



---

# Humanitarian Diplomacy and International Crisis Management

---

PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ORGANIZED  
BY THE FRENCH FOUNDATION OF THE ORDER OF MALTA

27-28 JANUARY 2011 AT UNESCO

PARTNER



---

# Humanitarian Diplomacy and International Crisis Management

---

PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ORGANIZED  
BY THE FRENCH FOUNDATION OF THE ORDER OF MALTA

27-28 JANUARY 2011 AT UNESCO

---

# HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT

---

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

Translated by Susannah Bayley

## PREFACE

**A**lthough the debate over relations between “humanitarians, diplomats, civilians and the military” is not a recent one, the “duty to intervene” and the “responsibility to protect” have opened the field to what some now call “humanitarian diplomacy”.

Since the military operations in Iraq, and even more so since the conflicts in Afghanistan, Darfur and the Sahel, the crisis resolution question has been in constant evolution. This has had a considerable knock-on effect on the debate on relations between military, diplomatic and humanitarian actors on the ground. Humanitarian organizations, the media, major multinational corporations, private security companies and non-state actors all now have a role to play in the institutional sector, raising questions on how these actors, whose objectives are often incompatible, cohabit, cooperate and integrate teams in the field.

Many sources of contradiction on the ground arise from the missions assigned to the armed forces today – the pursuit of peace, humanitarian assistance, “nation building” – and the first victims of these are civilian populations and humanitarian personnel.

The challenges the world must face today, whether they be the result of local or international armed conflict, major pandemics, human rights violations, major migratory movements, the struggle against corruption, terrorism or different forms of criminality, or the result of natural disasters and environmental degradation, can no longer be managed through inter-state diplomacy alone. Western governments are therefore looking to respond to these challenges by integrating all the political, military and humanitarian means available to them, and are increasingly delegating their authority, together with considerable financial resources, to multilateral organizations and international NGOs thereby using the humanitarian arena.

Over the last 20 years, those involved have become increasingly aware of their interdependence and their reciprocal relationships. Many attempts at harmonization have been made, but these have failed to produce a valid universal model, given the very specific nature of each unfolding crisis.

If we wish to achieve a sustainable form of crisis zone regulation, an entirely new approach is now required.

It is with this objective in mind that the Order of Malta and the French Navy, institutions that share many of the same concerns, chose to organize this conference bringing together international representatives from the major military and civil institutions, and more specifically those engaged in humanitarian actions, to delineate the practices and principles of action that should be adopted by the different operational actors, and to define together the ultimate objectives and the ethics of these actions.



**The Bailiff Jean-Pierre Mazery**

Grand Chancellor of the Sovereign Military  
Order of St. John of Jerusalem of Rhodes  
and of Malta



**Admiral Pierre-François Forissier**

Chief of Staff of the French Navy

# TABLE OF CONTENT

Thursday 27 January 2011

## WELCOME ADDRESS .....P.10

- **Bailiff Jean-Pierre MAZERY**, Grand Chancellor of the Sovereign Order of Malta

## OPENING REMARKS .....P.14

- **Ms. Irina BOKOVA**, Director-General of UNESCO
- **Admiral Pierre-François FORISSIER**, Chief of Staff of the French Navy

## MAJOR OBSERVATIONS AND NEW ACTORS

Round table 1:

## THE NEW STRATEGIC INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT .....P.26

- **Mr. Louis MICHEL**, European Deputy, former Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, former European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid
- **His Excellency Msgr. Francesco FOLLO**, Permanent Observer of the Holy See to UNESCO and the Latin Union
- **Rear Admiral Jean DUFOURCQ**, Editor-in-Chief of the French journal “Revue Défense Nationale”, former member of the CAP (Analysis and Forecasting Centre) at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, former member of France’s permanent representation in Brussels and at the NATO Defense College in Rome
- **Ms. Nicole GNESOTTO**, professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers (CNAM) (European Union Chair); former Director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies
- **Professor Mounir BOUCHENAKI**, Director General of the international Center for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM)

Round table 2:  
**WHAT HAS CHANGED IN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT?  
HOW DO THE DIFFERENT STAKEHOLDER GROUPS  
INTERACT? .....P.41**

- **Major General Claudio GRAZIANO**, Cabinet leader at the Italian Ministry of Defense, former Commander of UNIFIL in Lebanon
- **Mr. Philippe LECLERC**, Representative in France to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR)
- **Lieutenant General Xavier BOUT de MARNHAC**, Leader of the European Union “Rule of Law” mission in Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo, former Commander of the KFOR
- **Ms. Angela GUSSING**, Deputy Director of Global Operations at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

## **LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FIELD**

Round table 3:  
**WHAT IS EFFECTIVE IN THE FIELD AND WHERE ARE THE  
FAILURES?  
WHERE DO THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF INSTITUTIONAL,  
POLITICAL, MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN ACTORS AND THE  
MEDIA REALLY LIE? .....P.69**

- **Mr. Rashid KHALIKOV**, Director of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Geneva
- **Vice-Admiral Xavier MAGNE**, Deputy Chief of Staff of the French Navy for “Operations”, former Commander of “Operation Baliste” in Lebanon (2006-2008)
- **Ambassador Pierre DUQUESNE**, Ambassador for Economic Reconstruction and Development at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Reconstruction of Haiti (ICRH)

- **Mr. Alain BOINET**, Director General and founding member of “Solidarités International”, former President of the Strategic Council for Emergency Humanitarian Aid at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Round table 4:

**CRISIS MANAGEMENT:  
GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND ETHICS .....P.90**

- **Ambassador Régis KOETSCHET**, Head of the Civil Society Relationships Mission at the General Directorate of Globalization, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, former Ambassador in Afghanistan
- **Mr. Peter ZANGL**, Director General of the European Commission’s General Directorate for Humanitarian Affairs and Civil Protection (ECHO)
- **Mr. Michel VEUTHEY**, Vice-President of the International Institute for Humanitarian Law
- **Mr. Ingo RADTKE**, Secretary General of Malteser International, worldwide relief agency of the Sovereign Order of Malta

*Film:* Missions of the French Navy in support of the populations of Lebanon and Haiti

**CONCLUSIONS OF THE DAY .....P.109**

- **Admiral Jacques LAUNAY**, General Inspector of the French Navy



Friday 28 January 2011

## TOWARDS A NEW FORM OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Round table 5 :

WHAT FORMS OF COORDINATION, PARTNERSHIP OR  
INTEGRATION SHOULD WE BE ASPIRING TO?  
HOW BEST TO USE THE MEDIATION TOOLS

AVAILABLE TO US? ..... P.115

- **General Patrick de ROUSIERS**, Air Force General, General Inspector of the Armed Forces at the French Ministry of Defense
- **Ambassador Omar HILALE**, Morocco's permanent representative to the United Nations and other international organizations in Geneva
- **Mr. Laurent THOMAS**, Director of Emergency and Rehabilitation Operations at the FAO, Rome
- **Michael BITTRICK**, Deputy Director of the Office of regional and Security Affairs at the US State Department's Africa Bureau
- **Mr. Benoît MIRIBEL**, Director General of Fondation Mérieux, President of Action contre la Faim (ACF)

CLOSING SESSION AND SUMMARY ..... P.143

- **Ambassador Pierre MOREL**, the European Union's Special Representative to Central Asia and for the crisis in Georgia

CONCLUSIONS ..... P.154

- **Ms. Kristalina GEORGIEVA**, European Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response
- **Admiral Edouard GUILLAUD**, French Armed Forces Chief of Defense Staff
- **HMEH Frà Matthew FESTING**, Grand Master of the Sovereign Order of Malta

Thursday 27 January 2011

---

# WELCOME ADDRESS

---

**Bailiff Jean-Pierre MAZERY**

Grand Chancellor of the Sovereign Order of Malta

Messeigneurs,  
Admiral and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces,  
Admiral and Chief of Staff of the French Navy,  
Director-General Bokova,  
Excellencies,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Order of Malta is reputed for its discretion. For many years now, we have adopted Msgr. Rodain's motto: *le bruit ne fait pas de bien, le bien ne fait pas de bruit* (in fame there is no virtue, in virtue there is no fame). We are, however, proud of what we do, and I would like to remind you of our main overseas activities and achievements, as the sessions that will follow will have a largely international focus.

On an operational level the Order of Malta is, by virtue of its numerous national associations and foundations, essentially an extremely professional, global and largely decentralized international institution providing medical and health care assistance and emergency aid. Its 13,000 members, all volunteers, its 80,000 permanent volunteers and its qualified medical personnel made up of 20,000 doctors, nurses, health care assistants and first-aid and ambulance workers form an exceptional network. Its humanitarian programs – often implemented through cooperation agreements with governments or international agencies – are currently running in 120 countries throughout the world.

The Order therefore supports or directly manages hundreds of clinics, 40 hospitals, 30 ambulance services, 110 specialized retirement homes for dependent elderly people, and is involved in the provision of training to thousands of nurses throughout the world and many ambulance workers. Malteser International – the Order of Malta's worldwide relief corps – is currently running 200 projects in 20 countries in Africa, Asia, America, the Balkans and Central and Eastern Europe.

In France, the Oeuvres Hospitalières de l'Ordre de Malte or the Ordre de Malte France runs establishments for the physically and mentally handicapped and for the autistic, as well as retirement homes for dependent elderly people. Overseas, they run many hospitals, maternities, clinics, community health centers, and treat victims of leprosy and AIDS in particular, mainly in Africa, but also in Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Ecuador, Brazil, India, Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. I must also give a special mention to the Association Malte Liban in Lebanon.

Sovereign subject to international law, the Order is, by vocation, a neutral, impartial

and non-political *sui generis* institution, independent of all states, governments and organizations throughout the world and not in pursuit of any political or economic agenda. The Order maintains diplomatic relations at Ambassador-level with 104 states and with the European Commission. It has permanent observer missions to the United Nations in New York, Geneva, Vienna, Rome and Paris. From one side of the planet to the other, its members and volunteers fulfill cooperation agreements and are sometimes called upon to carry out discreet but effective humanitarian mediations due to the prestige and respect bestowed upon the organization by the international community. Its legal status guarantees its independence and autonomy, and protects it from all external influence and coercion.

This conference on “Humanitarian Diplomacy” is taking place at a key moment in the evolution of international and humanitarian crises; withdrawal from Iraq, intervention in Afghanistan, radical developments in Sudan, but also Haiti’s earthquake and the flooding in Pakistan and now in Australia.

Moreover, preventative diplomacy has given rise to new forms of diplomacy through intercultural dialogue and through the role played by the different religions in the great majority of modern conflicts.

The multiplication and prolongation of the many different types of crisis – many of which continue perpetually without ever achieving resolution – requires a new and multi-disciplinary reflection, taking into consideration not only the humanitarian perspective, but also that of military, political, and economic actors as well as opinion formers, historians, geographers, the religious and educational communities and civil society in general.

Each contributor in such an approach must maintain their own identity and function. There are circumstances in which humanitarian organizations are powerless, and they must be able to recognize this, but there are also tasks which can only be accomplished by humanitarians alone.

It is with this objective in mind that the Order of Malta and the French Navy decided to organize this conference bringing together international representatives from the major military and civil institutions, and more specifically those engaged in humanitarian actions, to determine the practices and principles of action that should be adopted by the different actors on the ground.

Allow me now to take this opportunity to extend my particular thanks to Admiral Pierre-François Forissier, Chief of Staff of the French Navy, and his cabinet, for having accepted the challenge that Reserve Captain Xavier Guilhou

and I, with support from the President of the French Association of the Order of Malta, Dominique de la Rochefoucauld and the President of l'Ordre de Malte France, Thierry de Beaumont Beynac, presented to him several years ago to organize a gathering of the major international stakeholders engaged in humanitarian actions in the field. Thank you for your confidence, Admiral, and thank you to your staff for their availability, their kindness and their competency.

I would like to welcome Admiral Guillaud, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and take advantage of his presence here today to offer our gratitude to the French Armed Forces, summoned to the front line anywhere in the world at any time to protect the citizens of France, but also to come to the assistance of local populations in danger, for the technical and logistics support they have provided when it was most needed.

I would like to express our utmost gratitude to Madame Bokova, Director-General of UNESCO, for having agreed to hold this conference at the prestigious UNESCO headquarters. The universal vocation of the United Nations and its major agencies to promote peace and safeguard human dignity is at the heart of our actions.

I thank you, Madame Director-General, for having allowed us to tackle the crucial question of the relations between diplomatic, humanitarian and military actors in surroundings to which discussions on the “interculturality” so dear to Monseigneur Follo are more than familiar. We hope also to be able to respond to some of the concerns expressed recently at the UNESCO General Conference; the need for a reinforcement of the coordination of humanitarian and emergency aid, an improvement in the security of humanitarian workers and better planning of international relief operations during major natural disasters. Furthermore, we hope to be able to develop our cooperation with the different UNESCO Services, and now also with ICCROM, notably in the protection of cultural and religious heritage.

---

# OPENING REMARKS

---

**Irina BOKOVA**

Director-General of UNESCO

Your Excellency, Grand Chancellor of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta,  
Sir, Chief of Staff of the French Navy,  
Your Excellency, Ambassador Ugo Leone, Permanent Observer of the Sovereign  
Order of Malta to UNESCO,  
Your Excellency, Msgr. Francesco Follo, Permanent Observer of the Holy See to  
UNESCO and the Latin Union,  
Excellencies,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Welcome to UNESCO.

Today, our headquarters are entirely at your disposal, and I am most grateful for the confidence you have placed in us.

The decision to host the conference here is not an insignificant one. Three particular premises for such a decision strike me particularly.

- The first is that we are convinced at UNESCO that managing modern-day crises calls for the mobilization of a multiplicity of disciplines, and not simply conventions of a military and legal nature. Crises are crises only because they affect human lives, the lives of children, women and men. The response therefore must also be formulated at this level. It is entirely symbolic then that an event such as this be organized at UNESCO, an impartial, universal and human space, rather than under the auspices of a military or economic authority.
- The second relates to the importance of culture and heritage in modern crises. Culture is sometimes used as a weapon of war. It is also powerful in “softening the blow” and an accelerating factor in the reconstruction phase. It is what I would call, to quote the title of the book by Professor Payot, the *guerre des ruines* or *the géopolitique du patrimoine* (the war of the ruins, or the geopolitics of archaeology).
- The third and final premise is the very great distinction of the participants invited to share their experiences. I have seen the program, and the human contribution is unbelievably rich, with men and women with operational experience who will bring us valuable feedback from their experiences on the front lines.

The way in which we manage crises tells us much about ourselves and the way in which we perceive reality. In this way, a “crisis” always reveals some form

of truth or knowledge. It elucidates our vision of the foundations of a society, and that which we believe should be defended as a priority: the buildings, the infrastructure, the people that live in them. Over time, major efforts have been made to end crises using military or diplomatic means. The major risk was, for a long time, armed conflict. The United Nations system was founded partly on the idea that the force of the law could be applied to make war “illegal”. At UNESCO, we are constantly reminded of this military dimension, I walk past the Ecole Militaire every day on my way to work... I can assure you that there is no better memory jogger.

The evolution and emergence of new forms of crisis, however, calls for the mobilization of skills and abilities far beyond those offered by military and diplomatic actors alone. Firstly, because we are seeing fewer and fewer inter-state conflicts, and increasing numbers of regional struggles. Secondly, because the lines are no longer linear; there is a blurring of the boundaries between civil and military actors. This situation calls for diverse competencies. Increasingly, civil society competencies must be integrated to reinstate crucial networks destroyed by natural disasters or armed conflicts; roads, energy networks, etc. The “Culture of Peace” concept conceived by UNESCO represents an important step in this direction as it defines peace not as the outcome of an agreement between states, but as part of a global culture, an integral part of the behavior of the individuals that make up a society. Modern-day crises also result from natural disasters, flooding, drought, migration, cultural diversity, the poor management of water resources.

Putting an end to the fighting though is not enough, nor is the call to dialogue; the conditions for reconciliation must also be established.

For this to be possible, a detailed analysis of the educational, cultural and scientific assets of a society is necessary to be able to support populations in need. In many cases, emerging from a crisis is entirely dependent on the continuity of education and on the protection of a society’s cultural and scientific structures, factors which can, to an extent, soften the impact on the population and accelerate the reconstruction process. There must be no hesitation, investment in these areas is necessary from the very start of a crisis.

On March 1<sup>st</sup> we will launch the 2011 Global “Education for All” Monitoring Report in New York. Its theme is exactly that, the impact of conflict on education. Crises do not affect infrastructure or school buildings alone. They also destroy the hopes and ambitions of the youngest members of a population. The process must start here. In Afghanistan, we are running one of the largest programs in our history, 35 million dollars to teach 300,000 women and men to



read and write across the entire country. In Iraq, we have set up literacy training centers. UNESCO is working in Gaza on the emergency re-establishment of secondary and further education.

Education is at the heart of UNESCO's actions in natural disaster situations. Take Haiti, take Pakistan: children must be able to continue with their schooling; they must have access to books, and teachers must continue to receive training, even when the country has been devastated. I would even go as far as to say particularly when the country is in the midst of a crisis, because these children will be the ones required to rebuild it.

Education, culture and the sciences are not luxuries to be dealt with as secondary priorities once peace has been re-established. The opposite is true: we must invest in these areas early, right from the start of the crisis if we wish to see the situation improve. Clearly, cooperation between many professions, civil engineers, teachers, scientists is required to achieve this. We must engage experts and expertise from around the world in dialogue to produce a detailed analysis of the regions concerned, in the Mediterranean, in Africa, in Asia. There can be little doubt that there is no better place to do this than at UNESCO.

All these different elements are interconnected. UNESCO's aspiration to marry several disciplines is entirely consistent with this idea. We would like our experience in the fields of education, science and culture to provide part of the solutions to the problems presented by these international crises.

This morning is also, for me, a chance to call attention to the fact that each time a crisis erupts, whether it is a natural disaster or a conflict situation, culture is always a target of choice. I am thinking of Sarajevo, where belligerents hit out at books, libraries, street signs to shake the very foundations of community life. I am also thinking of the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in Afghanistan, and what of the destruction of the museums of Kabul and Baghdad? Roofs bombed, windows vandalized, collections ransacked...

Nothing is more symbolic of the respect between nations than the way in which one country treats the cultural heritage of another. Attacking cultural symbols marks an escalation in violence. It accelerates the moral dislocation of societies, seeking to wound people by targeting that which is dearest to them and that which runs the deepest.

Crisis-affected societies are naturally vulnerable to looters who exploit human misery. We are seeing it in Iraq, but also in Haiti. We were forced to act extremely rapidly to do our best to halt the illegal trafficking of works of art. In Iraq, the melting pot of Mesopotamian civilization, 15,000 objects were lost from the

Baghdad Museum, one of the richest in the world. 5,000 have so far been recovered. Is this cultural hemorrhage really unavoidable?

Cultural property differs from other assets: it is the guarantor of memory and of individual and collective identity. When the history of a people is interrupted by a major crisis, culture can help that population to reinstate this historical continuity. This is UNESCO's entire reason for being.

This cultural aspect needs to be given greater consideration in crisis management. Just as an attack on culture marks a significant step in the degradation of a crisis, its protection can be a powerful instrument to accelerate the emergence out of it. As early as 1954, the Hague Convention laid down the principle for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. The 1970 UNESCO convention was a decisive victory against the illegal trafficking of cultural property in times of peace. Since then, we have been working with Interpol, UNIDROIT, customs and police authorities in a number of countries and museum professionals (ICOM), and protection and restoration professionals (ICCROM) to limit this looting, restore damaged or dispersed cultural property and return stolen works of art and masterpieces which are the essence and the expression of the genius of a population.

The World Heritage Convention is another important tool at the service of peace. The inscription on the World Heritage List of more and more sites that are situated on borders between several countries is proof that culture can be a factor in regional cohesion and stability. The reconstruction of the Mostar Bridge in Bosnia Herzegovina is another example of reconciliation through culture. The Preah Vihear Temple may also accelerate the reconciliation between Cambodia and Thailand. I have talked about culture, but I could clearly give numerous examples in the spheres of education, science and communication: taking these dimensions into consideration considerably changes the way crises are managed.

UNESCO has the reputation of an "intellectual" UN agency. There is some truth in this. However, for an idea to exist, it must also be translatable into reality. It is by obtaining results that we are able to convince others. All my work is oriented towards this goal. Clearly, it is more difficult, more complex, but it is necessary and it is inevitable.

Building peace is also learning to move from the theory to the action. The women and men that you are going to hear today are first and foremost women and men from the field, those commanding the theaters of operations. In my

experience, this often guarantees debates of an exceptionally high quality. This international conference is the result of three years of preparation. I thank all those who have made it possible and I hope you all have an excellent day.

---

# OPENING REMARKS

---

**Admiral Pierre-François FORISSIER**  
Chief of Staff of the French Navy

Director-General Bokova,  
Excellency,  
Messeigneurs,  
Distinguished Ambassadors,  
General Officers,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Gone are the days of bipolarity when nations watched over passively while one or other of the major powers maintained law and order, as it saw fit, within its own geographical zone of influence. Now, just as the crises themselves are extensive and diverse, their management requires the engagement of diverse responses and actors.

Since the end of the Cold War, traditional interstate confrontation has been replaced by peacekeeping or peacemaking operations, for which the use of force is just one of a number of integrated strategies implemented to return to a situation of normality.

Military action today is set in a new context in which armed intervention and civil action are increasingly interwoven, a world in which diplomacy and humanitarian action have become the preferred vehicles to “conquer hearts and minds”. A maritime arena in which diplomacy which previously took the form of the gunboat, brutally imposing the will of the strong onto the weak, has been replaced by a humanitarian diplomacy that has developed significantly over the last few years.

The debate over the relations between humanitarians, diplomats, civilians and the military is not a new one. But, set against a constantly evolving strategic backdrop and the development of accessible means of communication that are open to all, recent conflicts have demonstrated the extent to which reconciling the visions, practices and interventions of the many actors involved in the crisis response is challenging. There is no doubt, a new approach is called for today. The aim of this seminar is to help us to question our principles of action and the solutions we may be able to provide, with, I would be so bold as to say, the scrutiny of the night watchman who keeps a close eye out for developments in our world, quick to distinguish new landmarks.

First and foremost, I would like to thank Madame Bokova, Director-General of UNESCO, who has offered us such a warm welcome. Thanks to you Madame, this privileged space that encourages dialogue between civilizations, cultures and populations offers us an impartial venue, free from all prejudice. This neutrality

is a superb opportunity! It is sure to enhance the quality of our discussions and the objectivity of our debates.

I would also like to welcome the senior civil and military figures, from France and overseas, who have honored us with their presence here today. They have agreed to enlighten us with their testimonies and to share their experiences and I would like to offer them my greatest thanks.

The Order of Malta, through its exceptional humanitarian and diplomatic experience, but also in the universal nature of its operations, plays an important role alongside states and the major international institutions. The Order of Malta and the French Navy have a long history together, and the two institutions share real expertise in crisis management. I am delighted to have this opportunity to compare and contrast our experiences and viewpoints.

Before leaving the floor to the multitude of experts that are in our midst, I would like to leave you with one or two thoughts.

“Humanitarian Diplomacy and International Crisis Management”, despite its simple formulation, this theme in reality hides many perspectives...

Let's take “humanitarianism” firstly. Are any ideals truly still associated with this word today! A victim of its own success, it is used indiscriminately to designate any action that benefits a population in a crisis situation, but it voluntarily confuses political action, the securitization of a zone, military operations, economic stimulus, generous impulses, reconstruction etc. Although each one of these actions is legitimate, useful and complementary, we have to accept that they are not all humanitarian. We will have the opportunity to come back to this question.

Next, the crisis: It is composed of a myriad of different elements, from the most tangible to the most unconscious, the most manageable to the most irrational, requiring the mobilization and implementation of an immense range of resources and the invention of a multitude of actions. Ultimately, we are forced to admit that by their very nature, crises can be neither avoided nor managed, but rather that they can instruct us how to anticipate better and how to adapt.

In fact, this is the very heart of our debate: how best to coordinate our actions? How best to federate the efforts of all the stakeholders present on the ground? How to strengthen strategies for a return to normality while respecting international law and the interests of the populations? These are among the many challenges we are all facing.

The White Paper on Defense and National Security, commissioned by France's President to determine the strategic direction and the resources required by the nation at the beginning of this, the 21<sup>st</sup> century reminds us that: "the complex nature of international crises forces us to define strategies integrating all the diplomatic, financial, civil, cultural and military instruments available to us, both in the crisis prevention and management phases themselves, as well as in the stabilization and reconstruction phases that follow a conflict."

This is also our experience; theaters of operations are, it is true, now occupied by numerous parties. But confusion over the relations between civil populations, governments, non-profit organizations, the media, non-governmental organizations, commercial organizations, volunteers and even private military companies, proves that it is not easy to establish harmonious cooperation in the field. Even less so when the adversary of today is destined to become the partner of tomorrow, and when this partner must be integrated into the conflict resolution process...

Moreover, the heavy involvement of the armed forces in humanitarian actions can also generate an often evoked risk: that of the confusion over roles.

However, although it is true that developments in conflicts have led the French military to bestow greater importance on actions of a humanitarian nature, its primary mission remains nevertheless to protect France's interests permanently and to contribute, wherever necessary, to the security and the defense of our fellow citizens.

The French Navy is responsible for all actions related to the defense and security of air and naval space and operations originating from these zones. In a context where globalization and the economic crisis are increasing strategic uncertainty, it maintains a vigilant and active presence across all the oceans of the globe. It therefore offers France a capacity of action in line with its aspirations both in terms of defense and foreign policy.

When crisis strikes navy battleships and aircrafts are very often the first to arrive on the scene. In an international setting, they intervene in partnership, in addition or in support to the forces and humanitarian organizations already present on the ground.

The Navy's Projection and Command Ships such as *Tonnerre*, *Mistral* and soon *Dixmude*, are equipped with an extremely wide range of multi-purpose equipment. They are capable of deploying ground and air forces from sea onto land

and supporting and commanding them. They can also perform evacuations, assist populations in countries in crisis or contribute to the reconstruction of crisis-ravaged zones.

The ocean, which is too often perceived as a border, is in fact a vast territorial continuity. Given its international status and the pre-positioning of its resources, the French Navy is able to intervene with extreme rapidity in any corner of the globe. On a simple order from the Government, this position can be modified, and the entire deployment withdrawn in a matter of a few hours.

The 2010 Haiti Earthquake Operation is a good example of this. The *Batral Francis Garnier* and the Landing Craft *Siroco* were used to transport more than 2,500 tons of humanitarian freight, around one hundred soldiers and nearly 60 earth-moving vehicles to Haiti. The *Siroco* also dedicated its medical platform to the relief effort, with two surgical blocks and 50 hospital beds manned by armed forces health care personnel.

The French Navy is also engaged, with other European navies, in the anti-piracy operation in the Indian Ocean. One of the mission's objectives is to provide protection to ships chartered by the World Food Program. I will not dwell on the nature of these interventions as I am sure you will come back to them during the conference. I will however add that they perfectly illustrate how, in an integrated maritime policy, civil and military means must support each other. They equally illustrate how our naval means cannot be considered in isolation, but only as part of the crucial synergy created by pooling the resources of all the armies, and taking into consideration the need for interoperability between the national and international forces present in the crisis zone.

The principles of humanitarian diplomacy are not new. In 1841, in the midst of the Levant crisis, the Minister of the Navy and Colonies, referring to the fate of the Cretan insurgents, expressed his orders to the Commander of *La Minerve* in the following terms: "I do not need to remind you that when it comes to saving the outlaws, or defending the vanquished from the vengeance of the vanquisher, [...] humanity has rights that cannot, for any reason, be cast aside"<sup>1</sup>.

Today however, we have entered a new era that is far from that of the "pitched battle". I have mentioned them briefly; many factors multiply the difficulties in managing modern-day crises.

Although it would be fanciful to imagine that a unique framework can be

1 - Patrick R – *La marine française et la sécurité des chrétiens du Levant au XIXème siècle (1815 – 1878)* – French version quoted by Olivier COUTEAU-BEGARIE – *Le meilleur des ambassadeurs* – Economica – Paris 2010 - p.33



established providing simple, clear responses. We must however continue to reflect upstream of our commitments, cognizant that the collective approach is the only viable one.

There then are some thoughts I wanted to share with you in introduction to the debates that will follow which will, I believe, be of an extremely high caliber.

---

# MAJOR OBSERVATIONS AND NEW ACTORS

---

## **ROUND TABLE 1**

The new strategic international context

**Alain Ménargues**, special correspondent, former Director of Information at Radio France International (RFI), former correspondent for Radio France in Beirut from 1982 to 1995

This first round table, dedicated to an analysis of the humanitarian situation today, takes us straight to the heart of the matter.

Today, more than five hundred NGOs and humanitarian organizations are working in Haiti. Treading on toes, coordination difficulties, national rivalry... the humanitarian context has become extraordinarily complex. Crisis management has become increasingly complicated with the emergence of a sometimes splintered civil society, the contracting of private military companies, access to the internet etc. At the same time, international law is struggling to find its place. The concept of sovereignty is a fluctuating one, governments are failing, international organizations are struggling to assert themselves and new NGOs are born with every new crisis. We are left with a disturbing impression of confusion and sometimes even inefficiency, like that expressed in reports broadcast on the first anniversary of the Haiti earthquake.

To discuss this question, we have five distinguished specialists with us.

- **Mr. Louis Michel**, former European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Minister, Senator, Foreign Minister and Vice-President in two successive governments. He is best known however to the Congolese as *Kabilou* for the role he played in bringing peace to the Great Lakes region. Considered as a great master of negotiation, a key element in crisis resolution, he has said: "Mediation is a constant task. You must be ready to make hundreds of telephone calls to Brussels to resolve questions which are sometimes little more than details." And the devil, as we know, is in the details. He adds: "People believe in good faith that, in international institutions, things can move very quickly, they are talking about things they know little about."

- **Rear Admiral Jean Dufourcq**, former submarine Commander and doctor in political science, is a researcher at Paris' *Ecole Militaire* and Editor-in-Chief of the French military publication *Revue Défense Nationale*. A free thinker, he is an essential contributor to think tanks on international crisis management. In his opinion, negotiation today requires "a new tool kit" with new words and concepts tailored to the new, modern-day, global challenges we are facing. He maintains that the meanings of the words we use today – friend, ally, adversary, competitor, enemy, threat, risk, danger – are not the same for all concerned and have shifted over time. Equally, and let us be honest, they are also often manipulated by communication specialists. He believes the strange

defeat we have to fear at the beginning of this, the 21<sup>st</sup> century, is that of strategic thinking.

- **Ms. Nicole Gnesotto**, titular professor of European Union, Institution and Policy studies at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers (CNAM), having formerly been a researcher at the Paris Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po) and at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), was the very first Director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies. European security is now her profession and she is one of the most reputed specialists in the field. It was because she was asked one day to write a paper on French pacifism that she was introduced to the security issues that have now become her hallmark. She has never had direct operational responsibilities, but this sharp mind's work on strategy and analysis offers us an invaluable forward-looking vision of the immediate challenges.

- **Mr. Mounir Bouchenaki**, trained historian, very quickly became interested in world heritage. He became involved to the point of setting up museums such as those in Beirut and Tripoli (he worked on the Tripoli project for twenty years), of saving monuments in Cambodia, in Tyre, and in Mostar in former Yugoslavia. Cultural heritage is part of a population's material identity. A population without cultural identity is a population in escheat. It was Mr. Bouchenaki himself who managed the crisis triggered by the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan. Former Director of Cultural Heritage at UNESCO, he is saddened by the fact that a profound and latent crisis is underway in cultural heritage and that no one seems particularly concerned about it.

- **His Excellency Msgr. Francesco Follo**, Permanent Observer of the Holy See to UNESCO and doctor in philosophy at the Pontifical Gregorian University. He was successively a journalist at the Jesuit magazine *Letture* and Deputy Director of the weekly publication *Vita cattolica*. He is notably, however, a renowned specialist of inter-faith dialogue, and faith is an often important factor in a crisis.

Mr. Michel, you have stated that humanitarian action should pave the way for political dialogue that will bring about political solutions. What exactly do you mean by that?

**Louis Michel**, *European Deputy, Former Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, former European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid*

Very often we observe that humanitarian crises are even more serious and distressing when they occur in a country, or region, with a failing government. By

definition, the starting point for all humanitarian crisis preparation must be government consolidation. Haiti is the most glaring example; the absence of an effective government is significantly aggravating the situation.

Moreover, what is missing in a global world is what Jacques Attali refers to as the *Etat monde* or Super state. The only global public authority that exists today is the United Nations. For this reason, its reform is at the heart of the answer to these questions. The United Nations, bearer of universal values, is today the most effective instrument available to us. I believe deeply in this institution which is a unique melting pot for all these shared values. The complexity of the United Nations reform is partly the fault of the institution itself. Responsibility also lies however with its members and their reluctance to provide the resources required for the work we expect it to do. There is no doubt for example, that in Rwanda in 1995, the mandate that was given to the armed forces was totally insufficient, a far cry from that which was required to meet the mission's requirements. There is no need to revisit this tragedy today.

The United Nations reform is a necessary and urgent step. I was asked by Kofi Annan to sit on a high-level panel to present reform proposals which ultimately produced an interesting development. Progress has been made recently with the so called "One United Nations", which is a much more coordinated and coherent grouping of the different agencies and actors. This problem must be addressed. We cannot reflect on humanitarian action without also reflecting on this question.

