing agencies design and implement shared principles and standards for engagement across cultural lines, in light of the challenges and tensions these may elicit?

The ability of humanitarian actors to overcome these challenges and create open alliances that can foster innovation and look beyond the more traditional breakdown of groups in the sector will be critically important. Without meeting the potential cultural challenges of diversifying members and being open to including new participants, alliances could become closed groups of like-minded institutions and a stumbling block to the potential creativity of a networked system.

## Equality versus competition and power

### Will alliances reach their own goals or will traditional power structures limit the space for equitable relationships?

If traditional humanitarian actors are unable to move beyond transactional partnerships in which dominance is maintained through financial power and scale, then the resources, skills, and capacities of all alliance members are unlikely to be fully exploited. Governance in alliances must be shared and common resources developed to create the space for innovation and for efficiencies to be gained. Whether traditional humanitarian actors are willing or able to relinquish control over their resources on a large scale is as yet unclear.

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
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# Decentralization Of INGOs: Toward Federation

In 2015, the humanitarian landscape was dominated by International NGOs:

Local NGOs  
0.2%



National NGOs Southern INGOs



Decentralization can take 3 forms:

- Localization
- Delegation
- Devolution



## Key insights



International NGOs become more decentralized, transfer administrative responsibility and authority from the central headquarters closer to areas of operations.



The humanitarian sector will be “de-westernized” in a shift away from the historical western model.

## Main trends



Country and regional programming and advocacy will no longer be directed from Europe and North America.



The Western cultural dominance of the civil society will wane as NGOs decentralize and transfer more power to decision makers in less developed countries.

## Uncertainties



It is not clear whether decentralization will just mean a shift in activities or a true shift in power to southern actors.

Sources: Wamai, Fowler, Micheletti, Moorhead & Clarke, Tim Smedley for the Guardian.

# Decentralization of INGOs: Toward Federation

## Definition

Decentralization is the process of transferring administrative powers from a central authority to regional or local offices.<sup>486</sup> The process is intended to improve NGO operations by making them more efficient, responsive, and adaptable. Decentralization typically can be described as taking three forms:<sup>487</sup>

- Localization – where representatives of the central authority are relocated from the headquarters to regional or local offices. Some management and financial responsibilities are similarly redistributed, but broader authority remains centralized.
- Delegation – where management and financial responsibilities are transferred to semiautonomous regional or local offices.
- Devolution – where administrative responsibilities and authority are relinquished by the central authority to autonomous regional or local offices. This form can lead to federation, in which an organization's administrative powers are constitutionally divided between the central authority and regional or local authorities, the latter having extensive authority over their own operations and finances.

## Key insights

### INGOs are increasingly shifting toward a more decentralized, local control

Following the trend toward decentralization, the governance structures of INGOs will become increasingly federalized. Though there will be a scale of decentralization, many INGOs will establish autonomous, locally based organizations that are integrated into networks for the delivery of programs and advocacy.

### The humanitarian sector will shift away from the historical Western-centric model

Delegation and federalization will reduce the cultural dominance of the West over the actors in the humanitarian sector, as more power and decision-making is divested to local decision makers.

## Changes by 2030

### INGOs become more decentralized

In the humanitarian sector, decentralization is regarded as a strategy to transfer administrative responsibility and authority from the central headquarters closer to areas of operations. Depending on the level of decentralization (localization, delegation, or devolution), it also corresponds to a shift in the

power structure, with decision-making responsibility resting less and less at headquarter level. The concept has gained increasing prominence in civil society over several decades. For example, as the health status of populations changed and the capabilities of health services worldwide evolved, the types of institutions the WHO engaged with and their activities changed as well.<sup>488</sup> Based on this, the WHO and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) organized and sponsored the International Conference on Primary Health Care System, in 1978 at Alma-Ata (USSR).<sup>489</sup> That event called for reform, especially regarding decentralization. In a decentralized system, decision makers are physically present in the program area, the advantages of which include more targeted responses, faster funding turnaround, improved policy formulation, greater exploitation of comparative advantages, enhanced coordination, and less bureaucracy.<sup>490</sup> Despite these advantages, however, INGOs have been slow to move beyond localization and to transfer decision-making power or management to local staff. As Devex president and editor-in-chief Raj Kumar says,<sup>491</sup> "Localization is the kind of issue that everybody agrees with in development but not everybody agrees on the 'how.'"<sup>492</sup>

The advantages of decentralization, along with continuing pressure to localize responses,<sup>493</sup> means the challenges of doing so will likely be overcome, leading to the adoption of more decentralized and even federated organizational structures for INGOs.<sup>494</sup>

### Decentralization leads to the de-Westernization of civil society

INGOs operate in an ever-changing global context. New great powers are rising around the world. There has been rapid growth in the demographic, scientific, economic, and military power of China and other regional leaders. South-South partnerships are commonplace. For example, in Latin America over the past decade, the Trade Union Confederation of the Americas (TUCA) has been building a regional proposal for workers' rights and working conditions called The Development Platform for the Americas" (PLADA), which struggles in the Americas against neoliberal policies. Many civil society organizations, such as Friends of the Earth, Via Campesina, and the World March of Women, have been helping to define PLADA pillars.<sup>495</sup> The growing strength of initiatives stemming from the countries and regions of humanitarian operations will challenge the dominance of Western modalities of operations and funding. As is evidenced by some partnerships, in which initiatives between Northern-Southern actors are not fruitful,<sup>496</sup> engagement between partners is critical but sometimes insufficient if national dynamics are not adequately accounted for and as a result the efficiencies of decentralization cannot be realized.

The formal humanitarian sector has been imbued with the values and even the organizational framework of its donors in Europe and North America since its inception.<sup>497</sup> However, to be in line with



new international realities, this model needs to evolve and adapt. One of the advantages of INGOs adopting federation structures is that they could draw on global support where required but concurrently be more tuned in to the local social, economic, and political dynamics.

## Tomorrow is already here

Decentralization of INGOs has been ongoing since the 1980s. Though progress is slow, the process is accelerating and more authority is being devolved. Recently, ActionAid and Oxfam relocated their headquarters from the UK to Africa,<sup>498</sup> and Amnesty International is expected to follow suit. The executive director of Oxfam International, Winnie Byanyima, says it's "less about a move south and more about a move global. It's about spreading ourselves around the world and locating ourselves where the struggles are."<sup>499</sup>

Image by Zi Jian Lim



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# The Rise of Faith-Based NGOs and Local NGOs

International NGOs receive well over 75% of all direct funding, and over half goes to the ten largest organisations.

At the World Humanitarian Summit, signatories of the Grand Bargain committed to “a global, aggregated target of at least 25% of humanitarian funding [directly] to local and national responders.”



Common characteristics:

- Distinct from Western, secular INGOs and the traditional humanitarian model
- Access to different funding channels
- Easier access (physically and culturally) to beneficiaries
- Have different relationships with governments and local bodies than secular INGOs



## Key insights



Southern-based NGOs will be recognized as system leaders



Increased importance will be placed on the role of faith-based organizations



Humanitarian actors will become increasingly differentiated as local and faith-based NGOs dominate direct implementation of humanitarian programming.

## Main trends



The social, economic, and legal arguments in favor of using local organizations instead of INGOs as the primary implementers of humanitarian programming will continue to undercut the position of INGOs.



Local and Faith-based NGOs have a large and stable funding base.

## Uncertainties



Will capacity building for local NGOs and the use of local partners become a condition of operating for INGOs, or will this trend be challenged by issues of transparency and efficacy?



It remains unclear how the increase in religiously motivated conflict will impact faith-based NGOs.

Sources: GHA report, UN, INTRAC, ALNAP, OCHA, Pew Research Centre.

# The Rise of Faith-Based NGOs and Local NGOs

## Definition

With the proliferation of civil society actors, faith-based and local NGOs are becoming more visible in the humanitarian sector, increasing their financial capacity, presence on the field, and media exposure.<sup>500</sup>

Faith-based NGOs or faith-based organizations are defined as non-state actors that have a religion or faith as core to their philosophy, membership, or programmatic approach, although they are not necessarily missionaries. While there is no generally accepted definition of faith-based NGOs, they are characterized by having one or more of the following: “affiliation with a religious body; a mission statement with explicit reference to religious values; financial support from religious sources; and/or a governance structure where selection of board members or staff is based on religious beliefs or affiliation and/or decision-making processes based on religious values.”<sup>501</sup>

Local or national NGOs can be defined as any non-profit, voluntary citizens’ group that programs on a local level.

Even if they represent different entities, faith-based and local NGOs can be observed together because they have several characteristics in common and their increasing presence in the sector has a common impact on its evolution.

Common characteristics:

- distinct from Western, secular INGOs and traditional humanitarian model
- have access to different funding channels
- have easier access (physically and culturally) to beneficiaries
- have different relationships with governments and local bodies than secular INGOs

## Key insights

### Southern-based NGOs will be recognized as system leaders

With the growth of national NGOs and the creation of South-South alliances, national NGOs will grow in scale and importance and occupy more of the humanitarian space. The power balance between NGOs and INGOs will shift.