Lastly, I believe that another question must be addressed. Who are the actors engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance? There are the diplomats, and the military who offer a logistics capacity that the governments and operators are lacking. There are the politicians too. Any humanitarian gesture made by a government is politically biased. Some state actors are quicker to react when they have privileged relationships with the country affected by the crisis, when they have vested interests there or when their public opinion is set alight by an increasingly reactive media. The visibility of the humanitarian actor when these are state powers is also at the heart of the debate. This is a major difficulty for the European Union. It is one of the world's largest donors, but it lacks the visibility to influence public opinion.

The "operators" are civil society operators, United Nations agencies. Each operator, and this applies as much to the military, has its individual mandate, its own added value, but also its own inclinations and suspicions. The debate over advocacy for NGOs, in other words the right to denounce and criticize, originates here. I can accept that an NGO has the right to witness; I have trouble accepting that it has the right to interfere. The line between an NGO's mandate

and interference can be extremely fine. I experienced major problems in Sudan when a British NGO gave the Bashir regime (not an easy regime) the impression that it was purely and simply prejudiced against them and was interfering politically. It created unimaginable difficulties for us.

The military is a vital actor in the delivery of humanitarian aid, but confusion over roles must be avoided. As soon as the military is perceived as a political actor engaged or close to one camp or another in the country – we have seen this in Afghanistan and elsewhere -, this confusion must be avoided.

A final element: we are, with increasing regularity, seeing contraventions of International Humanitarian Law. This, in my opinion, is the most important point. Even democracies recognized as such are guilty of trivializing, or even contravening International Humanitarian Law which is, however, set in legislation by the Geneva Conventions.

### **Alain Ménargues**

In this context Admiral Dufourcq, is it not time to invent new tools, a new language? What can be done in this area?

**Rear Admiral Jean Dufourcq**, *Editor-in-Chief of the French journal Revue Défense Nationale, former member of the CAP (Analysis and Forecasting Centre) at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, former member of France's permanent representation in Brussels and at the NATO Defense College in Rome*

We have organized our humanitarian actions just like we organize those deployed in times of war and times of peace; concepts that have become blurred; situations that are not universally accepted. It seems to me however that we are today faced with the question of universality. Does the world still have universal values?

We are witnessing the erosion of an entire system of reflection and organization. We are reaching the end of a historical era which began many years ago; the Westphalia era, in which the organization of the world was rooted in the state which was the main actor and regulation was ensured through war, with law as a safeguard and a sort of general philanthropy that has gradually established itself as moral. All that is nearing its end; we have reached the end of a system, the end of an era.

We must have the wisdom to recognize this, the wisdom to ask ourselves why, as General Beaufre predicted not so very long ago, “great war and true peace” have been laid to rest together.

We are faced then today with a system that is much more difficult to understand and control, a system with fragilities, weaknesses, tensions, crises and, particularly, infinite incertitude. To plant markers in this fog of uncertainty, we must define a new tool box, new concepts and new ideas, in which the state is no longer the central actor in international and humanitarian action, and in which we no longer refer systematically to broad principles that are shared by all. We must tackle this challenging but necessary question with great determination.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Ms. Gnesotto, would it be true to say that certain individual states or Europe as a whole, exploit that which I would term deviation from, or failure to respect the law in the application of their security policies, in order to have greater influence in certain regions?

**Nicole Gnesotto**, *professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers (CNAM) (European Union Chair), former Director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies*

That could be said of many actors but certainly not of Europe! What the European Union has demonstrated over recent years, since it adopted a foreign security and defense policy, is the added value it can bring in comparison to its Member States.

And its greatest added value is the respect of international law. All actions implemented by the European Union are done so under the United Nations mandate. This is perhaps not true of individual states, but it is systematic for the European Union. Secondly, it has financial resources that the Member States do not. To give an example, the European Union is the largest donor to all the NGOs on the planet, the largest provider of emergency humanitarian aid. For Haiti, the Member States provided €200 million in the first three weeks; the Commission alone was able to raise €120 million, a considerable contribution. Europe's second advantage is that it is neutral. The external perception of Europe is not one of an imperialist, colonialist state that may have an unspoken or hidden agenda. Generally, it is more easily accepted in crisis zones than individual states, or organizations associated with certain Member States. It represents half a billion citizens, and that gives it a legitimacy that no other democratic state on the planet can claim.

Of course, there are distortions, deviations. Humanitarian-military relations are extremely ambiguous. But, the European Union adds far more value in terms of the respect of international law than its Member States. States are states, they are not humanists. They utilize the European Union when their national interests

are aligned with the collective interest. I believe that it is extremely important for governments to go through the European channels to increase their legitimacy. France can achieve more by going through the European framework than a bilateral framework in certain countries in Africa. The same is true for Great Britain in its former African or Middle Eastern colonies. States have much to gain by going via the European Union. They can also hope to secure larger amounts of funding than they would be able to secure alone.

### **Louis Michel**

I congratulate Ms. Gnesotto on having expressed her faith in Europe so eloquently. I also believe that the Member States do not exploit the European dimension sufficiently; they could mobilize it to a far greater extent. The Member States still have a slightly illusory vision of themselves as figures of power and sovereignty which is out of kilter with the evolution of the world. As early as the 1960s, Paul-Henri Spaak stated that all European Member States had become very small countries but that they did not know it. I strongly believe this is true. When considering the world as a whole, and its major challenges, there is no longer one single country, not France nor Great Britain, with the weight to influence world order. That is the added value of Europe.

### **Rear Admiral Jean Dufourcq**

I would add that the Member States are no longer the main actors in international action. They have been relieved of this activity, this responsibility, by a whole host of new actors that are truly tackling the difficult challenges that international governments are not able to tackle collectively. The actions implemented by states have therefore become relative, and this is complicated. As the community of states is starting to get organized, with the United Nations there to give coherence to the whole, we are also seeing a significant rise in the number of non-state actors, actors whose intentions are not always benevolent and that have a whole host of different constraints and biases. This is what we need to discuss if we wish to tackle the reality of this humanitarian diplomacy pragmatically.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Monseigneur Follo, I would like to ask you about the role of religions in these crisis situations. Do they act as a brake or an accelerator?

**His Excellency, Msgr. Francesco Follo**, *Permanent Observer of the Holy See to UNESCO and the Latin Union*

Allow me first to thank the Sovereign Order of Malta for having invited me to take part in this important moment of reflection and experience sharing, which



demonstrates how reflection can become a practice and an example to follow. Gandhi, quoting Christ, said: “My life is my message”.

I will start with a personal memory to develop the subject that the organizers have entrusted to me. One day, when I was preparing a lesson for my Greek philosophy students, I came across a fragment of Heraclitus that said: *ethos anthropo daimon*. This was wonderfully insightful. Ethos, in Greek, does not only mean ethic or moral, but also house. This great Ancient Greek philosopher’s phrase can therefore be translated as: “Man’s house is God”.

God therefore is not against man, He is his home, in other words, a place where man can live in peace. Home, I stress, and not den, because we are not animals, or at least we are “political” animals - intelligent, free and with a moral conscience. Beasts use their “home” as a refuge to a certain extent, to escape from the dangers of life. For us, men and women, home is where we start to grow in life, to learn to live, to live in peace. Parents, in the nest that is the family, introduce their children, their friends and those close to them to a dimension of peace and love. If you will allow me to continue this analogy, I would say that if God is the “ethos”, God is a fact, because the home is a fact; it is not an emotion, but a concrete reality. It can console, it can be a refuge, but it is, above all, a place built from a love that could bear a plan for life itself, an order of life, a goal of peace and harmony.

So, religion’s contribution to the life of man, under all circumstances but also in the crisis situations that are our topic today, is not simply, or most importantly, to console, to help relieve the suffering caused by conflicts or natural disasters, to have an additional motivation to help human beings. Publius Terentius Afer, the famous playwright from Ancient Rome wrote *Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto*. Faith is not simply a consolation, a mutual support. Its first vocation is to be a link with God, which is the meaning of life in three senses:

- Sense as in direction, because it indicates the way, it offers a destination and the path to reach it. Every human being at some moment in his life will ask himself the question: “Where am I going?”
- Sense as in meaning, because like Dante Alighieri wrote: *Nati non foste per viver comme bruti, ma per seguire virtude e conoscenza*. “You were not made to live like brutes, like beasts, but to pursue virtue and truth, the truth of the meaning of life.”
- Sense as in perception, the taste of life. Religion does not aspire first to

relieve the fear of man, to console him with the promise of eternal life, of a future, but its primary concern is to satisfy the need for a full and true life on earth.

### **Alain Ménargues**

What about the exploitation of religions, particularly in the Middle East?

### **His Excellency, Msgr. Francesco Follo**

German soldiers had *Gott mitt uns* inscribed on their belts. The exploitation of religion has existed throughout History. It may be criminal, but it is man that is behind it, not religion.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Beyond religion, there is culture. Do you, Mr. Bouchenaki, have the impression that crisis management includes this dimension among the priorities or is there instead a sort of dichotomy, with the protection of cultural property coming far behind other priorities?

**Professor Mounir Bouchenaki**, *Director General of the International Center for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM)*

Most definitely. I believe we are in a period of transition from a time when wars tended to play out according to a classical model. War was accepted, and belligerents fought on both sides. What we have seen since the Second World War, and particularly over the last thirty years, are conflicts and wars that differ from this classical model.

At UNESCO, we were forced to modify the 1954 convention with an amendment, adding the 1999 protocol adopted at The Hague, because we found ourselves in situations where we were unable to say to a country: "Take note: according to the principles of the 1954 convention, you must protect your cultural heritage; make sure there are no military installations on archeological sites or a historical bridge..." We were faced with this situation in almost every conflict situation; Former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. I intervened personally in each of these crisis zones where, alongside the humanitarian organizations there to assist the populations, we had to try to save the cultural heritage. I entered the Banteay Srei Temple in Cambodia with the French Legion to attempt to determine how best to prevent the pillaging of the statues by the Khmer Rouge and other traffickers, and to work on clearing the mines from around the temple which had become inaccessible. We conducted these operations in close collaboration with the army. This represented a shift

in the action of UNESCO itself. I entered Mostar with the Spanish contingent of the United Nations. We tried to establish a plan with NGOs working specifically on cultural heritage, the International Council on Monuments and Sites and the International Council of Museums. We came up with the concept of the “blue shield”. We asked the United Nations if we could add world heritage protection to the UN peacekeeper mandate. The difficulties we encountered were essentially with a regime that was not recognized by the United Nations, the Taliban, and the greatest difficulty was our attempt, in vain, to protect the Buddhas of Bamiyan which, sadly, were finally destroyed ten years ago in March 2001.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Do you also have the impression Ms. Gnesotto that we are entering into a new period in humanitarian relations, in the positioning of humanitarian action?

### **Nicole Gnesotto**

I do. A particular configuration for international security has definitively ended. We have left behind a world where security was relatively simple, and founded on three main elements: military force was considered omnipotent, and the exclusive paragon of a state's power and efficiency; nation states were considered supreme and the only actors in international relations, incarnated by the non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, and the West enjoyed relative technological and military superiority.

That is no longer. We are entering a much more complex, indecipherable world where these three elements have become relative concepts:

- **The relativity of military means.** The major lesson learned from recent crises, whether we think of Lebanon, Iraq or the Israeli-Palestine conflict, is that complex political crises are not managed through military strategy alone. The relativity of military means and the use of force seem to me to be one of the major shifts in the way international crises are managed today.

- **The relativity of state power.** States are no longer the only actors on the international stage and are alone, incapable of managing international affairs. The largest state in the world, the United States, even with its European allies, has failed to be able to resolve recent international crises.

- **The very relative power of the West** in comparison to other regions.

This new world is annexed to the old world. One of the major reasons for the illegibility of the international system is that the old world has not been replaced by the new world, but we are seeing a superimposition of a number of strategic layers. Newly arising strategic questions, global issues like pandemics

or the environment or violence-related factors such as anonymous terrorism or cyber criminality, are complicating classic conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Civilians are increasingly the victims of crises which today are characterized by confusion between civil and military action, between the different organizations on the ground, between combatants and humanitarians. The result is a falling number of conflicts but a rising number of civilian victims.

### **Louis Michel**

I share this point of view. I would also add a further consideration that may be constructive. I believe that individual liberty has, through the new means of communication available today, discovered exceptional potential. We are seeing this in Tunisia and elsewhere and I am delighted.

This potential however has its limits, because it grants power to individual liberty without demanding anything in return, no responsibility, from the individual that exercises it. This phenomenon was very clearly explained some ten years ago in a book by the American political writer Alvin Toffler, *Powershift*. He saw these new powers arriving on the political scene, particularly NGOs, non-profit organizations, small groups with either a particular material incentive or interest, but without the accompanying responsibility.

We are today paying the price for the end of political supremacy. We are in the midst of a political crisis, a crisis in which the elected representatives of the people no longer have authority over the social organization of society they held in the past. It is a real problem. In its broadest sense, we could call it a crisis of state power.

In the past, state power was the most effective instrument to ensure social cohesion and this concept of the common good. Today, we are under the impression that the common good is the sum of individual goods, the sum of all our egoisms, of all our little egocentric concerns. There is a need to reinvent a democratic political model; I am not ready to adhere easily to that which I would call the “assembled”, or “people’s” government. This shift is already visible at the European Parliament. When we tackle a particular subject at the European Parliament, we quickly see what is known as the “Christmas Tree” phenomenon occurring; everyone wants to adorn the tree with their particular decoration, however useless or counter-productive, everyone wants to see their decoration hanging there. I believe this is fundamental and I agree that an entirely new tool box is required.

### **Rear Admiral Jean Dufourcq**

Let’s take this theme forward into the future. We are today twenty years on from a key event, the end of the Cold War, but we are very likely in twenty years to be

facing an event of the same significance. This transition period is marked, in addition to the factors evoked by the previous speakers, by three major challenges:

- **The demographic question.** We are today seven billion on the planet and the population continues to grow. The international organization of the world was established around forty years ago for a planet with two or three billion inhabitants. Our instruments are not adapted to this new reality of an expanding planet which is only likely to stabilize in another twenty or thirty years. At that point, we will be nine billion.

- **The challenge of global resources.** Resources whose future citizens are perhaps more sensitive to than governments. They are proving to be finite; energy, agricultural food resources, arable land, forests... We have the impression that progress is beginning to slow down because we are struggling to manage our resources. It is the ecological challenge with the concern that perhaps we will not all have enough to eat, that we may not all remain as healthy as we had hoped to be, that we may not have access to all the elements we had based our hopes, our expectations for the world on, on the certitude of indefinite progress.

- **The third challenge we are facing is economic;** it is to re-establish the proximity between consumption and production. We do not produce where we consume and the stakes are high: we could be heading for major economic chaos.

Governments are struggling to tackle these issues, and even more so because the multilateralism that has been the key to this organization of the world for such a long time is proving to be less and less effective. The question then is to know whether we can repair the old system that has been damaged by these three challenges, or if we must devise an entirely new system. I do not know the answer to this question, but I believe that we must now start addressing it extensively.

### **Nicole Gnesotto**

I agree with Louis Michel and with the Admiral, but even so!

The crisis you have described of state power, this kind of Christmas tree democracy, attitudes towards scarcity, the consumption crisis, all this is true for the democratic OECD countries. For six billion of the planet's inhabitants, there is no crisis. The world as a whole is a world in which states are asserting their authority, where there is no crisis of state power, where even authoritarian states are happily proliferating, where the concept of the public good is to all extents

and purposes unlawful. For these people, the ultimate goal is to copy our society of consumption, to achieve the levels of consumption that we today are beginning to question. We must not be too Western-centric. We have the impression that we are experiencing a global economic, moral and political crisis, but we are only 8% of the planet's population.

### **His Excellency Msgr. Francesco Follo**

You took the words out of my mouth. We are far too euro-centric. I avoid the word Western, because for the Californians, China is the West...

I wanted to mention the phenomenon of regionalization at UNESCO. In 2002, we had 35 cultural and economic treaties, in 2009 there were 247 regional treaties. The solution to universality lies in regional coordination. If UNESCO did not exist, I would be delighted to be involved in its creation.

### **Professor Mounir Bouchenaki**

I would like to come back to the information revolution that has been underway over the last few years. The world today, whether East, West, North or South, is informed almost instantly of everything that is happening across the planet. Models are beginning to appear. The events taking place in Tunisia, in Egypt, this exploding demand for greater democracy, more freedom, is also linked to the global information system that is in place.

I would also like to come back to a point mentioned in the Grand Chancellor's opening speech, the question of intervention. This issue has arisen many times in this very room during the preparation of conventions, the 2001 Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage, the 2003 Convention on the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage and, particularly when we began enforcing the 1972 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. This unique and innovative convention was able to transcend national, legal and regional approaches to access a global approach. When Venice and Florence suffered catastrophic flooding in 1964, Italy requested that UNESCO launch an international campaign to save its monuments. When the Aswan Dam was under construction in 1960, Egypt asked UNESCO to safeguard the Nubian monuments. The transition had been made from a phase where cultural heritage was appreciated on a national level, to a phase where this appreciation was international. The 1972 convention offered the international community, an organization like UNESCO, the possibility to be able to say, "Take heed: this cultural heritage is not only yours, it belongs to all of humanity." We failed for the Buddhas of Bamiyan because the site was not registered on the World Heritage List and because the regime in place was a regime of know-nothings. UNESCO had sent Ambassador Pierre Lafrance to Kandahar a few

days before the Buddhas were destroyed through the intermediary of the French authorities, because, amongst other things, he spoke the Pashtun language. He telephoned me from Kandahar to tell me that his motivation was not political – he was not looking for recognition from the United Nations. It was not financial either – he wanted nothing to do with Philippe de Montebello's offer, then Director of the Metropolitan Museum, who was proposing to buy the Buddhas. It was a question of religion. We tried everything over those few days. We organized a telephone conference between Mr. Matsuura, then Director-General of UNESCO and President Moubarak to ask him to send the region's most respected religious figure, the rector of Al Azhar University. President Moubarak told Mr. Matsuura that he would send not only the rector, but also the Grand Mufti of Egypt. The religious delegation met with the Taliban in Kandahar whose verbal and written response was: "No! This cultural heritage belongs to us, why are you interfering in things that do not concern you?"

### **Rear Admiral Jean Dufourcq**

You are all right to point out that there are positive elements. We must not be too pessimistic in our assessments and in this vision of the end of a historic age with the apprehension of a looming era we know little about. There is, in the emerging concept of the global public good and in a new "tool kit", the notion that diversity is rich, that it can make a positive contribution to our society. There is also reflection on that which we do not want, on that which all of us, in different parts of the planet, consider to be unacceptable and against which we may stand together collectively to achieve results. We are also seeing reflection on "neighborly" relations, the concept of supporting one's neighbor which is emerging and which respects and values difference. We must remain resolutely optimistic as you are, but we must also pay attention however to three particularly influential regions which are shaping our global organization today, three zones of complete uncertainty whose evolution will define the world of tomorrow:

- **The first is the United States and the strategic overdrive** it has experienced over the last ten years with an affirmation of power and a desire to change the world for the better whose results have not been conclusive enough to inspire a continuation of the strategy. This leaves us wondering where the United States is going following the unipolar 2000s.

- **The second is economic overheating in China.** Will rapidly transforming China maintain its values, its structures, the balances between the different layers of society that define it, or will it see a shift towards an individualism that its economy may struggle to support? Will the modernization of China continue

without clashes, without catastrophes? Although this question primarily concerns the Chinese themselves, it is also of concern to us.

- **Lastly, the demographic overheating in Africa.** The population of the African continent will, over the next few years, increase by several hundreds of millions of inhabitants. Is it ready to welcome these citizens into a political, economic and social structure that is not yet completely stabilized?

These are the real debates we must prepare to face because the humanitarian questions will arise in these hotspots. We will be forced to ask ourselves if we have the organizational structure required to respond to them, whether the actors will be governments or non-state actors, and in what proportions. Certainly, we will have to look for other principles. But I do agree with you, there are also positive elements.



---

# MAJOR OBSERVATIONS AND NEW ACTORS

---

## **ROUND TABLE 2**

What has changed in international  
crisis management?

How do different stakeholder groups interact?

## Alain Ménargues

We have seen an evolution in the management of international crises over the last fifteen years or so. Who does what in crisis management? How do different stakeholders interact? Where do the real responsibilities lie? In a word, who directs the management of a crisis?

The tools used in crisis management have not been re-visited since the collapse of the blocks, while asymmetrical, local and regional crises have multiplied. The daily reality on the ground is a multiplication of tribal, civil and insurrectionary wars and the wrath of the earth manifested through flooding and earthquakes. International organizations and humanitarian NGOs are today working at the heart of these conflicts, without any real coordination between them. Some believe we are seeing a “militarization” of humanitarian action, for others it is becoming too “civilian”. There is however no real unanimity. Everybody is trying to move chaotically in the same direction. What are the real challenges? This is what we will be examining with our different speakers:

- **General Claudio Graziano**, Cabinet Leader at the Italian Ministry of Defense. A year ago, he was commanding the UNIFIL<sup>2</sup> in Lebanon where he was responsible for the political, economic, humanitarian and military management of South Lebanon. He was alone at the helm, as the head of UNIFIL was the United Nations Secretary General in New York. He has held different tactical, operational and strategic roles during his career. As Deputy Chief of Staff in the Italian Army, he was responsible for the planning, deployment and employment of the Italian contingent in all military missions. Commander of the Multinational Brigade, he has commanded battalions in Kabul and in Mozambique.

- **Philippe Leclerc**, recently appointed representative for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Paris after acquiring more than twenty years' experience in the field and at the headquarters, notably handled the gradual dissolution of a Palestinian refugee camp situated in a no-man's land between Iraq and Syria during his last deployment to Syria.

- **Lieutenant General Xavier Bout de Marnhac**, was leader of the European Union Rule of Law mission deployed in Kosovo. A Cavalry Officer, he was Director of Operations at the DGSE<sup>3</sup> for five years. Former Commander of the Kosovo Force, or KFOR, in Kosovo, he is a specialist in nation-building. He is convinced that the rule of law is the necessary prelude for all hope of political, economic and social advancement in a zone affected by destruction; “We must

2 - United Nations in Lebanon

3 - France's Directorate-General for External Security

maintain”, he says, “a balanced approach to be able to dialogue with all parties, the greatest mistake is to fall into a political role.”

- **Mrs. Angela Gussing** who is Deputy Director of Operations at the ICRC is particularly involved in affairs affecting populations displaced by conflict. People flee when their lives are directly threatened, but also when their economic situation is rendered impossible by raging conflicts giving rise to the major flows of displaced people we see periodically on our television screens. In her opinion, the greatest difficulty faced by the ICRC is gaining access to victims via safe and unhindered channels, because fleeing populations often settle in zones closest to their former homes and not necessarily in areas that are easily accessible for humanitarian actors. The population that arrives at an IDP camp is a minute proportion of those seeking to survive as best they can without external assistance.

General Graziano, during your time commanding UNIFIL, was the military, the humanitarian or the political aspect the most difficult to manage?

**Major General Claudio Graziano**, *Cabinet leader at the Italian Ministry of Defense, former Commander of UNIFIL in Lebanon*

UNIFIL was, effectively, a pinnacle of my career. Having commanded a battalion in Mozambique and in Afghanistan, having led a certain number of operations, my missions have been extremely varied.

In Afghanistan we saw the difficulties created by a challenging environment and a coalition. Under UNIFIL, the political, humanitarian, economic and military aspects were managed by a single headquarters under a unified authority. This simplified the situation. The UNIFIL operation was very structured with cooperation between Europe and the United Nations. The most challenging element is often to establish the best operational headquarters to ensure that the “whole” functions effectively and to ensure that personnel remain in the field long enough to get to know each other and to know the context. Having people commit for more than two years is extremely useful and this is what happened in Lebanon.

Adopting the American doctrine of the “multidimensional” mission, we aim to make all these aspects work together. The fact that contingents originate from different countries with different mentalities and concepts may undoubtedly have created some problems at the beginning, but this was a problem for the Chief of Defense Staff, who was ultimately responsible for military operations.

Ours was a multiple, integrated, multidimensional operation that included civil tasks. On the ground with the soldiers this works well and is not the most difficult to manage. The problem is less with the soldier or humanitarian worker on the ground, but more in the offices and with the cabinet leader. Training, which is very useful, is always difficult to organize.

The greatest difficulty was managing the different local actors on the ground, the Israelis, Hezbollah, the Lebanese authorities.

### **Alain Ménargues**

General Bout de Marnhac, you too have spent time in the field and you know South Lebanon, what is your impression?

**Lieutenant General Xavier Bout de Marnhac**, *Leader of the European Union “Rule of Law” mission in Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo, former Commander of the KFOR*

My career has developed in two directions, first as military leader in a multinational organization, NATO, and today leader of a European mission, the actors in which are more or less the same. I would like to try to illustrate some of the points made in the last round table by translating them into concrete examples from the field.

Two actors seem key to me in our approach to crisis management:

- The first actor is the media. The media generates emotion and very often, except for in certain specific cases in which we may have very direct interests such as the nationals of a country or our economic interests, our politicians base decisions on these emotions. We know however, particularly those of us with a military background, that following our emotions is not always the best course of action.
- The second important and recurring factor is the general and massive assault on law and the rule of law.

It is very important to have this idea in mind, because it is between these two extremes that we are navigating. One of the consequences of the utmost importance, to my mind, is that our approach to crisis management places far more importance on the effects of a crisis than on its causes. As a result of the emotion, as a result of a sense of duty, we begin to react in terms of numbers of houses burned, numbers of refugees on the roads, of populations massacred, of camps being set up and we pay little attention to the causes of the situation. It is easier to react like this; it satisfies public opinion which in turn satisfies

political decision-makers. Working on the complex underlying causes of a crisis is however, always far more complicated.

Modern crises are much more complicated, because they tend to oppose communities, groups of human beings in conflict with one another, rather than one country seeking to conquer or gain an advantage over a neighbor. We are in an altogether human dimension. What is at stake is the population. An essential factor is often under-estimated in our analyses: the loss of the balance of power within the very communities of a same territory and, to a greater extent than the loss of this balance itself, its perception by the populations. Two examples:

- The Kosovo conflict was a struggle between an Albanian and a Serbian community from the same territory. Historians and demographers agree that the loss of balance of power between these two populations was probably caused by different rhythms of demographic growth at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. It was only in the 1970s and 80s however, that the populations themselves became aware of the phenomenon.

- In Lebanon, the 1943 constitution that is the foundation for the country as we know it today, took into consideration the existing balance of power between the different ethnic and particularly religious communities. This demographic balance was lost due to the different rhythms of growth of the Muslim and Christian populations during the 1960s. The event that brought this loss of balance of power, and the deterioration in relations within the constitution itself, home to the people was the massive influx of Palestinians following “black” September in 1970 in Jordan. Some Lebanese people believed the only way to reestablish the balance of power was civil war. The importance of demographic factors seems to me to be absolutely essential.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Philippe Leclerc, you work with local actors. Some armed local organizations are blacklisted as terrorist organizations and local government positions can render access to them difficult. I am thinking for example of Hezbollah in South Lebanon. Does this limit the scope of your actions?

**Philippe Leclerc**, *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR) representative in France*

Of course, that does limit our field of action. In conflict zones, we are required to be in contact with official armed forces and non-state armed groups. Some aspire to positions of national authority, such as the many liberation movements we saw during the 1960s and are seeing in certain regions of the world today.

Mostly however, these are armed movements with no claims to power and that are unlikely to apply International Humanitarian Law either (If an armed group is attempting to take on the leadership of a country, we may hope that it will adopt behavior similar to a state power with regards to International Humanitarian Law).

I reiterate that national legislation in some countries, particularly in the United States, defines a certain number of groups as terrorist organizations. Consequently, if material support is given by an organization or an NGO – even by the United Nations – these organizations can be sanctioned. And the list of these groups is extremely long. We encounter them often on the ground, many control a large part of the territory and, in many situations, if we are not able to engage in reasonable, non-political, humanitarian dialogue with these entities, our operations are hindered.

A word on the example of the Palestinians in this no-man's land which, in fact, belongs to Syria: Syria, which had welcomed large numbers of Iraqi refugees, (we're talking about a million people, added to the 500,000 Palestinian refugees already in the country for a population of 20 million inhabitants) was unwilling to accept Palestinian refugees coming from Baghdad. The reasons for this were essentially political, each Arab country having a duty to contribute to the Palestinian cause and welcome refugees onto its territory, but it was also in order not to create a precedent which would encourage other Palestinians to come to Syria because it is a country in which refugees have the same rights as citizens. We were required at that moment to negotiate as much with the Syrian and Palestinian authorities as with other Palestinian factions to find a solution for these thousands of people in limbo, for three years, between the borders of two countries in the desert, to deliver humanitarian assistance to them, before finally allowing some of them to enter Syria and others to be resettled in third-party countries. And resettling Palestinian refugees in United States and various other European countries was a move that could have had consequences on the positions of certain Arab states, particularly with regards to the right to return.

### **Alain Ménargues**

You mention the difficulties you encountered with local actors on the ground, but also upstream with donor countries that can hinder activities. At the ICRC, Mrs. Gussing, do you have more freedom of action?

**Angela Gussing**, *Deputy Director of Global Operations at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)*

The answer to this question depends in part on context. We do, effectively, have

more freedom because the ICRC is a specifically neutral and independent institution which operates as such. We do not depend on individual states as does, for example, the United Nations. As for NGOs, they range from the very independent to those that are far less so.

The main challenge we are facing in today's major crises lies with the populations. We are today seeing an erosion of the confidence of these populations in humanitarian action as a result of integrated actions perceived as too militarized or the opposite, too "civilian". This creates cynicism. When a soldier is delivering humanitarian assistance one day, and involved in a military operation the next, what is the real reason for his presence? This contributes to an erosion of confidence and creates major difficulties for access. Confidence is not established in a day. It must be the fruit of dialogue, of presence, of action. Populations must be convinced that the aims of the organization delivering assistance are exclusively humanitarian, and these organizations must prove this not with empty statements, but in their actions, day after day. This is very important and we see it every day in the countries we are working in, for example throughout Afghanistan and throughout Iraq. These are extremely difficult contexts in terms of access and the populations are drastically in need of basic services. The question of access goes hand in hand with the confidence the populations have in the different actors and, in some cases, the mandate that brings them to the region is not clear to these populations. This question requires serious thought: how to re-establish a certain order to be able to create greater confidence and avoid confusion between roles.

### **Alain Ménargues**

General, UNIFIL's mission is above all to ensure the end of hostilities between South Lebanon and Israel, but you also deploy actions to support the civilian population. Have you experienced the suspicion Mrs. Gussing refers to on behalf of these populations, and if so, how did you overcome it?

### **Major General Claudio Graziano**

In a perfect world, there would be no difficulties in the relations between different organizations. We know however that things are not always as straightforward between theory and practice. When I was in Mozambique the missionaries said to us: "Don't give anything to the people; it will create problems. We are aware though, that without you, we can do nothing to help them." In some circumstances, the question of confidence and of credibility must be asked. UNIFIL is aware of this, and has more or less won over the confidence of the people. In Afghanistan, it is more difficult because many people have lost their lives, many civilians have been killed and there have been military accidents.

The main thing is to ensure that real coordination is in place to allow humanitarian organizations to do their job. Sometimes however their job cannot always be done with complete independence. This is a real problem for us.

In South Lebanon, we were not faced with a true humanitarian emergency. We were able to establish this relationship of confidence with the populations, to help with the reconstruction process. But the situation is a little different. We won over the confidence of the populations because we were able to manage the United Nations budget directly and to have real authority over the military contingent. In some contexts, the European contingent receives large budgets directly from European states, and this creates tension between the two approaches which can be problematic. The solution is not to stop giving money, but to ensure that there is enough trust between the different national authorities to share budgets fairly.

Clearly, the pressure under which national contingents are placed is a determinant factor. When I say that UNIFIL was relatively easy to manage, it is because it was under my authority. I was the General leading the mission and I was reporting directly to the Secretary General of the United Nations, I was responsible for security. In NATO operations, however, individual nations have more autonomy, more direct influence on policy and this can create more problems. We know that there is always a double chain of command that can create problems, but we also know that in a group of 20,000 soldiers, 8,000 can be reporting directly to their national authority; this can also create tensions. The more centralized the command, the more authority that command has over a multinational operation and the more efficient it will be, more so than in other circumstances. And a coalition is always useful, because a single country is rarely able to win over the confidence of the population.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Philippe Leclerc, we have seen the difficulties associated with managing a chain of command in the military world. In the humanitarian world, does the simple fact that different organizations have autonomous sources of finance that do not originate from their own decision-making centers create divisions?

### **Philippe Leclerc**

We were reminded that the ICRC was an independent institution; the United Nations High Commission for Refugees is too. When it comes to funding, the HCR has a mandate assigned by the United Nations General Assembly. Individual states, as these are our main donors, then decide each year if they wish to fund our programs or not. Persuasion could therefore be a factor, but the mandate is very clear on the protection of refugees, the protection of internally displaced persons



and the question of statelessness. Our actions are based on a mandate. NGOs do not always have a mandate. This clarity with those we encounter in our work, whether they are state or non-state actors, is extremely important. The role of humanitarian actors must be clear.

I agree with the ICRC on the fact that it is extremely important that a relationship of confidence must be established with the communities that we are there to protect and their representatives. Both the ICRC and the HCR have worked in Afghanistan for thirty years. Afghanistan has been tormented by war for twenty-five years. We believed for a short time in 2001-2002 that the conflict was coming to an end. I was serving in Afghanistan at the time, it was the era of optimism, people were voting with their feet, a million people returned from Pakistan and Iran. We had supported them in camps in Pakistan and Iran and we were in contact with those that joined the Taliban. Maintaining the civilian nature of refugee and IDP camps is extremely important from Afghanistan to the Great Lakes, and it is a huge task to accomplish. Despite the relationship of trust we had with the people of Afghanistan, and because external interventions are not always clearly understood by the population, we have reached a point where we can no longer fully exercise our role as humanitarians there. Both international and national personnel from both the ICRC and the HCF have been deliberately killed, men and women – and to kill a woman for an Afghan is a very serious violation of his culture. The context has evolved, and even though the population that knows us extremely well has confidence in us, external elements beyond our control are placing limits on this confidence.

Our humanitarian work in Iraq for example is made difficult by the perception that the UN may be biased when implementing political programs. Today, although we are required to work in Ivory Coast, for example with the internally displaced and refugees fleeing to Liberia, the fact that we are associated with the United Nations, can, even though our role is a humanitarian one, penalize our action because we can be perceived as an enemy. We also experienced this in the Middle East, when the United Nations was perceived as anti-Arab or anti-Islamic.

### **Lieutenant General Xavier Bout de Marnhac**

In Kosovo, we monitor the confidence that local populations may have in the actors involved in crisis management. Several factors cause this confidence to fluctuate in time and space. These indicators differ depending on whether we are asking one population or another about their confidence in the same international institution.

The challenge is to develop confidence and to maintain it and this challenge

has become even more difficult because one of the characteristics of the crises we are seeing today is their prolonged duration. Due to the failure of politics to tackle the causes, we are responding to the effects only and this sees us maintaining operations for years.

Today in Kosovo, part of the population's cynicism with regards to the intervention is generated by the number of different structures and agencies managing the crisis and their complex relationships. To name just the main ones, NATO is represented by the KFOR, the armed operation, the United Nations with UNMIK<sup>4</sup> which continues to have a presence even though it has been considerably scaled down, EULEX, the European Union Rule of Law Mission that I lead, the OSCE<sup>5</sup> and a whole host of associated agencies including the HCR. Gaining the confidence of the population in a context with such a high number of stakeholders is unlikely.

Attitudes to these various agencies are also influenced by the extent to which their mandates are political. The more political the approach, the less confidence it will inspire due to the perception of bias. The most respected institution today in Kosovo for the Albanese population is the NATO-led KFOR; the least respected is UNMIK, because the resolution adopted by UNMIK is to ensure a status quo which is negatively perceived by the Albanians. For the Serbs, the opposite is true: the most popular institution is UNMIK, because it guarantees through resolution 1244 that Kosovo remains an integral part of Serbia. Other agencies also experience very different perceptions depending on which side of the barrier that is very essence of the crisis they are situated.

### **Alain Ménargues**

A question from Sri Lanka's ambassador to UNESCO and in France; he points out that the label "international crisis" is applied by the foreigner. On the ground, such a situation is called a national crisis.

The international nature decreed for example by the Security Council is not always done so in agreement with national authorities in the crisis country. General Graziano, was the international nature of your command at UNIFIL a United Nations decision?

### **Major General Claudio Graziano**

It's always a little more complicated than it may seem. Of course, the United Nations deployed the UNIFIL forces in 1978 and 1982, heroic soldiers who worked for many years with the Palestinians. In 2006 when the situation in

4 - United Mission in Kosovo

5 - Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Lebanon deteriorated into war once again, the situation was very different. It was a different context. With the end of the Cold War, everything had changed. After the war in 2006, the whole world was preparing a new plan for Lebanon. When the European Union met to decide on its contribution to the mission, there was a desire on behalf of the international community to go into Lebanon and stabilize the situation. Clearly, it was a United Nations intervention and an extension of the mission by the UN. But it was the new situation on the ground which made this international action possible, and particularly allowed Western countries to return to Lebanon, to the Middle East to try and instigate a new dynamic to keep the peace and resolve the problem.

UNIFIL's greatest success was the momentum that had been set in motion. We wanted, at all costs, to avoid a civil war and there was effectively a chance to reconstruct the future. The UNIFIL deployment was the fastest and most efficient way, far more so than in Afghanistan. In two months, we had gone from 2,000 to 15,000 people. In a fortnight, 5,000 French, Italian and Spanish soldiers landed on the beach. It was a whole new approach. I escorted my Minister of Foreign Affairs when the European Union offered to contribute to the UNIFIL force, Kofi Annan came to the meeting, all the countries wanted to participate. It was different.

A mission's success is down to its mandate, the rules of engagement, the cooperation between the parties present and, of course, the will of the contributing countries. The force of UNIFIL was undoubtedly down to the Security Council, but also to the fact that the countries that were going to participate had a real desire and the resources to do so.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Mrs. Gussing, is this not in fact the definition of the "right to intervene"? The United Nations or organizations like the ICRC can enter a country saying they have the right to do so?

### **Angela Gussing**

I can only speak for the ICRC. The ICRC will only work in a country with authorization from the government of that country. That is the foundation for our action, rigorously respected wherever we work. When we offer our humanitarian services to a government, it is with the understanding that we are going to work with all the different parties involved in the conflict. Contexts like these always involve groups that are opposed to the government in one way or another. We work with the opposition with complete transparency in territories they control or not. Our work would never be considered as

“intervention”, because it is always carried out with the consent of the states concerned.

### **Lieutenant General Xavier Bout de Marnhac**

I would like to come back to the Sri Lankan ambassador's question. What he says is very true, but the media are very often the first to inform the world of a crisis situation.

The media attracts attention to a crisis initially and then, because public opinion reacts with emotion, because we believe that a certain number of things are unacceptable, we take the crisis into a sphere in which it can be managed politically. It all begins however with the media. The media informs us almost spontaneously. We know of crises that remained unknown to the public and international institutions for years because there was a total lack of media attention. Others took on massive dimensions instantly, often with a slight bias on the information reported because it was in the interests of a particular political agenda or humanitarian objective to exaggerate or slightly distort the reality on the ground. The role of the media seems to me to be key. What does “The Balkans conflict is only two hours from Paris, we must take action” mean? Does the population not suffer to the same extent whether it is more than or less than two hours from Paris? We are talking about murder, rape, houses being burned, people forced out of their homes. This was an argument however that we heard consistently during the mid 1990s in reference to the Balkans.

### **Alain Ménargues**

In South Sudan, the famine was revealed by a passing television camera. A question from the floor: Do you believe the media could contribute to clarifying the true role of international organizations in a crisis context and erasing the labels sometimes attached to these organizations? Is this not an element that is neglected by the media?

### **Angela Gussing**

Populations' perceptions are not only formulated by the media. Although the media have an important role, particularly here in our western world, we must remember that these populations do not have the same access to the media as we have in Paris, in Geneva. The media has a very important role in creating emotion here, but it is perhaps less important in reaching the populations in the different countries in which we are working. The population's perception and confidence are mainly established through the concrete facts and actions they witness. What is a particular organization doing? Did I hear on the radio that 100 million was being sent to Sudan in aid when six months later I still

haven't seen any of it? They listen to the headlines, but they will then go and see whether it is followed up with concrete actions on the ground. The confidence of a population is built on factual reality, by the way we operate, our respect of local culture, our respect of their way of life, the assistance that we deliver. Are the services we are providing those they need the most, or rather those that we think they need and that we are able to offer? We must constantly remain attentive to the specific needs of a population and refrain from allowing our judgments, our cultural perceptions to influence programming decisions. The appropriateness of humanitarian action is fundamental; it is this that helps to build confidence. And it must be maintained on a long-term basis.

But, yes, we too use the media, particularly radio broadcasts or press releases which present our activities. This allows us to communicate on the actions of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, to talk about what we are doing, to circulate the message that we have no political agenda, our principles... So we do use the media, and we do not in any way belittle their role because it is an important one. In confidence building, however, it is not enough to swing the balance in terms of trust and acceptance because we cannot make people believe what they do not see with their own eyes. They are not that naive.

### **Major General Claudio Graziano**

The media plays a determinant role. Today, it represents thirty percent of command chain efforts, it can determine whether a conflict is lost or won. It can influence confidence, mentalities, the course of events, the contributing country, and people's willingness to continue to participate or withdraw from a mission. I would therefore say it's a key factor. Of course, this is not true to the same extent in all contexts. In Sudan, it plays a less important role but in the Middle East, its influence is comparable to that in Paris or Rome. Everybody knows everything. The same is true in Afghanistan. We must confront this new development. The military are doing so; they are now required to have communication experts and a specialized unit managing media activity around the clock. Events can be amplified, exaggerated. In Lebanon, each political group, each community has its own television station and can therefore embellish a particular event to use it to its advantage. Confidence in humanitarian actions can be amplified. Hezbollah provides much humanitarian aid, and is, in this way, also competing with humanitarian groups.

### **Alain Ménargues**

There are increasing numbers of integrated missions being deployed by the United Nations. Two questions are asked on this subject : are "clusters" effective? Are they an appropriate way to respond to the expectations of the population?

### **Lieutenant General Xavier Bout de Marnhac**

There are two different aspects here. The first is the question of coalition and an action's multinational nature. We are less and less able to engage alone and are forced to work as a coalition, as much in the United Nations as within the European Union and elsewhere.

And coalition goes hand in hand with compromise. Our ultimate objective is to achieve a compromise in which each actor, each state within the coalition contributes a share of the major principles upheld by all, and a share of their own national vision or approach. The difficulty on the ground is maintaining a dynamic in which this compromise, and part of what we call in our jargon the "hidden agenda" – or national objectives –, must be synchronized by the leader.

The populations themselves also have this vision. Not all actors have the same level of visibility, the same perception of the engagement and the coalition. The way our coalitions operate means that, like in *Animal Farm*, we are all equal but some are more equal than others. Crisis management is dominated by the quintet – the Americans, the French, the Germans, the English and the Italians – and this is sometimes perceived negatively by other members of the coalition who have the impression of a two-tier system. This is the complexity of the political management of a crisis.

Earlier on we talked of the failure of the political dimension and of politics to effectively manage crises today, a failure that is reflected in their prolonged duration. We are able to act immediately, we are able to provide support for a certain time, and everybody is talking about the exit strategy. But, we have been waiting to exit from the Kosovo crisis for twelve years now. In Lebanon, we have been waiting since 1978 - more than thirty years. Many people theorize, discuss perfectly formulated exit strategy concepts, but the everyday reality is that it is extremely difficult to emerge from a crisis situation.

### **Philippe Leclerc**

Today, media battles can cause us to lose wars. The best example in recent history is undoubtedly the American intervention in Somalia. The media is very important but we can quickly fall prey to "CNN diplomacy": some humanitarian operations receive regular visits, every day a unit has to accompany TV personalities and cameras, while others, in spite of all our efforts, remain forgotten. We can be dependent on the media to mobilize the financial resources we need, and fail to convince governments because certain budget-related decisions are largely dependent on public opinion.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Does the fact that NGOs have their own funding limit coordination or is the opposite true: it gives them greater freedom of action, all the more so because planting their flags before the cameras can generate more funds?

### **Angela Gussing**

Yes, we are convinced that it is important to have humanitarian actors that work with neutrality and independence. Our independence is also derived from our capacity to intervene rapidly, which is related to our capacity to finance our activity ourselves. However, independence and coordination should not be perceived as contradictory concepts because this is not the case. Coordination is necessary, particularly to ensure a more global coverage of needs and a more coherent response from the different actors involved. We contribute actively to coordination activities together with all the active humanitarian actors on the ground. This coordination is not implemented for its own sake, but to avoid duplication and having too many “gaps” in the assistance delivered to a population. Coordination is in all of our interests. The ICRC, while strictly insisting on its independence and neutrality, contributes to the coordination undertaken in the different contexts in which it is working. We will not however, be told where to work or which geographical zones or needs are the priority. We program our activities based on our own needs assessments. We identify these needs and decide on the priorities and the responses required to address them.

### **Alain Ménargues**

But how effective is it really, when, like in Haiti, we have seen mountains of aid close to the airport awaiting distribution, when just a few kilometers away, people are desperately in need of it?

### **Angela Gussing**

The questions that could be asked here are: where was the coordination and are we placing realistic expectations on this coordination? I can speak for the Red Cross that was active in the hours that followed the earthquake. However, it is also important to understand that organizing logistics at this scale takes longer than just a few hours.

We were lucky enough to be able to land Red Cross emergency aircraft and were therefore able to provide personnel, equipment and materials very quickly. There are different types of humanitarian action: a soldier can make a humanitarian gesture, a government has a responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance to its population but it is also important that independent humanitarian action can exist, and that the global approach is not the only approach. We are not convinced that a person in need is better served by one single integrated approach.

### **Alain Ménargues**

So you question the United Nations' integrated structures?

### **Angela Gussing**

It is not our place to judge how others coordinate their internal systems, particularly when it comes to the coordination of the work of the United Nations specialized agencies. We are already concentrating on how best to manage the internal coordination of our own "system" made up of all the Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations and we are fully aware that this is no easy task.

For us, one of the most complex questions is that of the armed escorts that are used in some contexts. We do not work with armed escorts, not in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Congo or anywhere else. We always work with our flag, our vehicles and our staff. We work with a trust-based relationship that we have succeeded in creating. If we have not been able to create this relationship, we do not go in.

### **Alain Ménargues**

You say: coordination yes, but led by us.

### **Angela Gussing**

No, we say: we coordinate with you. We inform you of our actions, we tell you the needs we have identified. We are happy for others do the same, but not that they coordinate us.

### **Lieutenant General Xavier Bout de Marnhac**

Regardless of the different approaches, the point on which military and humanitarian actors come together is the security assessment. In my experience in different contexts, in Rwanda or in the Balkans, in that which some presented as a dichotomy between humanitarian and military action, there is in fact clear common ground, that of the security analysis.

In order to operate in a given context, humanitarian organizations require an initial analysis of the risks they may face. Often, it is military organizations that are able to provide this. A standard, well-known example is that of the mines in Mozambique. It is essential that we are able to keep humanitarian actors in the zone informed through the situation and risk analyses that we conduct. In general, the security meetings organized by all commands are always very popular with humanitarian organizations even if each party goes away and continues to work according to its own logic, sometimes in synchronization and sometimes less so. But, there is common ground which we, the military, try to capitalize on to keep the humanitarian actors in the loop.



The concept known as the “Comprehensive Approach” was not mentioned this morning. Clearly when faced with a crisis, neither humanitarian, military, political nor economical instruments alone hold the answer. It is the synchronization of all these broad spheres of action that offer a chance of resolving the crisis. Once again however, I am still waiting for examples of successful crisis resolution, I have not heard many.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Is the need to rebuild very quickly after a crisis a dimension taken into consideration in your approach?

### **Philippe Leclerc**

We take this aspect into consideration because our mandate requires us to look for lasting solutions for the people we are assisting. For refugees, it usually means repatriating them back to their country as soon as this becomes possible. These solutions are stipulated in our mandate. When we are planning an intervention, we must also look at the context and anticipate an exit strategy which may be of a greater or lesser long-term disposition. The Palestinian refugee crisis has been ongoing since 1948 and no solution has yet been found for these refugees.

When it comes to coordination, Louis Michel mentioned this morning the United Nations’ efforts to develop a more cohesive “One UN” system and integrated operations. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has, or course, shown his support for the reform and we are participating in the gradual implementation of the “One UN” system. We insist however that in certain complex, tense situations, neither integrated operations nor the “One UN” system are appropriate responses, and we continue to advocate for a specific humanitarian response in these situations. Dialogue continues. It is not only the different contingents within NATO forces that are difficult to coordinate, but also United Nations agencies and NGOs. The effectiveness of this coordination varies greatly in different contexts. No organization, including an NGO, likes to be coordinated. Each actor has its respective, unique statutes and mandate.

### **Alain Ménargues**

A question on this point exactly from Mr. Schmidt: who decides whether humanitarian organizations are legitimate?

There are no rating agencies for NGOs. How is this legitimacy assessed?

### **Lieutenant General Xavier Bout de Marnhac**

In my experience, no judgment is made. It is already very complicated to know, in a given theater of operation, how many non-governmental organizations are present. I have known NGOs that are represented by one individual. Someone arrives at the airport saying he is going to work on the artificial insemination of eggs to develop chicken farming. He may have received some funding from his General Council, he is working alone. This qualifies as an NGO and is identified as such, particularly by local authorities and those standing in for them. And then there are the major NGOs that we hear about in the media. Behind this need for visibility is the need for resources. We must not be naive; it is not all entirely philanthropic. Within these large machines, people are on a fair and honest career path. The difficulty for a force commander on the ground or for a civilian leader is to identify these people, to try to channel or synchronize them to ensure the best possible coverage of needs, without overlaps, without expending unnecessary energy, without too much waste. There is no NGO exchange. It is entirely reliant on good intentions from the outset.

### **Alain Ménargues**

One of the participants here today has mentioned a poster whose message was directed at humanitarian personnel: “Without Haiti, you would all be out of work.” Has UNIFIL encountered this type of reaction from the population?

### **Major General Claudio Graziano**

No, we did not encounter anything like this. A word on the legitimacy of NGOs: it is deeply rooted in their operations in the field, this is clear for organizations like the Red Cross.

UNIFIL is an unusual example because there is a whole military security component. There was no doubt over the need for coordination. In Mozambique, where we were running a very pacifist intervention, we were working to maintain peace while reflecting a little on the military aspect; we had absolutely no right to talk of intelligence - At UNIFIL, yes.

Coordination is indispensable. Cluster bombs are no longer seen in South Lebanon due to work that was carried out in conjunction with NGOs funded by certain government budgets, but with United Nations' coordination. Don't forget that Israel was providing UNIFIL with information where the mines were placed. Without a map, we would never have been able to succeed and without coordination, we would never have been able to de-mine the area effectively. With the exception of the Red Cross, which is in a category of its own

and which is independent, NGOs find it very difficult to work in an insecure context. Without coordination, humanitarian aid can even be dangerous or counter-productive.

### **Alain Ménargues**

UNIFIL troops are deployed for four months I believe. How are they able to immerse themselves in local culture, to adjust to Lebanon?

### **Major General Claudio Graziano**

It all depends on what is expected of the men on the ground. There is no problem with an infantry soldier staying for four months. The most important thing is that he has received the appropriate training prior to his deployment. Communication officers, those responsible for the media, yes, they must stay longer. I was in Lebanon for three years, my deputy for two years, my cabinet director for one year - the political affairs director stayed for ten years. This allowed us to acquire a good vision of the context. I believe a commitment of at least a year is necessary but it is entirely dependent on the levels of stress. I understand that stress can start to affect soldiers that have been patrolling for four months. The main point is to commit for long enough to be able to understand what is happening and act accordingly.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Admiral Dufourcq, how would you analyze this rapport with the local population of a troop arriving in a zone, as is the case for UNIFIL, placed between two groups and usually, in a hostile environment?

### **Rear Admiral Dufourcq**

Every situation is an exception; the question cannot be given a general answer. The key phase that must be engaged is that in which the population's mistrust is allayed. New arrivals have their own culture, their own mandate, their own ways to conduct their lives. Of course, we prepare the forces we deploy extremely carefully. The fact remains however that when we arrive in a country, we are different to those that we are assisting to re-establish some kind of balance. Allaying these suspicions is extremely delicate; great care must be taken to establish a balance of power initially, because our aim is to stop the violence, reassure and at the same time establish a relationship of trust. That is the key. These are cultural phenomena that must be prepared upstream and that must be handled very carefully on the ground. In some cases it is impossible to find the right solution, but we must also bear in mind that sometimes perhaps there is no solution to establish this trust, without which it is impossible to establish any kind of balance between the parties in the conflict.

### **Alain Ménargues**

How does one convince opposing parties to accept the rules of law, and populations to accept foreigners that know nothing about their culture, their language, but who are there to help them? How can this confidence be re-established?

### **Angela Gussing**

The answer to this question lies in the capacity to be able to respond to the real needs of a population. It is not as easy as all that to be able to respond accurately to the specific needs of a community. It means listening to them. True dialogue is essential. Another factor is the work undertaken by the newcomer with local organizations, the participation of the community. The Red Cross is fortunate to have partners like the Haitian Red Cross or the Afghan Red Crescent in every country in which we work. It is a huge asset for the work of the Red Cross because we can, from the outset, rely on national staff that know the communities, that understand the culture and that allow us to tailor responses to ensure that they are as relevant as possible. Acceptance is related to the appropriateness of an organization's actions.

### **Philippe Leclerc**

It is indeed very important to understand the context in which we are operating otherwise we risk favoring one side or another – humanitarian aid can sometimes represent a windfall to one party, to be used to their advantage to become stronger. The population's appreciation of an NGO depends on the extent to which they are listened to, the global nature of the action – not focusing on a single target group -, and the appropriateness of the action – we have all seen the gleaming 4x4s in total contrast to the programs being implemented.

We have been present in some countries for twenty or forty years. When implementing new operations, we can encounter difficulties in finding local partners. There is a “feet finding” period. But we have, and this is also true for the United Nations, a certain number of partisans in the United Nations member countries; we also work with local Red Cross organizations in many countries.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Manuel Rio has a question on the proliferation of multinational legal frameworks. What is their impact on their ground? Does this issue need to be developed?

### **Lieutenant General Xavier Bout de Marnhac**

The legal question is one of the important aspects of all humanitarian action and of its environment. The greatest mistake is to want to apply our own methods

directly to the foreign situation, methods which, as they stand, are not always appropriate. Legally speaking, this question is fundamental. The European Union Rule of Law mission in Kosovo is facing exactly this challenge. This question is even more poignant in the case of Afghanistan. The disparity between Western and Afghan cultural and legal frameworks is greater than that between Kosovo and the European Union, although having said that, this observation could actually be widely debated.

Identifying personnel is a necessity; it is also a weakness, or even a source of vulnerability. There is no doubt that when we arrive in an unknown emergency context and we are required to recruit local staff, we make mistakes. All of us here have examples of circumstances in which we went awry when selecting or identifying new members of staff. We are regularly manipulated by one camp or another, not to mention the intelligence that can be gleaned by communities working within our organizations. Very recently, my mission was the victim of a leak to the press of information on a classical aspect of our work that is familiar to all humanitarian organizations: the security level we apply to the zone we are operating in. All humanitarian and multinational organizations working in these zones have a security team responsible for constantly evaluating the level of security and informing staff of the type of risks they are exposed to and the precautions to be taken to minimize them. It is simply routine work in fact, but the press used the opportunity to deride us reporting that the mission was fearful of various aspects of the context. The source of the leak was a member of national staff whose intention was deliberate. This is complicated, particularly in the legal domain.

Confidence is built or destroyed based on the hope that we inspire. The real challenge is to live up to these hopes. When the mission arrived in Kosovo two years ago, it inspired huge hopes for the country's legal system, something local society knew little about, and particularly in issues like the struggle against corruption and organized crime. Building confidence is extremely challenging. We are asking the mission to produce results in the legal domain in just two years, when we are a multinational structure in which the law practiced is not the same between the Anglo-Saxons and the continental Europeans, in a country in which we do not speak the language, and we would like the process to be achieved more quickly than we are capable of doing in our own countries. Six months after having initiated an inquiry, I am asked why such and such a person is not yet in prison. The origins of both confidence and suspicion lie here. With time, the question of whether our approach is accepted becomes of real strategic importance. How tolerant is the population of our approach? Today this is the main challenge I face as the leader of the Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo.

### **Alain Ménargues**

A question from Geoffroy de Liedekerke: the speakers have mentioned the multitude of humanitarian actors present on the ground. But often, there are also missions with real proximity to the population. Can these have a role to play and be useful in establishing confidence?

### **His Excellency Follo**

Missionaries, brothers and sisters, work with all the different population groups on the ground. But I would like to insist on the fact that we continue to focus on the symptoms of the crisis and not enough on its causes. I was lucky enough to work with Mother Teresa. She was often criticized for not having enough of a strategic approach. She treated patients. She would say “How about if I take care of people’s immediate needs and leave the strategy to the politicians.” We really need to tackle the causes as well as responding to the effects.

### **Alain Ménargues**

A question from Mr. de Chavagnac: is there competition between humanitarian organizations?

If yes, does it have a negative effect on those needing assistance?

### **Angela Gussing**

It would be wrong to deny that competition between humanitarian actors exists. But there is also a huge amount of coordination and cooperation at every level. To give you an example, only last week, my President and I spent an entire day with the High Commissioner of Refugees and his team, discussing issues that were of interest and relevance to our two organizations. We look at how we see our action, we discuss the main challenges we are facing and ways or strategies to overcome them.

Humanitarian organizations do sometimes work in competition, we are conscious of this but we are also very conscious that we are working towards similar objectives, and of the need to coordinate our visions of situations and our activities. We are reference organizations in our respective fields; our responsibility goes hand in hand with this.

Does this competition have a negative impact on the satisfaction of humanitarian needs? I hope not, in fact I hope the opposite is true. Personally, I have never seen a situation in which this was the case. What can sometimes happen however is that all the agencies and NGOs are drawn to the place with the easiest access resulting in overcrowding, while areas with more difficult access are served by the Red Cross, which, as it has trucks present in many countries,

finds itself working in these zones only. When this happens, there is the risk that victims' needs, often greater in harder to access areas, are not always met because the aid remains concentrated where access is easiest or less costly.

### **Alain Ménargues**

There is also a media presence in these easy-to-access zones.

### **Angela Gussing**

The presence of the media helps many humanitarian institutions and yes, it is present in zones with the easiest access, not in the most removed zones of Darfur or Afghanistan which are controlled by opposition groups. The humanitarian work in these areas is however essential and is often carried out far from the eye of the cameras. The media offers visibility with regards to an organization's work which is necessary because it helps various organizations mobilize funds.

### **Alain Ménargues**

A question from Yann Leroux who notes that we have discussed military support in terms of security, but there is the whole aspect of logistics capacity too. In difficult intervention zones, should we be calling in the military for logistics support?

### **Philippe Leclerc**

In crisis situations which require a military intervention, military logistics can be used when civilian logistics, the state's own resources, cannot be used. It is important to remember however that the priority must be to reinforce state, or civil society, response capacity when it is able to respond, and not to call in the military or external international organizations. In some cases of course this is not possible, but external intervention, both military and humanitarian, should remain the exception to the rule. We have the capacity to be able to strengthen a country's logistics resources. We also work extensively with the Red Cross, the Red Crescent and the non-profit sector if one exists. And once again, it is on a very exceptional basis only that we enlist logistics assistance from the military.

### **Angela Gussing**

I would suggest that the situations in Haiti, Pakistan and Afghanistan differ. The answer to the question of the use of military resources is therefore not the same. Clearly, it is far less problematic in a context like Haiti affected by a natural disaster than it would be in Afghanistan, a country in conflict. It is not simply because there is this capacity that it should be used, or that it is appropriate to use it. The ICRC approaches this question with extreme caution.

For every operation in a country affected by violence, we weigh up the pros and cons between the humanitarian imperative and the use of military resources. In these contexts, we ask ourselves: can the military be perceived as supporting one side or another? The next question is, what does that mean for our mission? Can we respond to needs without taking this action? Is it really the only way? We must weigh up the humanitarian imperative. Our response in a context affected by violence will always be to dissociate ourselves from military elements that may be perceived as partisan.

### **Lieutenant General Xavier Bout de Marnhac**

Things have evolved in this domain. There was a time where we would engage a military operation with the sole aim of allowing the safe deployment of a humanitarian intervention. There was this notion of humanitarian corridors and the armed forces were there to help. Today, we are seeing a certain reticence from both sides. The military are reluctant to find themselves in this type of situation which is not easy to manage, and humanitarian organizations are unwilling to give the impression of being too close to the military. It is a domain in which we adapt in function of the crisis and its particular circumstances. A certain amount of pragmatism is required. Each actor brings its qualities, its advantages, its disadvantages and its flaws. One thing is sure: if the safety of humanitarian actors is threatened they are unable to fulfill their role.

### **Major General Claudio Graziano**

This issue was less complicated for us because UNIFIL was operating in a smaller zone with a clear mandate: to help and protect humanitarian organizations in their distribution activities and the civilian populations whose lives were threatened. This was requested specifically following lessons learned from other UN missions. I had a number of functions including responsibility for security. Ultimately, I was the one to say whether the security situation allowed the humanitarian community to enter the zone. If I said the situation was not safe, no one could access the operation because I had the authority to prevent them.

The entry point was the same for everyone, humanitarian organizations, development assistance, logistics and supply. We had to be very clear with everybody about what a peacekeeping operation with millions of tons of material, planes flying every day, ships arriving, thousands of trucks circulating at night only represents... It is a question of efficiency. We must help and support humanitarian organizations to achieve the best possible result, and if the best possible result is to allow them to travel without an escort because the security situation allows, so much the better. If the security situation is such that support and assistance are required, the authority, as was the case in Lebanon, must give the green



light. This is not the case in other operations. If I had not had the authority, they would have been able to travel freely within the zone. In all circumstances however, coordination is required to ensure that entry points and roads, which are under military control and that no one may use without authorization, are used effectively. It is impossible not to have this coordination. In all deployments a coordination room must be set up to manage these operations.

### **Alain Ménargues**

New actors are starting to appear: private-sector companies. They are becoming involved in humanitarian work, either by creating their own humanitarian structures, or by associating themselves with existing NGOs. Have you observed this phenomenon?

### **Rear Admiral Dufourcq**

Yes, there is indeed a whole series of new actors in the “crisis market”, not only companies. There are also private military companies. There are a whole host of new actors that are, in fact, compensating for the failures or difficulties of states to find their place in crisis management and who are providing a partial, transnational or transversal response to a certain number of problems. There are logistics companies that provide response capacity, service companies that offer technical capacity in areas like healthcare and water conveyance etc. A whole series of actors are starting to plan reconstruction activities in crisis countries that individual states are not themselves able to achieve, either because there is insufficient coordination of international aid or because budgets are not sufficiently detailed. There is a proliferation of economic actors and operators that are associating themselves with the major industrial groups that see this as a way to expand their operations. This is a new reality that we must adapt to.

Private military companies, the new phenomenon in the management or pacification of violence with all the failings that we have observed in Iraq and in Afghanistan, and humanitarian actors do not necessarily have entirely convergent interests. Time-frame is a particularly pertinent question. When private actors intervene in a crisis, is an end to the crisis really in their financial interests? This is an uncomfortable question, the response to which seems clear to many of us here today.

### **Lieutenant General Xavier Bout de Marnhac**

The question put another way is, what is the role of so-called civil-military operations – *Cimic* in Anglo-Saxon jargon – and, in particular, the role that private-sector companies may have therein?

Behind the concept of the “Comprehensive Approach” is the idea that the

quicker we are able to re-establish normal living conditions, the quicker we can hope that tensions will be reduced and that, returning to a normal life, people will stop fighting. Once again we are tackling the effects rather than the causes which remain fundamentally political, but why not?

There are two different components to this: firstly, the actions undertaken by the armed forces themselves, our actions at KFOR. I had a budget for operations that qualified as civil-military duties, the provision of services, repairs to drainage systems etc. The essential objective with this strategy, and we must be clear on this, is not to get the state or the country back on its feet, but to facilitate the populations' acceptance of the force by implementing micro projects. A second dimension is more important, and goes beyond the scope of military engagement: it is the reconstruction of the country. It can also involve large sums of money. It is business. The hero in Kosovo will be the organization that builds a power station. When I arrived in Kosovo in 2005, some areas were only receiving one hour of electricity per day when temperatures dropped to minus thirty in winter and there was no television, no radio etc. The Kosovo crisis began twelve years ago and still no decision has been taken on the power station.

So yes, this is an important factor. Yes, it is a way to restore some semblance of normality, to re-establish a life that is as normal as possible for the population. Large sums of money are involved however that could, in part, be provided by multinational organizations and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Do we have figures on the "return on investment" when an economic group invests in reconstruction or humanitarian aid?

### **Lieutenant General Xavier Bout de Marnhac**

That depends on what return and what investment we are talking about. Is the question whether France, in the money it spent deploying soldiers to Kosovo, saw a return on this investment or whether the company that sets up commercial operations in Kosovo will see a return on this investment... In the business world, I tend to think that companies that come and set up, and maintain, commercial operations benefit and are profitable. When the Inter-marché group opens superstores, which it has in Kosovo under a different trading name, the decision is based on business logic, that is their investment, and that they remain open and profitable, that is their return on investment. Other examples are less black and white. It is a strategy that many countries

are exploring, a strategy that France has been attempting to implement for several years now with varying amounts of success. It is a strategy that a certain number of our Anglo-Saxon partners in particular are implementing more far effectively than we are.

### **Alain Ménargues**

The massive American intervention in Haiti was justified in the American press as the desire to control possible population movements, like the boat people, in the American sphere of influence, and to prevent a repetition of the mass migration that took place from Cuba.