### Increased importance will be placed on the role of faith-based organizations

The importance of faith-based INGOs, NGOs, and alliances (including interfaith) will increase. Religious divides can affect the relevance of faith-based NGOs, which can best leverage their networks when providing assistance where the growth in

## Size and Projected Growth of Major Religious Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2010-2050

	2010 Estimated Population	% in 2010	2050 Projected Population	% in 2050	Population Growth 2010-2050	% Increase 2010-2050	Compound Annual Growth Rate (%)
Christians	517,320,000	62.9	1,112,390,000	58.5	595,070,000	115.0	1.9
Muslims	248,420,000	30.2	669,710,000	35.2	421,280,000	169.6	2.5
Folk Religions	27,010,000	3.3	61,470,000	3.2	34,470,000	127.6	2.1
Unaffiliated	26,240,000	3.2	50,460,000	2.7	24,220,000	92.3	1.6
Other Religions	1,920,000	0.2	3,740,000	0.2	1,830,000	95.3	1.7
Hindus	1,560,000	0.2	1,900,000	0.1	340,000	21.6	0.5
Buddhists	160,000	<0.1	220,000	<0.1	60,000	38.1	0.8
Jews	100,000	<0.1	70,000	<0.1	-30,000	28.9	-0.8
<b>Regional total</b>	<b>822,730,000</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,899,960,000</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,077,230,000</b>	<b>130.0</b>	<b>2.1</b>

Pew Center (2015) The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050

## Size and Projected Growth of Major Religious Groups in the Middle East and North Africa, 2010-2050

	2010 Estimated Population	% in 2010	2050 Projected Population	% in 2050	Population Growth 2010-2050	% Increase 2010-2050	Compound Annual Growth Rate (%)
Muslims	317,070,000	93.0	551,900,000	93.7	234,830,000	74.1	1.4
Christians	12,710,000	3.7	18,180,000	3.1	5,470,000	43.0	0.9
Jews	5,630,000	1.6	8,200,000	1.4	2,570,000	45.7	0.9
Unaffiliated	2,100,000	0.6	3,280,000	0.6	1,180,000	56.2	1.1
Hindus	1,720,000	0.5	3,700,000	0.6	1,980,000	114.6	1.9
Folk Religions	1,060,000	0.3	2,270,000	0.4	1,210,000	114.2	1.9
Buddhists	500,000	<0.1	1,190,000	<0.2	690,000	137.4	2.2
Other Religions	230,000	<0.1	260,000	<0.1	30,000	11.5	0.3
<b>Regional total</b>	<b>341,020,000</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>588,960,000</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>247,950,000</b>	<b>72.7</b>	<b>1.4</b>

Pew Center (2015) The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050

the population of their religion is highest,<sup>502</sup> but their influence collectively will grow worldwide.

### Humanitarian actors will become increasingly differentiated as local and faith-based NGOs dominate direct implementation of humanitarian programming

INGOs and transnational alliances will increasingly focus on advocacy and activism, while faith-based NGOs and local NGOs leverage their proximity to communities and established networks to lead on direct implementation of humanitarian programs.

## Changes by 2030

### Adapted actors in aid

Civil society has grown phenomenally since the early 2000s, especially as far as Community Interest Companies and Companies Limited by Guarantee are concerned.<sup>503</sup> Within the civil society, there has been a proliferation of faith-based and local NGOs.

These actors have become more visible and have taken on more responsibility in the humanitarian field. Increasing religiosity in areas of operation, an increase in donor funding for faith-based organizations,<sup>504</sup> and the opening of the humanitarian space (challenging traditional actors and principles) have increased the role of faith-based NGOs<sup>505</sup> in the sector.

While numerous faith-based NGOs concentrate their activities at the local level, many have emerged at the regional and international level and represent a significant part of the international humanitarian community (e.g. World Vision International, Catholic Relief Services, Islamic Relief Worldwide, BRAC). The growth in the portfolio of faith-based NGOs at every level is likely to be

supported by growing religiosity of areas of continued fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.

The ability to better align culturally with beneficiaries is an important factor. Both faith-based and local NGOs can share the same language and culture with the communities they service, which can have an added value in efficiency and acceptance. Cultural or religious connections can lead to better access to beneficiaries, especially in sensitive contexts marked by religious confrontations. Local religious leaders are critical to humanitarian responses<sup>506</sup> in many areas, particularly where the reach or legitimacy of the state is weak. In this context, faith-based and local NGOs are unique players in the international humanitarian

### Affiliation of Religious NGOs, 2010

Religious affiliation	No. of organizations	% of all religious NGOs
Christian	187	58.4
Muslim	52	16.3
Jewish	22	6.9
Buddhist	14	4.4
Hindu	3	0.9
Spiritual	25	7.8
Mutireligious	11	3.4
Other religions (23)	6	1.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>320</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: International Religious NGOs at The United Nations: A Study of a Group of Religious Organizations

space: rooted in their local or religious communities, they have a global reach.


### Access is local

Concurrently, the interventions of INGOs, which are largely from the Global North, are being politically challenged by states and communities in their area of operation. INGOs were historically the organizations with the most capacity to respond to large-scale humanitarian emergencies, but with crises becoming more complex and challenges to Western interference more common, many INGOs have difficulty accessing beneficiaries directly or being accepted by local authorities. Conversely, many local organizations have been able to maintain access in some of the most challenging environments (including Syria and Somalia). Local NGOs are well adapted to the context in

which they operate and remain in the country for the long term. Their weight in the humanitarian sector is likely to continue to grow, especially as direct implementers of humanitarian interventions.

One of the strongest messages resonating from the World Humanitarian Summit was the call for more international support for localized humanitarian action. The social, economic, and legal arguments in favor of using local organizations instead of INGOs as the primary implementers of humanitarian programming will continue to undercut the position of INGOs. Though INGOs will face pressure to no longer operate as implementers, the big five (MSF, Save the Children, Oxfam, Word Vision, and IRC), which represent 0.1% of all NGOs but 31% of expenditure,<sup>507</sup> are likely too big to lose in this outlook.

**International Humanitarian Assistance Channeled Directly to NGOs by Category 2013, 2014, 2015**



Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2016



## Resources and fundraising capacity of local and faith-based NGOs

Due to the private funding of faith-based NGOs, their financial autonomy is generally higher than their secular counterparts. One channel, the Zakat, is an example of Islamic social financing. An annual alms tax that people are expected to pay as a religious duty, the proceeds of which are used for charitable and religious purposes, it can provide Islamic NGOs with important funds. Similarly, Christian charities such as the Order of Malta receive significant funding from individual donations within their community.<sup>508</sup>

In addition to accessing different funding communities, faith-based NGOs have access to pre-existing, highly stable, and often longstanding networks through which they can work (e.g. churches and mosques). For example, Tearfund has created a network of 100,000 churches working to lift 50 million people out of poverty over the coming decade.<sup>509</sup> Such networks are expanding, with increased religiosity in many areas of humanitarian operations, so faith-based agencies' resources will likely continue to build.

Local, national, and, to a lesser extent, regional NGOs, which are founded in and staffed from the geographic area in which they operate, already dominate the humanitarian space in terms of volume: in 2014, 80% of the more than 4,000 operating NGOs were local entities.<sup>510</sup> However, though some have the capacity to fundraise locally and with private donors (this varies a lot depending on the context), direct funding to local NGOs through formal international humanitarian systems is rare, and their access to resources most commonly flows through partnerships with INGOs.

Though the current system is heavily weighted against national and local NGOs, there are high-level commitments to change the dynamics of funding, including the Charter for Change, which committed to give 20% of direct and indirect funding to southern-based NGOs by 2018,<sup>511</sup> and the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit Grand Bargain, which committed to give in excess of 25% of all humanitarian funding "to local and national responders as directly as possible."<sup>512</sup> Whether these commitments will be met in full remains to be seen.

Even if the international community falls short of its targets, it is likely that the level of direct funding for local and national NGOs will markedly increase over the course of the outlook, both from the international humanitarian system and from increases in individual giving in countries such as Kenya, India, Brazil, Myanmar, and Indonesia.<sup>513</sup> There are fluctuations in levels of individual giving and uncertainty in projecting, as donations are often correlated with the level of economic growth; however, rates of individual giving in countries with fast-growing economies as a whole have been increasing consistently.<sup>514</sup>

## Controversies and debates

### Will faith-based NGOs be reinforced or weakened by the increase of violence in the name of religion?

Given the suspicious and hostile environment surrounding conflict and terror attacks associated with groups that claim a religious agenda, religious and faith-based NGOs might be perceived as contributing to tension and terrorism.<sup>515</sup> Parallels made between religion and terrorism can be harmful to the role of faith-based NGOs and have direct consequences on their reputation, image, and credibility as humanitarian workers. The extent to which this will affect the role of faith-based NGOs is unclear as extremism could undermine the acceptance of any organizations that diverge from the beliefs and policies of the controlling group in operating areas.

### Will capacity building for local NGOs and the use of local partners become a condition of operating for INGOs, or will this trend be challenged by issues of transparency and efficacy?