### **Lieutenant General Xavier Bout de Marnhac**

Migration control can be a form of return on investment. In the Balkans, it is a major challenge which is becoming political. Stabilizing the region means preventing mass migration to Europe. Eleven years after the crisis, another process is also underway to encourage those that left ten or so years ago to return to their homeland. Both processes are proving to be equally complicated, and for reasons that are predominantly legal.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Do you have any suggestions for what could help to establish confidence and dialogue on the ground?

### **Angela Gussing**

As has been said several times already, we are at a crossroads which is the meeting of several different world orders. The world of yesterday has not yet quite disappeared and the world of tomorrow is not yet entirely clear. We, the humanitarian organizations must be more critical in our analysis of ourselves. We spend much time discussing the evolution of our environment, but little has changed in the humanitarian world. This reflection is necessary. Is it fair that humanitarian aid comes mainly from the West? How should we work with local actors? How coherent is an organization that complains about the confusion of military and humanitarian roles but which, the following day, sets off to work with a military escort? I am not here to give lessons to others but I believe we must question the way we operate on a daily basis, what we are there to achieve, what is the best way to serve those we are there to serve. There are no miracle cures, we have to come to terms with the reality and find solutions on the ground through dialogue.

### **Lieutenant General Xavier Bout de Marnhac**

The best way to manage a crisis is still to prevent it from happening in the first

place. Vigilance, monitoring, anticipation... Our western-centric perception is not the best way to view the world. Tomorrow, western humanitarian organizations could be required to manage six billion potential clients. This is what we should be thinking about and planning for. I do not know if that is possible.

**Alain Ménargues**

Thank you. I have no doubt that this morning's debates will fuel your conversations over lunch.

---

# LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FIELD

---

## **ROUND TABLE 3**

What is effective in the field and where are the failures?  
Where do the responsibilities of institutional, political, military and humanitarian actors and the media really lie?

## Alain Ménargues

Where do the responsibilities of the different institutional, political, humanitarian and military actors - not forgetting the media – really lie?

Today, states are forced to confront challenges that extend far beyond their national borders such as environmental protection, terrorism and criminality, while the major international institutions are called upon on occasions to replace failed states. Concurrently, international law is undergoing a complete transformation. The concept of sovereignty is evolving while the right and duty to intervene, widely accepted by public opinion, are not always easy to enforce on the ground. To what extent can the fields of responsibility be shared?

This third round table brings together four individuals:

- **Rashid Khalikov**, Director of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is, at the United Nations, the emergency and humanitarian disaster specialist. Both heavily involved in strategic decision making and close to operations in the field, he developed a simple and effective working methodology in Pakistan. In addition to meetings organized with the civil and military authorities, UN agencies and NGOs, he met with Pakistani “notables” every week to take tea and gain a better understanding of their expectations and needs. His actions are marked by a respect for tradition and a focus on developing trust between humanitarian actors and the population. Without this trust, he says, we can achieve nothing. For him, “there is no such thing as culture shock, it is simply a state of mind that stems from ignorance.”

- **Alain Boinet**, Director General and founding member of French NGO Solidarités International, is the former President of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Advisory Committee for Emergency Humanitarian Aid. In its 2008 report, the HCR reported 42 million people has been displaced by force – 15.2 million refugees and 15 million people displaced within their own country. Afghan and Iraqi refugees alone represented half of the world’s refugee population. “War,” says Alain Boinet, “is becoming less institutionalized, privatized, a way of life. It is creating criminal violence that can only be seen on the ground.” The number of conflicts has not stopped rising since 1947, predominantly due to interstate conflicts that are affecting ever increasing numbers of populations.

- **Vice-Admiral Xavier Magne**, Deputy Chief of Staff of the French Navy for “Operations”, former Commander of Operation Baliste in Lebanon (2006-2008), was also Commander of the French aircraft carrier *Charles de Gaulle*. For the last two years, he has been commanding the French Aero-Maritime Rapid Response Force. He freely admits that he is always a little reticent, as a marine,

to talk about “external operations”. Contrary to the Ground or Air Forces, this notion has little sense for the Navy, whose mission has always been to operate across the oceans of the world and therefore, by definition, outside the national territory. During Operation Baliste, 14,000 people including 10,000 French citizens were evacuated from Lebanon.

- **Ambassador Pierre Duquesne**, who has recently returned from Palestine, is Ambassador for Economic Reconstruction and Development at the French foreign ministry. He is France’s representative at the Interim Commission for the Reconstruction of Haiti (ICRH). He organized and followed up the International Donors’ Conference for the Palestinian State in Paris. He is responsible for some major international affairs, notably the West Bank and Gaza.

Sirs, starting at the very beginning, has the operational playing field really changed over the last ten years?

**Alain Boinet**, *Director General and founding member of Solidarités International, former President of the Strategic Council for Emergency Humanitarian Aid at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

What is changing in many conflict-affected countries is the radicalization of the conflicting parties. On a more global and structural level, what is changing is the demographics in these countries which is also providing insurgents with the combatants they require.

What is changing is that the world has discovered the world. We are aware of events that are happening everywhere, in Somalia, in Iraq, in Haiti, and we have experience from a certain number of peacekeeping operations with their successes but also their failures.

What is changing is that many of the countries we are working in are becoming far more self-aware. There is a renaissance of the affirmation of their own existence. Clearly, we can do nothing without them. We must act with them, for them, and not only for us, between us and with our own certitudes. That is fundamental.

What is changing is the outlook and the challenges we are facing. There is an evident rise in the number of natural disasters affecting the world, particularly disasters that are caused by man himself.

What is changing also is the consciousness of our responsibility in the problems

affecting others. We talk about economic crisis, about the G8, about the G20, about the possibility of renewed hunger riots... What is our share of the blame in the problems affecting others? We must include this perspective in our analyses because these populations believe, imagine, know and state that we have part of the responsibility for their plights. This changes much in our relationships with them and in our responses.

What is effective and where are the failures? What does not work is applying a unique intervention model across the entire planet, nor does making no distinction between a conflict situation and a natural disaster. No lasting solution is possible - I reiterate what I have said before - without the populations of the countries in which we are operating playing a major role. The West is often considered as an assured, to avoid employing the word arrogant, outsider. Adopting this attitude will only impede our ability to identify solutions together with populations that expect us to respect them. We are, as a general rule the champions of multilateralism, let us also be advocates of multiculturalism! I say this here at the headquarters of UNESCO, where the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity came into being. We often forget cultural rights when we talk about human rights. It is the right to dignity, to the respect of populations' cultural identities which is fundamental for today and for tomorrow.

**Rashid Khalikov**, *Director of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Geneva*

Like my predecessor, I believe that many changes have taken place over the last few years. I would like to focus on three:

- *Vulnerability to natural disasters.* Across the entire planet we can now see people suffering, on our televisions, on the internet, in our living rooms. Nameless suffering. The growing pressure from the public to do something about this suffering is considerable. At the same time, suffering and vulnerability do not imply that those who deliver assistance should forget the principles of independence, neutrality. These two aspects come together to create a growing problem; a huge presence on the humanitarian stage. We saw it in Haiti last year and during the floods in Pakistan.
- *Next, the need for transparency.* Increasingly, we want to be sure, for the Red Cross, for the Red Crescent, for UN agencies, what we are getting for our money. We want to be certain that the money we are donating is really useful. We are seeing increasing numbers of funding appeals which does not however reflect growing budgets. We are all competing for the same, limited, resources.



- *Who is in charge?* We have heard the term “multi” used often. Multilatera-  
lism, multiple actors, etc. Everybody wants to coordinate; nobody wants to  
be coordinated. When vulnerability is at its peak we must act rapidly, we  
must demonstrate that we are able to take decisions that have a real impact  
on people’s lives. We have no choice, we must act fast. I believe that the  
United Nations has a natural leadership role. This does not mean that we are  
perfect, but nothing else comparable exists today.

In the last ten years, natural disasters have killed more people than any other cause. The numbers killed in the December 26, 2004 tsunami or the earthquake in Haiti amount to the hundreds of thousands, not to mention the tens of millions affected. World leaders must have as strong a will to reduce the effects of disasters on people’s lives, and the great suffering they experience as a result, as they do to combat disease, terrorism and climate change.

**Ambassador Pierre Duquesne**, *Ambassador for Economic Reconstruction and Development at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Reconstruction of Haiti.*

As a natural optimist, I tend to see the glass half-full. It seems to me that *there is more effective coordination between the different actors today* and certainly between institutional actors. Ten or fifteen years ago, the cooperation between Bretton Woods and United Nations institutions was almost non-existent. Much remains to be done, but what we saw during the extreme emergency phase in Haiti confirms this point: there was good coordination.

A second aspect that has changed is the *willingness in the field to include non-governmental actors*. In the past, these operations tended to be considered inter-state affairs. This is also true within the donor countries themselves. In France, I lead the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Reconstruction of Haiti (ICRH). It was France that pushed for a series of meetings in Haiti between local authorities, Haitian and international, NGOs, Haitian and international, private-sector companies, Haitian and international and the Diasporas prior to the donor conference that took place at the end of March in New York. I organize similar meetings with all these actors in France too. This would not have happened ten years ago.

*And we are seeing positive results.* I will quote just two “success stories”: The tsunami response in Indonesia which, after all, lasted five years; and Palestine. I organized the Donor Conference for the Palestinian State and I have been heavily involved ever since. The state is more present in Palestine today than in many states in the world.

*A fourth element relates to the media.* The role of the media has gone beyond inducing compassion and reporting breaking news stories. This struck me during coverage of the earthquake in Haiti. Three days after the event, the media were covering the story from the right perspective: the seismic fault line was revealing structural faults, and it was these that needed tackling. There was less of a need to rebuild the buildings as there was to rebuild the country's institutions. All that would, in fact, take an extremely long time. They had hit the nail on the head. I was surprised when the first anniversary came around to observe that the media had once again fallen into the trap of analyzing the reconstruction in terms of volumes of rubble and headlines were accusingly focusing on what little progress had been made in a year. I still believe however that there is a more pertinent analysis of disaster situations by the media now than there was ten years ago.

*Another change: we no longer reflect in terms of project aid only, but also in terms of budget support.* Ten years ago, we would have implemented aid projects only and each country was satisfied with inaugurating its road or its school. Today, it is about state-building and this requires budget support. It is difficult for the politician and the tax payer to imagine that we can transfer funds directly to the recipient state budget. Efforts must be made to improve public finance integrity to reassure donors. The development of budget support is an important factor.

*Another new phenomenon: there are no longer only western organizations on the ground; we are also seeing emerging donor countries and others.* Brazil and Cuba are present in Haiti providing aid in kind. China is present in sub-Saharan Africa.

**Vice-Admiral Xavier Magne**, Deputy Chief of Staff of the French Navy for "Operations", former Commander of Operation Baliste in Lebanon (2006-2008)

What has changed and what has not changed? What has not changed is the murderous folly of man, and this is the cause of a great number of crises.

What has changed is when a wild animal has had its prey snatched from its jaws once it is not likely to let it happen again. It learns from its mistakes. We can see, in a certain number of today's conflicts, that people have adapted, that they have learned from our own weaknesses, they have learned how to use the media, how to influence our very own convictions.

When it comes to piracy in the Gulf of Aden, it is clear to me that the pirates have thoroughly analyzed the way we operate and are using it against us. We

are fighting with one or both arms tied behind our backs. The same goes for the fight against drugs or against organized crime. Each group learns from its mistakes and applies these lessons to be more efficient the next time. We are constantly one step behind.

There is law too. What is law fundamentally? It is the recording of a certain number of rules. But generally, the entity that set the rules down on paper is the entity with the most power. Did the fetus contribute to drawing up the laws for life? Of course it did not. The concept of law is never balanced. Many conflicts originate because one party contests the law that is opposing them. Each group learns to try to move their own cause forward.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Is law a hindrance? Do you, Mr. Khalikov, perceive it as an obstacle to action?

### **Rashid Khalikov**

The constituting elements of law lie in the past. Law attempts to analyze the past to be able to confront a situation that, possibly, no longer exists. The United Nations is similar to an oil tanker, a huge mass that can only change direction incredibly slowly. It is very bureaucratic. The systems in place to tackle natural disaster situations date back to September 1991 and their foundations go back as far as the 1980s. Our world however has evolved. There is a necessity today to go further, to go faster. I would not say that law is a hindrance, but it draws on the past when we should be looking towards the future.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Alain Boinet, you asked the question “who is in charge?” But does someone have to be in charge? And who has the capacity to be in charge?

### **Alain Boinet**

I agree with Pierre Duquesne that the coordination of the actors involved in crisis situations has progressed significantly over the last ten years. The United Nations has undergone a major humanitarian reform and has implemented the famous “clusters” or operational coordination groups in an attempt to deliver a response that is better coordinated to address the needs of the different populations. In its own way, France has also played an important role. The four themed conferences that preceded the Conference for the Reconstruction of Haiti which took place in New York in 2010 (Haitian civil society, local authorities, private-sector companies and NGOs) were the result of a proposition put forward and obtained by France. We had instigated a similar initiative in spring 2008 in Paris for the Afghanistan International Conference.

Pierre Duquesne played an essential role in both these conferences alongside Bernard Kouchner. This is real progress: creating dialogue to gain a better understanding of the positions of others to be able to work better together. We must also however be able to define the limits of this coordination. There are many diverse actors and we must differentiate between the respective responsibilities of each.

So, who is in charge? I will tackle the problem from the bottom up. The international community has, from its experience of peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, generally accepted that the best solution to a crisis situation is to integrate all the actors into a comprehensive plan. We must look beyond this and consider the diversity of the actors and the diversity of their mandates and responsibilities, in order to avoid confusion that can be harmful to us all.

I would like to take an example to illustrate this point more clearly. The largest mission currently deployed by the United Nations is that in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The MONUSCO<sup>6</sup> is a 20,000-strong force, mostly of soldiers but also of civilians including personnel working for the United Nations agencies with a humanitarian mandate. As a general rule for NGOs, the sole vocation of the humanitarian actor is to deliver emergency assistance to conflict victims. This is also part of the United Nations' role and the work of its humanitarian agencies. But, the primary and predominant part of the United Nations mandate is to support the political solution to the crisis alongside DRC President Joseph Kabila. Now, the East of the country is in the throes of war, particularly in the Kivu and Ituri districts, and independent observers inform us that the armed forces with the most responsibility for the massive human rights violations being committed in Eastern Congo is the Democratic Republic of Congo's own national army! This is a major problem for the international humanitarian organizations working in the region. Their goal is to access the populations in need of assistance. These populations are falling victim to various armed groups, but also to the DRC's own armed forces that are receiving military support from the United Nations mission to the DRC. This situation, which has existed for many years, remains a terrible reality today. Numerous rapes and summary executions have taken place as recently as the last few days in villages in North Kivu, carried out by members of the Congolese army. This army's units are receiving technical military support from the United Nations. Clearly, this is not simple. Our problem is to access the populations that need assistance. You will all understand that we do not wish to be confused with the United Nations mission on the ground because, true to the mandate it has been assigned, it is supporting units of the DRC's armed forces that are responsible

6 - United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

for committing war crimes. This is why it is absolutely necessary to distinguish humanitarian action from the political and military actions of the United Nations, even if we fervently hope, for the sake of the population, that peace returns to eastern DRC.

Today, it is important to recognize the diversity of the actors, the diversity of the funding and the diversity of our responsibilities. Humanitarian NGOs are not responsible for restoring the peace and they are not responsible for maintaining law and order. Even if they agree that this is the desired outcome, they believe that each actor must adopt and remain in its respective role.

On cooperation and coordination: conflict situations of a political nature are problematic for us. Natural disasters that lack a political dimension are more straight-forward. Cooperation is relatively easy when there are no political considerations or civil war. On the other hand, the political dimension is important; the more intense the conflict, the more of a problem it becomes for unarmed civilian humanitarian personnel needing to access civilian populations in situations where armed groups are in opposition and the international forces present are often also involved in the conflict. Humanitarian organizations are at risk, and must however at all costs access populations in danger. We are neither politicians nor soldiers. The extent and nature of the coordination depends on the situation on the ground and the context in which the humanitarian mission is to be deployed.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Would it not be possible to distinguish between political-military crises and natural disasters?

### **Alain Boinet**

You are right to make this distinction; it is an extremely important one because the mechanisms, including those for coordination and cooperation, are not the same. But natural disasters can sometimes also have a political dimension. We saw this in Sri Lanka with the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) and in Indonesia in Banda Aceh with a Muslim separatist movement. It could also become the case in Haiti where I hope for enough stability to be able to satisfy the needs of the Haitian population.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Mr. Khalikov, is it possible to make this distinction between conflict and natural disaster on an institutional level?

### **Rashid Khalikov**

Yes, we can, but natural disasters often have dramatic effects in countries experiencing political instability. This was the case in Pakistan for example. In the north-west of the country, the situation was very sensitive when the flooding happened. Military forces were supporting the population. For the United Nations however, the use of military transport is only used when a specific authorization has been issued. This was problematic. Sri Lanka following the tsunami is another example because ongoing conflicts were affecting a number of zones. In Indonesia too, Banda Aceh was home to a movement opposed to the political regime in place. In all these examples, political conflict, contestation, already existed when the disasters struck.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Is this distinction important for the reconstruction process?

### **Ambassador Pierre Duquesne**

We can make a distinction between civil war or conflict, and natural disaster. I would however say that in all natural disasters, there is a political crisis. I believe, to employ a little wordplay, that the state of nature reflects the nature of the state. In Haiti, the reason the earthquake, which was not as powerful as some we have seen (a quake of the same magnitude hit Chili just a few months later), wreaked such destruction, was because of the absence of the state. Prior to January 12, 2010, there was no housing ministry and no land registry... Tax revenue was among the lowest in the world, civil protection services were non-existent. The natural disaster revealed that there was no state and therefore a political crisis; even in the absence of a state, controversy and debate ensues on how the state should be managed. Need we be reminded that 85% of Haitian education is private? At the other end of the scale, I take the Indonesian example. The tsunami revealed the strong presence of a state in Indonesia. In the aftermath of this major disaster, the country took charge of its own reconstruction.

This brings me to the question should there be a “leader”? The answer is yes. Who should be in charge? In my opinion there is only one possible answer to this question: the recipient country. Neither an international organization, nor a bilateral partner, nor an NGO can nominate itself as leader. The recipient country must take on this role. When it does not exist, we must help it to exist. If you believe that a child will never walk, that you must constantly hold its hand, then it will never walk! But if you remain by its side, yes - it will fall over, but you will be there to help it up again. Please forgive the use of this metaphor in reference to certain states, but what I am trying to say is that we must at all

costs re-establish the confidence. If we say the state does not exist and that we are going to use everything in our power to circumvent it – multilateral, bilateral existing structures, NGOs – the country will never be able to move forward with an independent state of its own.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Admiral, was the state, an authority present during your operations in Lebanon or the tsunami response in Burma?

### **Vice-Admiral Xavier Magne**

In Myanmar, the state was so authoritarian that it proved to be a source of great frustration for us. We were ready. The Mistral was passing 400 nautical miles from the coast, with a military emergency medical team and civil security on board for a bilateral exercise with India; an amphibious vessel with the capacity to deploy men onto land in zones where vehicles were no longer able to travel. We have never before been unable to intervene because a state did not give us the authorization. Our emergency medical teams are probably still having nightmares about it. They had all the equipment and knowledge they needed, and were never able to deliver this assistance.

### **Alain Ménargues**

In South Lebanon during the 2006 war, did you have to deploy armed forces to protect your operations?

### **Vice-Admiral Xavier Magne**

No, not exactly. We sent a certain number of Marine Commandos to exfiltrate foreign nationals, of course, with the agreement of the Lebanese political authorities. It would have been extremely difficult to do so otherwise. This raised another problem for me. We often talk in our jargon of the “fog of war”. For me, NGOs were contributing to this fog. I did not know where they were, I did not know who they were, I did not know if there were risks of collateral damage, interference, or if the media would be attracted to a zone in which I needed discretion. That was my problem at the time.

### **Alain Ménargues**

The natural leadership role of the United Nations has been mentioned. How does it stand at the moment?

### **Rashid Khalikov**

We are trying to move forward, but I am not sure that we succeed in delivering assistance in every situation. I agree with Pierre Duquesne: the local authorities,

the recipient country should take the lead. Increasingly these countries want to take on this role. They want to show that they are taking responsibility, even if their government is weak, even if their capacities are extremely diminished. We should learn useful lessons from this. We may have doubts on the creation of their state structure or the organization of elections, but it is their country. Foreigners that arrive in their country will always remain foreigners. The governors of disaster-affected provinces have told me that the greatest problem they encountered was foreigners arriving abruptly and wanting to take control of everything. We must know how to behave with modesty. Of course, many NGOs and the United Nations understand this and take local contexts into consideration despite the difficulties that this can entail.

But we encounter situations where the perception of the military is very negative even though the assistance they are providing is vital. Sometimes, the population reacts badly to them wearing sunglasses; they should not be worn because people want to see their eyes. Next they are asked not to throw food parcels at the population, but to hand them out with respect. Again, this is a question of cultural understanding: the army had been trying to distribute the parcels as quickly as possible to respond to the emergency, but their manner was extremely negatively perceived.

### **Alain Boinet**

The question of leadership raises the question of the mission. Let's take Solidarités International, the organization I represent. We are working in 17 countries and we implement 120-130 programs each year for 3.5 million people in countries affected by conflict or natural disaster from the emergency phase through to reconstruction.

Our mission is to provide assistance to populations in danger. To successfully achieve this mission, we must work in close proximity with the populations that also have an important role to play in the relief effort. Furthermore, in crisis situations it is these populations that are the first to offer support to each other. They are the first to act in solidarity. Then there are the population's representatives, local authorities, institutions, NGOs and then there are the conflicting armed groups. Our response must be planned and implemented in communication with all these actors. In Darfur, where we operate both in rebel-controlled zones and areas controlled by the Khartoum government, it is understood that we enter rebel zones with the unspoken agreement of Khartoum and that we are in contact with the commanders of all the rebel movements (JEM, SLA, etc.). To enter a rebel zone you must have contacts, you must make yourself known, have entered into prior agreements. And the same agreement is required from



the government side. An NGO is there to deliver assistance to populations in danger. No agenda should stand in the way of this mission. NGOs are not going to bring peace; it is not their role, the responsibility for this task lies with others.

The country's authorities represent its population. In the absence of national authorities, it may be traditional or local authorities or the people that take things in hand. I have great respect for the state and public services because I know too many countries in which they do not exist, and I see the consequences of this on the population.

One of the changes that has taken place over the last ten years is a new expectation from citizens for fair, honest and efficient governance. This is a huge change that is part of the reality we are experiencing right now. What do we do in situations where this governance does not exist? We look to support fair, honest and efficient authorities at a local level, because our actions are first and foremost implemented at a local level.

Although it is the population's representatives that must have the authority, external actors operating within its boundaries must know the country and its people, they must understand and respect their history and their culture. Without them, there can be no solution. They are not anonymous human beings, interchangeable and without identity. In Afghanistan, we arrived with a ready-made model that we "pasted" directly onto the situation. I am not saying that the situation was a simple one, but we gave no thought to events that had taken place during the thirty years that preceded the interventions by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the American military. We wanted to establish a centralized state – and a central state is necessary – except that Afghanistan is traditionally an extremely decentralized country with strong regional ethnic diversity. We did not ask those with a long presence in the country for their opinion on the situation. Ten years later, we are beginning to understand the consequences of this oversight. Let us ask ourselves about our part of the responsibility in the suffering of others. Who is responsible in Afghanistan for the radicalization of Islam, or even the war that has ravaged since the Soviet invasion of 1979? Who is responsible for the fact that we believed that as the Taliban had evacuated Kabul, the war was over? Who went to ask the ethnologists, the journalists, the humanitarian organizations working in the country who was who, and what we should be doing and not be doing? This would have been of great use. Why did certain major countries support the Afghan resistance, the Mujahedeen, the freedom fighters, and then abandon them once the Soviets had left? To what extent are the main countries engaged in this conflict responsible? How can we claim to

understand the radicalization we are seeing today without taking into account thirty years of war, immense suffering and a certain number of mistakes?

### **Ambassador Pierre Duquesne**

I believe that the only possible coordinator is the United Nations and I would like for the institution to better assume its role, which means in the first instance a better coordination of the United Nations agencies themselves.

The HCR representative said this morning that the United Nations was very bureaucratic. The calamity is that each United Nations agency tends not to want to be coordinated by anybody else, even by the United Nations system itself. Claiming to coordinate everybody else when there is no internal coordination is a little difficult. When special representatives of the United Nations Secretary General are present in the crisis country, firstly and most importantly the various United Nations agencies must accept to be coordinated by this representative. This is not always the case. During my two years working on the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the conference that Alain Boinet referred to, I was shocked to see that OCHA, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – refused to be coordinated by the Secretary General's special representative. You may well go and see the World Bank, the IMF or individual countries, you are badly placed to assume the role of coordinator in any way, shape or form!

Is law a hindrance? One of the many mistakes committed in Afghanistan is neither economic nor military in nature, but related to constitutional law. The United States strongly incited the country to adopt their presidential system. It is not possible however for Afghanistan to function under an executive President. Such a president has two roles to fulfill, that of the Chief of State, the monarch that is the country's public representative, that talks interminably and travels to the provinces, and that of the Prime Minister, call him what you will, who makes decisions. We expected the President of the Afghan Republic to fulfill two roles which, in the Afghan structure, are extremely difficult to exercise concurrently. Mistakes like this have profound consequences.

### **Alain Ménargues**

A question from the floor: we have talked about the new actors present in the domain of humanitarian action and reconstruction, but no mention has been made of the power of a number of private individuals. Bill Gates, for example, today leads some areas of health policy in Africa. If he was to withdraw tomorrow, the whole of health policy in Africa would be affected. Is this true? Does it represent a benefit or a danger in the medium to long term?

### **Ambassador Pierre Duquesne**

It is going a bit far to say that health policy in Africa would collapse. It is however true that, among the new actors we are seeing increasing numbers of privately funded foundations.

This raises two subjects. The first is that western countries no longer wish to commit to providing public development assistance. Our electorate and our leaders from all political parties are increasingly reluctant to make these types of commitments. It is being replaced by private financial flows. The second issue is that these “new arrivals” must agree to enter into coordination activities with all the other actors. I have nothing against the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation or any other, as long as they do not insist on working alone and believing that they know more about what needs to be done than other aid providers or the recipient country. We could in fact question their motivations, although this aspect does not worry me. Public assistance is required to challenge this private funding, but the most important thing is that these private foundations accept to fit into the system in place. They must not arrive on the scene behaving like a bull in a china shop.

### **Rashid Khalikov**

When the current system was put in place the perception was that as soon as the Red Crescent, the Red Cross, the NGOs and the United Nations agencies were present, everybody was involved. Today, there are many more actors: the governments of affected countries, local authorities, donor governments, private foundations etc. In Haiti, twelve African countries provided multilateral assistance for the first time. They wanted to know where their money had been used and they had every right to want to know. Their contribution per inhabitant represented a major effort. Fifteen or twenty years ago, there were no contributions from the private sector. The army was much more active.

This brings us back to the question of the natural leader in this international assistance. I would not say that the United Nations functions optimally systematically, but it is in a strong position to coordinate all these different contributions to the relief effort.

### **Alain Boinet**

The Bill and Melinda Gates foundation represents a budget that is greater than that of the United Nations World Health Organization (WHO). The resources mobilized by Warren Buffet and other American billionaires with the powerful movement that is emerging in the United States will add to this budget. Private actors are not only appearing on the humanitarian stage, but also in human rights and in international relations. They can bring interesting solutions. One

of the great problems facing individual states and the United Nations is coordinating all this. The aim of all these diverse actors is not to add to the disorder and anarchy, but to respond to the needs and expectations and to ensure that the situation improves. A major challenge for the United Nations, but also the United States and all the countries involved in these crises wishing to play this role, is to improve coordination.

Coordination cannot be obligatory. We are not about to implement a soviet-like coordination system, we know full well this does not work. But all these different actors are a reality. Private military companies also pose not-insignificant problems.

How to coordinate all this judiciously? This question is becoming increasingly complex, things are moving more and more rapidly, there are increasing numbers of initiatives from the different actors that must be taken into consideration and often, thrown into the bargain, a failed state. Local actors are not always dependable and efforts must be made to help them to develop. The challenges are considerable; the solution however lies not in a general confusion of roles and responsibilities, but in the optimal coordination of that which is possible and in the respect of the different actors.

**Patrick Bernard Renaud**, *the Order of Malta's Ambassador in Lebanon*

Newly accredited Ambassador of the Order of Malta in Lebanon, I was formerly the European Union's Ambassador in Beirut and responsible for the reconstruction of the Balkans from 1997 to 2000. I identify particularly with two words I have heard used today: dignity and the respect for others. These are essential components of humanitarian action.

If we are to respect others in the humanitarian context, involving the population in our actions is fundamental. This requires investment upstream in the process. We cannot, particularly when we are dealing with a political crisis or a conflict of a religious nature, arrive on the scene and start delivering humanitarian aid without engaging with the affected population. How is this achieved? By working with local NGOs. During the long and painful war in Lebanon, the Order of Malta used Christian and Muslim congregations to treat the wounded. In Sarajevo, the KFOR Commander said to me: "the army must at all costs be involved in the reconstruction." Being an idealist, I used funds from the European Cooperation for this. Today, I am not sure it was the right decision. Humanitarian actors are not apolitical; the army is political; France is political; the Order of Malta is political, but in all its neutrality and independence. It is

the capacity to gain the acceptance of the affected population we are working with that makes the difference.

### **Ambassador Pierre Duquesne**

Of course it is important to work respecting the recipient country, its population and its customs! Of course we must adopt a bottom up as well as a top down approach. I would not however go as far as to say that all operations enacted by nation states and international organizations which are, in essence, political, would be illegitimate and that all programs implemented by NGOs, which are in essence, charitable and kind, would be legitimate.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Didier Destremau asks: we have talked about conferring the coordination role to recipient governments. When these governments are corrupt or tribal, is it not fuelling a system that only exacerbates the difficulties?

### **Ambassador Pierre Duquesne**

I would like to mention the atypical model that we collectively adopted for Haiti. In the absence of a reconstruction agency that should be established at the end of 2011, an Interim Commission for the Reconstruction of Haiti was created.

It has twenty-six members, thirteen Haitian and thirteen international. The thirteen Haitian members, and this is new, do not only represent the executive, but also the judicial system and legislature, NGOs, the private sector and local authorities. We meet every two months under the presidency of the Haitian Prime Minister and Bill Clinton, the United Nations Special Envoy for Haiti. We approve projects including NGO interventions. It is the first time that a multilateral system such as this has the authority to approve the work of NGOs. One of the criticisms voiced by the Haitian authorities was that they had little influence over the work of NGOs. The Interim Commission, established in June, has only existed for seven months. I may be forgiven for thinking that given the elections (an electoral campaign in any country is not a good time for making difficult decisions), very little would have been achieved without the ICRH. The commission has forced donors and the recipient country to move forward. We have heard it said that nothing has been achieved in Haiti. Of the two billion dollars pledged in 2010, 1.4 billion was received last year. That represents 20% of the country's GDP. Absorptive capacity has almost been reached. This foreign aid would represent €400 billion in France. Much has been achieved, but of course, it all takes time. Progress should not be measured according to how fast the rubble is disappearing (the earthquake left twenty or thirty times the rubble left by the World Trade Center disaster in New York and that took two years to be

cleared). Let us not expect that all this can be done in a year. Let us, through strong control, prevent this aid at best being wasted, and at worst, embezzled. The model we have created is far from perfect but I believe it will mark a milestone in development history.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Alexis d'Herbais asks if, when it comes to humanitarian action, it is acceptable to distinguish terrorist acts from political and social disorder, using the nature of the victims as a criteria?

### **Vice-Admiral Xavier Magne**

If the camera had been on close up, you would have been able to see the little hair I have left standing up on end! A victim is a victim. I do not believe we can make distinctions according to the nature of the victims. But, behind this question, I am sensing another: are the military forces there to facilitate the work of humanitarian organizations? My answer is no. Mr. Boinet said that humanitarian organizations had a mission. Of course they do, but we also have a mission. We are appointed by politicians; we are there to resolve situations which are, as a general rule, fairly demanding.

What is interesting in this question is that it comes back ultimately to the question of the leader, of final accountability but also of the overall coherence of the actions of all the actors involved.

Today, NGOs are usually deployed some time before we arrive in a crisis zone because they have anticipated the difficulties and have begun work in zones where the crisis has not yet broken out. I believe that there is no coherence at all because, when we arrive on the scene, the alleged principles of independence and neutrality often lead to confusion over roles. The NGOs are already operational and cannot brutally withdraw to leave us to resolve the military crisis and then allow them back in. This need for neutrality, this need to be able to continue their operations or face becoming potential hostages, creates a number of risks. Independence can tend towards alienation or limit productive relationships. This is the problem we are facing. No party has a global vision; no party can bring coherence to the action. It could even be possible to a certain extent that the combined actions of NGOs and military forces could turn out to be more catastrophic than the initial disaster itself.

### **Alain Ménargues**

What major lesson has each of you taken away from your own personal experiences?

## **Alain Boinet**

There will always be questions, challenges. I have been involved in humanitarian operations for thirty years with *Solidarités Internationales*, I know the international humanitarian sector relatively well, as well as the international relations we are confronted with in our everyday work. We have however made considerable progress both in the volume and the quality of the relief we deliver, and in its coordination. The debate is not over and the interest of an international conference such as this is to work towards improving stakeholder coordination to provide a better response to the situations we face. I thank the Order of Malta and the French Navy for having organized this conference and for having invited us to take part.

I would add, because we have been asked, that I could portray humanitarian NGOs as a sort of international public service to be called upon when, and for as long as, it is needed. The day we are no longer needed, this role must be handed over to local and national authorities. We are not there for life, but to support the populations in danger. Our role is not to replace these authorities. In our field teams, there is one expatriate for ten members of national staff. Whenever we are able, we work with the authorities, not only the official authorities but also with traditional or customary representatives of the population and often with the rebel leaders that control the zone in order to gain access to the populations in need.

I respect all the actors engaged in these operations. I am fairly critical of the events in Afghanistan, but I have great respect for the military forces engaged there, particularly for the French military forces that risk their lives for their work. We can however question what is going on there, and how best to resolve the situation because it has major consequences for our country and particularly for the people of Afghanistan. So, respect for the actors while reflecting too on how to improve coordination. We need blueprints developed based on experience, lessons learned, but not a standard model that is applied systematically to all contexts. We must decide on the optimum level of coordination, country by country, context by context and on how are we going to be able to optimize it to best serve affected populations. But we must also respect the diversity and the mandate of each organization because we work together. I believe we are making progress.

## **Rashid Khalikov**

Firstly, I would like to express my entire agreement with earlier comments on the need to respect the dignity of beneficiaries and affected populations.

One indication of the member states' confidence in the United Nations is the emergency fund that was created five years ago to come to the assistance of populations in need. 124 member states have contributed to the fund which is the largest in the UN secretariat. More than 3.2 billion dollars have been raised. 8,000 projects in 77 countries and occupied territories, and some fifty organizations have received funding. In 2010, the lion's share of funding was allocated to Pakistan and Haiti. And donor countries continue to place their faith in the United Nations capacity to use these funds effectively.

### **Ambassador Pierre Duquesne**

I retain two lessons:

1. The first is to reiterate that success is possible, in order not to fall into undue pessimism. The Palestinian Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad, is due to arrive in Paris in eight days to be received by the highest authorities of the state. Here is a man – and he is not alone, but together with several hundred men they have succeeded in building a Palestinian State. This is not what we hear as a general rule. Some people will tell you that the Palestinians are still incompetent at best, terrorists at worst, and others will tell you a state is of no use at all until all the region's problems have been resolved. In three years however, Salam Fayyad has laid all the foundations of a state, and this has been recognized by the major international organizations. There is governance, security, public finance, all the state functions. The Palestinian Prime Minister has resolved a problem that blights all developing countries which is that of subsidies for water and electricity. In some areas, Palestine outdoes certain developed countries. The Palestinian Authority's budget in commitments and expenditure is published online on the fifteenth day of every month. That is something we have not yet implemented in Europe. But we hear about very little of this, which brings me to my second point.
2. The biggest challenge is battling against preconceptions and the short-sightedness of communication. People reason based on both enduring and short-term preconceptions. I see it with Palestine, I see it with Haiti. There is a need for constant communication. The same media commentators that sometimes, deservedly, accuse capital markets or politicians of having too short-term a view are sadly guilty of their own crime. Maybe this is human nature, a consequence of the fact that human life comes to an end before we see the long-term benefits.

### **Vice-Admiral Xavier Magne**

Just so there is no misinterpretation, I would like to voice my great respect for



NGOs and the fantastic work they do. Having said this, there is huge disparity between them. They are not all at the same level. If we scratch a little at the surface, we can often find that some of their motives are a little suspect. I believe that one of the first things to implement would be some sort of classification system to be able to identify the truly credible NGOs with genuine motivations, therefore limiting confusion between roles.

In a crisis caused by the madness of men, the chronology of past events tells us that NGOs are usually deployed long before the military. In this way, we, the armed forces are fighting with our hands tied behind our backs. If we want to avoid confusion between roles, determined strategic thinking on prevention is required. Prevention is one of the strategic objectives included in the security and defense white papers. The facts however show that our prevention capacity is not as great as all that. The title of this conference is “Humanitarian Diplomacy”. The only thing we can say today is that humanitarian diplomacy does not work, because crises are still happening. This does not mean that humanitarian work has not managed to prevent a certain number of crises, but we only see those that do break out. There is a concerted effort to be made in prevention, and an interrogation into whether there is a real willingness to tackle this issue.

### **Alain Boinet**

Benoit Miribel and I, at the request of Bernard Kouchner, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, had the opportunity to produce a report entitled *Analysis and Propositions on Humanitarian Action in Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations*.<sup>7</sup> Ambassador Régis Koetschet, here today, was our main contact at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the report. We believe and hope that our report will contribute to improving partnerships between public authorities and humanitarian NGOs. We adhere to this spirit of partnership, each actor retaining its respective responsibilities and its role, and ensuring there is clarity and not confusion over these roles and responsibilities. This is how we will move forward together the most effectively.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Thank you to all four of you for having found the time in your busy diaries to share your experience and thoughts with us. After the break, the fourth round table will tackle the principle and ethics of crisis management.

<sup>7</sup> - *Analyse et propositions sur l'action humanitaire dans les situations de crise et post crise*

---

# LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FIELD

---

## **ROUND TABLE 4**

Crisis Management:  
Guiding Principles and Ethics

## **Alain Ménargues**

Last round table of the day: guiding principles and ethics. The violence facing those involved in crisis management calls for great consideration to be given to the protection of the numerous actors on the ground. As a consequence, guiding principles, the respect of ethics and a duty to be cautious are all increasingly necessary elements of disaster management strategies. Is a humanitarian “code of conduct” necessary? On the platform with us:

- **Ambassador Régis Koetschet**, who is Head of the General Directorate for Globalization at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, former ambassador in Afghanistan and who has held past posts in Tripoli, Islamabad, Muscat, Lomé, Jerusalem and Kabul, is today Head of the Directorate’s Civil Society Relationships Mission.

- **Peter Zangl**, Director General of the European Commission’s General Directorate for Humanitarian Affairs and Civil Protection (ECHO), is the man who holds the keys to grants and subsidies. He firmly believes that humanitarian action is inseparable from independence, neutrality and impartiality. ECHO works with 200 partner organizations across the world and disposes of a budget of around €700 million. It is also interesting to know that there are 600 NGOs across the planet seeking to become an ECHO partner.

- **Michel Veuthey** is Vice-President of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo. For this ardent defender of the Geneva Conventions, law professor and former legal advisor at ICRC, respect for the law is the key to effective action. He is a reference for developments in the debate on the compromise between military necessity and humanitarian requirements.

- **Ingo Radtke** is Secretary-General of Malteser International, the Sovereign Order of Malta’s worldwide relief agency. He is German and went to the Military School in Paris. He is in direct contact with the realities of relief and aid today.

There are many questions on a subject like this. With respect to guiding principles, I would like first to ask you about the potential traps awaiting the actors involved in crisis management. A first trap could be that the military forces deployed into the area “militarize” the humanitarian intervention context to too great an extent. A second could be that NGOs become too involved in security and become “reserves” for private military companies. What are your thoughts on this question Mr. Radtke?

**Ingo Radtke**, *Secretary General of Malteser International, the Sovereign Order of Malta's worldwide relief agency*

When military forces arrive in a crisis-affected area in which NGOs are already operating, good coordination and good communication is required. The first step to establishing this communication is to meet face to face.

What distance should be maintained between military units and NGOs in a crisis situation? The optimal degree of collaboration cannot be stated as a universal rule. The appropriate distance must be carefully analyzed and decided for each individual situation. In Afghanistan, greater distance from the armed forces is undoubtedly necessary to ensure the security of NGO workers, because in this context, the military are stakeholders. NGOs must at all cost avoid adopting a stakeholder position. This is not the case however in Haiti where military logistics was essential, particularly during the first days.

**Peter Zangl**, *Director General of the European Commission's General Directorate for Humanitarian Affairs and Civil Protection (ECHO)*

I agree with the concept of communication, which is the most important element. The greatest traps are not the examples given in the introduction, but the potential pitfalls of working with local authorities. Take for example Sri Lanka two years ago. When you propose humanitarian assistance, the initial reaction of most authorities is: "Excellent, leave the materials in the hangar at the airport and we'll deal with it." Humanitarian organizations always refuse to work in this way because their bottom line is that the aid reaches those who need it the most and local authorities do not always identify these target groups accurately. This needs assessment must be carried out by the humanitarian organizations. This is the most frequent trap.

I will never tire of repeating the extent to which principles and respect are important, but no actor can be entirely neutral, independent or impartial. Each organization can aim to adhere to these principles, can give itself codes of conduct, but it is the stakeholders on the ground that determine whether you are perceived as such or not.

When it comes to relations between the military and the NGO community, I like to quote professor Kellenberger, President of the ICRC who says: "the military was invented to perform military actions and humanitarians were invented to perform humanitarian actions." This is a good starting point. From here, we can establish dialogue to better understand each other. We hear that one group has

greater responsibility for such and such an aspect, for example that the military organize security before the humanitarians arrive on the scene. Furthermore we all know that this is not true. I do not know one NGO that would have claimed to take responsibility for security. Moreover, while we're on the subject, I believe that security is tantamount to public order.

It is very important to start with the assumption that NGOs are extremely professional. They have evolved significantly over the last 30 or 40 years. They are no longer enthusiastic youngsters with little more than long hair and a backpack; they are experts that really know their profession.

Today, two codes of conduct exist: International Humanitarian Law and, at the European level, the 2007 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. We have brought a stock with us; please feel free to help yourselves. Everything of importance for humanitarian aid, its principles, humanitarian relations and relations with civil protection services and the military is contained inside.

Lastly, on the question of dialogue, we have no problem communicating either with the military or with NGOs and there is no reason for this to be the case.

**Ambassador Régis Koetschet**, *Head of the Civil Society Relationships Mission at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs General Directorate of Globalization, former Ambassador in Afghanistan*

I consider the use of the word “trap” to be fair, because traps do exist, and for all of us; diplomats, the military and humanitarian organizations. I would like to try to analyze their importance, particularly in relation to my experiences in Afghanistan.

Allow me to quote Elisée Reclus who said “geography is little more than history in space, as history is simply geography in time.” We are effectively confronted with these two traps; the concepts of time and space in the crisis situation.

The crisis brings unstable, complex and uncertain concepts of time. Our diplomatic services dislike this; they are operating in timeframes that are often relatively short:

- The military timeframe may be determined by a mandate, and may also be non-consistent, interrupted. The crisis timeframe for affected populations can vary significantly, either being immediate – I experienced this during the London Conference on Afghanistan where we were talking in billions

of euro, major perspectives, and the Afghans felt that we should be talking in entirely different terms about what should be done the very next day – or, the other extreme, a very lengthy time frame equivalent to the life of a population in a country like Afghanistan. An Afghan proverb says “I took my revenge after one hundred years and people say I hurried.” We must reconcile these two notions of time in our actions and our approach. This is clearly a first trap. It was touched upon earlier during the discussion on law. If training magistrates in Kosovo is complex, imagine what that implies for Afghanistan. The President of the French National Consultative Commission for Human Rights, a remarkable Afghan woman who nearly became a Nobel laureate, made the slightly tongue in cheek remark that: “an entire generation is required to train a magistrate.” These notions of incompressible time then are challenging for us all.

- The second difficulty is space. We tend to perceive Afghanistan as a vast, open country, but the reality is that there are real constraints in access to parts of the territory, a segmented vision gleaned from the accessible intervention areas, the risk of skewed perspectives for example by certain diplomats that are not able to travel throughout the entire country. These complex elements, traps we fall easily into, deprive us of an essential element in the crisis: proximity; that which Gérard Chaliand calls *la connaissance par la peau*, in other words hands-on experience, the perceptions one can only gain through direct contact with a situation, the need for a tactile relationship.
- A third element is the cross-discipline approach, a little like that that so interested Edgar Morin; interconnecting different fields of knowledge. I believe we must come together to connect our different fields of knowledge. A crisis is, by its very nature, extremely complex. The first step is to assume this complexity. Our diplomatic services are not necessarily at ease with this; they tend to be wary of the implications of this kind of reasoning.
- Proximity, complexity and also humility. We must be clearly aware that a crisis calls for humility. This is not simple for any of the groups we represent. We are facing non-negligible challenges and demands, people’s lives are at stake, there are a multitude of different aspects to be managed simultaneously and this can be difficult for a foreign service. The same is true for humanitarian organizations - their professionalization can lead them to remain locked in their certitudes - and for military forces given their level of responsibility in a crisis zone.

On the notion of complexity, I saw progress during my time in Afghanistan. When my mission began the word was somewhat taboo, this was no longer the case towards the end and President Obama and General Petraeus now use the term with confidence and purpose.

**Michel Veuthey**, *Vice-President of the International Institute for Humanitarian Law*

The trap is to rush into action. To quote Albert Camus: “to fight for a truth without destroying it with the very means used to defend it.” This is as true for a military organization as for a humanitarian one. A humanitarian organization cannot limit its actions to assistance, it must also take into account protection. Because protection is prevention: protecting the civilian population means less refugees, less displaced persons (in addition to the fundamental principle of respecting and protecting civilians, one of the rules stipulated in humanitarian law is to outlaw forced population movements). Furthermore, it is the respect of humanitarian law that makes humanitarian actions, both assistance and protection, possible.

Law does not only encompass “positive law” enacted or adopted by lawyers and legal research and training facilities, it also incorporates “natural law” whose foundations are universal and anchored in all civilizations. We can no longer impose our European vision, our perceptions from Paris, from Geneva, from Rome or from London as if we held the key to the entire truth of humanity. No, humanitarian action must be able to lay down foundations in each country, in each civilization. Our duty is not to arrive like extra-terrestrials, but to act with the conscience that we are operating in a space occupied by human beings and communities who have lived and evolved there for millions of years, who have traditions, who have their own law, who have a sense of dignity and of the value of human life. Humanitarian organizations’ first undertaking, before assisting and before protecting, should be to listen to those they wish to help, taking the time to create trust through mutual respect, accepting empathy, trying to understand their priorities, admitting to being able to learn from those we have come to help. And particularly accepting that helping the target population to help themselves should be the overriding priority of the assistance we deliver.

**Badaoui Rouhban**, *Director of UNESCO’s Disaster Reduction Section*

UNESCO is delighted that the words “protection” and “prevention” have found their place at this event. One of the guiding principles for crisis management is that those that come to help affected populations keep at the forefront of their minds the importance of putting milestones in place for the future, for future

crises or disasters that, sadly, may reoccur. Take Haiti for example, it was a fore-told disaster. We knew that the island could be hit by an earthquake of magnitude seven or more. We knew that 85% of the buildings would not withstand an earthquake; we knew that the urban planning was ridiculous. What must be done now? We must implement an emergency response yes, but we must also prepare the prevention of similar disasters threatening Haiti; prevention through warning systems, paraseismic building design, urban planning, information to the population. All this is possible thanks to science and technology.

In the aftermath of disasters we are ready to spend millions. But if we invested in prevention before they happened, we would save millions. We must decide to allocate ten percent of the resources pledged to the reconstruction to earthquake disaster prevention. That requires political will.

### **Alain Ménargues**

A reaction from each of you to what has just been said?

### **Ingo Radtke**

A first rule is to leave things in a better state than we found them. We must not leave a population in a permanent crisis, which was the case of Haiti prior to the earthquake.

A second rule is, when we start working in an emergency situation, we must be looking three to five years ahead. An exit strategy that transfers responsibility to the affected population must be envisaged from the outset. We are talking about their lives, their will and their dignity. The third is to ensure disaster prevention training. This is part of the reconstruction process. If this is not included in the response, we have failed before we start.

### **Peter Zangl**

Emergency situations call for fast action, but this is entirely different from rushing in. This is what distinguishes the amateurs from the professionals.

Protection, prevention and I would add preparedness. These three words are among the cornerstones of the work of ECHO. Generally speaking, any emergency response operation includes an essential protection component. It is unfathomable to begin planning to distribute food aid to the displaced without also considering how you will protect those that are particularly vulnerable and exposed.

An example of the protection work conducted by ECHO is the disaster preparedness program, DIPECHO, but we also implement drought preparedness



programs in the north of Kenya. If the nomads have access to water for longer, the risk of conflict is more than proportionally reduced.

Preparedness means: what actions are people ready to implement when the crisis hits? Who should be communicated what information and how? What are the indications that this really is a crisis situation and that there is imminent danger?

I would like also to comment on the conference title that mentions “crisis management”. It could be more precise. Beyond the bounds of preparedness, my profession is in fact “crisis response”. Crisis management tends to be more applicable to a situation like Afghanistan, what can be done to emerge from the crisis.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Ambassador, how do you believe prevention ties in with crisis management?

### **Ambassador Régis Koetschet**

Prevention today is the role of diplomatic services. Our new minister places much importance on the need to anticipate situations, to reflect on what can be achieved through preventative diplomacy. This requires a debate on the role of states, on the relationships of cause and effect and also on societies.

It can be difficult to embark on this type of reflection particularly for traditional diplomatic services with the instruments they have available to them. This is the reason for the creation of the General Directorate for Globalization, Development and Partnerships and within it, the Civil Society Relations Mission for reflection on civil society relations and also the Crisis Center. The idea is to define forms of action that enable us to better understand the terms of this new international reality, to be in a position to respond better to it and to take into greater account what are known as fragile situations.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Are you inventing a new type of diplomacy?

### **Ambassador Régis Koetschet**

We are not inventing a new type of diplomacy, but we are keen to implement resources that are adapted to a new and changing international landscape. Global issues raise a whole host of concerns, and then there are the questions – climate is a good example – for which the expertise goes beyond state boundaries. We must be ready to go out and gather this information. State actors are still of central importance, but it is clear that other actors now play a fundamental role in international life.

We must adapt our instruments and our processes to these developments which is no mean feat given the complexity of the tapestry as a whole. We are witnessing the emergence of organized civil societies in the southern hemisphere, new actors, agents of change that we must be ready to support, observe and understand. We must be both interested in and open to these new global actors.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Can law serve as a tool, Professor, to move from management to prevention?

### **Michel Veuthey**

Law is itself the result of action. The Geneva Conventions are the result of disaster situations, collective tragedies. The process began in Solferino, it continued in Tsushima, a naval battle well known to the sailors among us. After the First World War, we made provisions for prisoners of war and after the Second World War, for civilian protection. Humanitarian law, I believe I heard earlier, is always one war behind. This may be, but this war is now an integral part of it, it is written in blood, and the ultimate aim is to prevent its repetition.

I believe prevention starts with education. Not simply giving technical training to humanitarian personnel, but educating people in ethics and in the respect of the civilizations and the customs of the people we intend to assist.

Next, we must empower these people, we must build their capacity to be able to confront the crisis themselves, facilitate resilience. We are not trained to descend like squads of elites, but to have many auxiliaries. The Grand Chancellor said this morning that the Order of Malta had people in many countries. We must also look at this: who are our allies in each country? How can we mobilize them and how can we do so while communicating the appropriate message?

### **Alain Ménargues**

Can ethics contribute to international effectiveness?

### **Michel Veuthey**

Yes of course! Who was saying that the media evoked emotion? Ethics have re-entered the playing field. Muslim sages tried to convince the Taliban not to destroy the Buddhas. Religious communities have their role to play here too, and not only Christians. They can be allies to humanitarian action and bring this ethical aspect into play.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Have you come across this moral dimension Ambassador?

### **Ambassador Régis Koetschet**

Part of my personal motivation is related to humanitarian action, to the conception of the world reflected in this action. I am fortunate that diplomacy in my country makes room for this and errs in a similar direction. Twenty-five years ago, before being posted to Afghanistan I was based in Pakistan. For my birthday, I was given a small engraving of a camel by several humanitarian organizations I worked with. I told them that it would always have a place in my office and would, as a reminder of their commitment, guide my actions as a diplomat. It is still in my office today. Crises create difficult, uncomfortable, violent situations. We must be able to look beyond these and concentrate on maintaining proximity. The reality we were confronted with in Afghanistan was extremely harsh. It is a country where it is impossible to unwind. Whether you were a diplomat, a humanitarian worker or anyone else, it was important to get together to stay on track and share experiences. Our action is based on fundamental shared values. But the reality of a crisis is, by definition, harsh and constraining.

### **Peter Zangl**

I believe that we must differentiate between two things. Firstly, humanitarian aid as we know it is anchored in our western values. If, as we have said, every country has its own truth when it comes to natural law, this is also true for value systems. A humanitarian organization must identify the values that are specific to the population group it encounters. This is the convergence point between our values and the values which are essential to the vulnerable people we are looking to help. This dialectic functions well and, in my experience, is not a difficult one. Islamic Relief Worldwide delivers humanitarian assistance just like any other organization.

### **Ingo Radtke**

I would offer an example from our own experience in Indonesia. We arrived in the country during a phase of extreme crisis. So many organizations arrived in Sumatra in the aftermath of the tsunami a further crisis ensued. Indonesia was, initially, going to expel us from the country. Three years later, the Government of this, the mostly highly populated Muslim country in the world, came to us with an agreement to continue our work in Indonesia. “We would be very happy to continue working here, but why? You are aware that we are a Christian, a Catholic organization?” we asked. Their response was: “That is exactly why we want you to stay, because you have values and they resemble ours. You believe in something, you are not just technicians, you also come with compassion and faith. We know that you are Catholic, but you impose nothing on us, you respect our religion, our way of life and we respect yours. This is why we are asking you to continue working in the country.” We were extremely proud.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Are the terms “ethic” and “Real politik” compatible in humanitarian action?

### **Peter Zangl**

Humanitarian action is real action. If you define “Real politik” as the execution of real actions, then it is also comprised within our action.

This brings me to the title “Humanitarian Diplomacy” which I am not entirely comfortable with. If we convey the impression that humanitarianism has a diplomatic goal, then the respect of humanitarian principles becomes a pipe dream. Inferring that humanitarian actions have collateral effects on diplomacy is a different story. Take for example Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008. ECHO had been working in Myanmar for a long time because the refugee groups on the country’s different borders had already attracted our attention. This made us an acceptable and recognized partner for the Burmese authorities. As a result, we were among those who had the least difficulty acquiring the green light to work in the crisis zone. It was on this basis that the authorities of Myanmar, who ultimately decided that we were acceptable – not to go as far as to say respectable – set in motion the process that, in the end, opened the diplomatic corridor to us. If you consider humanitarian diplomacy as a collateral effect I agree, but if you are stating that humanitarian organizations have diplomatic ambitions, I do not, because this is not the case.

### **Alain Ménargues**

I referred to “Real politik” in the sense that it must encompass every aspect we encounter in a crisis situation to be able to access the populations, including the negative elements and the ethics associated with our own action.

### **Peter Zangl**

This is the only way we are able to work.

### **Ingo Radtke**

I would add that in the crisis country, which remains a sovereign country, we are invited, we are guests. The people have a government; there is a system in place. To respect the population we must be in contact with this government, with those in power in the country. It is impossible to work in a country without doing this. The Order of Malta had been present in Myanmar since 2001. It was almost the only Christian organization that was able to work there because we had 200 national staff that knew better than anybody else what to do. We had the trust of a government with which we had kept the appropriate distance.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Ambassador, for several years now attacks, kidnapping and the assassination of humanitarian aid workers has been increasingly common.

Does this, in your opinion, imply that they are becoming more reckless, that they are operating in more difficult contexts than before, or that there has been an evolution in the risks that surround them? Is insecurity likely to transform the actions and visions of humanitarian organizations?

### **Ambassador Régis Koetschet**

This is a major concern shared by our entire national community. I remember back in the 1980s when our friend Alain Boinet crossed the whole of Afghanistan on foot with his caravans. There were humanitarian casualties back then, but the security context was better than it is today. Insecurity today is affecting everybody, humanitarian organizations, journalists, diplomats. If diplomats too often enclose themselves in a restricted space, it is for security reasons. Populations are also affected. The number of kidnappings of Afghani citizens is extremely high. During my time in the country there was a strike by the doctors in Herat to demonstrate that they would no longer tolerate their families falling victim to this criminal behavior. These are all consequences of the crisis. It is an additional and significant issue requiring consideration within our foreign affairs department. Today, the situation in the Sahel is forcing us to think very carefully about the potential consequences in terms of our presence, outreach and development. It is a context which presents intrusive limitations that can often make us feel as though our hands are tied.

### **Peter Zangl**

In any case, it is one of the greatest dangers for humanitarian action. Humanitarian personnel are serious, rational and courageous. In the positive sense of the word, yes, they are reckless, but they are not impetuous. Contrary to diplomats who also have humanitarian mandates that are not always easy to fulfill, humanitarians prefer discretion and dialogue. Our concern is always to assess whether we are able to deliver aid to a particular beneficiary group. There are thousands of ways to do this. Dialogue with local populations and a minimum display of discretion are, in general, the preferred tools to give us the necessary assurance in the majority of cases. When non-humanitarian vehicles are painted white, this need for discretion is compromised and this is a problem for us. One of the most critical situations today is Darfur where insecurity has escalated to such a degree that the so-called "humanitarian space" has been reduced to practically nothing. The question - how are we going to be able to continue delivering humanitarian aid in Darfur? - is just around the corner.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Have you been forced to withdraw humanitarian assistance for security reasons?

### **Peter Zangl**

It is not up to me to make this kind of decision but, in a manner of speaking I have. I do not want to sidestep the question. The humanitarian aid we provide is implemented by partners - NGOs, United Nations agencies, the Red Cross family - under these organizations' own responsibility. In Darfur, in the communication we engage in with our partners to organize the delivery of this aid, we are, sadly, frequently forced to conclude that continuing operations is impossible. The number of western NGOs operating in Darfur today is falling rapidly, limiting our implementing capacity substantially. So in this sense, the answer to the question is yes.

### **Ingo Radtke**

We encountered this problem in Afghanistan. When we saw a third colleague die, we left the zone. Our very presence, the fact that we were from a western country transformed the situation. And it was not the expatriates being targeted but particularly the national staff. I saw letters that had been sent to our local colleagues threatening to kill their wives and their daughters. We decided to step back in order not to jeopardize the work. If we place those that bring humanitarian aid in danger, we put the entire system in danger. Each humanitarian organization must judge the situation for itself.

### **Alain Ménargues**

That falls within the definition of "Real politik" that I gave earlier. This is a question for the law professor: are "Real politik" and ethics constitutive elements of the same position?

### **Michel Veuthey**

Yes, of course, because positive law is conferred by government legislation, it is therefore part of the political work of the government. But these same governments do not wield limitless power in their implementation of "Real politik" policies, they also require legitimacy. This legitimacy is acquired through ethics.

### **Ambassador Régis Koetschet**

The word confidence has been used frequently throughout the day. I too believe that this concept is absolutely crucial. I would add self-confidence for affected populations who, in a crisis situation, are required to rebuild communication and self-confidence. Confidence however calls for proximity. We must have confidence in them and them in us. Being confronted with insecurity and

the consequential distance that it creates, can complicate the development or conservation of this crucial trust element. Every look, gesture and word is a stepping stone across the river of suspicion to the trust that lies on the other side. Actively maintaining a situation of insecurity is also a way to break down this trust relationship.

### **Alain Ménargues**

A question for Michel Veuthey: do you believe that *Jus post Bellum* can serve as a legal framework for the coordinated activities of the different actors in the reconstruction phase?

### **Michel Veuthey**

We are not going to embark here on legal explanations about the differences between the law that applies when going to war, the law that applies during that war and the law that applies after it! This is not central to our discussions today. What is central can be summed up in a single word: respect.

How do we respect affected populations while we are assisting them and while we are helping them to rebuild their communities? Are we going to ask them for their opinion? Are we going to ask them if they would prefer a hospital or a school? The answers to these questions do not lie in international law but in consultation, true cooperation. Our African friends could teach us much if they were to attend our international summits. This is what we must try and envisage. Next, we must work to reintegrate demobilized former combatants for example, we must help entire civilian populations to overcome their trauma, starting with child soldiers. If we do not tackle these issues, we will encounter these same individuals in the future as criminals and terrorists. “Real politik” asks us to be humanitarians. *Post Bellum* law is not only there to rebuild walls, to rebuild electricity or water networks, but it is about rebuilding a community that can stand on its own feet, and not one that is held up by a head of state imposed on a country according to standards that were defined on the other side of the world.

### **Alain Ménargues**

The urgency of an emergency situation gives us the impression that everything must be done in the hour that follows. Yet, we must not rush if we are to be able to respond effectively. *Demain ou après demain, le temps ne compte pas* an Arabic proverb tells us: what is important is not the time it takes, but achieving the results. Tailgating the emergency phase is the consequential enduring crisis which has, in some cases, continued for more than twenty years. How do you manage this time dimension?

## **Peter Zangl**

I would like to make one further comment on the security aspect. The expatriate humanitarian network, which mostly includes nationals from countries we work very closely with, and the security systems employed by the United Nations, foreign embassies, the European Union and NGOs as well as our own, provide us with a constant security information exchange system in our different intervention zones. It is on the basis of these broadly collective analyses that decisions are taken by individual actors on withdrawing from an area for security reasons. When, for example, the ECHO staff in South Darfur evacuate at a given moment for a limited period of time, it goes without saying that this information is shared with the NGOs working with us in the same zone. Movements of this type tend to coincide, but are not pre-empted by public debate. They are structured decisions made on the basis of correctly analyzed and shared flows of information, information which is constantly updated and fed into the system.

On the time dimension: what happens in a crisis? Let us take the example of Haiti. The first information we receive is that there has been a serious earthquake. Within 24 hours, an expert from ECHO has arrived in Port au Prince and in 72 hours a civil protection team has followed. What do these people do? Firstly, a situation analysis. This is the difference between rushing and working fast. These are the people that are able to tell us as quickly as possible “this is what we need immediately” and these are the people that are able to organize the priorities in the appropriate chronological order allowing us to strike the right balance between these two time-related dimensions.

The first experts arrive with a standard backpack that provides them with a desk and a computer; the team that follows is made up either of a taskforce or of members of organizations such as Telecoms without Borders who set up basic communication capacity. Following these initial steps, a close collaboration with the United Nations is established. I know that the world is far from perfect and that the United Nations is complex but, if we did not have the central coordination role provided by the United Nations, we would be particularly badly equipped to be able to find this balance between time-critical actions and the space to deliver a coherent response.

## **Alain Ménargues**

A question from Mr. Attar from the Algerian delegation of UNESCO: Ambassador, is there not an urgent need to combine national reflections to encourage the global reflection imposed by the interdependence that is inherent to globalization? Does today's global reality not call for an entirely inclusive approach with crucial contributions from all nations?



### **Ambassador Régis Koetschet**

The holistic approach to knowledge evoked by Edgar Morin that connects different disciplines calls for a shared approach that is as broad as possible. Local realities are major components of international life. We must, to a far greater extent than we have been able to in the past, consider how we are going to articulate and animate this global reflection. I am delighted that southern countries are beginning to challenge us and that they are expressing their desire to enter into the dialogue on different issues. Our engagement today should be organized based on this very question. The reason the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs created the General Directorate for Globalization was to work towards this very ambition.

### **Alain Ménargues**

But, are we observing an increasing number of identity crises, in some cases going as far as territorial divisions?

### **Ambassador Régis Koetschet**

I read Régis Debray's book, *Eloge des frontières*, and his positive vision of borders with interest. This is an important issue in the context of our discussions here. I would like to talk briefly about the cultural dimensions of a crisis. A crisis wreaks physical and material destruction yes, but there are also significant psychological and moral dimensions to this destruction. Once the crisis is over, there is a need to re-weave the threads of cultural identity.

A collective conscience has been wiped out and must be reconstituted. I am committed to this concept of cultural identity. In Afghanistan, the international community may well have neglected it. We wanted to move fast, and that was important, towards institutional regeneration, a reconstruction of the state. An important prerequisite however was overlooked: the consideration of so much suffering, the necessity to facilitate both individual and social reconstruction. I believe strongly in the notions of cultural identity and social contract. I am delighted that our country's foreign service integrates this conviction entirely. In Afghanistan, we promoted the production of films and the training of film producers - cultural activities and we renovated the French cultural center which is the only venue in existence for artistic creation in Kabul today.

All this is extremely positive; these are real contributions to the reconstruction and crisis emergence efforts. When I was in Jerusalem, five cultural centers were under the authority of our consulate. Cultural centers also contribute to the dialogue on peace. I believe this is a prerequisite. We do not always grant it enough importance and yet it is difficult to develop an institutional, political,

democratic or legal project if this dimension, which is very intimate and comes back to the populations of affected countries, is not handled with great attention and sensitivity.

### **Alain Ménargues**

A question from Rear Admiral Michaud: ECHO has been greatly criticized for its lack of visibility due to its systematic partnerships with implementing NGOs. The image of Europe is suffering as a result. Have measures been taken in this area?

### **Peter Zangl**

This is a long debate. I am happy that our partners are raising it because one of our ongoing discussions is on how these implementing partners – NGOs, United Nations agencies -, beyond ensuring their own visibility, also ensure ours. It is a permanent dialogue.

Visibility is an extremely difficult issue. It must be worked on at all times. We can always do better. But there are moments when discretion is preferable, where arbitration is required between the capacity to deliver aid and visibility. If there is the slightest doubt, the balance must tip towards the capacity to deliver aid. Following discussions last summer in Pakistan we decided to keep a low profile in terms of visibility. This does not mean hiding away, but that caution is required. I have just returned from Tindouf. If you were following the Algerian press yesterday, you would have seen that I made concerted efforts in terms of visibility. The Commissioner may tell you tomorrow that I am not doing too badly and yet that much more remains to be done.