The traditional relationships between local NGOs and INGOs have been criticized as "the formal humanitarian sector finds it extremely difficult to establish genuine, inclusive partnerships."<sup>516</sup> Such arrangements are being increasingly challenged, and international commitments to empower local organizations through the direct flow of capital could change the nature of these partnerships. Rethinking the relationship between INGOs and local partners, where the power is rebalanced, will be a significant reform in the humanitarian sector if it transpires over the course of the outlook. However, there is still the possibility that this trend toward reform will plateau or even revert (sustaining the current power dynamic in the relationship between INGOs and their local partners), due to the heavy burden of reporting and risk aversion by major donors. The capacity of local organizations to comply with reporting obligations, as well as fraud and counter-terror legislation, remains substantially weaker than that of INGOs and as a result the process to increase direct financing and create a more equitable dynamic with international organizations could be stemmed, as donors could be reticent to accept less rigorous compliance.

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# Humanitarian Workers

Within the humanitarian sector, there are an estimated 249,000 NGO personnel:



“Humanitarian workers’ refer to all individuals working to alleviate human suffering. They can be employed by any type of institution, can be paid or unpaid, working in their country of origin or abroad, in situations of crisis as well as on long term human development projects.”

## Key insights

**1** The number of humanitarian workers is likely to continue increasing in the outlook.

**2** Inequalities in the humanitarian workforce will persist.

## Main trends

The humanitarian sector has gone through an extensive phase of professionalisation, which will continue to shape its evolution through to 2030.

Staff will remain two-tiered, between national and international, women and men, Western and non-Western.

## Uncertainties

Is professionalisation on the rise or on the decline?

It remains to be seen whether unpaid work in the sector will continue rising or will face enough criticism to halt the practice.

Sources: OCHA, Stoddard, CHS, RelifeWeb.

# Humanitarian Workers of Tomorrow

## Definition

'Humanitarian workers' refer to all individuals working to alleviate human suffering. They can be employed by any type of institution, can be paid or unpaid, working in their country of origin or abroad, in situations of crisis as well as on long term human development projects.

## Key Insights

**The number of humanitarian workers is likely to continue increasing in the outlook.**

As the definition of a humanitarian worker widens, new humanitarian actors are created and new sectors are integrated into the humanitarian ecosystem, an increasing number of people will be considered to be 'humanitarian workers'. The majority of workers will continue to be staff working in their country of origin, while expatriate positions will continue to decline.

**Inequalities in the humanitarian workforce will persist.**

Disparities in decision-making power, seniority, security and safety, salaries, and capacity building between local and expatriate staff, women and men, Westerners and non-Westerners are likely to continue, despite a slow shift towards greater equality.

## Changes by 2030

**The professionalization of the sector**

The origins of aid organizations<sup>517</sup> are rooted in citizens mobilizing to help others affected by hardship. Many of the early grassroots aid movements relied on volunteers. This is still true in early crisis response – many of the first responders are present when a crisis hits and quickly become relief volunteers. However, today NGOs operate like businesses do – they have administrative, financial, and human resource functions, to support the delivery of operations. NGOs are staffed by salaried employees with technical skills working within the confines of their job descriptions. Operations have spread beyond national borders and the humanitarian imperative has become a vocation, and later a profession. Today becoming a humanitarian worker requires study, technical training, expertise and professional experience. It is a planned and carefully executed career path.

This transformation is known as the 'professionalization' of the aid sector. The most evident drivers of this change stem from the growth of budgets and operations, the increasingly complex quality and accountability controls imposed by donors and governments, the difficulty for humanitarians to get jobs in other sectors due to the perceived lack of professionalism in aid, and finally, the

exposing scandals of aid malpractice.<sup>518</sup>

In the 1990s, efforts were made to launch coordinated quality and accountability initiatives in the humanitarian sector including the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) International, People in Aid, and the Sphere Project. These initiatives, along with other partners, created the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS), a unified guide to be used across the sector. In order to meet these obligations, NGOs have had to professionalize their operations. Often this includes offering employees certified courses and training<sup>519</sup> that recognize and formalize their professional experience. These courses were originally targeted at those without high levels of formal education, but are frequently only accessible to high-level expatriate, rather than national, staff.<sup>520</sup>

Though there have been benefits to professionalization, such as the improved quality of service delivery and reporting, increased bureaucracy has in many instances increased the distance between aid professionals and the affected populations they are employed to assist.<sup>521</sup>

For local NGOs, professionalization has made it harder to keep up with industry standards and compete with larger INGOs. Local or national NGOs can have fewer resources for capacity building and training, and as a result, can struggle to train their staff as regularly and as thoroughly as their larger, international counterparts.

As the work of some humanitarian actors shifts, the human resources that they require will also change. As national NGOs are increasingly funded directly, they may require an influx of resources to manage the additional burdens of accountability and compliance. Similarly as INGOs reduce their rate of direct implementation, their staff profiles could shift from that of operational expertise to fundraising, technical support, analysis and advocacy. The ability of humanitarian organizations to adapt resourcing to decentralization trends will determine their level of success and sustainability through to 2030.

**Two-tiered staff : power, contracts, and safety**

Imbalances, particularly in decision making power, between national (or local) and international (or expatriate) staff in the humanitarian ecosystem are stark. The implications of this have been severe, potential has been lost, staff have been undervalued<sup>522</sup>, and divisions have created political difficulties. These inequalities have been widely reported and are highly contentious. The debate has prompted a shift, at least in name, to rebalancing the status quo. Though some of the arguments for hiring international staff remain part of the discourse<sup>523</sup>, there is growing support for trying to hire local rather than international staff for aid delivery. As a result,



there has been a slow but sustained trend towards hiring non-Western, local/national staff in leadership positions in INGOs.<sup>524</sup> Though the rebalancing of management roles will lead to greater diversity among decision makers, it is likely to be slow to manifest.

Significant inequalities in salary persist between local staff, who are systematically paid less, and expatriate staff.<sup>525</sup> This is also evident in the slow trend of the expatriation of national staff. For example, when non-Western staff are hired on expatriate contracts to work in other countries of operation, they are often paid less than their Western counterparts.<sup>526</sup> The rebalancing of salaries is unlikely to change before the majority of Western expatriates transition out of operational roles.

There is also often a stark difference in the tenure of national and international staff.<sup>527</sup> National staff often stay with an organization for much longer than expatriate staff, who are known for high turnover, even at leadership level.<sup>528</sup> Having national staff in leadership positions of INGOs, at least at country level, could ensure more long-term sustainability and planning of interventions due to staff continuity.

The perceived insecurity of humanitarian workers worldwide is also divided along national and international lines. It is estimated that the level of violence directed against humanitarian workers is three times higher than it was ten years ago.<sup>529</sup> In Afghanistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen “there were 13 times as many national staff victims as international (expatriate) victims”.<sup>530</sup> However, in the international media, attacks on international staff generate significantly more coverage than attacks on local staff.

Humanitarians will continue to be targeted by violent armed groups and agencies will continue to manage insecurity for years to come, often at the expense of access to vulnerable populations. New ways of working and the development of technological solutions, both to protect humanitarian workers and to access those most in need, could allow agencies to better protect their staff, report attacks, and ultimately ensure the continuity of programming, especially in areas of hot conflict.

## Gender divisions

The aid sector is predominantly female in its workforce – some sources cite up to 70% of all positions are held by women.<sup>531</sup> However, at senior levels, the majority of decision makers are men.

Many humanitarian organizations have gender programs dedicated to reducing the inequality between men and women around the world. However, the implementation of gender standards are often much stronger in the programs that are delivered by humanitarian actors than in the organizations themselves. This is evident in the slow pace of reform in recruitment, parental leave<sup>532</sup>, treatment of harassment cases, and other human resource practices where many humanitarian actors lag behind their private sector counterparts.

When it comes to sexual harassment cases in particular,

humanitarian workers have been particularly vocal about the lack of provisions for women, who are often more vulnerable in volatile contexts than their male colleagues.<sup>533</sup>

Across the board, closing the gender gap will be slow and genuine equality in the workplace is unlikely by 2030.

## Controversies and debates

### Professionalization: rising or falling?

There is some disagreement on whether the humanitarian sector is still undergoing professionalization. Some reports have highlighted the need and the appetite for further professionalization<sup>534</sup>, while other have concluded that the sector has undergone enough transformation. The arguments of the latter group have also highlighted the potential downsides to the trend such as the real or perceived distance between aid worker and beneficiary, the barriers to entry to the sector, the greater risk aversion and generalized low levels of innovation<sup>535</sup>. Whether professionalization continues at the same rate in the humanitarian sector remains to be seen.

### Unpaid work

The sector has experienced criticism for the widespread culture of unpaid work.

Unpaid internships have become extremely widespread<sup>536</sup> in small and large organizations, including throughout UN agencies. Unpaid contracts have become longer and at times been integrated formally into higher education degrees. Critics argue that this form of free labor is unethical and that entry to the sector via internships means that only the wealthy (those who can afford to work unpaid) are employed, perpetuating a culture where ‘the rich help the poor’. Scandals in recent years have exposed this practice and, criticism for unpaid internships have gathered momentum.<sup>537</sup> As a result some countries and organizations have imposed salary regulations for the payment of voluntary staff, but small NGOs often remain unable to remunerate entry level staff and resort to unpaid internships. It is unclear whether this trend is likely to continue or whether it will abate over the outlook.

Similar to the rise of unpaid internships, is the controversy of ‘volontourism’ which has attracted much attention and debate since 2012. Though this issue was prominent before, particularly in long-term development projects<sup>538</sup>, it has gained in relevance and media attention in the aftermath of the 2015 earthquake in Nepal. Voluntourism is described as “a form of tourism in which travellers participate in voluntary work, typically for a charity.” Critics have argued that this practice does more harm than good<sup>539</sup>, is “self-congratulatory and disingenuous”, boosts the CV of those voluntouring rather than truly alleviating poverty and suffering, undermines local labour economies, and allows foreigners to do jobs they would be underqualified to do in their countries of origin. Public outcry may slow voluntourism through to 2030, but smaller NGOs who rely on this practice will likely continue to use unpaid volunteers, albeit with more discretion.

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# The Role of Private Companies and Foundations

Between 2006 and 2010 the Central Emergency Response Fund saw private sector donors rise from 2 to 22.

In 2015 private contributions amounted to US \$6.2 billion, 22% of all donations

In 2015, government donors increased their humanitarian assistance contributions by around 11%, and private donors increased theirs by 13% from the previous year.



Over the last decade and despite a global financial crisis, private donations and the role of private actors in the humanitarian sector have increased steadily, suggesting that the presence of private companies in the aid sector is here to stay.



## Key insights

1

Delivering assistance to affected populations has become a multi-sectoral affair which involves NGOs, governments, small local businesses, and large multi-national corporations before, during and after a crisis.

2

Private sector actors will take over more elements of the humanitarian value chain, becoming implementers in their own right, fully separate from (and in competition to) NGOs.

3

A humanitarian marketplace is created in which beneficiaries can choose their services – driving competition between private sector actors and NGOs.

## Key trends



Mutually beneficial partnerships between the private sector and humanitarian delivery organisations are likely to continue increasing, with private sector partners moving beyond funding to providing technical expertise and the supporting the active delivery of aid



Private companies will invest heavily in Disaster Risk Reduction efforts in support of humanitarian ends and to safeguard their economic interests.



Local businesses in the Global South are playing a leading role in aid delivery.

## Uncertainties



While concerns about the dangers of the “privatization of aid” will persist, the increasing role of private actors in the space could change the narrative.



The level of accountability and transparency required in aid delivery will challenge the operating principles of private actors.

Sources: Development Initiatives, GHA, OCHA, Heba Aly for IRIN news, Steven Zyck for ATHA, Joanne Burke & Randolph Kent,

# The Role of Private Companies & Foundations

## Definition

Private sector actors refer to for-profit corporations and their philanthropic branches, foundations, and trusts. Private sector actors are implicated in the humanitarian sector as funders of humanitarian action, supporters of humanitarian organizations, and as direct implementers.<sup>540</sup>

## Key insights

### Aid is everyone's business

Delivering assistance to affected populations will increasingly become a multi-sectoral affair that involves NGOs, governments, small local businesses, and large multi-national corporations before, during, and after a crisis. The partnerships between these organizations will be varied in nature and structure and will add further complexity to the sector.

### Private sector actors operate in their own right

The donor mentality will be replaced by one of partnership based on competency, efficiency, and access. Private sector actors will be increasingly implicated in the humanitarian value chain, becoming implementers in their own right, separate from (and in competition with) NGOs. Success will be measured against quantitative and qualitative targets and, if achieved, could result in repayments on investment.

### A marketplace

A marketplace for humanitarian services will be created where beneficiaries are able to choose the services to which they subscribe – driving competition between private sector actors and NGOs. Where this functions, there could be an increased focus on quality driven by accountability to communities, but in more insecure environments with limited access, monopolies could create sub-standard programming.

## Changes by 2030

### Actors: a shift toward the Global South

Large Western multinational corporations with global reach have received the most attention for their involvement in the humanitarian sector. Often structured as part of or leading a large consortium of applicants, corporations have the capacity to apply for funding in significant tranches. Though Western corporations receive more coverage, regional, national, and local businesses are increasingly implicated in humanitarian aid delivery as direct

implementers<sup>541</sup> and are a critical force in the privatization of aid.<sup>542</sup>

An increasing number of commercial actors from the Global South have been getting involved in humanitarian assistance. Up until 2014, middle-income countries saw the most private sector investment. These countries, and enterprises within them, are likely to adopt game-changing tactics in years to come.

Natural disasters and preparedness are the interventions where private sector actors have focused, contributing half the humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines and accounting for 70% of USAID in the Haiti earthquake response.<sup>543</sup> Private sector actors have been most hesitant to engage in protracted conflicts and unstable environments because of the danger of appearing to take sides or tarnishing their reputations with their consumers. However, we may see an increase in the role of national private sector actors in these sorts of crises in years to come, particularly in states wary of external interference.<sup>544</sup>

Governments concerned about foreign political intervention, such as Zimbabwe and Myanmar, will increasingly work with businesses to deliver assistance rather than aid agencies, which they may mistrust.<sup>545</sup> Aid agencies in these contexts will have to deal with the attitudes of these governments and will need to collaborate more with local business partners to ensure access to affected populations.

### Mutually beneficial relationships

Since the early 2000s effective, mutually beneficial partnerships have been established in which the private sector, previously seen as little more than a “cash cow,” provides expertise, technical know-how, and efficiency streamlining to humanitarian counterparts. Though funding may have been the first form of support, for-profit companies now provide the humanitarian sector with services and resources as varied as telecommunications, construction, consumer goods, pharmaceuticals, logistics, and innovations.

The motivations behind the private sector's involvement in the humanitarian sector have shifted. Originally focused on the reputational benefits, companies now view<sup>546</sup> NGO partnerships as core to their business – from staff recruitment, well-being, and retention to investment in future growth opportunities (more on this last point in the DRR section below). This change in the private sector's approach has coincided with a professionalization of the aid sector and a drop in financing following the economic crash of 2008.<sup>547</sup>



Effective partnership building requires time and effort on the part of both parties — at the scoping stage and throughout the project's lifetime.<sup>548</sup> Finding the right “fit” between organizations and getting them to “speak the same language” has been a barrier. However, in the coming years partnerships are likely to become much less ad hoc, and matching competencies and effectiveness will become the norm. The painstaking negotiation and development of partnership agreements that have limited impact will become a thing of the past, and businesses and NGOs will develop new, more strategic ways of working together.

New trends in the private sector, based on efficiency and cost cutting, are also likely to be integrated into the humanitarian sector over the next decade. For example, the rise of the sharing economy,<sup>549</sup> which includes businesses like Airbnb, or circular economy movements,<sup>550</sup> which use waste or used products and add value, could play a key role in the humanitarian sector, shaping it into a more inclusive and inter-operable community.<sup>551</sup>

### Investment in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)

Private companies are increasingly investing in DRR efforts, viewing resilience and preparedness as an investment in the future not only for affected populations, but also for the stability of their working environment and the potential to expand to new markets.<sup>552</sup> The 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction urges the private sector to integrate disaster risk into management practices and to invest in pre-disaster rather than post-disaster efforts in the interest of sustainable development. Out of the Sendai Framework also came the ARISE,<sup>553</sup> which had an initial membership of 140 private sector organizations and aims to energize the private sector to create risk-resilient societies.

On the African continent, the rise of DRR and private partnerships has been evident since 2013, when a private sector initiative for Africa was launched by the UNISDR<sup>554</sup> Chief at the 4th Africa Regional Platform for DRR, bringing together representatives from ARUP, Microsoft, Safaricom, the Climate and Development Knowledge Network, Oxfam-Tanzania, and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. Participants shared experiences on DRR and resilience building and presented five recommendations on how to help the private sector engage in DRR in the region.<sup>555</sup>

On a global scale, the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) facilitated the establishment of the Connecting Business Initiative (CBI) — “a multi-stakeholder initiative that provides a mechanism for the private sector to engage with the United Nations system, national governments and civil society in a coordinated manner on crisis risk reduction, emergency preparedness, response and recovery.”<sup>556</sup> It comprises 11 national private sector networks, representing hundreds of companies worldwide, and reflects the strong commitments made during the WHS on private sector collaboration.

The CBI reflects a recognized need in the humanitarian sector to think more long-term and assess risks and programs with their future impact in mind. As donors are pushed to move toward multi-

year funding, long-term efforts such as DRR have the potential to make currently sporadic and partial public-private partnerships more consistent and encompassing — leading the way for other more sustainable, cross-sector collaborations in the future.<sup>557</sup>

## Controversies and debates

### Principled action

Up until this point, the greatest controversy regarding private-public partnerships has been surrounding clashing motivations and principles between the two sectors. For years aid agencies have accused corporations of white-washing, getting involved in humanitarian work for reputational gain, and have raised concerns about how their operational independence is affected by such partnerships.<sup>558</sup>

Though these debates are likely to continue, especially as the ethics of new supply chains and networks are further explored, mutually beneficial and effective private-public partnerships will continue to grow. While concerns about the dangers of the “privatization of aid” will persist, the increasing role of private actors in the space could change the narrative.