And now a word on globalization: surprisingly, the globalization question has two dimensions: a local dimension and a global, universal dimension.

- From the local perspective, I agree with the Ambassador. We must involve local actors to a greater extent. We work with NGOs that have a headquarters in Europe, but in our framework agreements with these partners, it is clearly indicated that they may work with local actors for project implementation. This is how we maximize the capacity to involve those with the greatest proximity to the vulnerable target groups in question. This is particularly important when it comes to prevention and preparedness. When working on disaster prevention it is vital to work with local actors and this is what we do. This is the local dimension and we can never place enough importance on it.
- At the other end of the scale is the universal dimension. For a number of years now, diverse humanitarian actors have been appearing on the scene

and are becoming increasingly active. These are the Chinese, the Group of 77, actors from the Arab and Islamic worlds – I differentiate between them -, and Russia. These actors call what they do humanitarian aid, but as it does not adhere to the very minimum of humanitarian principles we tend to say that it is aid, but not humanitarian aid. We must, and this is urgent, engage in dialogue with these actors, because the worst case scenario with regards to the provision of independent aid would be, in ten years or so, to find ourselves in a situation with ten key actors from the United Nations system and a host of others, either working without any coordination at all, or worst of all, working in competition with one another. This is one aspect of globalization that we must keep constantly in our sights. The Commissioner is regularly reminding me of this. It is a phenomenon that will become increasingly predominant in the months to come.

### **Ingo Radtke**

As an operator, one thing that is important for humanitarian aid is the existence of a network. If we do not have a network, if possible a global one, there is a great risk of failure. It is always preferable to have organizations on the ground and, in times of crisis, to arrive with the intention of reinforcing existing teams. We are fortunate because with the embassies and the associations we are affiliated with, there is someone from the Order of Malta in nearly every country. The time dimension is clear. The military says no action without reconnaissance. But if the reconnaissance is already done, or partly done, and we come with the rest we are in the best possible position to be able to help the people on the ground according to their needs.

### **Michel Veuthey**

At the end of the last century, there was much celebration of the United Nations Charter, the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We no longer have great reason to celebrate, but we have not reached the point of despair either. We should acknowledge that our contemporary positive law is not as benevolent as it could be. We, in the West, have made compromises between “Real politik” and humanity, but we could learn from other civilizations. That is what we must do: engage in dialogue on the fundamental rules of humanity. The essence is a golden rule which is not only Christian – it is well-known as far away as China and in many other places and that is: “do not do unto others as you would that they should do unto you”. In fact, we should be doing the opposite: let us treat others as we ourselves would like to be treated.

**PROJECTION OF THE FILM:**

*Missions of the French Navy in support of the populations  
of Lebanon and Haiti,  
produced by SIRPA Marine*

[www.conferenceordredemalte.org](http://www.conferenceordredemalte.org)



---

# CONCLUSIONS OF THE DAY

---

**Admiral Jacques LAUNAY**

General Inspector of the French Navy

I wanted to include a short interlude to close this stimulating first day of discussion and presentations giving us the opportunity to reflect on the meaning of our actions. The images you have just seen, while continuing to advance our discussions, also trigger an emotional reaction. It is emotion too that helps to illuminate the understanding and innovation that generate concrete solutions to crises and to their humanitarian consequences. It is for this reason that I decided to let these images speak first before summing up my perceptions of the challenges in question.

My conclusions are naturally based on my personal experience (working with the World Food Program in Nairobi to assist the population of Somalia), but predominantly on the very rich discussions that have been heard here today. I have also collected testimonies from Haiti from Admiral Raffaelli, currently Senior Commander of the French Armed Forces in the Caribbean, and from Captain Damien Lorge, Commander of the French Navy ship *Siroco* during the Haiti earthquake operation. I have collected testimonies from Lebanon from Admiral Magne and from Captain Gilles Humeau, then Second Commander of BPC *Mistral* and BPC Commander at the time of the tsunami in Myanmar.

The list of these testimonies alone confirms that the French Navy has a major presence on the ground (what an expression to use for the Navy!) in the management of major international crises and their humanitarian consequences.

Having seen the film, you will join me in acknowledging that we have one duty only: to succeed. Our experience in the management of crises and of their humanitarian consequences should help us to broaden the scope of our reflection, without interfering in each actor's particular role, but without excessive complaisance either. I would like to structure my conclusions around the three main criteria for success: cooperation, coherence and continuity.

In this era of relative powers, relative organizations, relative perceptions and specific interests, we must pursue these criteria concurrently to succeed:

## **1. Cooperation**

The first cornerstone on which our action should be founded is the promotion of cooperation. We can consider this cooperation at four levels:

- First of all, internal cooperation at the Ministry of Defense, because this is the institution I am representing today. This cooperation is undoubtedly the easiest to translate into action as it is inherent to our ministry's organization, and particularly to that of our operational forces. It is the interoperability of

the armed forces and of the health service and the notion of inter-armed command that enables this command to fulfill its responsibilities.

- Cooperation is also required between ministries. The reorganization of crisis management with the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs holding the centralizing and coordinating role is a step forward for our national organization. This inter-ministerial role once more allows us to enlist the best available skills in the country while attempting to minimize the bureaucratic nature of the decision-making processes.
- In addition to these internal state endeavors exists the cooperation in the relations between state and non-governmental organizations. This type of cooperation tends to be improving for two reasons - non-governmental organizations have matured and have become more professional and all the actors, with a few rare exceptions, are increasingly open to this type of cooperation. These relations can however also expose a number of fundamental pitfalls that have been discussed today. The objectives of private companies, non-governmental organizations and states do not always converge and need to be clarified rapidly and at the right level. This is vital because it is these operators that ensure, or not, continuity in the reconstruction phase.
- And lastly the fourth level, cooperation is also necessary in inter-state international action. This applies as much to government forces from different countries being able to work together as to the development of a common strategy by foreign diplomatic services and the local representatives of an authority inevitably weakened by the humanitarian crisis. The situation after the earthquake in Haiti was unique in this respect, because the country's authority was heavily weakened in its capacity to respond both by the scale of the physical destruction of the country's infrastructure and by the humanitarian disaster affecting so many state officials and their close families. The example of Lebanon in 2006 demonstrates the need to be able to engage an operation that factors in both a specific and contested force within the Lebanese population, in other words Hezbollah, and the Israeli naval forces patrolling off the coast. In this example we were not only required to manage international cooperation, but also the short-falls in this cooperation.

So, cooperation is a requirement to pave the way for hope. It is the key to successfully implementing the first few steps in the management of a crisis to strengthen the coherence of the longer-term response.

## **2. Overall coherence**

Overall coherence is the second criteria for success and something that we should be constantly seeking to achieve. It is measured both by the capacity to respond to the needs of affected populations and by its favorable impact on international public opinion.

Lessons learned from recent operations have shown that very real opportunities to improve this coherence exist, and, in most cases, that they are within our reach. The actions of a single entity are today no longer sufficient to respond to all the consequences of a crisis. We must exercise humility. Concurrently, the emergency, the multiple tasks requiring action, the necessity for expertise and divergent objectives are among the factors that need to be reconciled to mount a coherent response in an extremely rapidly-changing environment.

Port or airport access is required to be able to supply equipment, and human and medical aid but this access will inevitably be anarchic in a non-secure zone like in Lebanon or in the absence of operational infrastructure as was the case in Haiti. Similarly, and everyone here is well aware of this, relocation of the population to temporary camps can only be envisaged after a rapid, yet comprehensive and accurate, analysis of the health risks associated with a large number of people living in close confines. The gravity of the recent cholera epidemic should compel us to think about the consequences and limitations of actions decided in emergency conditions.

This determined and constant search for a coherent response, based on a shared vision, still has much scope for improvement. Different decision-making processes have been implemented with varying degrees of success during the major crises of the last few years. They have provided responses with differing degrees of effectiveness, underlining shortfalls in performance, in coherence and undoubtedly insufficient consideration of a number of notions related to public interest. Our communal efforts should allow us to federate the engagements of all the actors: states, non-governmental partners, the media and the target populations, to work towards a structured, efficient, coherent and durable response.

Wishful thinking I hear you say. Yes, implementing successful humanitarian actions also means pronouncing aspirations that keep the flame of hope alive.

## **3. Continuity**

Continuity is the third criteria for crisis management. It must be reinforced



across the entire spectrum: prevention and onset of the crisis, and the emergency and reconstruction phases.

Military forces have the huge advantage of being able to implement a large-scale response with little notice and in sometimes insecure environments. The way in which many NGOs and UN agencies are organized allows highly skilled human resources, funds and stocks of emergency materials to be mobilized extremely quickly and facilitates inter-cultural communication. This combination of resources, as was very clear in the initial response in Lebanon, is a real advantage but in order to be effective and of a high standard, it requires upstream preparation. Continuity then must begin before the humanitarian crisis. Agreements such as the South Pacific regional agreement between France, Australia and New Zealand offers a framework to be able to work on these issues before the crisis hits, resulting in better continuity in the management of the response.

Furthermore, greater consideration should be given to the handover between operators working on the initial emergency phase, often government forces, and those implementing the reconstruction response, usually NGOs. This transition phase deserves our full attention today.

But the most important point in this continuity is of course long-term action and post-crisis management. This phase can run from a few weeks in the simplest of cases to several months or several years in the most complex situations. The transition from the initial response timeframe to the reconstruction timeframe is a tricky one. The two examples we have mentioned today (Haiti and Lebanon) show to what extent long-term deadlines need to be envisaged, and the political, economic and governance perspectives that need to guide the management of these crises. We have a duty to intervene, while not overstepping our role, and while keeping in the forefront of all our minds the long-term reconstruction objective.

The humanitarian emergency cannot be a policy in itself, or act as a warning against future inertia, but it must lead, provoke and federate the reconstruction process. Although we sometimes question the bureaucracy and sluggishness of decision-making processes within international organizations, we must however acknowledge that these institutions, and these institutions alone, have the capacity to ensure continuity in their actions over extremely long periods of time. The challenge is to be able to successfully associate the particular merit of each of the actors: the governance of international organizations, the immediate intervention capacity of nation states and the capacity of NGOs and private economic actors to mobilize specialized human resources and competencies.

By associating these three criteria in our strategic thinking to encourage non-exclusive cooperation, seek coherence in our response and reinforce continuity, we may be able to rise to the challenge of improving our management of international crises and their humanitarian consequences. Given the magnitude of the financial flows, the networks of skills and human intelligence and the public and private resources available, it would be completely incomprehensible that we were unable to mobilize an effective response to come to the assistance of disaster-affected populations or those that fall victim to human folly.

You have experienced emotion while watching the film and you have listened to a day of high-level reflection and debate.

I will leave you with three points I consider to be particularly important:

- Firstly, I will reiterate that emotion is part of life. It is consubstantial to our reaction in a given situation. It deserves a place in our discussions and debates and even in disaster planning. We do not live without emotion. Rational reasoning should not exclude emotion or feelings.
- Next, to come back to a subject touched upon today, it is relativity which leads us to question the legitimacy of our actions. We are today, as Amin Maalouf describes it in his book, *Le Dérèglement du Monde*, in times of “unstable legitimacy” or even “lost legitimacy”. We are constantly required to seek channels of accepted legitimacy. And yet, with constantly moving goalposts we must be vigilant in times of change.
- Lastly, several speakers spoke rightly of dignity. We must effectively take great care not to reach the “threshold of moral incompetence” described by Maalouf in his book by becoming increasingly insensitive to individual and collective pain.

And without comforting ourselves with illusions of human and collective motivation, we must rediscover the path of the “gratuitous act”. It is in rediscovering this essential notion of the gratuitous act that we will work together to defend Man and Humanity.

Thank you.

Friday 28 January 2011

---

# TOWARDS A NEW FORM OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT

---

## **ROUND TABLE 5**

What forms of coordination, partnership or integration should we be aspiring to? How best to use the mediation tools available to us?

## **Alain Ménargues**

We talked yesterday about the contexts in which crises occur, about what a crisis really is, about the actors, about what is effective and what is not in their management and about guiding principles and ethics. This morning, we will be taking a forward-looking approach. Today's new challenges call for new mechanisms for consultation and action. Other actors are appearing on the scene. We are seeing massive population movements, a radicalization of certain conflicts, more dramatic disaster situations, new mediation methods appearing within emerging civil societies and an inter-faith dialogue which is still hesitant but which is beginning to assert itself. What is the potential for coordination and partnership? Is there a need to redefine the missions of the major humanitarian actors? What are the ideal conventions we should be aiming for to best serve affected populations? Which initiatives should be encouraged? With us today to discuss these questions:

- **General Patrick de Rousiers**, Air Force General and General Inspector of the Armed Forces at the Ministry of Defense, formally led the French military representation to both the European Union and to NATO in Brussels. A fighter pilot, he commanded Air Defense and Air Operations for homeland security and was part of the command center for NATO air operations during the Kosovo conflict.

- **Ambassador Omar Hilale**, Morocco's permanent representative to the United Nations and other international organizations in Geneva, previously held the positions of General Secretary of Morocco's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and Ambassador for Morocco in Indonesia for a large part of Asia including Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. He has spent almost half of his career in Geneva and closely follows all initiatives related to justice, health, prevention and security.

- **Laurent Thomas** is Director of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division. Generally in a crisis situation, it is the farmers and fisherman that are the most affected, and being able to get back to work is a question of life and death for them, their families and their immediate environment. He began his career with the FAO in Angola developing agricultural research programs in a context of war. He has worked in every crisis and natural disaster situation that has arisen in the last twenty years from Rwanda to Afghanistan, from the "Oil for Food" program in Iraq to the recent flooding in Pakistan.

- **Benoît Miribel**, Director General of Fondation Mérieux since January 2007, is specialized in the fight against infectious diseases. He is here today as President

of international NGO Action contre la Faim (ACF). He describes his mission as follows: “We are all aware that humanitarian action is not an exact science and that it requires constant adaptation to the realities of the field and the challenges. Vulnerable populations, and firstly those that are dying from malnutrition, are the motivation behind our humanitarian commitment.”

- We are awaiting a recorded statement from Mr. Mike Bittrick, Deputy Director of the Office of Regional and Security Affairs at the State Department's Africa Bureau. He was supposed to be here with us in Paris today but was unable to travel due to the American snowstorm. Former Colonel of the Marines, he is responsible today for implementing and overseeing key activities for the Americans, such as military professionalization and peacekeeping capacity enhancement programs. He has been involved in the conflict resolution efforts in Sudan including Darfur, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and others. His office plans and supervises an annual aid and security budget for Sub-Saharan Africa of more than 200 million dollars.

Let us start by hearing from each of you. There appears to have been a degree of misunderstanding in our perception of an emergency. It seems they are easier to anticipate than we thought, and particularly that they last for far longer.

**Laurent Thomas**, *Director of Emergency and Rehabilitation Operations at the FAO*

It is important to acknowledge that today, indeed, the large majority of victims in crisis situations are farmers and fisherman and that for them, their activity is their survival. When the aid organizations pull out their only chance of survival is to produce their own food. But there is also a question of dignity. There is nothing more humiliating for a producer than being dependent on food aid. We must, when implementing our emergency response, prioritize reinstating these agricultural activities as quickly as possible.

Can crises be anticipated or not? Is it an emergency or not? My starting point in addressing these questions is that the diversity of modern-day crisis situations calls for a more detailed analysis. What are the threats? We have talked about more frequent and more violent natural disasters, we have talked about ongoing conflicts, we have talked about food crises – we could easily see a repetition of what happened in 2008. We have been reminded that food crises are not only the consequences of a humanitarian crisis but that they can also be the cause. We have also talked about newly emerging diseases, new threats such as the swine flu epidemic we faced two years ago.

We often present crises, and this is also true of the media, as events that interrupt a development process: development process – crisis – intervention of the “emergency services” and then we pick up the development process where we left off. The reality is very different.

Can we anticipate a crisis? Yes, absolutely. Even natural disasters can be anticipated. The monsoons in Southeast Asia are an annual phenomenon. Cyclones hit the Caribbean every year. We know the vulnerable zones, the fragile states, the crises that are ongoing. We would like today to see alternatives to the traditional emergency response.

**Benoît Miribel**, *Director General of Fondation Mérieux, President of Action contre la Faim*

If I may add a nuance to the previous speaker's comments, in my opinion, there is no such thing as a humanitarian crisis. There are political crises with humanitarian consequences. What is a humanitarian crisis really? Initially, there is a political crisis or a natural disaster with consequential aftereffects on the population. We must clearly state the causes each time.

What is an emergency? An emergency is a relative concept according to the perceptions of the different actors. For us at ACF, the eight thousand children that are going to die in India constitute an emergency - and United Nations and WHO figures corroborate this. India has the highest mortality rate for young children. In some cases we are faced with a crisis in the conflict sense, but there is less loss of human life among the civilian population than in other contexts.

**Alain Ménargues**

Ambassador, you are in a privileged position to observe the work of the major international organizations. What is your perception of an emergency, shaped by these observations?

**Ambassador Omar Hilale**, *Morocco's permanent representative to the United Nations and other international organizations in Geneva*

I must acknowledge that there has been a realization within these international organizations that crises can now be anticipated, particularly food crises and humanitarian crises. In the past, they were not equipped with the tools to anticipate such events, but for several years now, since the major disasters of recent times, the tsunamis, the earthquakes, it has been made possible. I agree with my colleagues, I believe that crises can be anticipated, particularly political crises.

We can anticipate political conflicts, we can intervene upstream, we can do much to prevent a situation from becoming a humanitarian crisis. But, this depends in the first instance on political will. International organizations are powerless without the political will of individual nation states because initial responsibility for the assessment and anticipation lies with our governments. Just as the military make preparations for future wars, politicians have a responsibility to take action to foresee, and not to have to manage, emergencies. When we find ourselves having to manage an emergency, the crisis is already upon us and everything is inevitably more challenging and more complicated.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Mediation upstream of the crisis - do you share this vision that crises can be anticipated General?

### **General Patrick de Rousiers**, *General Inspector of the Armed Forces*

I am going to take the opposite position; anticipation is extremely difficult. We can predict types of crisis, the places in which they are likely to occur, but what is always extremely complicated is trying to predict the reactions of different states and the level of involvement states or organizations will be ready to assume.

This makes planning particularly difficult and analysis indispensable, particularly the detailed exploration of interactions between different actors, in order to predict how they might react to a particular event. It is extremely complex within multinational organizations, whether it be the European Union, NATO or inter-state partnerships, to anticipate the reactions of a particular stakeholder to potential events. There is however one area in which it may be possible to anticipate an emergency: military engagement. By engaging a military operation, we temporarily create the emergency situation. This is obvious, and it is the reason that types of military operation, and the interactions between humanitarian actors and the armed forces, have evolved significantly over recent years.

### **Alain Ménargues**

How have these relationships changed?

### **General Patrick de Rousiers**

I believe firstly that these relations have changed at home, within our national borders, and in our perception of the application of force. The first change is that in the past, military operations were deployed sequentially: deployment, gaining air superiority, coercion followed by a stabilization period. The theory

behind this approach is very comfortable, but it is totally incoherent. History shows us that this has always been an incoherent model, and it is even more so now. There is an ongoing interaction between all these phases. Our interactions with humanitarian actors have therefore changed because there is a general acceptance that the illusion of a chain of events in which humanitarian actors are present on the ground prior to and after the conflict, but absent while it is ongoing, is not the reality and we have collectively acknowledged that they are, and should be, present throughout, and therefore that we must work with them because there is a need to coordinate, and sometimes to integrate, all these actors.

Another considerable change is the fact that armed conflicts are more violent, much faster moving and particularly of a much greater intensity than in the past. If we think back to Kosovo, the first Iraq war, Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq, all these conflicts were characterized by an intense period of military action followed by a very long stabilization/reconstruction period as the causes of the conflict were not resolved during the very short conflict period. It is therefore during the stabilization period that the issues that sparked the conflict can gradually be worked through. Consequentially, there is a far longer period of military-humanitarian interaction than there has been in the past. This is what we are experiencing in Kosovo and Afghanistan. The provision of humanitarian aid in natural disasters is the exception to this general trend as there is a much more short-term, time limited, military engagement.

### **Alain Ménargues**

You do not consider ACF interventions to be of an emergency nature. What does characterize them and how could they evolve?

### **Benoît Miribel**

To put your question into context, I would like to mention once more that the end of the Cold War brought about a paradigm shift. The diversity that we know today (the world of international NGOs on a global level is a veritable jungle), was made possible by the end of the Cold War.

Twenty years ago, I was in Liberia. For the first time ever a sub-regional United Nations interposition force, the ECOMOG, had been deployed. It was seen as a way to allow Africa to manage its own security, but could also be perceived as a disengagement of the major powers: over to you to manage your own problem! The civil war that broke out in Liberia on December 24, 1989 was the first civil war to follow the Cold War. It is heavily symbolic. Liberia was never colonized, but the Americans had a strong grip over the country. I remember



when the Gulf War broke out on January 17, 1991. From one day to the next in Monrovia, all the American navy ships had left. Seven marines were left at the American embassy. For me this symbolizes the end of the Cold War, a paradigm shift. While every square meter of the earth's surface had been under the grip of one of the two blocks, what were we seeing in the 1990s? Numerous territories, which had somehow been “frozen”, were exploding, rediscovering their autonomy, not to mention events taking place in the Balkans and other parts of the world. NGOs, led by citizens that wanted to go into contexts where governments would not or could not intervene, decided to take action. The result was an explosion in the number of NGOs during the 1990s. I fully understand that this recent NGO proliferation is difficult to delineate. The entirely unregulated term “NGO” is a catch-all definition encompassing everything and anything. (Take for example L'Arche de Zoé)

So, ACF is a humanitarian NGO that operates in conflict zones. Increasingly, our assessments are based on vulnerability. This is the reason I mentioned India earlier as an emergency. Today, 10,000 children under five years old are still dying every day. They are dying in India, in Nigeria, and in many other countries but not necessarily in contexts of armed conflict.

The definition of an emergency differs depending on whether you are a government facing a political uprising that must be contained or whether you are a humanitarian organization. In Sarajevo, people were dying as a result of the conflict, but they were not dying of hunger. There were moments when there was no access to water, but there was no comparison with the situation faced by some countries. The political context should always be analyzed in relation to a mandate and a mission. For us, there is no such thing as a humanitarian crisis – except for the potential crises arising between humanitarian actors due to poor coordination for example – there is a political crisis or a natural disaster with consequences for the population.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Mr. Thomas, you work with humanitarian organizations. In your opinion, has the same intervention model been rolled out repeatedly over the last decade or so? Is the culture of these organizations not a little “fossilized”?

### **Laurent Thomas**

No. I would like to come back to the question of whether a crisis can be anticipated or not. The majority of crises that are in existence today have been ongoing for twenty or thirty years: Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan etc. We talk about anticipation, but the crises are already there. Have we forgotten them?

NGO interventions are fundamental. Without them, the actions of organizations like the FAO would not be possible today. But, yes, we should be asking ourselves whether, in emergency situations, the “emergency” response is always the right one. Today, in southern Somalia, we are implementing programs to multiply seeds, to renovate irrigation systems and to vaccinate livestock. This year, southern Somalia has not required food aid.

So care must be taken to ensure interventions are adapted to the context, and there is the risk, we have seen this in various emergency situations, that an intervention can actually worsen a situation. We have distributed fishing equipment for example that has led to over-fishing in certain regions, or distributed seeds that were not adapted to local growing conditions.

### **Alain Ménargues**

How should we be managing NGOs to ensure that they adapt to the needs of a country?

### **Laurent Thomas**

The answer to this question lies in coordination, in technical assistance. It was said yesterday: everybody wants to coordinate but no one wants to be coordinated! The more we talk about coordination, the less of it there actually is!

The reality is that much progress has been made in the coordination of humanitarian actions among NGOs and other actors to develop a more effective working partnership. Today, the FAO is working in our area of intervention, agriculture, with more than seventy NGOs in Haiti, with fifty in Afghanistan and with around one hundred in Pakistan. Working together we are able to piece together a better understanding of the reality, to define needs and priorities, to identify the zones requiring an intervention and to prevent all the actors implementing operations in the same zone. We must be in a position to analyze the type of response needed.

These partnerships are in place. They are what are called, in the framework of the humanitarian reform, the “cluster” approach. These “clusters” have their limits, but they are working.

### **Alain Ménargues**

General, have you been in situations where you engaged in strategic reflection with humanitarian actors?

### **General Patrick de Rousiers**

In the knowledge that we will be operating in the same theaters as humanitarian

organizations for extended periods of time, we have thoroughly revised our academic training process at the Joint Defense College in Paris. We now engage in frequent and diverse interactions with the humanitarian community in order to deepen our understanding of our respective approaches, expectations and obligations. This is also true of our field exercises both for the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and for joint exercises. When I began my career in the depths of the Cold War we faced an entirely different set of problems. Today, a component on the action of all non-military actors on the ground, including of course, humanitarian actors, is systematically included in all military exercises. This helps to elucidate the respective challenges faced by all the actors.

I have two experiences of this type of strategic reflection in conflict situations, one during the Kosovo conflict and the other in Afghanistan. I was in Vicenza, from where all air operations were planned at the height of the Kosovo conflict, when we suddenly learned that humanitarian convoys were leaving Greece and were moving north. In this situation, we were caught entirely on the back foot and were forced to implement reactive rather than proactive coordination.

Afghanistan is the counter-example: there was a very discernable awareness among all the actors of the need for interaction and coordination during the conflict. Following the events of September 11, I travelled to the United States with a small group of French actors led by a General Officer to work on a joint military strategy. Our counterparts were the American military staff and, gradually, growing numbers of international actors. A month later, increasing numbers of buildings had been assigned to these non-American actors. They were zones from which each party interacted, represented its own nation, and contributed to establishing this coalition. In October I believe, or perhaps November, in any case while the Afghanistan conflict was raging - the North had not yet been liberated, the South was the theater for all the fighting - the humanitarians arrived. I witnessed the development of a humanitarian village that was engaging in interaction and dialogue with the rest of the coalition. It was at this moment that I realized that this was an entirely different type of interaction whose aim was not to be integrated, or for one party to be under another's orders in any way, but that set out with the principle that information exchange was beneficial, particularly information provided by the military and the state to the humanitarian community, to discuss what was happening, particularly the evolution of the context or zones of military intervention, and for the humanitarians – if they so wished – to share information on zones with priority needs and to discuss what could be done – parachute drops of essential items or food in certain areas, the transport of humanitarian personnel in others. Interaction of this type is built gradually on the awareness that we are all operating in the

same context for the same reason which is, from a military perspective, determined by the states that appoint us and is to restore peace. It is therefore clearly beneficial to work together.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Is this shared strategic reflection between military and humanitarian actors possible in Europe?

### **General Patrick de Rousiers**

It is possible everywhere. There are examples in France and this is why we now have humanitarian actors coming both to the Joint Defense College and taking part in our military field exercises. Over recent years we have become increasingly aware of this need for dialogue and interaction and it is an extremely positive thing. In Tampa, Florida, the strategic US Central Command "CENTCOM" implemented this type of coordinated strategic thinking during the period of dense military engagement. I do not know what the situation is now, I am not sure it is true to the same extent because the needs have evolved, but in my opinion, during the intense period of an armed conflict, this approach is beneficial to all. Interaction exists then at military staff level, but, albeit to a lesser extent, also on the ground. I experienced this firsthand during the EUFOR operation in CHAD/CAR where there was an interaction on the ground between the humanitarians and the armed forces whose mandate was the protection of refugees and internally displaced persons. Clearly, the UNHCR and the non-governmental humanitarian organizations were working in coordination on the ground, with the military forces, and particularly with the Polish patrol that we visited with the European Union Military Committee.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Mr. Miribel, do you engage in strategic dialogue on a given problem?

### **Benoît Miribel**

This tends to be common practice. I have mentioned the multiplication of NGO interventions since the end of the Cold War; well the same is true for United Nations' interventions. During the Cold War there were very few international interventions, and of course - United Nations interventions mean armed forces. Military actors are not all identical either. Nepalese forces have been deployed in Haiti. In the Balkans, we always preferred to have a British or a French escort rather than a Bangladeshi one for example. Troops under the United Nations aegis are not all the same, they may differ in level, in the training received and also in the quality of the relationships they build with local populations and humanitarian actors.

Military and humanitarian actors have significantly increased their degree of dialogue and interaction to ensure a better mutual understanding and to affirm their respective differences. The word coordination is a complicated one. Yesterday evening, Michel Veuthey and I were discussing the term “cooperation”, a sort of harmonious agreement. We need to cooperate, it is a natural need for the communities we are there to assist. It does not, however, fall within the scope of an NGO like ACF to call for military intervention. As a French citizen, I could have an opinion on the issue and say we should intervene. As a representative of a humanitarian organization, I am unable to take a stand on such an issue.

When I was Director of the Institute Bioforce created by Charles Mérieux with Charles Béraudier and Charles Hernu, Hubert Védrine organized a meeting at the Quai d'Orsay in March 1998 with the leaders of the main NGOs in France. He told them that it was entirely up to them, but that there were increasing numbers of westerners being taken hostage, and that they should consider specialized training in the issue. At Bioforce, we offered a training course for humanitarian workers and journalists because, at the time, seven journalists from RFI<sup>8</sup> had been killed in Afghanistan. For me, it was unimaginable that a course of this type could be designed without input from the military, because we were required to recreate a very specific environment with very specific training. The course, which was called “Behavior in Situations of Insecurity”, was also used by the HCR and the French Diplomatic Institute, and comprised three years of training - it was far from being a “commando short course”. It was of great benefit in this example to mobilize the military, as they could bring firsthand experience to the role plays and make useful suggestions on the behavior to adopt in conflict and emergency situations.

It is a starting point for people who may consider that they have nothing in common, but who in the end, have certain shared values. Furthermore, this dialogue should enable us to affirm our differences. A humanitarian NGO is not destined to be armed, to defend itself. Security is a military issue, one that needs to be handled by security professionals. We, as an NGO, prefer to see soldiers in known and respected uniforms than the private security companies that we are seeing in some countries whose personnel wear civil dress, jeans, and closely resemble NGO workers but who are, in fact, military personnel contracted by the government. Such companies are illegal in France, fortunately, but this is not true in all countries and it creates great confusion among the population.

This dialogue has been necessary in the past, and it continues today in the interests of affected communities.

Context is also an extremely important aspect. Clearly, in natural disaster contexts, we must work together. There are logistical challenges to be resolved but an absence of political agenda. After the tsunami, helicopters were needed to assist the population, cooperation was necessary. In contexts of armed conflict however it is very different. Behind the scenes communication remains possible, but it must be avoided on the ground, and we should not be deploying joint operations. We can, in the example of the tsunami and in all natural disaster contexts, work hand in hand, establish an overall coordination, but in contexts of armed conflict this becomes impossible. In Ivory Coast in 2004, a French military intervention saved our teams from attacks and from rape, but this does not mean that we should work together in a context like this.

There have been situations in which soldiers were authorized to assist in refugee camps. They were, with agreement from their superiors, working in a humanitarian capacity. A week later, they picked up their assault rifles and fought. As a French non-military actor working alongside them, there is a strong risk of association, and this creates confusion.

We are uncomfortable with the concept of the integrated mission. An integrated mission is when the United Nations mandate in a conflict situation includes both humanitarian activities implemented by the specialized UN agencies and, simultaneously, the engagement of force. The population sees this. The mandate creates confusion that is detrimental to our access to beneficiaries. The consequence is a feeling of generalized insecurity. We, the NGOs, would prefer to see the United Nations restrict their role in conflict situations such as these to one that is entirely political and security-focused, leaving the humanitarian work to professional NGOs, therefore avoiding this adverse confusion that compromises our access to affected populations.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Ambassador, you have developed the idea of a mediation obligation upstream of the crisis. Do you think that this could be possible?

### **Ambassador Omar Hilale**

Before answering the question, I would like to come back to the question of integrated operations. I believe they contribute a huge amount. I would use the example of Morocco's intervention in the Balkans with EUFOR, where one unit, a Muslim unit, was able to achieve a huge amount. There is no doubt that the religious dimension played a role. Many Kosovans received medical assistance and that gave our troops, our doctors, a dimension that valorized the actions of the United Nations. The same is true in Ivory Coast, it was

appreciated enormously. Of course, there is a need to consider the conditions under which such operations are mobilized, but they can be extremely beneficial and looked on favorably by local populations. This in no way belittles the role of humanitarian organizations working in the medical field.

Prevention has arisen in nearly all the round table discussions so far. We are thinking increasingly about this intermediation obligation as an instrument to prevent crises and conflicts, to prevent certain humanitarian situations and to be able to take precautions and actions. When tensions arise, countries have a duty to take actions to find solutions. France took rapid action with regards to the Georgian conflict. But could it not have done so before? In Lebanon two years ago, France was able to bring the two neighboring countries a little closer together. Preventative diplomacy played a role. There are success stories in Africa. Guinea nearly deteriorated into civil war after the coup d'Etat and the rupture in the election process. Fortunately, a diplomatic intervention by several European actors, the United States, Morocco and France was able to preserve and save the transition process. The election went ahead and the country escaped war. This was not the case for neighboring countries. Why were we not able to do the same?