### Accountability

Private sector actors are perceived to operate more efficiently than NGOs; however, Western for-profit personnel tend to have higher salaries than NGO personnel, and some research suggests that “contracts won by for-profit outfits were more likely to bust their budgets and miss deadlines.”<sup>559</sup> As the number of partnerships increases, the public is likely to demand more accountability and transparency, which may challenge private actors, who are not accustomed to operating with the same levels of transparency as not-for-profit humanitarian actors.

## Tomorrow is already here

Though humanitarian action is still marginal to their core business, several examples highlight the growth of private sector involvement in humanitarian action. Here are a few that illustrate the changes by 2030 outlined above:

- OCHA has formed partnerships with private companies such as Microsoft, Vodafone, and DHL to improve coordination, information management, and fundraising.<sup>560</sup>
- Since 2009, DHL has also partnered with the UNDP to “Get Airports Ready for Disasters” in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, and Lebanon.
- As of 2013, the IKEA foundation and the UNHCR have partnered to create a flat-packed weather-resistant shelter that requires no tools for assembly.
- Mastercard and WFP have formed a partnership to issue food vouchers redeemable at local shops – simultaneously tackling problems of food distribution and market dumping.

- The Global Fund has since 2012 been using Coca-Cola’s extensive distribution network worldwide to deliver medicines to remote locations.
- Earlier this year, Ericsson announced its Emergency Wallet program, which provides mobile finance solutions to those affected by disasters. This is the latest in Ericsson’s 15-year history of supporting 40 UN missions in over 30 countries.
- Google’s Terra Bella initiative shares its geospatial imagery, which maps disasters and their effects for emergency responders.
- As for DRR, the strongest and most recent example of growing attention and investment in this area is the aforementioned CBI.

The above demonstrates the breadth of private sector involvement in aid delivery, how this trend has grown over recent years, and how it is likely to continue doing so until 2030.

## IKEA & UNHCR Shelter



Source: IRIN News

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# The Militarization of Aid

The militarization of aid refers to the use of humanitarian assistance to support military strategic goals and can take one of the following forms:

- Military actors directly delivering aid.
- Military actors collaborating with civil society to deliver aid (also known as Civ-Mil operations).
- Military actors providing protection to humanitarian actors delivering aid.



2% of official development assistance goes to militaries for humanitarian response and training



## Key insights



Militaries will continue to be involved in humanitarian aid raising ethical and security dilemmas for traditional humanitarian actors.



Military involvement in humanitarian work will continue to raise ethical dilemmas and security concerns for the traditional humanitarian community. The perception of the neutrality of all agencies is likely to deteriorate, which could have a deleterious effect on aid worker security.

## Main trends



Militaries are becoming increasingly involved in humanitarian operations, especially in the context of natural disasters and disease outbreaks.



The involvement of new actors such as Private Military Companies (PMCs) will continue raising ethical and legal questions.



The blurring of lines between military and humanitarian actors has resulted in a perceived erosion of neutrality and a loss of access for NGOs, widespread abuses of the laws of war, and reduced protection of civilians in conflict settings.

## Uncertainties



Is militarization to blame for greater aid worker insecurity?

Sources: Maria Corsini, Andrej Zwitter, Vincent Bernard, Pierre Krahenbuhl.



# The Militarization of Aid

## Definition

The militarization of aid refers to the use of humanitarian assistance to support military strategic goals<sup>561</sup> and can take one of the following forms:

- 1 Military actors directly delivering aid.
- 2 Military actors collaborating with civil society to deliver aid (also known as Civ-Mil operations).
- 3 Military actors providing protection to humanitarian actors delivering aid.

Militaries in this document refer to state/national military groups, as opposed to non-state armed groups.

## Key insights

### Militaries delivering aid

Foreign and national militaries around the world will increasingly deliver humanitarian aid. In some contexts this will not raise any questions or debate; national militaries have long been early responders to emergencies, and where foreign militaries abide by the Oslo Guidelines<sup>562</sup> they can provide much-needed resources and expertise. However, in more complex conflict settings, military campaigns to “win hearts and minds” through aid delivery are likely to continue to be highly contentious.

### Drawing the battle lines

Military involvement in humanitarian work will increase and will continue to raise ethical dilemmas and security concerns for the traditional humanitarian community. The perception of the neutrality of all agencies is likely to deteriorate, which could have a deleterious effect on aid worker security.

## Changes by 2030

### The rise of military involvement in aid

In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, the national military of the affected state usually provides lifesaving aid, as it can launch a prompt response underpinned by significant logistical and organizational capacities. Military engagement in relief activities has grown since the early 1990s,<sup>563</sup> including the aftermath of the cyclone in Bangladesh in 1991, Hurricane Mitch in Central America in 1998, and Hurricane Katrina in the US in 2005.<sup>564</sup> Many states cannot manage humanitarian crises using civilian capacity alone, and there is a growing trend in disaster-affected countries to train national militaries for such humanitarian response interventions.<sup>565</sup> Regional alliances are also paying more attention to transnational military cooperation in humanitarian responses, as is exemplified

by ASEAN's disaster-risk-reduction regional strategy.

The use of military assets and resources in humanitarian action is not new, but the trend to involve foreign militaries in humanitarian aid is increasing.<sup>566</sup> This is evidenced in the delivery of assistance, the provision of security, and the support of logistics. For example, as a response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013, where 23 foreign militaries provided assistance.<sup>567</sup>

Since the 1950s, hegemonic powers have used “humanitarian intervention” as a justification for military action.<sup>568</sup> In addition, aid delivered by foreign militaries has been used as a mechanism of soft power<sup>569</sup> in areas of engagement or strategic importance to win over the “hearts and minds” of civilians. The inclusion of a humanitarian dimension (either directly or through improved coordination and support of other humanitarian actors) in military action is a central part of a more comprehensive security approach that is likely to be standard in major international military interventions in the future.<sup>570</sup>

Since the 1990s, foreign military actors have been increasingly involved in humanitarian responses that are distinct from active military involvement in the context, for example Operation United Assistance, the US military's response to the Ebola crises.<sup>571</sup> Supporting responses outside theatres of active operations offers training opportunities for military staff and a way to expand the purview of the military to justify budgets and resources.<sup>572</sup> The success of such ventures has been dependent on the commitment of the military to dedicate the requisite resources and leadership to move their intervention beyond an exercise to a response, coordinated with other actors.<sup>573</sup> The legitimacy of the growing role of military actors in the humanitarian space will depend, in large part, on their success in mounting a coordinated response where the strengths of the military are leveraged and the efficiency of the overall response is improved. Though such action is less overtly political than military involvement in responses within an active theatre of engagement, the inclusion of foreign military operatives in any space can encourage the perception that international humanitarian aid in general is motivated by political or security concerns.

This was clearly demonstrated with the introduction of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) by the United States government in 2002 in Afghanistan, and then in 2008 in Iraq. PRTs are civil military organizations designed to operate in fragile environments following open hostilities for reconstruction, security, and development.<sup>574</sup> PRTs have been criticized for their uneven performance, especially because, with the mixture of humanitarian and military operations, they have politicized humanitarian assistance, underpinning the perception of local populations that aid is an instrument of foreign policy. Though it is often asserted, studies have failed to demonstrate that this

politicization is correlated to increased security incidents against aid workers in the field.<sup>575</sup>

### New faces in conflict

Conflicts are increasingly protracted, more frequently intrastate, often fragmented, and involve a more diverse set of actors.<sup>576</sup> Private involvement is reforming the sector. In conflict settings in particular, the rise of new corporate actors such as private military companies (PMCs) has been problematic. PMCs have been accused of becoming immersed in highly dubious situations and operating in a “legal vacuum”<sup>577</sup> where there is limited oversight of their operations and tactics. With less rigorous command and control than most national militaries, PMCs can increase instability in already fragile areas. PMCs have actively made use of the increasingly complex crises and the crowding of the aid industry to carve a space for the privatization of force. Though PMCs have created a Code of Conduct<sup>578</sup> for Private Security Services, and the sector has become more transparent through rapid self-regulation initiatives<sup>579</sup> and intergovernmental initiatives such as the Montreux Document, which is specifically focused on the use of PMCs and humanitarian and human rights law,<sup>580</sup> the involvement of PMCs in conflicts and humanitarian interventions is likely to continue to raise ethical and legal questions.

### A dangerous blurring

The increased number and diversity of actors delivering humanitarian assistance has resulted in a perceived conflation of the humanitarian and military agendas. This blurring of the lines<sup>581</sup> has had dangerous consequences:

- The erosion of neutrality

Through the established humanitarian principle of neutrality, many Western NGOs define themselves as actors who don't take sides. Their perceived neutrality is often their only protection in conflict settings,<sup>582</sup> and until the last decade this status was mostly respected by warring parties around the world. However, in recent years, this immunity has been destabilized by actors delivering humanitarian assistance as part of a military and political strategy. The concept of “integrated missions” aimed at integrated political, military, and humanitarian operations in a common program is a highly contested initiative. Many humanitarian actors object to unification of humanitarian programming with political objectives, saying that it has severely compromised the fundamental principle of neutrality for aid delivery. The impacts of integrated missions on humanitarian work are uneven, as the policies and safeguards for humanitarian action are not universally applied,<sup>583</sup> and the effects of mission integration varies by context.<sup>584</sup> Nevertheless, in some contexts the polarization of aid has created real confusion among the communities, resulting in a mistrust or rejection of humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian actors are and could be increasingly viewed with skepticism, accused of being pawns of foreign policy and Western imperialism.