I would give the example of a border that has been closed for twenty years in French-speaking North Africa. The Maghreb is Europe's, and particularly France's, cultural and commercial arena, its strategic depths. The Maghreb is Europe's border, and yet Europeans look on, without applying the pressure required to convince Morocco and Algeria to open their border. Opening borders is good international relations. It in no way prejudices disputes on other issues, but encourages greater cooperation, particularly against international terrorism and would improve coordination to combat illegal emigration. Opening the border would open opportunities for European investors and operators in the region. It is the only border in the world still closed in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, a diplomatic anachronism at the gateway to Europe. Europe must refuse to accept this situation, which could be resolved. Europe, which is ready to intervene rapidly in other regions, is facing a mediation emergency right here.

### **Alain Ménargues**

So you are a partisan of a diplomatic “duty to intervene”?

### **Ambassador Omar Hilale**

Not a duty to intervene, a duty to engage in mediation. Intervention supposes that we go as far as coercive action. I am for a diplomatic intervention by several countries within the European Union. “Contact groups” exist to seek

solutions to a number of conflicts in the world. Why not seek the means to convince these two countries that it is in their interest to open their border, that they are depriving their populations of the free circulation of goods and people? The Maghreb is losing 4% in GDP each year as a result of the closed border. Imagine the impact on progress, on the wealth of the populations in question. These disputes are also accumulative phenomenon that can ultimately create tensions, potentially influencing the security of the region and that of the Mediterranean.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Mr. Thomas, in your opinion can upstream diplomatic mediation be a first step to finding solutions to a crisis?

### **Laurent Thomas**

Undoubtedly. We are not leaders in this field, but we can participate in upstream mediation endeavors. What are we really talking about here? We are talking about achieving convergence between the interests of parties and, particularly, tackling the roots of a problem. From our perspective, supporting a mediation process would mean for example in a conflict situation identifying viable economic livelihoods for ex-combatants to ensure that they do not fall back on their Kalashnikovs to assure their financial survival. It is not easy, but it is the key to prevention. Territorial issues are the cause of many conflicts. This is the case in Darfur, in Eastern Congo. This means competition for resources, for water, for grazing, competition between crop and livestock production. This would be our angle of attack for mediation.

One coordination-related question that has not yet been raised is that of the mediation between all the actors in this great circus that is the humanitarian response. The more I listen to our discussions, the more I realize how important it is to work consciously to understand the cultural differences in our organization, our operational practices and our missions which often, because we underestimate this aspect, stand in the way of effective communication. I remember taking part in a training session on the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants with some military colleagues. After several days of working on role plays together, we realized to what extent our differences in culture and in intervention principles were a major obstacle to our communication. We must not under-estimate the importance of this aspect.

### **General Patrick de Rousiers**

This is exactly why the issue was raised at the last Atlantic Alliance summit in Lisbon, where the twenty-eight states decided that NATO structures should,



gradually, both at a strategic and an operational level, management structures included, form a civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners. This was unthinkable ten years ago but today, with our experience of the various military deployments undertaken since the end of the Cold War, it is almost beyond comprehension that such a step has not been taken earlier. It is a deep shift politically speaking, but also for those involved in dialogue between actors.

### **Alain Ménargues**

In the different positions that you have held in Brussels, have you seen evidence that upstream mediation is possible and effective?

### **General Patrick de Rousiers**

The structures are not yet in place. At NATO they are completely non-existent. Today, it is states that are best placed to instigate these initial mediation processes although the European Union has made some progress. The structures and mechanisms are however emerging.

I believe that we will face a situation that acts as a catalyst, an opportunity, and that will perceptibly alter the way we approach crisis situations - it is the “solidarity clause” stipulated in the Treaty of Lisbon. The solidarity clause indicates that if a member state is the victim of a humanitarian crisis or the target of a terrorist attack, the Union and its member states will act jointly and in a spirit of solidarity and will engage all the means possible, up to and including military means, to respond to the crisis. It may be a Chernobyl in Europe or an industrial catastrophe like the explosion of the chemical factory in Toulouse in France, which would cause extensive damage and have such an impact on the population that a single state would be unable to cope creating the need for inter-state cooperation.

We are at the dawn of a profound shift. For the moment, there is no single planning and implementation centre or single information centre. Political arbitration and decision-making bodies exist, but the structures that will enable the European Union to react in this framework will come. They will deeply transform our approach to crisis management. As a result, different states are beginning to reflect on the engagement of the military in civilian structures within their national borders. This is already fairly frequent, or at least, not incoherent here in France, but in many European countries it is completely alien. Legislation and current practices will therefore need to evolve, not to mention the coordination and management aspects.

### **Alain Ménargues**

The role of the press has been mentioned several times.

How do you, Mr. Miribel, perceive the influence of the press and the media on NGO activities?

### **Benoît Miribel**

It is not easy to evaluate, but one trend has been on the increase for twenty years: fewer and fewer independent journalists have the resources to be able to travel to the field. The press in crisis has a far smaller budget. Few journalists with a good understanding of NGOs and conflict situations remain.

When a natural disaster occurs, what we see, sadly, is an influx of freelance journalists sent by production companies with absolutely no knowledge of the context. The focus is increasingly on the images, the immediate, a direct line to the emotional angle. People no longer read - they look at images. This worries us. When it comes to new technology there are positives and negatives. The speed of communication is clearly a benefit, but we are seeing little explanation of the context, prioritization of the emotional angle and there are fewer and fewer professionals that have a real grip on the contexts and the actors.

### **Laurent Thomas**

If we are not in the media, we do not exist. An emergency today that does not receive media coverage is not really happening. The Central African Republic is not in the media? There is no humanitarian crisis in the Central African Republic! The media, in fact, has an overwhelming responsibility because we rely on its content to better inform public opinion, to mobilize emotions and to mobilize funding. We need CNN, Al-Jazeera, the BBC and France 24 to talk about our interventions. We need educated media, which do not simply look at what is happening on the surface or seek the sensational story, but which provide a thorough analysis of the issues, the substance and the heart of the problem. It is not an easy issue and there is a real need to educate the media.

### **Alain Ménargues**

New communication technologies and the internet mean a photograph can go round the entire planet in seven seconds before anyone has the chance to contradict it. Inaccurate or false information is on the increase. What are your thoughts on this, General?

### **General Patrick de Rousiers**

The way information is circulated has changed, the actors have changed. A new voice is being heard, our voice, the voice of the citizens. We must all remember that

information can rapidly snowball into something that can no longer be ignored, but it is not necessarily disinformation or misinformation, it is often entirely accurate. We are all being forced to focus on something new. Twenty years ago we followed the written and audiovisual press, and this still has an important place today, but what could almost be considered the most influential in contemporary media are the blogs and the pages of Facebook and Twitter. Furthermore, this information is accessible to all. This type of instant information calls for a whole new form of management.

The changing face of the media in any event reinforces the need for professionals that are able to rapidly study, analyze and enrich the data collected, those for whom noise is transformed into information, placing us in a less vulnerable, less reactive position.

### **Ambassador Omar Hilale**

The role of the press is central in raising universal awareness. It is the press that takes news of humanitarian catastrophes to the world. The reason so many journalists are killed or assassinated in conflicts every year is because they antagonize, because they report the truth. The reasons increasing numbers of hostages are journalists is because there is a desire to silence them, to compromise their work. They do a commendable and honorable job and they pay for it with their lives. They do this out of their dedication to humanitarian work. We should pay tribute to them.

### **Alain Ménargues**

We have now received the interview with Mike Bittrick. Naval Officer Colonel Xavier Collignon, who is the French representative to the African Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, has agreed to introduce the film and I thank him.

### **Colonel Xavier Collignon**

Just a few minutes ago, I was not supposed to be talking to you here today. Weather conditions have prevented Mike Bittrick from being here with us today. He is currently responsible for security at the State Department's Africa Bureau where he has worked for some fifteen years. He is a very experienced specialist. He is today sharing his thoughts with us via a recorded message. We are going to play two extracts from that message: the introduction illustrates the excellent relations that exist between our two countries. The second extract concentrates on the different thrusts of US African policy since Mr. Barack Obama came into power. These thrusts are centered on work with the African Union and with regional and sub-regional organizations.

**Mike Bittrick**, *Deputy Director of the Office of Regional and Security Affairs at the US State Department's Africa Bureau*

Dear colleagues. It is a pleasure to join the conference that has been working so diligently over the past 24 hours. I too have been working diligently, but I was stuck in a snow bank most of that time, trying to get a flight over to you – I am sorry not to be there. I would like to thank the Order of Malta and the French Navy for the opportunity to share with you and discuss some of the experiences of the U.S. Government as we deal with the crises and opportunities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. I would like first of all though, to express my personal condolences and those of my colleagues here, to the families and friends of the French citizens who were the recent victims of terrorism in Niger. There are, as well, other innocent victims being held hostage in the Sahel and in other parts of Africa and we share your deep concern about this situation.

### **Colonel Xavier Collignon**

After this introduction, Mr. Bittrick develops his subject in four parts. The first part is an overview of the contextual situation in Africa which we will not go into. The second part is the evolution of American policy in Africa. He insists particularly on the cooperation aspect and the importance of working with international organizations and other countries. He also insists on the implementation of new tools.

The Center for Strategic Studies to which I am currently assigned was not an initiative implemented by the new administration - it has existed for eleven years. It is an example of the increasing importance being placed on the African question. The United States Africa Command was created three years ago. You may have followed the debates that spiced up its journey to becoming a fully operational unit, particularly on the location of its headquarters which is currently Stuttgart. This military command is a first of its kind for the Americans because its departmental organization mirrors that of the American Government. This was an attempt to avoid the compartmentalized organization so common in public administrations, and particularly in American ones, that results in a right hand that is unaware of what the left hand is doing. This innovative organizational structure was conceived to test a new system: the United States Africa Command in Stuttgart. Policy has also evolved. The “Smart Power” concept developed by Mrs. Clinton is a not-insignificant change of direction for the American Government. On the ground it translates either into a reproduction of what Mr. George Bush began, or an improvement of it.

We are seeing today, it seems to me, a real convergence between United States

and French foreign policy. Let us take Mr. Obama's speech in Accra in July 1999 as an example, he talks of democracy, of good governance, of African appropriation - all terms used often by France.

### **Mike Bittrick**

We work then with international partners to strengthen the global security architecture for conflict management capacity throughout the world. Specifically, I want to look today at our efforts to help the African Union build up its African peace and security architecture or APSA.

As the state fragility slide I showed testifies, Africa is where we are finding some of the most difficult state building and conflict management challenges. But, the African Union was created not even ten years ago and in the span of its eight years of organizational life it has achieved a great deal of progress. The African Union has articulated a clear vision for the development of a comprehensive regional structure for conflict management. It has elaborated a clear set of political, economic and security goals of a general or broader nature, seeking to raise norm standards across the continent.

Within the Africa Bureau one of the areas of specific work, working closely with the European Union and other stakeholders, has been to help the Africans build this peace and security architecture, and particularly the Africa Standby Force, they have sought to build a large force, not just for conflict response but for crisis management too. It is important to work closely with our partners in Africa because it is not just the United Nations that can build and support the stabilization dynamic. The African Union has a role, and is increasingly playing a larger and bigger role in stabilizing its own neighborhood. There are challenges of course.

The brigades, for example in the case of the African Standby Force, the units that have been created, still require a substantial amount of international support. The United States, the United Nations, the European Union and other countries are providing a lot of support at various levels: at the continental - the African Union level, to various sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS and then of course to the member states. These efforts have been marked with much success. The African Union has undertaken successful deployments to Burundi, to Darfur, and to Somalia over the past seven years and these deployments have, in their own way, helped to mitigate the worst aspects of deteriorating situations. There is a lot more to be said as concerns what we are doing together as a global community to address some of these challenges and I really, from my heart, wish that I had been able to listen in on all the proceedings of the last twenty-four hours.

But from the perspective of someone who has not taken part in these discussions, let me throw out some additional best practices or at least some lessons learned that may be useful and that we are seeking to inculcate in our systems here in the United States.

Firstly, we need to work to increase the capacity of diplomats, development personnel and the military and police personnel that operate in complex, humanitarian environments. We must make staff promotion a benchmark, and this is something we are looking at within the United States. Our aim is to ensure that all military personnel that are going to be involved in stabilization operations not only attend a course, but that certain professional requirements are also to be promoted. This is certainly the case within the State Department; we are focusing on certain courses that provide a better understanding of state fragility, state building and the developmental contexts in which we are having to implement much of our work in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. That is being rigorously looked at within the US, and it needs to be part, I suspect, of the human resources systems of many of us around the table. We should always consider requirements for working together and seeking these personnel systems to build that up. In some cases it may be that we need to force the system. A few decades ago within the US Defense Department, the Army, the Air Force, the Navy and the Marine Corps were incapable of engaging in dialogue, and as a result of specific legislation, those services were forced to learn how to work together. Maybe we at the state department, at the ministry of foreign affairs, and in other agencies need to learn how to work together too.

Another way, or means, of directly addressing stabilization work is, within our agencies, and in our inter-agency contacts, to support a three 'D' approach, that is Defense, Development and Diplomacy. One of the things that we have not done, but which the United Kingdom does, is what is called conflict pooling whereby a certain amount of funds is made available for stabilization and crisis response. And within the UK's conflict pool you have representatives from DFID, from the Ministry of Defense, as well as the FCO, and those individuals must come up with an agreed position before funds can be used. We in the United States consider that a good idea and are seeking, in some of our budgetary means, to be able to be more adept in our responses.

Often we see that the right application of force or diplomacy at the point of crisis can be just what is needed to get a train back on track. As I mentioned earlier, we greatly support the African Union and we greatly support ECOWAS. ECOWAS has stepped up in Togo and in other places, within its member states to push, and to prevent crises before they occur and we think that is the best way to work.

Sometimes you need shared resources to be applied in the most efficient way and taking a three 'D' approach with conflict pooling can be quite useful and our African partners can benefit when we work together in these combined ways.

We also need to engage in policy support and capacity building within the African Union, and some of Africa's leading sub-regional organizations are high priority for the international community. What we are seeing today is increased focus and attention, we have the G8++, we have the United Nations bringing together a number of us, the African Union itself is stepping up and bringing people round the table to talk about how to provide better capacity building and policy support. But sometimes, the international community does not come together around the table as efficiently as it should and it could, and that is an area in which work must continue.

Thank you for your attention.

### **Colonel Xavier Collignon**

So, today, United States foreign policy is articulated around three words, a strategic triangle: Diplomacy, Defense and Development. These three words guide all the United States' efforts to support Africa to institute stability on the continent.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Let us not forget that America's interest in Africa manifestly began once the Chinese had implemented economic and diplomatic activities on the continent. Ambassador, you are from the African continent, what is your reaction?

### **Ambassador Omar Hilale**

As an African, I would say that we congratulate the United States on their actions and on this three 'D' triptych approach.

Europe is fourteen kilometers from Africa at its closest point, the Strait of Gibraltar. One question I would ask is: Where is Europe? Why did we have to wait for the United States to take action on the continent in response to Chinese penetration? We would have liked to have seen proactive, more enterprising action in the spirit of solidarity from European countries and particularly from those in the northern Mediterranean region.

The international community has an obligation to the first of the three 'D's' in the triptych, development. Without development, there are a certain number of crises we will be unable to resolve. Without development and aid – and not assistance – a certain number of countries risk becoming international terrorism sanctuaries. Ten years ago, Al Qaeda was not present on the African continent.

The Sahel Region has become the Achilles heel of Africa. Why? The nebula of terrorist networks has discovered a fertile land to put down roots, a land blighted by poverty, misery, frustration and despair. As long as we are unable to give promise to these communities, to help them to achieve a decent standard of life at home, to slow emigration and to restore their dignity, Al Qaeda will continue to find people willing to enlist. Europe has a duty to be more proactive on the African continent because the danger is gradually moving north. Morocco sounded the alarm some ten years ago but no one listened. Years later, events have proved us right. Five years ago, Sorbonne professor Mr. Chopard, cautioned that terrorist networks were developing links with actors in the region, with the Tuaregs, with a certain number of small terrorist organizations. It fell on deaf ears. Is this a problem of interpretation, a conflict of interests, a European Union common defense policy issue? But the security of North Africa is the security of the whole of Europe! If North Africa collapses, the ripples will spread out to Europe. This is why I talk of an obligation to mediate, of the need to act before the catastrophes arise. This is Europe's duty. It must take up this challenge.

### **Alain Ménargues**

General, what are your reactions to Mr. Bittrick's testimony?

### **General Patrick de Rousiers**

Firstly, converging perceptions: we have the same analysis of the need for states and international organizations to engage in Sub-Saharan and Central Africa – this is the core of the work of the US Africa Command: to support regional African organizations and to do everything possible to encourage Africa to take responsibility for its own destiny. That in itself is a shared vision.

I would like to comment on the issue raised by Ambassador Hilale. I would not presume to comment on North Africa, but regarding Europe's commitment further south on the continent, the signs are positive. They are not sufficient, but they have seen a timid evolution over the last few years. I would cite the examples of Congo and of Chad. Who would have thought twenty years ago that Sweden would be engaging heavily in Congo? Who would have imagined that the Polish would take on full and entire political responsibility for the successful completion of the mission in Eastern Chad? Who would have thought that the Dutch would do the same? States are committing to Africa. I do not believe that this is related to American policy in Africa, or to the perception that the continent is becoming a zone of tensions between two major powers. I believe it is the result of a collective awareness of the necessity to commit to this part of the world. European resources are funding this investment, and in the respect of the internal policies of member states. Another example is the European investment in the Euro RECAMP program.



Euro RECAMP was a national French initiative to build African peacekeeping capacity that we opened up to Europe explaining that we could not maintain it alone, but that it was a model that appealed to the Africans and it seemed, to us, pertinent to continue. The three components - training, exercise and equipment - aimed to help African Union Standby Forces to deploy effectively, thus promoting Africa's capacity to react autonomously to potential troubles on its own continent. The European Union will become a stakeholder in the program and will join the African-led exercises. Admittedly, this does not concern North Africa, but there are clear indications of Europe's commitment to the continent. Moreover, there is a very major debate underway within the European Union to decide what investment is required in the Sahel region. Of course, we are talking here about non-military investment.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Multilateral development agencies are determinant partners in humanitarian crisis management. Mr. Guillaume Cruse is sorry not see any representatives from such agencies among the participants. The Order of Malta did invite the British development agency DFID to take part in the conference but they were unable to attend. Do these so called intermediary organizations have a role to play in humanitarian management?

### **Laurent Thomas**

Firstly, I would like to thank the United States' efforts to support our humanitarian operations. The American people, alongside the European Union are our biggest donors. Much of our work could not have been achieved without this support. Our principal donors are firstly the European Union, then the American people followed by various individual European countries: the Scandinavians who have a long foreign policy tradition of "doing good" and the British who have a very structured approach; we engage in strategic and political dialogue with them that goes beyond funding and the implementation of the projects that they may be willing to support. As institutional donors, their work is fundamental. We could also mention the international financial institutions, the World Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and regional banks, which have a fundamental role to play in the reconstruction phase.

I would like to come back to a point raised during the intervention of our American colleague; the failure of development. Many crises today are the result of failed development models. The three pillars, Diplomacy, Defense and Development, however should be handled with care. The approach is an important one, but it also presents risks that we must monitor closely.

The crucial aspect of Mr. Bittrick's intervention in my opinion is the need to

strengthen regional institutions. This is fundamental: the reinforcement of regional, national and community-level institutions. We do not do enough in this area in our humanitarian work. Humanitarian actors tend to prioritize fast results, interventions that replace, rather than support, local actors. We must, at all costs, do more to capacity build within these community-level, national and regional organizations. We must also put far more effort into ensuring the sustainability of our operations.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Benoit Miribel, you co-authored the report commissioned by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Mr. Alain Boinet. Could you summarize the report's conclusions for us today?

### **Benoît Miribel**

The report will be the basis for a conference on humanitarian action, we hope, during 2011. It aimed to encourage governments to think about their strategies and methods with regards to humanitarian action.

The French Government's resources are fairly limited: the *Fonds d'Urgence Humanitaire* (FUH), the emergency humanitarian fund managed by France's Crisis Center is around €10 million. We lobbied for a larger fund. Our proposal, which will be discussed in parliament, is for a sort of strategic orientation doctrine setting out the humanitarian positions France wishes to defend, similar to those that have been established in some other European countries. Currently, nothing like this exists in France. Decisions are taken on a case by case basis in function of a given crisis which is already a good starting point. The Crisis Center is now the link between consular and humanitarian action, assigned the important task of elucidating that which can be defended, the principles of International Humanitarian Law including the principles of impartiality and neutrality. Does France defend these principles? American policy has been seen to risk completely integrating these two mechanisms which could, in a conflict situation, compromise the necessity to be able to distinguish between political action, in other words crisis control or administration, including security, and humanitarian action. Differentiating between the two is vital if we are to ensure humanitarian actors have access to beneficiary populations.

Crisis prevention has cropped up often in our discussions. We know that a crisis has underlying, economic and social contexts. It has taken years for us to convince USAID for example that sending massive food aid, particularly as an outlet for massive American surplus, has a long term destructive effect on the

agricultural economy of certain countries in Africa. This was the case in Ivory Coast in the 2000s. We need to consider the pernicious effects of state-supplied, and even NGO-supplied, emergency food aid. In Haiti, certain American NGOs were condemned for having subsidized fishermen or farmers to such an extent that they no longer needed to work. The finality of humanitarian action must come back to the best interests of the beneficiaries. I believe strongly that prevention also requires economic and social action.

So, to summarize, we stress the importance of the distinction in conflict situations between the political actors needed to administer, resolve or prevent the crisis, those responsible for security - the military, and the professional humanitarian community. They should engage in dialogue but not co-act in contexts of conflict because the issues are different, inter-related yes, but different. Dialogue and interaction can take place in the wings but not on center stage. We are for dialogue approached in this manner. The presence of private security companies whose personnel wear civilian dress and enforce security adds to the confusion. The greater the confusion, the more widespread the different problems become. I reiterate that there is no such thing as a humanitarian crisis, only political crises or natural disasters. Political crises require the intervention of experts in civilian, political crisis management. Today, the European Union is a major player on the international stage from a humanitarian perspective. We fear that the European Union's humanitarian office, ECHO, become embroiled in European humanitarian foreign policy issues. To use our French cities as a metaphor, it is not the Paris Mayor's office or the politicians who decide where the emergency medical services should be deployed first. They are professionals who work with resources provided by the politicians, but who manage these resources and decide where they should be working autonomously. This is not happening at an international level. We see a systematic convergence of political interests and financial resources. Significant resources were allocated to Iraq at a time when there were no humanitarian priorities in the country.

A conflict in the north of Yemen has created 300,000 refugees and we have heard nothing of it. We have a responsibility to follow the humanitarian priorities, which sometimes converge with international crises in the political sense of the term, and in which political mandates are assigned to military forces. After a given time, these forces are withdrawn and return home. We are working in entirely different timeframes. The United States are beginning their withdrawal from Afghanistan which will take two or three years. What will happen after that? How will it be managed? Who will come to the assistance of the communities? We do not have the same timescales or the same mandates. Our professions are not the same. We need to engage in dialogue and in particular to affirm these

differences if we wish to continue providing an increasingly professional service in the interest of local populations. The humanitarian community has, over the last twenty years, become far more professional in every area of humanitarian action. The security issue is becoming increasingly pervasive and we find ourselves, along with journalists, targeted and in some contexts associated with those responsible for political control and security.

### **Alain Ménargues**

Ambassador, which point in our debate have you found to be the most pertinent and why?

### **Ambassador Omar Hilale**

I have been most interested in the work of the humanitarian community. I believe that they have a major role to play in bringing people together. Humanitarianism should not exist simply to manage crises, to deliver assistance.

It can contribute to developing understanding and proximity between two sides. We must think about creating a space for dialogue. The Union for the Mediterranean particularly, could integrate a humanitarian component as a gesture of solidarity between Europe and the countries of North Africa. It could also take the form of a meeting or brain storming between Europe and Africa on how to coordinate humanitarian activities on the continent, because there is a great need for this. There is also a need to demystify humanitarian action to divulge its noble and human side and prevent the militarization of certain operations from tainting the work of these men and women who go all over the world, sometimes even risking their lives. I was impressed when I heard the testimonies of the humanitarian workers who were asked to remain in Aceh to deliver aid to the Muslim population. They were the very symbol of shared values. I was impressed by the work of the Order of Malta, one of the first organizations on the scene after the earthquake in Iran. Working independently without political or hidden agendas, humanitarian actors can achieve immense humanitarian, and even political, goals in bringing people closer together, in conflict resolution and particularly in encouraging mutual understanding. Humanitarianism is a space that should be put to use for many good causes.

### **General Patrick de Rousiers**

What has struck me today is the convergence of all of our analyses.

We are in agreement that professionalism is necessary. On the ground, our actions should be dissociated, but in the strategic thinking and management, we should be working together, cooperating, interacting. Although this is the case

in strategic thinking, the same cannot yet be said for strategic management. This is probably the first area for development and it is probably easier to implement in a multilateral framework than in a purely national one. This would provide the opportunity for a gradual convergence, bearing in mind that we, at least the military, are operating in an increasingly inter-dependent system and in a spirit of solidarity. To take an example in the aeronautical field, the creation of the European Air Transport Command - which directs the use of five countries' military, fixed wing, air transport assets and which will soon have a multinational A400M unit - will allow us to work better together when faced with humanitarian crises. This will inevitably call for all the actors we have mentioned to work in a multilateral framework rather than in a national one.

### **Laurent Thomas**

The converging analyses are clear. The question then is: how to transform these converging analyses into a partnership for action? That is more complicated. It begins with dialogue, similar to that which we have seen over the last two days, to better understand where we are coming from and our respective guiding principles, perspectives, missions and cultures.

I have also been struck by a remark that has come up repeatedly over the last two days: the importance of investing to a greater extent in risk management and not only in the management of the response - all the aspects of prevention and the need to put more effort into reconstruction.

Lastly, this morning the question of building capacity within national communities and regional organizations was raised. I am convinced that we are not doing enough in this area. Too often, our interventions replace the local capacity that we should be reinforcing. If we continue in this direction we will, twenty years from now, still be talking about the humanitarian crises in the Horn of Africa, in Afghanistan and in other parts of the world. There is a need for a change of model. We must consider models that give national actors greater capacity to be able to take their own destinies in hand. We must remember that our actions should aim not only to save lives, but also the livelihoods of affected populations. This is a question both of sustainability and of dignity.

### **Benoît Miribel**

We agree that there is a need to build capacity locally. We know which twenty or thirty countries are the most fragile today due to their exposure to natural disasters or potential conflicts. Work must be undertaken by international experts, the United Nations to work with these countries and to strengthen them, this does not fall within the NGO mandate. This is very clear. I stress once more the

importance of the necessary complementarity between actors and, at the same time, a clear distinction between roles. We should not all be doing the same thing, each actor is a professional in its own field.

Once more, there is no such thing as a humanitarian crisis, there are political crises. The Ivory Coast may come unstuck and tomorrow become a humanitarian priority because the current political crisis has degenerated. A political crisis or a natural disaster may or may not, at any given moment, have humanitarian consequences. The same is true in Haiti, if the Haitian Government continues in the right direction, there is a good chance that a year from now, considerable progress will have been made in good governance. If however, the situation deteriorates from a governance perspective, the situation could explode because the populations that were living in slums at the time of the earthquake, and that have been waiting for change since, will run out of patience. These are all contexts that require a professional response. Once again, this is not the role of humanitarian NGOs whose vocation is to support the civilian population. It is the role of professionals in civilian crisis management and administration, in politics, and in security when necessary. Security can be defined as behavior on the ground that is either acceptable, or that blazes out of control – it is an entirely separate register.

We are involved in the interaction and dialogue that is necessary to defend principles, and particularly the humanitarian principles of independence and impartiality, because the alternative is confusion and disengagement. We are left with no guarantee that in the future we will be able to deliver independent assistance freely. I remind you that there is not necessarily a correlation between international UN interventions and humanitarian needs. Take for example the various countries where populations are extremely vulnerable but there are no UN or military interventions. There is a necessity for dialogue then, a necessity to respect the professionalism of all the actors. This is how we will avoid the confusion and associations that have done so much harm over the last few years.

---

# CLOSING SESSION AND SUMMARY

---

**Ambassador Pierre MOREL**

European Union Special Representative for Central Asia  
and for the crisis in Georgia

I would first like to thank and congratulate you all. This remarkable endeavor that we have all been a part of has been particularly well organized and comes at just the right time. My summary will be a simple interpretation of the density of our discussions.

Two preliminary remarks before covering three points:

1. **I am struck by the remarkable level of attention and listening throughout the conference.** We have paid attention to the views of others to a degree rarely seen at this type of event.
2. **We have shared the feeling of entering into a new phase.** This was a moment to gain some perspective, to take stock between national, international and multilateral actors among whom there are no strangers. We encounter each other in the field, we talk, we are all involved in emergency operations, but it is far less common for us to reflect together in moments of calm. This is what these two days have been all about.

The conference title came under discussion. Is “Humanitarian Diplomacy” the right term? Diplomats, the military, humanitarians need to think together about international crisis management. Again, what is a crisis? I believe that this analytical convergence which is today coming to maturity, will call for more substantive work outside the frame of necessity, outside of particular circumstances.

I would like to pay tribute to all those living and working in the contexts we have been discussing today, our teams, our partners, those that give, those that receive. All the testimonies confirm that they are present and that they are indispensable. We have seen to what extent, when it comes to crisis management, our leaders must adapt to the operators on the ground and to those in need. We are operating in an inverted hierarchy. It brings us back to a reality that has been clear to the Order of Malta for nine centuries: the poor are our masters. Nowhere does this truth carry more weight than in the reality of international crisis management. In an attempt to summarize, I have identified three areas of reflection:

1. A reflection on the international system. This is imperative because there is a constant interaction between the system and our working methods and operational organization.
2. The idea that a common operational framework is beginning to emerge.
3. The question that I call, for want of a better word, the immaterial.



## 1. Observations on the international system

The first session established that we are faced with growing, unrelenting and expanding complexity. I have one correction to add however with regards to states. We are quick to say that they are losing control, but this is not wholly true. States are very much still there. It is important to analyze their true role in the world today: they are the guardians of the coherence of human societies. We spoke a little quickly, almost in passing, of religions which play an incontestable and, to some extent, growing role. Faith, wherever it intervenes, creates links. These fundamental functions of social relations at a planetary scale are, and will remain, very present.

Many participants agreed that we were in a period of transition. Everyone has their own interpretation of this however and we could have long discussions on the subject. I believe that one particular transition is coming to an end. We have moved from a western phase of globalization to a multi-polar phase that is still not entirely clear. One step has been completed, the movement continues and it is difficult to clarify, but what interests us here is primarily the context in which crisis management will be required to evolve. I will cite the work of two major figures in contemporary diplomatic history, two Americans, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brezinski who have both recently developed lines of thought on this subject.

- Kissinger, referring to the fundamental concept of the Westphalia State which has underpinned international relations since the Cold War, says that in today's system, difficulties arise as states deviate from the Westphalia state as we know it: post-Westphalia states, growing Westphalia states – and how true that is for the emerging powers – and lastly, pre-Westphalia states that have not yet achieved the classical structure we associate with a state. This diversity in state forms, which are no longer heterogeneous with that which we are used to, explains our feeling of confusion and loss of control. This does not mean that the state is disappearing, it means that we must work together and with different forms of engagement. Regarding these so-called pre-Westphalia states, we often talk about “failed states”. I believe we should be more precise and talk about incomplete states, states in transition, states that are deficient and that will remain so for a long time, but which will become states all the same. This broadening of the range of state forms is deeply disturbing and influences our forms of action.
- Mr. Brezinski employed a phrase that almost sounds like a joke: “an international society with two hundred politically-active actors is unmanageable.” He is right. This is however, and will continue to be, the reality of the world today.

These two international affairs practitioners give us two ways to reflect and to consider the disorder that characterizes the modern world. Furthermore, this disorder is “multi-layered”. This does not mean that we should wave the white flag and declare it unmanageable. Mireille Delmas-Marty, who has spent a great deal of time reflecting on the legal systems of the contemporary world, coined the powerful expression “ordered pluralism” which I believe is a good starting point for the type of reflection required to tackle this multi-layered disorder that is inherent to 21<sup>st</sup> century society.

The next question is that of global authority. It was not mentioned in the discussions, but the last encyclical, *Caritas in veritate*, advances this theme that had already appeared in *Pacem in terris* in 1963. It is a theme that the Church has always defended. It is also said however that the emergence of a global authority is less likely than ever. Time will tell. We are seeing both disintegration and integration of the elements that make up global or international authority. It seems to me that we are currently in a time where forces are united around the table in function of need, and consequently, particularly in crisis situations. International crises further synergy, the pooling of ideas and resources. Every party knows that they are unable to cope alone. The United Nations continues to stand out as the natural center around which these synergy efforts gravitate. This has been clearly highlighted in our discussions.

It would not be unthinkable then, despite the major difficulties, that there is a potential axis for development. We must however, accord the necessary importance to the obstacles we face:

### **Deviance**

A first obstacle relates to that which I would call deviance, behavior that deviates from universally accepted norms: ethical aberrations, isolationism, the fervor which can overpower elementary forms of social life, criminality. International crime is, today, valued at about one tenth of the world's GNP. Some experts estimate it at even more than that. The main beneficiary of globalization is international crime: borders are removed and it becomes easier to act against the elementary norms that structure the way we live together. The door is opened to every imaginable type of trafficking: drugs, weapons and people. When it comes to crisis situations, which create lawless zones into which the globalized criminal infrastructure - the first to learn to use the internet to its advantage - readily disappear, this is a major factor. These are real challenges that deserve constant consideration in the planning and implementation of our actions.

## **Contestation**

The second difficulty is contestation in all its forms, the most violent and intolerable of which is terrorism. But, there is also a position that challenges the recognized universal values, that attempts to disqualify them or maintains that they should be renegotiated or redefined. We observed this phenomenon when President Ahmadinejad pronounced a radical challenging speech to the United Nations, the only speech of its type to be pronounced by a state in modern history, or with Wikileaks which is an attempt to promote an entirely transparent society, antonymous with that which we perceive as a universal value. It is a fact, a constant interrogation that we must affront. We can kid ourselves that these are one-off events, but it is clear that there is support for the weak in their contestation of the powers of yesterday or today. This is an element to be taken into consideration, even if we consider that it is possible to manage this complexity and move forward effectively.

## **Skepticism**

The third obstacle is skepticism. It is something that both organizations and states are faced with. We must be honest: international and regional organizations, NGOs, are the object of deep skepticism in public opinion. We hear the questions often: “What is the United Nations doing? What is Europe doing?” and so on. We have the feeling that we will never be in a position to respond because we are in the heart of the emotion, we constantly require more time, even if we are always working faster to keep up with accelerating crises. The gap is almost insurmountable - we must work with and try to overcome it.

## **The true role of international humanitarian action**

This is what I wanted to say on the observations of contemporary international society as perceived in our discussions over the last twenty-four hours. Meanwhile, humanitarian action, whose structural role has evolved on a global level, is already an integral part of the very painful and laborious reorganization of the international system which is currently underway.

The humanitarian function is there, it has matured, its identity is clear. The crisis response must be implemented whether the crisis is a short, medium or long-term one. This is even more important because within this system of multi-layer disorder which is, let's hope, moving towards ordered pluralism, every crisis widens the gap between the most developed and the least developed. Every crisis takes the complex framework that surrounds us closer to breaking point. The reorganization will not happen unaided. There is, in this humanitarian function at a planetary level, a fundamental and indispensable systemic dimension.

This leads me to the conclusion that public development assistance will be indispensable in the future. Private funding can support it, bringing new, innovative elements and facilitating rapid response, but as soon as a structural problem appears it is indispensable to ensure that public development assistance is available. This was a major theme in discussions.

## 2. Toward a common framework

In each of our sessions we have gradually watched a framework emerge. It is founded on values. Yes, these are contested, refuted and cast aside by some, but we will always be confronted with contestation and skepticism, with confusion and irony. This is our backdrop, but the answer is simple, these values endure. How do they endure? Through experience: these values endure as a result of the work of all the actors in international aid, and particularly those engaged in humanitarian action and crisis response.

Paul Ricoeur said of the truth: "What is the truth? The criterion for truth is the honest man." When we accept that trust, respect, gratuitousness and responsibility are the cornerstones of humanitarian action in the management of international crises, then the responsible man is the criterion for responsibility, the man who gives without expecting anything in return is the criterion for gratuitousness, the respectful man is the criterion for respect. Values in action are the true foundation of international humanitarian action.

Let us also remember Paul VI. When faced very early on with contemporary skepticism, he said: "Modern man listens more willingly to witnesses." The values reflected in humanitarian action in crisis situations have a witness bearing role. There is a right way to operate in today's world, and humanitarian action is a part of it. There is a gradual acceptance and recognition of this which is the basis for the determination of a common framework.

### The four steps

What is this framework? The sequence that is acknowledged by all crisis management specialists is the four steps: early warning, prevention, crisis management and reconstruction. There is a consensus that this sequence is imposed by circumstances, and it has become gradually engrained as the norm. We should however exercise caution. The theory appears to be a rational one, but it can be interpreted and debated in as many ways as there are actors.

- **Early warning.** Diplomatic and military political and security monitoring on one side, on the other, major risks, natural disasters. These are two entirely different areas, but are they? Yes and no. The separation exists, but it cannot be

entire. Let us take the example of Aceh. One of the European Union's twenty or so actions was to send a mission to Aceh to mitigate the risk of the rebellion against the central power reigniting after the tsunami. Climate-related events and natural disasters can have consequences on the political context. Regardless of the context, early warning is the fundamental starting point for all crisis management strategies.

- **Prevention.** Preventative diplomacy is, in itself, a subject that requires deep consideration. I retain the formula proposed by one speaker, a "mediation obligation". This is an idea to explore further. I also wanted to mention the work of the OSCE which has been touched on very little during the conference. The OSCE Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna is working to explore the preventative diplomacy approach. We saw it in the Balkans and in other parts of the world. A certain culture has evolved considerably in this field.

Public development assistance is a crisis prevention tool that should not be forgotten. In its lasting dimension, its programming, its continuity, it is an investment in crisis prevention.

- **Crisis management** is too copious for me to go into here. We have broached the subject in all our various discussions. The question of interaction and of civil/military cooperation is at the forefront of our minds. I will note only one recurrent observation in all our discussions which is the question raised by private security companies. This aspect appears to concern everybody. Regardless of one's view, this issue emerges as a sensitive political problem. We saw recently with President Karzai how private companies were starting to be the object of a political game. They are becoming a political problem in their own right. This also raises questions on human rights and the respect of humanitarian law in and around situations of conflict. This is one important question requiring action and progress.

- **The reconstruction.** This is a major component, which takes several forms and on which critical feedback is indispensable. To give you an example, I was in Kyrgyzstan with Ms. Georgieva two weeks after the dramatic ethnic clashes (more than 500 killed and more than 400,000 people in the streets between June 10 and June 14). At the beginning of July, Ms. Georgieva travelled to the site of the worst clashes as the shelter clusters were being established to prepare everything for thousands of people before the winter. In Och, I saw the emergence of the "Chinese window" dispute. Clusters are a good instrument to achieve fast results and implement effective shelter programs while awaiting the construction of new housing. To build fast and efficiently, we order in large quantities and we then redistribute and allocate the materials. We ordered the

windows for these houses from neighboring China, which produces excellent products with impeccable plastic frames. They were available and had fast lead times. Most of the houses destroyed however, belonged to the Uzbek community. Today, there is frustration, renewed hostility and even a desire for vengeance from the Kyrgyzs who believe that those that killed so many members of their community now have better quality windows than they who are living in the same conditions as before. The reconstruction must therefore be approached with extreme caution. The risk otherwise is that the original cause of the conflict may be reignited. There are many other examples. In each situation, we must identify the course of action that must be respected, even when real difficulties are encountered.

### **The duty to coordinate our actions**

Leading on from these four steps is the fundamental question of coordination. It has been said: everybody wants to coordinate but no one wants to be coordinated. This clearly implies that all the stakeholders have a strong sense of identity. We have matured, we have learnt our professions and our self-identity is greater now than ten years ago. Each actor brings its own qualities to the table and has learnt how to earn recognition as a major partner – I leave the host of unscrupulous actors aside. This increased self-identity coupled with a clear need for ever greater coordination makes for a challenging adjustment. We talk about coordination, integration, cooperation - the worst possible scenario would be if the diverse organizations working to serve peace found themselves in competition. The practicalities and the implementation of this cooperation are not straight-forward. The awareness of its necessity has been acknowledged. There is no question, we have a duty to interact and exchange, and a duty to ensure our actions are adapted to the needs. We cannot afford not to fulfill these obligations to the maximum, with each organization remaining true to its own approach and principles.

It comes back to the words of Hippocrates: *Primo non nocere* meaning first, do no harm. If the system of interaction and dialogue is damaging, it is extremely serious. We can, at least, adopt this as a starting point.

And this is the starting point for my recommendation for future efforts. This is an extremely complex area encompassing a huge number of elements. To be more effective in our coordination we could approach each of the four steps in the theoretical sequence individually. We could work on coordinating the early warning system for example by organizing a series of conferences on this subject. Next we could tackle the prevention, management and reconstruction phases in turn, trying to minimize the difficulties encountered in each by concentrating on a single aspect. It is with this suggestion that I will close this section on the common framework.

### 3. The question of the immaterial: confidence

All the participants agreed that at the end of the day there is a need for confidence. Confidence is essential, and in its absence all the rest is subsidiary. We must tackle it head on and entirely. It has come up throughout our discussions. There was talk of emotion, of culture, of symbols, of rights and of the rule of law. We have talked about the ethical, or even moral, dimension, while acknowledging that, in the throes of an emergency situation, the temptation is to focus on the organization, equipment, delivery and effectiveness of the action. If we focus on the technical aspects alone however, we will not be able to contend with the violence of the contemporary world. There is no purely technical or material answer to this violence. The immaterial dimension is inevitable.

#### **Building “moral competence”**

I would add one element to this immaterial dimension with the phrase used by Admiral Launay when he talked of “a threshold of moral incompetence”. It represents an alarm, a danger signal. We must build moral competence. Conviction that we are doing good alone does not mean that we are building moral competence. There are many components. We talk of a global approach, an integrated approach; we talk of smart power as being more effective than hard or soft power. Let us try to use smart power. But this requires, and this is extremely demanding, moral competence.

On this subject I would like to mention four points which correspond to convictions and which recapitulate, to different degrees, that which has been said:

- **The careful use of words.** The discourse, narratives, commentary, talk, declarations about, around and towards situations of crisis are a major strategic factor. We are often faced with situations that are sparked by “words that kill”. We know that the consequences can be horrific. Once the seed of an idea has been planted and the initial reaction, the instinctive feeling has crystallized, it becomes extremely difficult to correct. We must work on this register with infinite caution, in our communications, by monitoring reactions and commentary in all the different languages. Official declarations may be unobjectionable, but have we listened to what is being said on the radio in local languages? This work on representation is fundamental. The image of the enemy, once established, is perpetuated for far longer than the crisis we believe we have resolved. It is a point I consider to be of great importance that we have barely covered today.

- **Establish the facts.** Crisis resolution strategies must take into consideration information gathered during fact finding missions. These fact finding missions are

not always easy. We have in Europe, followed the Balkan crisis – I will not go over it again, our involvement goes as far as the judiciary phase. So, at least to begin with, establishing the facts is important. It is this that will take us beyond these terrible words – genocide etc. – which can, once established, have an irreversible influence on the transmission of hate from generation to generation.

Allow me to mention two important recent documents:

- The first relates to the Georgian conflict. The Tagliavini Commission report, mandated by the European Union which was involved in the resolution of this conflict, is a 900 page reference text, whose 40 page core explains where the shared responsibilities for the conflict lie. The report is the result of eight months of work. Although it is quoted by different parties to serve their own particular interests, it is a reference document that is utilized by all and is an effective instrument to surpass the absurdity of contradictory hate speeches.
- The other example, on the Kyrgyzstan conflict, will come out in a month. An international commission was laboriously established, and after four months of negotiation, the ad hoc Kill-Nielsen commission will release its report at the end of February. It should allow us to move beyond the hate speeches and an impression on both sides that responsibility lies with the other.

- **Establish the rule of law.** The rule of law has been covered extensively. It may seem like a luxury in a crisis situation. We would be wrong however to consider it as such. The fundamental, elementary role of law is to safeguard the social pact when it is threatened. Ethnic, clan-based, ideological clashes, all the different triggers for crisis situations, start from the same point: the collapse of local authority, the feeling that we are not respected and therefore that we are threatened, that we must defend ourselves and, in order to defend ourselves, we must attack. These self-defense reflexes which translate into aggression are accompanied by an undermining or a complete absence of the rule of law and the emergence of lawless areas. Europe learned this lesson with the Balkan crisis. The establishment of the rule of law is an indispensable element for moral competence.

- **Work towards reconciliation.** Lastly, to finish, reconciliation. It is a fifth stage to be worked towards and developed beyond the reconstruction. It may even be considered as part of the reconstruction. It is a process that requires so many pre-conditions that it must be perceived as just this, a process. I would like to quote Paul Ricoeur once more, from his arduous and admirable book entitled *Memory, History and Forgetting*. At the end of 450 pages, he resumes the whole concept in a single phrase. The logic of forgiveness, the logic of reconciliation - which is not the same as forgetting - means reaching this fundamental observation which is as



true for one party as for the other, as it is for each individual: “You are worth more than your actions.”

This says it all. It is the essence of all possible moral reconciliation or appeasement following a crisis.

Ladies and gentleman, I have attempted to produce a summary of these two extremely rich days of discussion. My summary can be nothing other than caricatural in nature and for that I hope you will forgive me. Our deep discussions and this veritable exchange have revealed that the fragility of our actions in today's world is unavoidable, but that one way or another, together, we can confront the violence.

---

# CONCLUSIONS

---

**Ms. Kristalina GEORGIEVA**

European Commissioner for International Cooperation,  
Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response

I am deeply honored to be concluding this conference on “Humanitarian Diplomacy and International Crisis Management” organized by the Sovereign Order of Malta in partnership with the French Navy.

The Order of Malta has been a humanitarian actor for centuries and the Commission is extremely proud of the institution's long-standing partnership with ECHO, the European Humanitarian Service. The Order has also always played an active role in contemporary debates, often playing a monitoring role and identifying future trends and facilitating dialogue. The French Navy has a long tradition of lifesaving and solidarity on our oceans, and does not limit its actions to diving into deep waters, but also dives readily into major ideological debates.

I am particularly pleased to see that their partnership has been able to create a platform for high-level debate and discussion between professionals on the transformation of the political landscape that is currently underway and the challenges and opportunities that this shift represents for humanitarian aid.

\* \* \*

My work, which aims to help those that are the most at risk, is one of the most challenging missions within the European Commission because it is related to the innumerable lives threatened by conflict and by war.

I took up the position on February 9, 2010. It was a baptism of fire because our planet had experienced a series of recent earthquakes, droughts, floods, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, fires and conflicts.

This morning, we received news from Davos. The message was very simple: the world has changed. The focus at Davos is the economy and the new contributors to growth, the emerging economies that are likely to overtake the G8 in terms of industrial and commercial production and GDP. This is causing tectonic changes in the balance of power. President Sarkozy is this year chairing both the G8 and the G20, which is the symbol of this change. As observed by Farid Zakaria, it is the transition from western domination to a situation in which the new powers are taking the lead.

The question was raised at Davos of the role of both non-state actors, and also citizens who, via Twitter and Facebook, are mobilizing themselves. Recently, during the Moscow airport bomb attack, the first information was circulated via Twitter, the television followed thirty minutes later and other media another two or three hours later. NGOs, the private sector and the global media all play an important role in this new world configuration. All this is changing the way in

which we organize ourselves. Every actor can analyze these changes and interpret them in their own way. I consider five events from the last ten years to be particularly poignant:

1. September 11, 2001; the world no longer looked the same.
2. In 2005, for the first time, the GDP of developing countries equaled that of the developed countries.
3. In this same year, the world's urban population exceeded the rural population. These are two strong indicators.
4. In this same decade, the middle class tripled in size going from 200 million to 600 million people. The “bottom billion” however, to use a very appropriate phrase coined by Paul Collier, did not change during this period due to demographic pressure that remains a great obstacle in poorer countries.
5. Finally, in 2010, two major catastrophes occurred with one year.

We are witnessing tectonic changes. We tend to focus on economic and political changes but we should also be looking at the new strengths of the emerging powers.

I would like to draw your attention to another aspect of recent change which is the rise in vulnerability and fragility.

Let us imagine superimposing over a first map showing the countries the most affected by natural disasters that of the regions affected by food crises – regions in which people are suffering from hunger. Let us then add the zones affected by water shortages and demographic pressure and finally, the coastal zones with the highest risk of natural disaster and the conflict areas.

The result is a worrying picture. The red zones represent the countries where the growth rate exceeds 5% per year. You will note that these growth drivers are located in the highest risk areas.

This brings me to my most important point.

We must confront these growing weaknesses and vulnerabilities. These are extremely complex challenges which have the potential to influence our own perspectives. We must first recognize that the needs and the requirements are

growing. The United Nations recently launched an appeal for 7.4 billion dollars of humanitarian aid – this is the largest appeal ever. Do you know which country is to be assigned the greatest share of this sum? It is Sudan with 1.7 billion. Maybe we will have some pleasant surprises. The referendum went smoothly, but we are likely to see some extremely serious problems over the next few months with mass population movements from the North to the South and emigration from within Sudan to other countries. Even if things there improve, we are seeing a continual rise in the frequency and the intensity of natural disasters and the complexity of conflicts. Every year, between thirty or forty countries enter or emerge from a conflict situation. This places huge pressure on resources. It is for this reason that all those that work in the humanitarian sector must understand that it is indispensable to show that it is possible to adopt a results-based approach. The sums that we are spending are donations from our fellow citizens; they must be used efficiently and we must be able to demonstrate this clearly. As Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid, I never begin a meeting without reiterating this point. I regularly repeat that we must communicate transparently with the associations and our partners on the ground to know exactly how these funds are being used.

But we will also require additional resources. Here, the role of emerging donor countries takes on great importance. These countries, whose growth rate exceeds 5%, contribute a small percentage of humanitarian aid – 10% according to official data. This does not correspond to these countries' economic capacities or their interests in reinforcing stability. China, for example, which is investing heavily in Africa, should be repaying its strategic interests to the continent as assistance.

Ambassador Morel used the very important terms “cooperation” and “coordination” in his summary. All those engaged in humanitarian action already share a certain number of values and principles. We work well together. We could do more, but we already have a good approach and good cooperation. We should however do more to work effectively with three non-humanitarian communities:

- Firstly, all those involved in foreign policy development. We must protect the neutrality and independence of humanitarian workers and it is important for us to learn from the assessments and analyses produced by diplomats in zones of risk. We can also make useful contributions in this area.
- Next, the military community. We are fortunate today to be at a conference organized in cooperation with the French Navy. This cooperation is an extremely sensitive and critical question for humanitarian field staff. I can resume

all that I have learned since the beginning of my mandate and during my travels all over the world as follows: military intervention in emergency contexts should be a last resort, but that does not mean that we should only be talking to the armed forces once we have explored all the other options. The contrary is true; the communication channels should be open from the outset in order to enable us to make the right decisions. I have seen four examples of good military-humanitarian cooperation. In Haiti, the armed forces provided aid and assistance. Without their presence there would have been a far greater number of victims. Secondly, the armed forces can guarantee a certain level of security. In Darfur for example, humanitarian organizations would be unable to fulfill their mandates without the presence of the United Nations forces. Thirdly, armed forces also maintain order. Lastly, there are contexts in which aid workers do a remarkable job preventing victim numbers from rising without any military support. This was the case during the Sahel drought where there was no military presence.

To conclude, I believe we have no alternative but to successfully establish this inter-actor dialogue. In Europe, we are fortunate to have platforms in place to facilitate this.

- The third point is that we must protect the neutrality of humanitarian actors without fail. We need to insist, explaining on a daily basis why this independence and this neutrality are indispensable. We, in Europe, have intentionally separated Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection from the External Action Service because it is indispensable for humanitarian personnel to be able to work independently. Last year, many more humanitarians died than United Nations soldiers. It is important to know that rebel forces, but also ordinary people, understand that humanitarian aid is neutral, that it is, just like justice, blind, free from ethical or political sway. A need is a need, it is human. A few weeks ago, I saw with my own eyes how crucial this neutrality is to our ability to work. We were the first visitors of a certain level to be admitted to Saada in North Yemen. We were accompanied by the international media, and representatives from the rebel forces agreed to meet us on their territory. This was possible as a direct result of our neutrality and because the reason for our presence was to discuss assisting victims of the conflict. It was a fascinating visit. The room had two sofas with on one side, the Saada Houthi rebel Commander and on the other, Commissioner Antonio Guterez from the HCR and myself. There were a number of Kalashnikovs close at hand. We were able to move forward: the Houthis agreed to allow access to humanitarian organizations, to guarantee their security and not to dictate who they should be helping. I

hope that agreement will be respected and upheld. Without neutrality, this meeting would never have been able to take place. The principles therefore are extremely important and, as Ambassador Morel said, we must explain the reasons for their importance on a daily basis.

- And the last and determinant point: we must also build bridges with our development colleagues. If one community is missing here today, it is the professionals from the development sector. Only once we have successfully eliminated the underlying causes of conflict - misery, hunger – will we be able to reinforce the resilience of communities. It is only at that moment that we will see humanitarian needs declining.

It is for this reason that we have set two priorities together with our development colleagues. Aid must be linked to development. We must find ways to come to the assistance of local communities, and particularly to focus on reducing the consequences of disaster situations. We must do everything in our power to mitigate the risks highlighted on the map. We have taken an important step in this direction with a new European food aid policy. According to the new policy, sending food aid in kind is a very last resort. Instead, we will send vouchers or funds and ask our partners to purchase food locally. This way, we both feed the hungry and support the local community and local farmers. I am convinced that we can find ways to develop these links. Working hand in hand with the development community, with the military and with foreign services, we can work more effectively. No organization, not the Order of Malta nor the French Navy can, alone, overcome the challenges of modern-day crisis management. Together, however, much is possible.

---

# CONCLUSIONS

---

**Admiral Edouard GUILLAUD**

French Armed Forces Chief of Defense Staff



Director-General Bokova,  
Excellencies,  
Messeigneurs,  
Sirs,  
Distinguished Ambassadors,  
General Officers,  
Ladies and Gentleman,

You will undoubtedly be familiar with the words of Georges Clemenceau: “War is far too serious a matter to entrust to military men.” This witticism, some might even say mockery, conceals the very essence of the question around which discussions over the last two days have been centered: how should we be managing international crises today? How does military and humanitarian action cohere with a context of irregular wars, asymmetric conflicts and security crises in which the populations are both victims and hostages, political pawns and protagonists of complex rivalries?

Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Sudan and Somalia are all theaters of conflict in which violence is committed against civilian populations, where International Humanitarian Law is ridiculed, where security actors and humanitarian actors, both necessary, both dependent on the other, are driven by two approaches and two cultures that are difficult to reconcile. The answers to these questions are essential: they determine the credibility and therefore the future of diplomacy as the effectiveness of military action for the resolution of present and future crises.

We live in a crisis-provoking world in which crisis management is extremely complex. You have all stressed this. The world is today being rocked by more than forty conflicts of varying magnitudes many of which have the potential to spill across borders. The backdrop for our operations is the fragile or the “failed” state. The nature of these conflicts and the face of war have changed: there has been an evolution from a Westphalia model to an asymmetric one. War is protracted, it has become a “way of life” once again like in the Middle Ages in Europe, but without the law, the practices and the customs.

We no longer resolve conflict, we manage it. The notion of victory has disappeared. The traditional model in which two armies come face to face no longer applies - instead our adversaries are increasingly well equipped guerrilla forces. Forces that respect the law oppose forces whose principle is too often an absence of principles.

The state no longer goes to war alone represented by its national military force. Wars are fought with coalitions, military intervention is multinational. But war

is also tending to become a privatized affair! The non-military actors have multiplied: international organizations, NGOs, PMCs, local actors, economic, financial, religious and Mafioso actors and the media gravitate towards the conflict zone with often divergent intentions, ambitions and interests.

There is no purely military solution to these crises and conflicts any more than there is a purely humanitarian solution.

But, there is no solution either without both military and humanitarian action. This does not mean we should be looking to “militarize” humanitarian action, or confuse roles in any other way. We are all aware how such confusions limit our actions. We must be realistic, this type of crisis is likely to remain the status quo, and probably become increasingly prominent: even if we cannot rule out the resurgence of classical inter-state conflicts, the operations that we will be deploying tomorrow will undoubtedly be principally of a similar vein, that is: working in the midst of affected populations, in configurations where this asymmetry is likely to remain the operating model of choice.

As you all know full well, the years to come are laden with challenges: As Europeans, we face the hatred and sentiment towards an Occident perceived as a conqueror, arrogant and decadent. For others, it is the threat of an ideological fundamentalism that cleverly exploits the contradictions and misery in the world. Other challenges include access to energy, water and food resources as well as the technological and systemic challenges we face in the form of cyber warfare. These numerous factors that contribute to insecurity, when combined with the risks of natural disasters and dangers to public health, have the potential to produce major catastrophes.

Faced with the complexity of crises and the diversity of actors involved, we have, over the last few years, seen a true awakening. We have woken up to the fact that we need new methods and tools for crisis management. We have woken up to the fact that the only way to generate both credible and effective solutions is via a multidisciplinary approach. We have woken up finally to the fact that it is only by regulating actors and actions within a clear ethical and legal framework that we will be able to move away from segmented logic or ideological concepts. With this in mind, different approaches have been implemented to identify these synergies and provide lasting solutions in order that humanitarians and the military, but also diplomats and civil society can work together.

The United Nations, which provides the framework for international legitimacy, has implemented an “integrated approach”. It has acquired a certain amount of expertise in the field but with varied results.

The European Union defends its “global approach” advocating the cogency of the non-military instruments it alone possesses.

NATO, particularly in Afghanistan, has developed the “comprehensive approach”. It should be noted however that as a purely military alliance, it does not have the internal civilian structure or capacities to be deployed in crisis management. In fact, there is no universal, coded or standardized concept for a global approach. Despite sharing a common final objective - the resolution of the crisis - there is huge diversity in the visions, strategic positions, organizations, methods and processes. Behind these concepts, the realities reveal real challenges in implementation. Effectively, what is more difficult than aligning so many different actors? There are yawning gaps between the different cultures, organizational structures, objectives and working methods. As you well know, these difficulties are as structural as they are cultural.

International organizations use their own projects, doctrines and prerogatives to maintain their strategic positions. It is simply a question of influence in an international political game.

NGOs defend their independence, their impartiality and their neutrality. They are wary of any instrumentalization or political manipulation that may impact their capacity to deliver effective assistance. Lastly, civil actors are suspicious of the military and vice versa in questions of power and influence. Naturally, more technical, but very real, questions add to these difficulties such as procedure, inter-operability, compatibility and funding which render the practical application of a global project in a “failed” state or crisis zone yet more complicated.

Far from wishing to provide a solution that would finally bring about the harmony required for greater synergy in crisis management responses, I would like to conclude with four principles that move us in the right direction. These are principles we endeavor to implement in the management of our own operations:

- The first principle is the mutual understanding and recognition of two postulates: the first is that humanitarian action is engaged in the name of values. The second is that military action is governed by state policy (which does not, of course, exclude that the said policy is engaged in the name of these same values)
- The second principle is that of transparency. It simply means knowing each other to have a better mutual understanding and to be able to learn from each other.

- The third principle is a multi-disciplinary approach. I prefer a local and multidisciplinary approach to the conceptual “top down” approach. Each crisis is unique. The context, the geography, the culture, the circumstances lead the way. We must constantly be making this effort to adapt. We must move away from ideological and bureaucratic models to adapt to the reality and take into consideration the constraints of each theater, to respect the cultural, religious and societal environment of each country in which we are deployed. I ask that the French armed forces make this effort. It requires training, including ethical training, in order that the use of force does not legitimize unbridled violence. Our honor lies in the control of our legitimate violence.
- The fourth and last principle is that of the cooperation between actors for coordinated action to serve a shared final desired outcome. It is not simply a question of coming into contact and working in the same zone, it means engaging in dialogue to cooperate. Confidence between civilian and military actors is required to achieve this, with the recognition of the role of each actor in a given place and time. This is important: the role of each actor needs to be understood in the context of the different phases of an operation: while armed conflict is still underway, the military should be responsible for coordinating the actions of its civilian and humanitarian partners. On the other hand, in contexts where the level of violence is contained by national police or security forces, civilian experts (including humanitarian organizations) should be responsible for coordinating governance and development activities.

In this context, the role of the military actor is, if required, to contribute its knowledge of the operating theater, to provide material support or to undertake a specific task in a particular environment. Cooperation of this nature does not mean integration. Cooperation does not have to compromise independence, it is *ad hoc*, localized and adapted to particular situations. It should be considered as an instrument to ensure complementarity and be based on a non-passionate and pragmatic approach. Remaining true to these principles will minimize the risk of confusion between roles, and will allow us to come together to fight a war against inhumanity, each remaining true to our own register: political and security-based on the one hand and humanitarian on the other.

To conclude, we are not condemned to work together, we are called upon to innovate together to respect our own vocations and to accomplish our Duty of Man.

Thank you.

---

# CONCLUSIONS

---

**H.M.E.H Frà Matthew FESTING**

Grand Master of the Sovereign Order of Malta

Director-General Bokova,  
European Commissioner Georgieva,  
Your Excellency, the Apostolic Nuncio,  
General Officers,  
Excellencies,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am deeply sorry not to have been with you for these two valuable days, due to an unforeseen illness that has prevented me from flying.

I would however like, however, to thank you all for your participation in this conference, which has gathered together international representatives from the most important military and civilian institutions engaged in humanitarian action. Thanks to their experience and profound knowledge, extremely constructive recommendations and remarks have been formulated on the principles that should be guiding the actions implemented by the different actors on the ground.

The Sovereign Order of Malta is one of the rare international institutions in a position to be able to assemble distinguished experts from broad horizons – military and diplomatic, humanitarian and religious – to share experiences and to discuss how best to proceed.

The Sovereign Order of Malta's diplomatic activities are distinct from those of nation states. They have a different dimension and different objectives. We do not have a territory to defend, economic or political interests to promote or citizens to protect. We do not adopt a political stance in international conflicts. Our work aims to promote the ethical and spiritual values that have guided us for nearly a thousand years to serve the suffering and the abandoned, particularly in the fields of medicine and health, and humanitarian aid in emergency situations. Implementing these activities throughout the world with neutrality and impartiality, we hope to contribute to a feeling of solidarity between nations, to a better mutual comprehension and therefore towards peace in the world.

We highly value the work undertaken by the European Union to define the policies and resources required, and we wish to continue to strengthen our partnership in the implementation of disaster prevention and humanitarian aid programs.

I would like to thank you warmly, Commissioner Georgieva, for your personal commitment, as well of that of the European Union, to the field of international humanitarian aid and crisis management. I sincerely hope that your words

today will be the beginning of a new and fruitful partnership between our institutions and our organizations in this field.

Working together, in our respective roles, with the shared goal of alleviating human suffering, we can improve the lives of many people and inspire hope for the future of humanity. You can rely on the Order of Malta.

We are all, here, artisans of peace. It is important to keep in mind that peace builders are not only those working to prevent conflicts, but also those who devote themselves to the service of peace and who are actively committed to building it – sometimes to the point of sacrificing their own lives.

I would like to express once more how sorry I am not to be among you. I wish all the conference participants my best wishes for the future, and I hope that God will continue to guide you.

Thank you very much for your presence and for your attention.

ÉDITIONS DU PALÉMON  
Z.A. de Troyalac'h - 10, rue André Michelin  
29170 SAINT-ÉVARZEC  
Legal deposit December quarter 2012

ISBN 2-916248-35-6

Printed in France

All contributions to this collective publication are protected  
by the copyright of the French Foundation of the Order of Malta.  
All reproduction requires prior authorization



“[...] managing modern-day crises calls for the mobilization of a multiplicity of disciplines, and not simply conventions of a military and legal nature. Crises are crises only because they affect human lives, the lives of children, women and men. The response therefore must also be formulated at this level.”

**Ms. Irina Bokova**, Director-General of UNESCO

“This conference on “Humanitarian Diplomacy” is taking place at a key moment in the evolution of international and humanitarian crises [...] The multiplication and prolongation of the many different types of crisis – many of which continue perpetually without ever achieving resolution – requires a new and multi-disciplinary reflection, taking into consideration not only the humanitarian perspective, but also that of military, political, and economic actors as well as opinion formers, historians, geographers, the religious and educational communities and civil society in general.”

**Bailiff Jean-Pierre Mazery**, Grand Chancellor of the Sovereign Order of Malta

“We are witnessing tectonic changes. We tend to focus on economic and political changes but we should also be looking at the new strengths of the emerging powers. [...] I believe we have no alternative but to successfully establish this inter-actor dialogue.”

**Ms. Kristalina Georgieva**, European Commissioner  
for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response

“[...] will allow us to come together to fight a war against inhumanity, each remaining true to our own register: political and security-based on the one hand and humanitarian on the other. [...] we are called upon to innovate together to respect our own vocations and to accomplish our Duty of Man.”

**Admiral Edouard Guillaud**, French Armed Forces Chief of Defense Staff

In organizing an international conference on the theme of “Humanitarian Diplomacy”, the Order of Malta and the French Navy have opened a new debate based on concrete experience on the theme of crisis management in the framework of military, diplomatic and civil coordination. Organized at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris, this conference represents a great moment for the leaders of humanitarian diplomacy, a moment at which the fundamental “responsibility to protect” has been recognized and affirmed as the guiding principle for twenty-first century crisis resolution.

---

*Contacts :*

**Ms. Dominique JAN**  
*Managing Director of the French  
Foundation of the Order of Malta*

**Mr. Xavier GUILHOU**  
*Special Advisor of the French  
Foundation of the Order of Malta*

42, rue des Volontaires  
75015 PARIS  
fondation@ordredemaltefrance.org

[www.orderofmalta.int](http://www.orderofmalta.int)  
[www.conferenceordredemalte.org](http://www.conferenceordredemalte.org)