- The reduction in access

The blurring of lines has impeded the ability of many humanitarian agencies to access the most vulnerable populations.<sup>585</sup> Examples of this can be seen in many parts of Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia, where those in the most hard-to-reach areas are often those in most need of assistance.<sup>586</sup> When aid is not equitably distributed it reinforces the perception that humanitarians favor some victims over others – beneficiaries on the “right side” of the conflict now have access to aid, while the others are not entitled to it.<sup>587</sup> It is increasingly difficult for agencies to deliver principled humanitarian assistance.

## Tomorrow is already here

### Examples from Iraq and Afghanistan

In Iraq and Afghanistan there was evidence of all three aspects of our definition: the military has delivered aid directly, partnered with NGOs to deliver aid, and been used as escorts to humanitarian organizations seeking protection. Military actors (foreign and local) have delivered development and humanitarian assistance programs covering issues as diverse as agriculture, gender-based violence, and reconciliation.<sup>588</sup> In foreign interventions these “non-kinetic” activities have been part of the “Whole-Of-Government-Approach,<sup>589</sup>” which included stabilization, peace-building and reconstruction programs, in addition to traditional offensive military operations.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams are an example of this conflation of agendas. The goals of PRTs are threefold: improve security, aid reconstruction in selected provinces, and extend control of the Afghan government. Twenty-seven operate in Afghanistan, each consisting of 50 to 500 military personnel.<sup>590</sup>

### Natural disasters

The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami saw the beginning of a sharp increase in the involvement of foreign militaries in natural disasters. Such initiatives can improve access to hard-to-reach areas quickly and efficiently and have occasionally been requested by NGOs.<sup>591</sup> The intervention of military actors in natural disasters and non-conflict settings for the purpose of logistical support is likely to continue in years to come.

## Controversy and debates

### Is militarization to blame for greater aid worker insecurity?

The blurred separation between armed groups and humanitarian actors has occurred concurrently with a threefold increase<sup>592</sup> in the number of violent targeted attacks on humanitarian workers worldwide in the last decade.<sup>593</sup> Though these trends are often associated, the link of causation between militarization and increased aid-worker insecurity is open to debate given the multitude of other variables involved.

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# Donors of Tomorrow

International humanitarian assistance for 2015 was the third yearly increase in a row (from US\$18 billion in 2012 to US \$28 billion).

97% of government funding comes from 20 states, primarily in the West, though the Middle East has seen a five-fold increase in funding over the past five years.



The bulk of funding for global humanitarian action has been provided by the governments of Western countries, who accounted for 88% (\$19.2 billion) of reported international humanitarian assistance in 2015



## Key insights



The future of the humanitarian funding landscape will reflect the multi-polarity of the world, with non-traditional donors looking for their own space and voice in the humanitarian sector.



Non-traditional private donors will play an increasingly important role in humanitarian funding due to the creation of user-friendly donation technologies.



In a crowded sector 'coopetition' will force humanitarian actors to raise funds in new, non-traditional, creative ways.

## Main trends



Funding requirements will increase, driven mainly by increasing displacements, violent conflicts, and natural hazard crisis.



The financial contribution of donors will remain far below the what is needed to respond.



New donors are mostly from the Middle East and North Africa, contributing \$2.4b in 2015. Funding from new donors is likely to continue increasing through 2030.



Private donors, of which individuals make up the large majority (60%), will continue to contribute at a similar rate.



By 2025, non-DAC contributions could reach \$50 billion with China and India as the greatest contributors and East Asia as the biggest recipient.

Sources: GHA, Development Initiatives, OCHA, The Asia Foundation, ICRC ICVA.



# Donors of Tomorrow

## Definition

The bulk of funding for global humanitarian action has been provided by the governments of Western countries or, more precisely, by the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)<sup>594</sup> of the OECD, who accounted for 88% (\$19.2 billion) of reported international humanitarian assistance in 2015.<sup>595</sup> Driven by their growing contribution to the sector, the total financial inflow for humanitarian assistance has significantly increased over time, reaching a record high of US\$28 billion in 2015.<sup>596</sup> Despite this increase, there is a widening gap between available resources and humanitarian requirements,<sup>597</sup> which are rising at an even faster pace. In the last decade, on average, the international community met only two-thirds of the reported needs.<sup>598</sup> Decisions on funding are highly political.

## Key insights

### Reflecting multi-polarity

The regionalization of donors will determine the distribution of humanitarian contributions. Gulf donors will focus on giving to Middle Eastern crises, and Asian countries will prioritize enhancing regional resilience to natural disaster risks in Asia. Simultaneously, the sector will be molded by the growing importance of transregional forces in the humanitarian aid flows (such as the Islamic social finance sector or the BRICS), and more countries (e.g. India, China, or Brazil) will incorporate humanitarian assistance as a foreign-policy set of tools.

### An increasing proportion of private donors

Non-traditional private donors (including companies and individuals) will play an increasingly important role in humanitarian funding due to the creation of user-friendly donation technologies.

### Competition fosters creativity

Consortia funding mechanisms (e.g. START) and private-public partnerships (under-used so far) will likely increase over the course of the outlook, broadening the resource base for humanitarian action. As a result, there could be an increased call for creativity, risk-taking, and collaboration, which could foster innovative financing (e.g. crowdfunding or social impact bonds), increasing the use of services like cash-card systems, social-safety-net payments, or even outsourcing technical expertise to private companies in the industries of water, electricity, and telecommunications to provide people in need with basic services.

## Changes by 2030


### Growing unmet needs

Since 2004, the number of individuals targeted for assistance almost tripled to reach 82.5 million people in 2015.<sup>599</sup> The increase in funding requirements has also grown rapidly<sup>600</sup> (requirements for 2004 were US\$3 billion and nearly US\$20 billion in 2015).<sup>601</sup> This increase has been driven predominantly by violent conflicts, with Syria being the recipient of 31% of all humanitarian assistance, though increasing displacement and crises induced by natural hazards also play a part.<sup>602</sup> Though humanitarian funding has increased year on year since 2013, funding for humanitarian responses has failed to keep pace with the dramatically escalating need. In 2015, there was a record shortfall of 45%, or US\$8.9 billion,<sup>603</sup> for UN appeals. The scale of humanitarian need is likely to continue to grow, and funding will struggle to meet these needs.

### New countries enter a funding landscape dominated by government contributions

The US\$28 billion of humanitarian funding in 2015<sup>604</sup> included contributions from government donors (which includes the European Union) as well as private donors (individuals, trusts, foundations, companies, corporations, and national societies).

## Funding and Unmet Requirements in USD billions



Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance report 2016


From 2011 to 2015, the vast majority of international humanitarian assistance contributions came from government donors, and in 2015, 97% (US\$21.0 billion) came from 20 government donors.<sup>605</sup> The United States was the largest contributor, accounting for 31.6% (almost US\$6.5 billion).<sup>606</sup> The United Kingdom, European countries and institutions, Canada, and Japan are other main contributors.

Despite the global financial crisis, funding from traditional donors has continuously increased since 2013. In 2015, OECD-DAC donations accounted for 88% (US\$19.2 billion)<sup>607</sup> of all global humanitarian funding given by governments in 2015. Non-DAC donors have substantially increased their humanitarian funding.<sup>608</sup> However, changes in OECD donors' aid policy could undermine this trend and mark a turning point in the way they manage and provide contributions. President Trump's proposal to cut the budget dedicated to US diplomacy and foreign aid by 28% in 2018 is

an indication of his administration's priorities, which could suggest that there will be a reversal in the trend of consistent increases in US contributions over the course of his term.<sup>609</sup> In addition to reductions in the overall amount, the way in which OECD donors provide funding could become more restrictive, aligned with their foreign policy interests, for example, the position of the new United Kingdom Secretary of State for International Development, who will promote a more "trade focused" vision for the attribution of development assistance funds.<sup>610</sup>

Though unlikely to equal the volume of OECD-DAC governments' contribution by 2030, new governmental donors are significantly increasing their financial commitments to humanitarian aid, growing it from 4% in 2006 to 12% in 2015.<sup>611</sup> New non-DAC donors are mostly from the Gulf States and North Africa. In 2015 these new donor countries contributed approximately US\$2.4

### Contributions by Donor Region (US\$ billion)




Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2016

billion, which was an increase of nearly 500% since 2011 due to multiple crises erupting in the Middle East.<sup>612</sup> From 2014 to 2015, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) increased its contribution by 193%, Kuwait by 86%, and Turkey rose to second place globally (donating US\$3.2 billion).<sup>613</sup> These three countries were also the main non-DAC contributors in terms of percentage of gross national income (GNI).<sup>614</sup> Funding from non-DAC donors is more likely to be given as bilateral aid between governments and is predominantly directed at crises in their region. Though the contribution of non-DAC states is increasing, it is an emerging trend, with growth in the proportion of government aid from the Gulf States and North Africa expected to continue to 2030. Considering the growing global humanitarian requirements and the protracted nature of crises in the Middle East, however, progress in some regions could be erratic.

Though 89% of funding from East Asia still came from Japan in 2015, the donor landscape is evolving in the Asian region.<sup>615</sup> China's average total assistance represents less than 0.1% of the country's GNI, as opposed to the 0.3% given annually by the 29 OECD-DAC countries. A rather prudent forecast suggests that

### International Humanitarian Assistance from Gulf States (main donors in US\$ billion)



Source: At a glance, Humanitarian policy of the Gulf States – European Parliament 2016

non-DAC contributions could account for US\$50 billion in aid by 2025, with China and India being the main contributors and East Asia being the main recipient.<sup>616</sup> China, India, and Russia have some of the highest levels of GNI globally,<sup>617</sup> but in 2015 none of these three countries ranked in the top 20 largest contributors of humanitarian aid. Considering rising global interest in humanitarian affairs and their slowly increasing contributions to aid, a further increase from China and India is likely by 2030, which could accelerate the shift in power balance between Western and non-Western funding actors.<sup>618</sup> Funding patterns are also likely to be further impacted, based on the evidence that non-DAC donors tend to prioritize high-profile crises or be oriented toward regional and chronic issues.<sup>619</sup>

While contributions from state donors might look significant, the difference between pledges, commitments, and actual funding can vary.<sup>620</sup> For instance, following the London Conference on the Syria crisis in early 2016, only US\$1.16 billion had been committed out of the US\$6 billion in pledges,<sup>621</sup> depriving the crisis of a significant portion of funding.

After the 2010 earthquake that struck Haiti, it was reported that only 63% of pledges had been allocated by the end of 2011. Only a few countries – Japan, Finland, Italy, Denmark, Russia, and Saudi Arabia – had fully disbursed their commitments.<sup>622</sup>

### Private contributors

The majority of private donors are individuals, trusts and foundations, companies and corporations, and national societies (this includes the Red Cross and Red Crescent national societies supporting governments locally). While the total amount contributed by private donors has fluctuated since 2010, private donors slightly increased their contributions to international humanitarian funding three years in a row, reaching an estimated US\$6.2 billion in 2015.<sup>625</sup> Individuals are by far the most important contributors of all private donors, with an average contribution of more than 60% of private funds between 2010 and 2014.

Although private donors tend to donate to natural disaster responses, in 2015, 75.5% (about US\$ 400 million) of all contributions went to the Syrian crisis.<sup>627</sup> The Nepal crisis was the second most donated to, amounting to 30% of all private contributions.

Mirroring the growth in trusts and foundations,<sup>628</sup> private companies have also been increasing their share of the funding space, contributing some of their profits to humanitarian causes. Despite the economic recession, a steady rise in private donations to the humanitarian sector over the last decade has been seen.<sup>629</sup> For example, TripAdvisor was one of the first companies to contribute to the European migrant crisis response – donating US\$250,000 to IRC and Mercy Corps, emailing users for donations and matching them, and allowing staff to take volunteering leaves.<sup>630</sup> In September 2016, the TripAdvisor Charitable Foundation pledged a further US\$5million over the next three years to the cause.<sup>631</sup> This example is part of a larger trend of private sector companies

### Remittances

While individuals are the most significant private funders of international assistance, the scale of support fed through the humanitarian system is dwarfed by the amount of money transferred to vulnerable communities through remittances. Though not included in metrics measuring humanitarian assistance, remittances from family members working abroad exceeded \$429 billion in 2015.<sup>141</sup> Though relatively stable in absolute amount, the growth rate of remittances is closely tied to the strength of the global economy and as a result can fluctuate. Given dynamics in migration and increased connectivity, their importance as a source of income in the developing world is unlikely to be diminished.


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getting involved in humanitarian responses (both financially and operationally), but it also sheds light on the changing methods of donating.

In consultations, round-table discussions, and commitments made at the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, the need for innovative financing approaches was emphasized and supported. The following were announced: a humanitarian impact bond, in which private investors make an initial investment into a humanitarian response program and are reimbursed, with a profit, by traditional donors only if certain outputs are met; an autonomous, global Islamic endowment fund for humanitarian needs; and finally, a private-sectorled initiative to increase risk financing in the most vulnerable countries. Hundreds of companies have also signed on to the Common Business Initiative (explored in the DRR section below) to improve coordination between the private and humanitarian sectors.<sup>632</sup> The history of private sector involvement in humanitarian aid to date suggests that these partnerships are steadily increasing and will continue to do so.

Technologies such as email and social media have made it easier than ever for individuals to donate to causes, and companies have used these platforms to bring attention to their philanthropic gestures and to the causes they choose to support. Crowdfunding, a newcomer to the humanitarian space, has allowed projects to be proposed and funded by the public. An example is the #HelpCalais campaign, set up by eight people in 2015 who sought to raise £1000 and ended up receiving £53,000 from 1,893 individuals all over the world.<sup>633</sup> Thanks to technology, donating to humanitarian causes is likely to become increasingly user-friendly and transnational, which could result in a reduction in the amount of funds that are passed through the international humanitarian system, as funds can be more easily sought by smaller, local, direct implementers or communities themselves.

## Private International Humanitarian Assistance by Donor Type, 2010–2014



Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2016

### Global funds, localized action

UN agencies receive most of donors' contributions (52% in 2014)<sup>634</sup> as the first-tier recipients and mostly rely on partners – second-tier recipients – for implementation. The vast majority of second-tier recipients are Western INGOs.<sup>635</sup>

Local and national NGOs have limited capacity to access institutional funds.<sup>636</sup> First-tier recipients tend to consider direct funding to local NGOs as a risk,<sup>637</sup> and the majority of local agencies lack the means to go through the grueling granting process. Nevertheless, in 2016 the UN committed to increasing the share of financing for local NGOs by 25%.<sup>638</sup>

The humanitarian funding landscape by 2030 is characterized by growing "competition" (rivalry over funding, combined with an imperative to join forces in consortia).

### Alternative funding sources

The START network is a global movement of INGOs harmonized in their efforts to accelerate crisis response.<sup>639</sup> One of the pillars of the START network is the START fund: a pooled fund aimed at providing quick response to "forgotten crises" and at enlarging funds for national and local NGOs. It provides needs-based, direct, and fast funding to NGOs for small-scale emergencies evolving out of traditional donor schemes. Less than one year after its launch (mid-2014), the START fund was able to reach 1,320,017 disaster-affected people through the funding of 29 projects in 12 different emergencies.<sup>640</sup> This initiative fits into a funding landscape that is increasingly needs- versus capacity-based.

As another example, since its creation in 1972, BRAC (Building Resources Across Communities, a development organization born in Bangladesh in 1972) has become one of the most important international NGOs, with more than 100,000 employees and US\$845 million of expenditure within a variety of sectors; it reached 138 million people in 2014.<sup>641</sup> BRAC represents an alternative model to institutional funding: it is almost self-funded through a network of local social enterprises, microcredits activities, and

investments mechanisms. In 2016, BRAC self-funded almost 88% of its expenditures.<sup>642</sup> The BRAC system sets interesting new standards for NGO operations' funding in a landscape where external contributions are the main power supply.

Another growing trend in the humanitarian funding space is the rise of faith-based NGOs and their associated foundations. These include, but are by no means limited to, the Islamic bank, faith-based funds, and the Zakat tradition.<sup>643</sup> The rise of faith-based humanitarian actors and the growth of religious communities worldwide, combined with the evolution of technology, which allows people across the globe to donate easily and quickly, means that funding mechanisms that are beyond institutional donors are likely to continue to play a role in humanitarian funding.

### Tomorrow is already here

Although the current DAC-driven paradigm of the aid donor landscape isn't likely to radically change by 2030, non-DAC donors have demonstrated their capacity to commit to humanitarian assistance, reshuffling the parameters of traditional donors' response. In some countries, non-DAC donors are already funding a significant portion of the overall response. For example, in Bangladesh in 2007, 70% of overall donor contributions were from non-DAC sources and in Yemen in 2008, over 80% of funds were from non-DAC donors.<sup>644</sup>



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# Principled Humanitarian Action And Advocacy

Humanitarian principles helped shape international humanitarian law and were devised to guide the work of humanitarian actors. These principles are:



## Key insights

1

The applicability of Dunantist humanitarian principles are challenged by non-Western cultures, private sector actors, and militaries -- all of which are increasingly involved in aid delivery.

2

Country and regional programming and advocacy will no longer be directed from Europe/North America; there will be a decentralization of INGOs toward more federated structures organized through alliances.

3

Private sector actors and the militarization of humanitarian action will challenge the application of humanitarian principles.

## Main trends

The Dunantist principles of humanitarian action will no longer be universal as Solidaristic, Wilsonian, Confucian, and other approaches become more present in the sector.

While relief organisations may be able to abide by Dunantist principles, organisations involved in long-term development may not.

The increasing role of private actors will undermine classical humanitarian principles to make way for arguments of efficiency, scale and reach.

Advocacy will be a prerogative of NGOs.

## Controversies

As most humanitarian organizations today are not able to operate entirely under Dunantist principles of impartiality, independence, neutrality and humanity, it is worth asking whether there is a need to debate humanitarian principles at all.

Sources: GSDRC, Abby Stoddard, Hugo Slim, Stuart Gordon & Antonio Donini, ODI, Parker.

# Principled Humanitarian Action and Advocacy

## Definition

How Dunantist humanitarian principles are applied and negotiated is evolving.

## Key insights

**Humanitarian principles will be altered by the integration of non-Dunantist cultures and different perspectives on humanitarianism.**

With the increasing role of non-traditional actors and donors, the role of Dunantist principles will be further minimized. The neutrality principle will be greatly eroded; the remaining humanitarian principles are likely to be complemented by alternative narratives of humanitarianism or new principles such as justice. Independence, impartiality, and humanity will continue to be part of the discourse but are more flexibly applied by a smaller proportion of actors in the space.

**Private sector actors and the militarization of humanitarian action will challenge the application of humanitarian principles.**

As the role for private sector and military actors grows in the humanitarian space, the relevance of the Dunantist principles and the safety that they provide INGOs will be continually undermined. Pragmatism will be prioritized (teleological reasoning over deontological), reframing how humanitarian agencies engage with these actors.

**Country and regional programming and advocacy will no longer be directed from Europe/North America; there will be a decentralization of INGOs toward more federated structures organized through alliances.**

Pushed by principles of subsidiarity, the governance structures of NGOs will become increasingly federalized, and the role of local NGOs will increase. Advocacy will be driven and articulated through alliances organized through shared approaches, principles, and priorities.

## Changes by 2030

**Increased complexity and decentralization: a challenge to universality of Dunantist principles**

The principles as recognized in the UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (1991) of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence have been put forward as guiding principles to respond to the needs and vulnerabilities of affected populations. The General Assembly resolution reinforced the narrative that these principles, founded on the work of Henry Dunant, are universally applicable.

The challenge to the “privileged position”<sup>645</sup> granted to Dunantist principles is not new. Complex crises coming to the fore at the end of the Cold War, the move by states to see humanitarian action as an extension of their own power, and the professionalization of the system as a reaction to the questioned legitimacy and

### Representing the Differing Approaches of Classicists (or Dunantists) and Solidarists

	Classicists	↔	Solidarists
Engagement with political authorities	Eschew public confrontations	↔	Advocate controversial public policy
Neutrality	Avoid taking sides	↔	Take the side of selected victims
Impartiality	Deliver aid using proportionality and nondiscrimination	↔	Skew the balance of resource allocation
Consent	Persue as sine qua non	↔	Override sovereignty as necessary

Source: Stoddard, A. (2003) Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and Trends, in Humanitarian Action and the “Global War on Terror”: A Review of Trends, Humanitarian Policy Group



effectiveness of the humanitarian sector have underpinned the elaboration of competing narratives that intensified in the 1990s. These challenges to the dominance of Dunantist principles, encapsulated by “new humanitarian”<sup>646</sup> approaches and driven by new styles of conflict and violence, will continue to underpin the debate between a deontological or teleological approach.<sup>647</sup> In addition to the diversity of approaches taken by the largest northern-based INGOs, the narrative of humanitarianism will be advanced by non-Western-centric approaches as the sector decentralizes and the balance of power shifts closer to the areas of operations. Principles of non-intervention in India,<sup>648</sup> the Confucian tradition embraced by Chinese NGOs, and a stronger Solidaristic tradition in Latin America<sup>649</sup> indicate the breadth of the principles that will shape global humanitarian action.

### Justice or relief: the challenge of multi-mandated organizations

Not only have the approaches of humanitarians to implement their mandate changed, but the scope of what humanitarians are expected to address has grown. The expansion of what is considered to be the prerogative of humanitarian organizations beyond “bed for the night humanitarianism,”<sup>650</sup> which focused on the charitable provision of lifesaving care to victims, has embroiled many humanitarian actors in the political sphere that the Dunantist principles were established to avoid.

“Humanitarian endeavor and political action must go their separate ways if the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian work are not to be jeopardized.”<sup>651</sup>

Though this political engagement is antithetical to Dunantist principles, the trend toward multi-mandate agencies (those that work on both relief and longer-term development) is well established. Such agencies look beyond the initial response to “development, conflict resolution, human rights and rehabilitation tasks,”<sup>652</sup> creating inevitable conflict between their objectives as they try to manage this alongside their emergency response.<sup>653</sup> Engagement in the political sphere to address the underlying causes of human vulnerability requires a focus on longer-term, more political objectives and, usually, the adoption of a rights-based narrative with a focus on justice and/or equality.

### New types of actors: diversification

A consequence of private sector actors increasing their role in the field<sup>654</sup> will be a significant weight added to the teleological schools of humanitarian principles, the result being that the discourse of consequentialist-based ethics could reinforce the challenges to the inefficiencies of NGOs in favour of private firms. The legitimacy of private sector actors who operate apart from the Dunantist principles would dramatically increase if “the legitimacy and value of humanitarian action is based strictly on deliverables and producing measurable outcomes – saving lives at the cheapest price.”<sup>655</sup> Private sector actors and social entrepreneurs could drive innovation to improve the efficacy of assistance. Given the attitude of many donors that there is a need for greater efficiency and the push for NGOs to justify their position as primary implementers,

the growth of the private sector will erode the principled approach that has defined the main actors in the sector.

The increasing role of private actors for whom principled action is not a strong or defining characteristic of their engagement in the sector will undermine the rationality and applicability of having guiding principles. Broader understandings of intention and consequentialist arguments of efficiency, scale, and reach could provide an added strand to the humanitarian narrative.

### Advocacy as a prerogative of NGOs

The weight given to advocacy<sup>656</sup> in an NGO is tied to its understanding of humanitarian principles. Exclusive advocacy organizations are a minority of the voice in the sector, as agencies that also implement programming are increasingly investing in this space, leveraging their programming to ground the legitimacy of their advocacy interventions. Advocacy can be used, as epitomized by organizations such as Oxfam, to advocate on behalf of the poor,<sup>657</sup> to draw attention to injustices and attempt to tackle the deficiencies in the underlying socioeconomic structures that result in vulnerability, or it can be tailored to focus exclusively on dimensions of access, as accords with a narrower humanitarian mandate. For international NGOs the weight accorded to advocacy could increase as their percentage share of direct implementation decreases; however, for those that continue to prioritize access and confidentiality over developing a more public voice, this trend could be less evident.

Advocacy will be a driving force toward a stronger networked approach from NGOs to increase the level of influence that can be wielded by the sector. Engagement in these networks will depend on the interest of NGOs and the degree to which shared advocacy objectives resonate with their mandate. Advocacy networks will be increasingly transversal between local, national, regional, and international NGOs.

### Controversies and debates

There is significant controversy over the need for a debate in humanitarian principles. While many organizations routinely affirm their commitment to Dunantist principles, others question their relevance for the sector, given the huge variation in their interpretation and application. In particular, the ability of agencies to be neutral is highly questioned. While it has never been expected that humanitarian agencies apply Dunantist principles universally and without some compromise, the ability of multi-mandate NGOs to claim to abide by Dunantist principles at all is disputed, given the level of influence that agendas distinct from a purely humanitarian motive have on many organizations.<sup>658</sup> Competing agendas can be grouped into three areas: the agenda of particular social movements that sponsor NGOs (e.g. trade unions), the agenda of states in advancing their political agendas through NGOs (e.g. a pull to a more Wilsonian approach), and the agenda of religious groups aligned with faith-based NGOs, each of which demonstrate some distortion in the system.<sup>659</sup>

Whether Dunantist principles will hold their primacy over a broader understanding of what constitutes principled humanitarian action that reflects the different agendas and approaches in the humanitarian sector is yet to be seen.

## Tomorrow is already here

- A Grand Bargain – continued controversy: There has long been controversy on the humanitarian/development nexus as to whether it is possible to align different strands of work, given the perception that there needs to be a greater distinction between the principled approach taken for solely needs-based interventions and more political and “state-centric development action.”<sup>660</sup> At the World Humanitarian Summit, a Grand Bargain was signed by 15 donors and 15 aid agencies. This elucidated the commitments that had been made toward reforming the humanitarian sector. One such commitment was to improve the link between the humanitarian and development fields to “use existing resources and capabilities better to shrink humanitarian needs over the long term with the view of contributing to the outcomes of the Sustainable Development Goals ... This will need to be the focus not only of aid organisations and donors but also of national governments at all levels, civil society, and the private sector.”<sup>661</sup> This highlights the continuing controversy surrounding the application of principles.
- The Wilsonian agenda: The intersection of foreign policy with the humanitarian sector has in many ways already eroded the notion of aid based on need alone and the impartiality of actors implementing programming. Since the primary funding streams for humanitarian aid are through institutional donors, funding regularly comes with conditions that align to the priorities of the funding states. The investments of international donors are seen more through the perspective of what is strategic for donor states rather than principled action. This is exemplified by the focus of funding in Afghanistan after the coalition invasion in 2001:

“In 2002 nearly half of all funds given by donor governments to the UN’s 25 appeals for assistance went to Afghanistan. If funding decisions were based solely on need, then places like Sudan, Congo, northern Uganda, and Angola would leapfrog to the top of the list.”<sup>662</sup>
- Advocacy networks: There are numerous groups, such as START in London and Interaction in Washington, D.C., as well as NEAR in Nairobi, that operate as networks for coordinating advocacy.

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